Suit Challenges U.S. Providing Information to Iran About Asylum Seekers Including Members of Religious Minorities

An advocacy organization for Iranian Americans filed suit this week challenging the Trump Administration's treatment of Iranians-- including members of minority religious groups-- who are seeking asylum in the United States. The complaint alleges that ICE provides information to Iran about detainees it wishes to deport in order to obtain Iran's agreement to accept their return. The complaint (full text) in Iranian American Legal Defense Fund v. Rubio, (D DC, filed 7/7/2026), alleges in part:

1. In furtherance of its mass deportation agenda, in March of 2025, the Trump administration adopted a policy of providing the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iranian Government) with confidential information from the immigration files of Iranians seeking asylum in the United States. Many of the asylum seekers are pro-democracy protestors, members of religious minorities such as Evangelical Christians, or members of the LGBTQ community who seek refuge in the United States because of the grave dangers they face in Iran. Disclosing their confidential information to the Iranian Government violates the asylum seekers’ confidentiality rights, endangers their family members and acquaintances who may still be residing in Iran, and puts those who are subject to removal to Iran, directly or through chain refoulement via third countries, at risk of persecution, torture, and death following their arrival in Iran.  

2. The new policy has continued notwithstanding the June 2025 military strikes by the United States, the massacre of tens of thousands of Iranian protestors by the Iranian Government in January 2026, and the war launched by the United States on February 28, 2026.  

3. Plaintiff brings this action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requesting that the Court declare the policy unlawful and order that it be vacated. Plaintiff further requests that the Court order that those whose information was unlawfully shared with the Iranian Government be provided notice of the breach so that they can move to reopen their immigration cases to determine whether they are entitled to asylum or other relief based on the violation of their confidentiality rights.... 

Public Citizen issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

3rd Circuit Hears Arguments on Rules Protecting Employers Who Have Objections to Furnishing Employees Contraception Coverage

On July 7, the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and New Jersey v. President of the United States, (audio of full oral arguments). In the case, a Pennsylvania federal district court invalidated two rules promulgated under the Affordable Care Act that allow employers with religious objections and most employers with moral objections to opt out of directly furnishing contraceptive coverage for their employees in their health insurance plans. Little Sisters of the Poor intervened as a defendant in the case. The trial court held that government's action in promulgating the rules was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. (See prior posting.)

EWTN reported on arguments in the Court of Appeals, saying in part:

Under the rule, employers who have moral or religious objections can opt in to an accommodation in which the federal government subsidizes contraception coverage in their plans. Employers who also have moral or religious objections to the accommodation can sidestep contraception coverage altogether.

[Aimee Thomson, arguing the case for Pennsylvania and New Jersey] told the panel of judges that the exemption exceeds the scope that is required under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). She said the regulators failed to show that these exemptions were necessary to solve the religious liberty issue and expressed concerns over employers potentially getting exemptions even though their objections are not sincere....

Mark Rienzi, president of Becket and lead attorney for the Little Sisters, argued that the federal government sought to “choose a middle ground” that created a mandate but protected religious freedom, based on Supreme Court guidance: “Nothing about that is even close to arbitrary and capricious.”

Church Autonomy Doctrine Prevents Review of Salvation Army's Ban on Certain Methadone Treatments in Its Rehab Centers

In Tassinari v. The Salvation Army, (D MA, July 6, 2026), a Massachusetts federal district court dismissed claims that The Salvation Army (TSA) violated the federal Rehabilitation Act and the Fair Housing Act when it denied plaintiffs residing in its Adult Rehabilitation Centers (ARCs) access to certain medications for their opioid use disorder. The Salvation Army disallowed treatment with methadone or buprenorphine because they are addictive narcotics, even though they have been approved by the FDA as Medications for Opioid Use Disorder (MOUD) and are not addictive when used in treatment. The court said in part:

TSA’s primary argument is that the church-autonomy doctrine shields its Medication Policy from government regulation and judicial scrutiny.... Specifically, TSA argues it is entitled to summary judgment because adjudication of this case involves matters of “faith and doctrine” that the First Amendment places beyond the ken of civil courts.... The undisputed facts establish that ARCs are residential churches with an evangelical mission in which Salvationist doctrine—including the prohibition on use of narcotics as MOUDs— determines the message TSA preaches and the rules by which beneficiaries must abide.  The relief the Injunction Class Plaintiffs seek would require the Court to evaluate and potentially invalidate TSA’s religious doctrine.  The First Amendment bars the Court’s interference in the challenged portions of TSA’s Medication Policy, and TSA is entitled to summary judgment....

