Bishops Excuse Those Who Fear ICE Raids from Attending Mass

This week, the Bishop of the Catholic Diocese of San Bernadino issued a Decree (full text) formally dispensing from the obligation to attend Sunday Mass "all members of the faithful in the Diocese of San Bernadino who, due to genuine fear of immigration enforcement actions, are unable to attend...." The Decree encourages those excused from attending Mass to engage in other spiritual practices to maintain their spiritual connection to Christ and His Church. It also suggests that individuals participate in televised or online Masses.

In May, the Diocese of Nashville issued a similar lifting of the obligation to attend Mass by those who are concerned about possibly being confronted or detained.

Axios reports on these developments.

Arresting Person for Praying with Others Violates European Convention on Human Rights

In Rafiyev v. Azerbaijan, (ECHR, July 8, 2025), the European Court of Human Rights in a Chamber Judgment held that it violates Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights to hold a person in violation of law for praying together with others. The court said in part:

1.  The case concerns the arrest and subsequent conviction of the applicant, a follower of the Nurism teachings of Islam, for the administrative offence of holding an unauthorised religious meeting on private premises....

6.  On 4 March 2017 the applicant went to Guba to attend a funeral ceremony. Afterwards, the applicant, together with others, visited their friend, T.A., at his private house. At around 1 p.m. several police officers raided the premises and took the applicant and twenty-one other individuals to the Guba District Police Office.

7.  ... An administrative-offence report ... stated that ... the applicant had violated the rules on holding religious meetings ... and that he had committed an administrative offence under Article 515.0.2 of the Code of Administrative Offences ("the CAO")....

59.  Moreover, as is clear from the meaning of Article 515.0.2 of the CAO, in order to fall under its scope, an administrative offence had to be committed by an individual who either established a religious organisation or operated one. Given that the applicant was not the owner of the private residence at which he was arrested and was merely in attendance there with his friends, it is unclear how he could have been regarded as having committed an administrative offence under Article 515.0.2 of the CAO....

60.  In any event, even assuming that the private residence where the applicant assembled with others was used as a place of religious worship as argued by the Government, the Court finds it necessary to reiterate that, while States can put in place a requirement that religious denominations be registered in a manner compatible with Articles 9 and 11 of the Convention, it does not follow that sanctioning an individual member of an unregistered religious organisation for praying or otherwise manifesting his or her religious belief is compatible with the Convention.... To accept the contrary would amount to the exclusion of minority religious beliefs which are not formally registered with the State, and consequently would amount to admitting that a State can dictate what a person can or cannot believe....

Law & Religion UK reports on the decision.

New Missouri Laws Require Recognition of Religious Student Groups by Colleges; Allow Public Schools to Employ Chaplains

On July 9, Missouri Governor Mike Kehoe signed S.B. 160. The new law (full text) (legislative history) provides in part:

173.1556.  1.  (1)  No public institution of higher learning shall take any adverse action against a belief- based student association or an applicant to be recognized as such:

(a)  Because such association is political, ideological, or religious;

(b)  On the basis of such association's viewpoint or expression of the viewpoint by the association or the association's members; or

(c)  Based on such association's requirement that the association's leaders be committed to furthering the association's mission or that the association's leaders adhere to the association's sincerely held beliefs, sincere practice requirements, or sincere standards of conduct....

3. The provisions of this section shall not apply to a belief-based student association if there is substantial evidence that such association's viewpoint or expression of the viewpoint by the association or the association's members would cause a material and substantial disruption to the educational environment or interfere with the rights of others on campus, in accordance with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).

St Louis Public Radio reports on the bill. 

The Governor also signed SB 49 (full text) (legislative history) which allows school districts and charter schools to employ chaplains or accept chaplains as screened volunteers to provide support, services, or programs for students. Missouri Independent reports on the new law.

6th Circuit: Ministerial Exception Requires Dismissal of Employment Discrimination Suit by Christian School's Principal

In Pulsifer v. Westshore Christian Academy, (6th Cir., July 9, 2025), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the ministerial exception doctrine required dismissal of an employment discrimination suit brought by the Dean of Students/ Assistant Principal of a Christian elementary school in Muskegon Heights, Michigan. The court said in part:

No one disputes that the Academy is the type of religious entity that can avail itself of the exception.... The Academy sees its role in inculcating the Christian faith as essential to its students’ salvation, and its “mission of Christian ministry and teaching” marks the school with “clear [and] obvious religious characteristics.”...

