In Rodriguez-Ramirez v. State of Arizona, (AZ Sup. Ct., Aug. 12, 2026), the Arizona Supreme Court held that a conversation which the pastor of a Phoenix church had with his co-pastor in which the pastor discussed a sexual impropriety he committed was not a "confession" and so was not protected by Arizona's Clergy-Penitent Privilege statute.
The Arizona Supreme Court adopted a 4-part test to determine whether the privilege applies: (1) Is the person who received the confession a clergyman or priest as defined by the church's customs and laws. This is not limited to members of religious organizations with ordained clergy. (2) Was the confession made while the clergyman or priest was acting in his professional capacity? (3) Was the confession made in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which the clergyman or priest belongs? (4) Was the communication at issue a "confession"? The Court said in part:
Doe [v. Corporation of the President] defined “confession” consistent with the First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment Clause jurisprudence, as “a confidential acknowledgment or admission of a crime, sin, or fault to a member of the clergy, priest, or Christian Science practitioner for the purpose of absolution.” ... We construe ”absolution” by its function, not by denomination. A confession need not follow a formal sacramental rite; it is enough that the penitent discloses a crime, sin, or fault to a member of the clergy while seeking spiritual absolution, consolation, or guidance.... The dispositive question is not whether the penitent’s tradition observes a rite of absolution, but whether the communication sought spiritual absolution, consolation, or guidance. Accordingly, a party invoking the Clergy-Penitent Privilege must first establish that the communication constitutes a confession.... Only if that threshold requirement is satisfied do we consider the remaining requirements governing the privilege.
Applying this definition does not require the kind of doctrinal analysis we held impermissible in Doe.... The test we describe here does not run afoul of that holding. A factfinder applying our definition does not assess whether a communication satisfies any particular faith’s theological requirements; it asks only whether the communication sought spiritual absolution, consolation, or guidance. That question is factual—it asks what the communication was for, not whether it complied with the tenets of any religion—and it therefore does not implicate the constitutional concerns identified in Doe....
The superior court reasonably found that the discussion centered on protecting Rodriguez-Ramirez’s reputation, addressing church administration, and minimizing the legal and practical consequences of the allegations made against him. The discussion even turned to the logistics of Rodriguez-Ramirez’s flight from law enforcement, in case Padron’s efforts to dissuade the victim’s parents from pursuing charges failed. The record contains reasonable evidence supporting those findings, and the court of appeals therefore erred in declining to defer to them.
Collectively, those findings establish that Rodriguez-Ramirez neither sought absolution from Padron nor intended that their communication remain confidential. His communication with Padron, therefore, did not constitute a confession as defined in Doe.