TSA’s rehabilitation-through-conversion program requires beneficiaries to both engage in Salvationist practices—weekly chapel services and Bible studies, biweekly spiritual counseling, and daily devotions—and adhere to Salvationist rules—including the Medication Policy’s prohibition on use of narcotic MOUDs....  TSA sincerely believes, as a core tenet of Salvationist doctrine, that “abstinence and the power of God unto salvation” is the “only form of successful rehabilitation,” and that the long-term use of narcotics—including methadone and buprenorphine—to treat addiction is not true rehabilitation....

DOJ Letter Emphasizes U.S. Rejection of International Criminal Court Jurisdiction

The Justice Department on June 29 sent a Letter (full text) to the President of the International Criminal Court reiterating that the United States is not a party to the Rome Statute and has never consented to the Court's jurisdiction. It emphasizes that the U.S. will oppose any attempt to assert ICC authority over any U.S. person. The Letter reads in part:

... [T]he ICC has acted in an increasingly lawless and illegitimate manner. It has repeatedly asserted jurisdiction over non-consenting countries, disregarded its own complementarity requirement, and pursued investigations that appear driven as much by political pressure and institutional self-interest as by legal merit. Its record of selective enforcement and credible allegations of internal misconduct raise serious doubts about the ICC's impartiality, credibility, and legitimacy....

Congress has made the United States' position unmistakably clear since 2002, when it passed in the American Servicemembers' Protection Act ... which expressly repudiates ICC jurisdiction over U.S. persons, including U.S. servicemembers, government officials, and civilians.... We will neither extradite nor transfer any U.S. person to the ICC, and we will actively oppose any effort by other countries to do so. If any U.S. person is detained under purported ICC authority, the United States will take all necessary measures to secure that individual's immediate release....

The Rome Statute gives the ICC jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression. The Department of Justice last week issued a press release announcing the submission of the letter.

8th Circuit Remands Case That Invalidated Conversion Therapy Bans

In Wyatt Bury, L.L.C. v. City of Kansas City, Missouri, (8th Cir., July 2, 2026), the U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals sent back to the district court a case in which the district court had upheld most of ordinances passed by Kansas City and Jackson County that prohibited mental health professionals from providing conversion therapy to minors. The court said that the remand was appropriate in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's intervening decision in Chiles v. Salizar. The court said in part:

Chiles addressed a free speech challenge to a Colorado statute similar to the Counseling Ordinances at issue here.  The Court rejected Colorado’s theory that its statute regulated professional conduct and not speech....  And it concluded that the Colorado statute triggered strict scrutiny because it regulated content and discriminated based on viewpoint.... Notably, Kansas City and Jackson County pressed the same speech-conduct distinction the Supreme Court rejected in Chiles before the district court and before us, and this distinction featured prominently in the district court’s order.

The Pathway reports on the decision.

1st Circuit Upholds Maine's Antidiscrimmination Rules For Religious Schools Except Its Religiouis Expression Nondiscrimination Requirement

Last week, the U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals issued opinions in two cases raising similar, but not identical, challenges to the antidiscrimination requirements of Maine's Human Rights Act. The schools particularly focused on provisions barring religious discrimination and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.  The Act applies to private schools that receive public funding, such as funding under Maine's tuition assistance program.

In St. Dominic Academy v. Makin, (1st Cir., July 2, 2026), the court in a 108-page opinion, held that the employment nondiscrimination rule "does not credibly threaten to injure St. Dominic".  The court said in part:

While the rule generally bars schools from employment discrimination based on religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity, the MHRA contains two specific carveouts for religious schools that apply regardless of whether a school participates in the tuition-assistance program.  First, section 4553(4) expressly protects a religious school's ability to discriminate "with respect to employment of its members of the same religion, sect or fraternity."... Second, section 4573-A(2) allows a religious school to "require that all applicants and employees conform to [its] religious tenets."