The question, then, is whether Pulsifer was the type of employee covered by the exception.  We hold that he was.  Pulsifer played an important role in furthering the school’s mission to provide for the religious education and formation of students.  Judicial review of the way in which the Academy chooses who should fill that type of role “would undermine the independence of religious institutions in a way that the First Amendment does not tolerate.”,,,

... Pulsifer played a role in teaching the faith.  He was tasked with leading the staff in religious devotions each morning and also led devotions at each meeting of the school’s board.  Pulsifer also played an important role in conducting communal prayer with staff and board members....  And by implementing and leading two religious youth programs, he played a public-facing “role in conveying” the school’s religious “message,”,,,  

... Put simply, an employee can fall within the ministerial exception even when “[m]ost” of their “work [is] secular in nature,” ...  so long as the employee, like Pulsifer, also performs the types of religious duties we outline above.  Accordingly, the district court properly granted the Academy’s motion for summary judgment.

Planned Parenthood Fights New Medicaid Funding Cutoff

Planned Parenthood filed suit this week in a Massachusetts federal district court challenging Section 71113 of H.R. 1, One Big Beautiful Bill Act which denies federal Medicaid funds for non-abortion services for one year to any non-profit that provides abortions, and which received in 2023 Medicaid funds exceeding $800,000. (Use of Medicaid funds for abortions is already prohibited under other laws.) The complaint (full text) in Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Kennedy, (D MA, filed 7/7/2025), alleges that the provision was drafted to target and retaliate against Planned Parenthood. The complaint reads in part:

10. There is no legitimate justification for the statute; rather, the true design of the Defund Provision is simply to express disapproval of, attack, and punish Planned Parenthood, which plays a particularly prominent role in the public debate over abortion and (if Planned Parenthood’s Members are treated collectively) is the only nationwide abortion provider. Supporters of the Defund Provision, including President Trump and members of Congress, have made this point unmistakably clear. 

11. For these reasons, the Defund Provision’s exclusion of Planned Parenthood Members from a program designed to provide high-quality medical care to the Nation’s neediest patients—care that Planned Parenthood Members have delivered for decades—is unconstitutional as to all Planned Parenthood Members as a Bill of Attainder and it also violates Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection and First Amendment rights.

On the day the complaint was filed, the court issued a 14-day Temporary Restraining Order (full text) requiring that Medicaid funding continue to be furnished to plaintiffs. After the government responds, the court will decide whether to issue a temporary injunction in the case. Jurist and The Hill report on these developments.

Barnard College Settles Lawsuit Charging Antisemitism

As previously reported, in March 2024 Jewish and Israeli students sued both Columbia University and Barnard College (which is affiliated with Columbia but is a separate institution) alleging pervasive antisemitism that violates Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act as well as state and local civil rights laws. On Monday, plaintiffs in the case and Barnard College announced a settlement agreement that will resolve plaintiffs' claims against Barnard College. The settlement apparently does not resolve claims against Columbia University. According to the announcement, Barnard will appoint a Title VI Coordinator who will assure compliance with the antidiscrimination provisions of Title VI. According to the announcement:

When enforcing Title VI, the Title VI Coordinator will review and implement all applicable regulations consistent with guidance from the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”), including OCR’s 2021 and 2024 guidance which directs schools to “consider” the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s definition of antisemitism and its accompanying examples “to the extent that” any such “examples might be useful as evidence of discriminatory intent.”...

Barnard will also require all students, faculty, and staff to complete training on the Policy Against Discrimination and Harassment, which will address recognizing, combating, and reporting antisemitism.  Beginning in the 2025 fall semester, the Office of the President will communicate to Barnard students, faculty, and staff an annual message conveying the College’s “zero tolerance” for discrimination and harassment based on all protected traits, including Jewish and Israeli identity.... Barnard will also expand its existing relationship with the Jewish Theological Seminary (JTS), so that beginning in the 2025 fall semester, courses at the JTS will be available to all Barnard students at no cost....

...  Barnard will maintain policies limiting the time, place, and manner of demonstrations and prohibiting the use of face masks and other personal disguises to intimidate or interfere with the enforcement of the College’s policies.... [T]he College and its senior leaders ... will not recognize, meet, or negotiate with Columbia University Apartheid Divest, any of its successor or spin-off organizations.... Finally, the College reaffirms that its endowment is intended to maintain intergenerational equity and to ensure the stability of Barnard’s financial position; it is not a vehicle for expressing political positions, which includes taking actions for the purpose of penalizing the government of a country or the commercial/financial activity within that country.... 