The court also held that neither the ban on religious discrimination in admissions nor the ban on sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination trigger strict scrutiny. The court said in part:

[T]he Religious Nondiscrimination Rule does not exclude any school solely because of its religious character.  Rather, the rule excludes a school because it discriminates against students on the basis of the students' religion, a practice that is neither uniquely religious nor uniquely tied to religious schools.... In short, the State is simply saying that a school in Maine, whether religious or not, cannot accept public funds while simultaneously putting up, for example, a "No Protestant Children Need Apply" sign....

... [T]he record does not suggest that religious schools, by their nature, engage in sexual-orientation or gender-identity discrimination.... Simply put, barring sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination does not exclude religious schools from the tuition-assistance program solely based on their religious character....

Just as combatting religious discrimination qualifies as a legitimate governmental pursuit, so too combatting sexual-orientation and gender-identity discrimination rises to the level....  And the imposition of liability for sexual-orientation or gender-identity discrimination on those schools that accept public funding rationally relates to those antidiscrimination goals, as does the requirement that such schools respect students' expression of their gender identity....

The court, however, ordered the trial court to issue a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the rule that  provides "to the extent that an educational institution permits religious expression, it cannot discriminate between religions in doing so." The court said in part:

St. Dominic, as part of its religious mission, requires students to attend religion classes, Mass, and other religious activities.  These activities necessarily entail some degree of student participation.  Even under the Commissioner's reading of the Religious Expression Rule, then, if a preacher at a school-mandated Mass permits students to say "Amen" in order to signify agreement, St. Dominic would then be required to allow expressions of disagreement.  And in the classroom, inculcation often solicits -- indeed encourages -- affirmation, for example in the form of an iterative exchange of expression.  Few would teach the Lord's Prayer without having the students recite it; and under the Religious Expression Rule that recitation would, in turn, appear to require the school to allow the reciting of, for example, the Hare Krishna Mahā mantra.  And while such an example may seem fanciful, the point is that the Religious Expression Rule would inevitably interfere with a religious school's ability to foster an expressive environment consistent with its religious mission.....

Here, the Religious Expression Rule is facially nonneutral because it singles out "religious expression." ...

In Crosspoint Church v. Makin, (1st Cir., July 2, 2026), the court considered additional challenges to Maine's antidiscrimination rules as they apply to religious schools. Crosspoint Church contended that 2021 amendments to the state's anti-discrimination laws were a response to the Supreme Court's decision in Carson v. Makin that required Maine to include religious schools in its tuition assistance program.  The court said in part:

The State likely adopted the 2021 Amendments at least partially in response to the Carson litigation.  But we will not infer something as sinister as an "express[] design[]" to discriminate against a specific religious entity where Maine offers a quite logical and compelling rationale for the amendments' structure and timing: 

If [the State's] Legislature anticipated that the [Carson] litigation might result in [the State] being prohibited from excluding religious schools from [public funding], it would have been entirely appropriate to then make the same distinction in education as the Legislature did [years earlier] for employment and housing and require religious organizations that accept public funds to comply with [all antidiscrimination rules]. 

Thus, just as we concluded in St. Dominic that the plaintiffs there had not shown that general antireligious animus likely motivated the 2021 Amendments,... so too do we hold here that Crosspoint has not shown that specific anti-BCS animus motivated the same amendments....

The court also rejected Crosspoint's free expression claims, saying in part:

The Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Nondiscrimination Rule, Crosspoint contends, regulates speech because it would "require BCS to affirm a student's gender identity and sexual orientation," even though it would "violate[] BCS's statement of faith to admit a student or allow a student to remain enrolled who violates BCS's statement of faith by presenting as a gender not consistent with his or her biological sex."...

... [H]ere, Crosspoint seeks to refuse admission to (and expel) any student who is gay or transgender, irrespective of that student's speech.  Although such refusal may express Crosspoint's views regarding sexual orientation and gender identity, and the Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Nondiscrimination Rule would interfere with that expression, that does not transform the rule into a speech regulation....