IRS Says Houses of Worship Can Endorse Political Candidates

In a Joint Motion for Entry of a Consent Judgment (full text) filed on Monday with a Texas federal district court in National Religious Broadcasters v. Long, (ED TX, 7/7/2025), the Internal Revenue Service agreed that houses of worship can endorse political candidates without violating Internal Revenue Code §501(c)(3). (See prior related posting.)

Section 501(c)(3) bars tax exempt non-profits from "participat[ing] in or interven[ing] in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office." The Motion from both parties seeking entry of a Consent Judgment reads in part as follows:

7. When a house of worship in good faith speaks to its congregation, through its customary channels of communication on matters of faith in connection with religious services, concerning electoral politics viewed through the lens of religious faith, it neither “participate[s]” nor “intervene[s]” in a “political campaign,” within the ordinary meaning of those words. To “participate” in a political campaign is “to take part” in the political campaign, and to “intervene” in a political campaign is “to interfere with the outcome or course” of the political campaign.... Bona fide communications internal to a house of worship, between the house of worship and its congregation, in connection with religious services, do neither of those things, any more than does a family discussion concerning candidates. Thus, communications from a house of worship to its congregation in connection with religious services through its usual channels of communication on matters of faith do not run afoul of the Johnson Amendment as properly interpreted. 

8. This interpretation of the Johnson Amendment is in keeping with the IRS’s treatment of the Johnson Amendment in practice. As recounted in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, the IRS generally has not enforced the Johnson Amendment against houses of worship for speech concerning electoral politics in the context of worship services....

11. Accordingly, the Parties request this Court enter the attached proposed order enjoining Defendants ... from enforcing the Johnson Amendment against Plaintiff Churches based on speech by a house of worship to its congregation in connection with religious services through its customary channels of communication on matters of faith, concerning electoral politics viewed through the lens of religious faith.

New York Times reports on the IRS's action.

Virginia Enters Consent Decree Permitting Religiously Motivated Talk Therapy to Change Minors' Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity

In a press release last week, Founding Freedoms Law Center announced that the Virginia Department of Health Professions and the Virginia Board of Counseling last month entered into a consent decree (full text) in Raymond v. Virgnia Department of Health Professions, (Cir. Ct., June 4, 2025). The decree enjoins defendants from enforcing Virginia's ban on conversion therapy for minors against plaintiffs and all similarly situated counselors insofar as they are engaging only in religiously motivated "talk therapy" aimed at aligning a minor's gender identity or romantic attractions with the client's biological sex. The decree provides in part:

11. Plaintiffs are Christians and integrate their religious faith in their counseling of clients through talk therapy, which consists of voluntary conversations, prayer, and sharing of written materials such as Scripture, between an individual counselor and an individual client....

22, ...[T]he parties consider that enforcing the Challenged Provisions with respect to talk therapy between a licensed professional and a client that is motivated or informed by religious beliefs and desired by the client would violate Article I, §§ 11 and 16 of the Virginia Constitution, as well as the Virginia Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

Virginia Mercury reports on the consent decree. [Thanks to Scott Mange for the lead.]

Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine Requires Dismissal of Suit Between Unification Church Factions

In Family Federation for World Peace and Unification International v. Hyun Jin Moon, (DC Ct. App., July 3, 2025), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's final dismissal of a lawsuit surrounding a schism and succession dispute in the Unification Church.  The dispute has been in litigation for 14 years and has been before the Court of Appeals three times previously. (See prior posting.) Among the numerous issues dealt with in the Court's 59-page opinion was whether the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applies to the dispute. The Court said in part:

... [A]ppellants argue that the trial court erred by (1) finding that resolution of the contract claims required determining questions of disputed religious doctrine; and (2) after making that finding, failing to apply the fraud or collusion exception to nonetheless permit review of the contract claims....

At bottom, appellants have yet to provide a clear, spelled-out answer as to how a court or jury might parse their contract and quasi-contract claims through neutral principles of law.  Pointing us to any and all potential contract conditions in the record does not cure the underlying problem we identified in Moon III—which was reiterated by the trial court on remand—that any path of decision-making analysis would require deciding actual, disputed questions of religious doctrine or leadership.  This necessarily results from the combination of (1) the use of extraordinarily broad, religious language in the purported contract terms and (2) an intrachurch dispute about the meaning of that language.  The contract-related claims therefore must fail under the baseline religious abstention doctrine....