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

• Kevin Crow, Subjects and Objects of God: Non-state Normative Orders and International Corporate Theology, (June 07, 2026).
• Stephanie H. Barclay, Making Laws for the Human Mind: The Founding, Free Exercise, and Parental Rights after Mahmoud and Mirabelli, (June 28, 2026).
• Kerolos Kamal Rezk, The Metastasis of Infallibility and the Architecture of Factionalism A Socio-Ecclesiastical Study of Functional Sacredness, Monastic Sovereignty, and Faith Deconstruction in the Contemporary Coptic Context, (June 24, 2026).
• Tayson DeLengocky, D.O., Pilgrimage Under Siege: The Complete Story of Thích Minh Tuệ: A Silent Ascetic Under Global Watch; Part I: The Pilgrimage Before the Phenomenon (Chapters I-IV), (June 23, 2026).
• Tayson DeLengocky, D.O., Dharma and the State: Trần Nhân Tông and the Constitutional History of Buddhism in Vietnam, (June 14, 2026).
• Acharya Pt Dr Avdhesh Kumarr, Rebirth and Near-Death Experiences: A Comparative Interdisciplinary Study of Consciousness and Survival Hypotheses, (June 09, 2026).
• Sonia M. Suter & Naomi R. Cahn, IVG in a Post-Dobbs/Skrmetti World: Parentage, Personhood & Regulation, (Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2026-35 (2026).

From SSRN (Islamic Law):

• Samia Jaman Karobi , Legal Language and Human Dignity in Muslim Marriage Documentation: A Critical Study of Kabinnama and Talaqnama in Bangladesh (June 08, 2026).
• Shehzad Ahmed & Rafiqul Bhuyan, The Jurisprudential Boundaries of an Interest-Free Substrate: Riba, Gharar, Maysir, and Qabd in Cash-Settled Synthetic Instruments, (June 09, 2026).
• Shehzad Ahmed & Rafiqul Bhuyan, Money as a Mirror: Classical Islamic Monetary Ontology and the Foundations of Interest-Free Pricing, (June 09, 2026).
• Muhammad Bilal Gill, Between Faith and Aspiration: Religion, Patriarchy, and the Educational Aspirations of Young Women in Pakistan, (June 08, 2026).

Religious Liberty in America at 250

 As America celebrates its 250th Anniversary this weekend, thoughtful reflections on America's tradition of religious liberty have appeared. Here are a few of them, reflecting a variety of viewpoints:

• Center for American Progress, Religious Liberty for All: Celebrating This Founding Freedom at America 250, (June 15, 2026).
• BYU International Center for Law and Religion Studies, The United States of America at 250: Life, Religious Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness, (June 16, 2026) (videos of Conference presentations).
• Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights, 250th Anniversary Scorecard, (2026).
• Mary Annette Pember, America 250: Religious Freedom, But Not for Everyone, (ICT, June 8, 2026).
• Thomas S. Kidd, 250 Years of Faith: The Story of Christianity in America, (Desiring Good, July 1, 2026).
• Marjoleine Kars, The Itinerant Preacher Who Helped Secure the Separation of Church and State, (New York Times Magazine, June 22, 2026).

5th Circuit: Evidence of Defendant's Affiliation with Satanism Was Relevant in Sentencing Phase of Murder Trial

In Davis v. Guerrero, (5th Cir., June 25, 2026), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the death sentence imposed on Irving Davis who was convicted of raping and murdering a 15-year-old.  In the habeas proceeding challenging the sentence, Davis contended that it was error for the state to introduce evidence of his affiliation with Satanism at the sentencing hearing. The district court rejected that claim, and the 5th Circuit affirmed that decision, citing Supreme Court precedent that rejected the argument that the Constitution forbids consideration of evidence protected by the First Amendment in making sentencing decisions. The 5th Circuit then went on in part to say:

... [T]he evidence [in this case] was not adduced just because the jury could think that Satanism is unpalatable in and of itself, but to indicate that Davis’s adherence to Satanist views increased the likelihood that he would be a danger to society. ....

Davis claims it is undisputed that he was an adherent of the Church of Satan and its non-violent ideals, but as previously highlighted that is not the case.  Because the actual nature of Davis’s relationship with Satanism was not undisputed or established as a fact, it was reasonable for the CCA to conclude that Davis belonged to a group that endorsed or encouraged violence.  Likewise, it was not unreasonable for the CCA to rely on Haley’s interpretation merely because another expert and Davis himself testified that the language in the Satanic texts were symbolic. ...

... [T]he drawings and writings “exhibit[ed] a preoccupation with rape, violence (particularly towards women), and death.”...  Because those materials were admissible on their own, the bare fact of Davis’s association with Satanism ... would likely be beneficial, not prejudicial, to Davis, providing him an opportunity to explain the metaphorical nature of his writings....

Texas Scorecard reports on the decision.

Oregon's Definition of "Religious Employer" Violates Free Exercise Rights of Right-To-Life Organization

In Oregon Right to Life v. O'Day, (D OR, July 1, 2026), an Oregon federal district court held that provisions in Oregon's Reproductive Health Equity Act (RHEA) that effectively require Oregon Right to Life to provide its employees health insurance covering certain abortions and "abortifacient contraceptives" is unconstitutional as applied to Oregon Right to Life. Exemptions in the Act allow plaintiff to obtain employee health insurance from an insurer that is exempt from the Act's requirements. However, that company's policies still cover contraceptives that plaintiff classifies as abortifacients and do not limit abortion coverage to cases of imminent danger to the mother’s life. The Act does include an exemption for "religious employers" that meet the Act's definition. Plaintiff does not qualify for that exemption, however, because its purpose is prolife advocacy, not inculcating religious values, and because it does not primarily serve only persons sharing its religious tenets.

The court held that the RHEA's definition of "religious employer" violates plaintiff's free exercise rights. The court said in part:

While church and non-church distinctions may be permissible in other contexts, RHEA’s criteria here are not neutral or objective. RHEA’s religious employer exemption expresses a preference for religious organizations who inculcate and only serve members of the same religion. Defendant therefore owes the burden to show that RHEA passes strict scrutiny....

...  Defendant does not explain how exempting organizations that inculcate or only serve co-religionists and requiring other religious organizations to comply has any relationship to ensuring reproductive care for all Oregonians. The mere aim to limit the number of exceptions does not pass constitutional muster.... RHEA’s religious employer exemption is therefore not “closely fitted” to Defendant’s interest ...  and it is unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiff’s religious views.

OPB reports on the decision. 

[Thanks to Eugene Volokh via Religionlaw for the lead.]

7th Circuit: Bus Driver Gave No Religious Reasons for Rejecting Covid Vaccine

In Snyder v. Chicago Transit Authority, (7th Cir., June 30, 2026), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the firing of a Chicago Transit Authority bus driver for refusing to comply with CTA's Covid vaccine mandate after his request for a religious exemption was denied. The court said in part:

... Snyder submitted a request for a religious exemption. He explained that he practiced “the laws of cleanliness” and adhered to dietary rules outlined in the biblical books of Leviticus and Deuteronomy. He explained that the Bible instructed him to “refrain from the ingestion of unclean animals,” including “pork or derivatives, such as gelatin which are in most vaccines.” He also attached a letter from his minister explaining that vaccines were “inconsistent” with their beliefs, though individuals had discretion to choose which vaccines and immunizations they received.  

... Snyder also cited concerns about the presence of heavy metals in most vaccinations, potential long-term risks, and the rush with which the vaccine was approved....

But even accepting the religious significance of Snyder’s belief that Biblical laws prohibited him from ingesting certain ingredients, the [district] court wrote, Snyder did not connect this belief to any content in the COVID vaccine that he was religiously obligated to avoid.... The court thus concluded that there was no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that his grounds for objecting to the vaccine were religious in nature....

Supreme Court Denies Review in Case of Attorney Held in Contempt for Disclosing Information About Abusive Priest

On Monday, the U.S. Supreme Court denied review in Trahant v. Roman Catholic Church, (Docket No. 25-1260, certiorari denied, 6/29/2026). (Order List.). In the case, the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals in a January 2026 opinion (full text of opinion) upheld a finding of contempt and a $400,000 sanction imposed on an attorney representing victims of clergy sexual abuse. The 5th Circuit explained in part:

Richard Trahant received confidential information regarding sexual abuse allegations against a New Orleans priest while serving as state court counsel for several alleged victims of sexual abuse who were also members of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.  Despite a protective order prohibiting the disclosure of confidential information revealed during discovery, Trahant contacted the principal of a local high school to confirm that the priest remained the high school’s chaplain.  Trahant then sent an email to a journalist listing the priest’s name in the subject line, identifying where the priest was employed, and advising the journalist to “[k]eep this guy on your radar.”  The bankruptcy court held Trahant in contempt for violating the protective order and sanctioned him for his conduct.  The district court affirmed....

Notwithstanding the fact that the record fully supported the bankruptcy court’s finding that Trahant violated the protective order, Trahant maintains that he “acted in the utmost good faith at all times” and that the sanctions are “disproportionate” to the alleged conduct.  To support this argument, Trahant points to his “legal, moral, and ethical obligation . . . to keep [the priest] away from children.”  He also points to his belief that the $400,000 sanction is “not causally related to any actual damage or prejudice to any party.”  These arguments are without merit.

The Guardian has additional information on the case.

1st Circuit: University's Rejection of Property Sale to Church Was Not Religious Discrimination

In Calvary Chapel Belfast v. University of Maine System, (1st Cir., June 30, 2026), the U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's refusal to stop the sale by the University of Maine of the Frederick Hutchinson Center property to a bidder that was competing with Calvary Chapel Belfast to obtain the property.  Originally, the University selected Calvary Chapel to negotiate a purchase agreement. However, according to the court:

In the days following the public announcement, numerous area residents as well as University alumni, donors, students, faculty, and staff criticized the University's selection of a religious entity, and Calvary in particular, as the winning bidder.  One online commentor, for example, referred to the decision as "disappointing," with another writing, "[t]hese evangelists from [Calvary] are just another religious cult that believes in magical thinking."...

Calvary asserts an intentional discrimination claim, arguing that the University violated the Equal Protection Clause by carrying out the facially neutral public procurement process in a discriminatory way. ... Specifically, Calvary argues that the court created a "novel rule" when it required Calvary "to make a direct 'showing connecting the animus in the community to the government action' to raise an inference of discriminatory intent."  ...

The court recognized that widespread religious animus in the community can, in certain circumstances, support an inference that a government official acted with discriminatory intent by essentially adopting the community's view even if the official did not personally share that view.... But the presence of community opposition does not, without more, imply a conclusion of intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.... And here the court found scant evidentiary support for the alleged irregularities -- "the more" -- urged by Calvary....

Michigan Catholic Charities Sues State Officials Over Ouster as Provider of Women's Substance Abuse Services

Last week, Catholic Charities serving the Lansing, Michigan area filed suit against the director of Michigan's Department of Health and Human Services, Michigan's Attorney General and other Michigan officials as well as Mid-State Health Network that administers the Department's Medicaid and federal Substance Use Block Grant funds. Catholic Charities, through Cristo Rey Counseling Center, offers federally funded services for women with substance use disorders. The complaint (full text) in Catholic Charities of Ingham, Eaton & Clinton Counties v. Hertel, (WD MI, filed 6/26/2026), alleges that Mid-State discontinued Cristo Rey as a provider under the program after questioning the Counseling Center's requirement that its staff not discuss or make referrals for abortions, contraception, gender identity, or adoption placements with same-sex couples. It alleges that Michigan state Attorney General Dana Nessel is providing legal guidance to the Department of Health and Human Services, and that "Nessel harbors ... hostility toward Catholic and other religious organizations that hold sincere religious beliefs about abortion and contraception...." The complaint alleges that discontinuing Cristo Rey as a provider violates its 1st and 14th Amendment rights as well as federal statutory provisions. ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

2nd Circuit Reaffirms Permissibility of NY Repeal of Religious Exemptions from School Vaccination Requirements

In Miller v. McDonald, (2d Cir., June 30, 2026), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed its earlier decision that New York's repeal of its religious belief exemption from required school immunizations, while keeping medical exemptions, does not violate either Amish parents' free exercise rights or their parental rights to control their children's religious upbringing.  Last year, the Supreme Court had remanded the case to the Second Circuit for reconsideration in light of Mahmoud v. Taylor. In reaffirming its earlier decision, the Second Circuit said in part:

New York Public Health Law § 2164 is neutral on its face.  It does not target or affirmatively prohibit religious practices....  Moreover, the act of repealing the religious exemption did not “in and of itself transmute” this otherwise neutral law into one “that targets religious beliefs.”...

Nor does the legislative history reveal an anti-religious bias....

... [T]he motives of a small number of legislators cannot be attributed to the legislative body as a whole.

Plaintiffs contend that exempting students for medical reasons treats comparable secular conduct more favorably than religious beliefs....

Repealing the religious exemption decreases “to the greatest extent medically possible” the number of unvaccinated students and thus the risk of disease; maintaining the medical exemption allows “the small proportion of students” who medically “cannot be vaccinated” to avoid the health consequences that “taking a particular vaccine would inflict.” ... Exempting religious objectors, however, detracts from that interest.  Religious exemptions increase “the risk of transmission of vaccine-preventable diseases among vaccinated and unvaccinated students alike.”...

New York passed § 2164 in response to the 2018 to 2019 measles outbreak.  Legislators felt particularly concerned about the concentration of unvaccinated children with religious exemptions in the same schools....

Plaintiffs’ remaining argument is that, even if § 2164 is neutral and generally applicable, it burdens the parental free-exercise right recognized in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and clarified in Mahmoud v. Taylor.  We conclude that it does not....

Section 2164 does not regulate what children are taught, does not require them to affirm any belief, does not expose them to state-selected instruction contrary to their parents’ faith, and does not enlist school officials to displace parental religious formation.  It imposes a health-and-safety condition on in-person school attendance to reduce the spread of communicable disease....  The burden may be serious, but it is not the kind of state interference with a child’s religious development that triggered strict scrutiny in Yoder or Mahmoud....

Mahmoud asks whether a burden is “of the same character” as the burden in Yoder, not whether it is more or less serious....  A greater burden in degree is not necessarily the same burden in kind....

Supreme Court Grants Review on Ripeness for RLUIPA Zoning Claims

The Supreme Court yesterday granted review in Grand v. University Heights, (Docket No. 25-965, certiorari granted 6/30/2026) (Order List). In the case, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals (full text of 6th Circuit opinion) held that plaintiff's claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act as well as the 1st and 14th Amendments are not ripe for review.  Plaintiff, an Orthodox Jew, held weekly prayer sessions in his home for himself and his neighbors. After the city raised zoning objections, plaintiff had applied for a special use permit necessary in order to operate a "house of worship" in the area that was zoned U-1. Just before a second hearing on his application, plaintiff withdrew the application. After that hearing, the city took no further action on the application. Some 18 months later, plaintiff filed suit against the city. Affirming the district court's dismissal of the case, the 6th Circuit said in part:

... [N]either the Planning Commission nor the City Council nor the Board of Zoning Appeals has ever determined whether UHCO § 1274.01 applies to the kinds of gatherings he has in mind.  And because Grand withdrew his application, the zoning board has never issued a final decision—or for that matter any decision—about his eligibility for a special use permit.  The government body “charged with implementing the regulations,” in short, has not “reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue.” ...  Grand’s claims thus never ripened into a dispute suitable for federal review.

Plaintiff's Petition for Certiorari lists as the Question Presented to the Supreme Court: 

Whether the First Amendment's established chilling-effect doctrine-- under which a credible government threat that deters the exercise of fundamental rights constitutes a complete and independently actionable constitutional injury-- is displaced by Williamson Cnty.'s land-use finality requirement when a plaintiff alleges that government threats both before and after a Planning Commission meeting chilled religious exercise, worship, and assembly.

The Court will hear arguments in the case in the Fall. ADF issued a press release announcing the Court's grant of review. [Thanks to Eugene Volokh via Religionlaw for the lead.]