Preston has only fraudulently donated UCI’s assets if he is not the true leader of the Unification Church and he knows it.  We cannot say the first thing without running afoul of the abstention doctrine, as we made clear in Moon III, and if bare allegations of fraud or collusion could get us around that, then the courts would be thrust right back into resolving core theological disputes about religious doctrine, hierarchy, and succession.  “No thanks” to that—that runs afoul of the abstention doctrine’s central animating principles.  And it is well established that we cannot apply any fraud or collusion exception in a way that violates the existing Supreme Court precedent on religious abstention....

The trial court acted well within its discretion to put an end to this decade-old case rather than breathing new life into it on its deathbed years after appellants could have gone after the discovery they now belatedly seek.

Section 1981 Suit Can Move Ahead Against Defendants Who Disrupted Jewish Religious Celebration

Congregation Hazon Ovadya, Inc. v. Rabbinical Council of California, (CD CA, July 1, 2025), is a suit by a Sephardic Jewish synagogue against several individuals of Ashkenazi Jewish origin as well as a group of Ashkenazi rabbis. The court describes the dispute:

On or about July 13, 2022, CHO organized a procession and solemn, religious ceremony centered around the dedication of a Torah.... In preparation for the Ceremony, CHO contracted with various rabbis and vendors, including musicians, a disc jockey, and equipment providers....

Plaintiffs allege that the Rabbinical Defendants contacted hundreds of people, including the Individuals Defendants, to organize a riot and frustrate the Ceremony.... Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants were motivated by their bias and animosity towards people of Sephardic origin.... In addition to playing sirens and other noises, some of the Individual Defendants shouted racial slurs at Plaintiff Vanounou, including but not limited to calling him "Arab."....

Due to the riot, the musicians and other vendors were unable to perform their contractual duties during the Ceremony....

Plaintiffs sued under 42 USC §1981 which prohibits discrimination on account of race in the making and enforcement of contracts. The court denied defendants' motion to dismiss the case under California's anti-SLAPP law, saying that the suit does not seek to hold defendants liable for their speech. The court refused to dismiss the suit against three individual defendants, saying in part:

The Court acknowledges that § 1981 is not "meant to provide an omnibus remedy for all racial injustice."... And the facts at issue in this action certainly do not fall within the typical kinds of claims raised under § 1981. However, having been presented with no authority expressly precluding claims of this nature, the Court does not view dismissal on this ground appropriate at this stage. At bottom, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled that their contractual rights were impaired...

However the court dismissed charges against the Rabbinical organization, saying in part:

Even if the Rabbinical Defendants organized the riot and some of the participants engaged in racial chants, Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts supporting the idea that the Rabbinical Defendants engaged in this conduct themselves or otherwise ordered or condoned it....

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

• Brandon L. Paradise, Agape and Law in Byzantium, (November 09, 2015).
• Ahmer Bilal Soofi, Comparative Study of Quranic Perspective on Counter Measures with the Principles of Public International Law, (June 20, 2025).
• Grace Watkins, Piety Police, (Yale Law Journal, Volume 134, No. 8, Pp. 2984-3072 (2025)).
• L. Joe Dunman, What Hath Obergefell Wrought, (52 Northern Ky. L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming)).
• Eric Heinze, Criminalising Hate Speech: A Comparative Study, (December 02, 2024).
• Tracy L. Turner, Gender-Affirming Healthcare Bans as a Hybrid Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process Problem, (May 24, 2025).

From SSRN (Abortion rights):

• Lois A. Weithorn, Dobbs, State Policies, and Minors' Interests in an Open Future, (UC Law SF Gender and Justice Law Journal, Volume 36, Pp. 99-250, 2025).
• Stephen G. Gilles, Why Fourteenth Amendment Personhood Requires Live Birth, (39 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y (forthcoming 2025)).
• Dov Fox, The Personhood Double Standard, (UC Davis Law Review Online (forthcoming 2025)).
• Katherine Shaw, Hidden Harms: Abortion and the Shadow Docket, (Supreme Court Review (forthcoming 2025).

From SSRN (Non-profit organizations):

• David Gilchrist & Ben Perks, Value of the Not-for-profit Sector 2025: The Fourth Examination of the Economic Contribution of the Not-for-profit Human Services Sector in the Northern Territory (June 17, 2025).
• Elaine Wilson, The Fallacies Behind The Excise Tax On "Excessive" Charity Compensation, (Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, Vol. 56, p. 17 (2024)).
• Matthew S. Johnson, Hospitals and Local Taxation:  The Troubled Tale of Property Tax, (October 19, 2023).

From SmartCILP and elsewhere:

• Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 39, Issue 2 (2024).
• Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Hemispheric Justice: Awakening to 303 Creative's Troubles—A Glocalized LatCrit Analysis, 22 Seattle Journal of Social Justice 705-746 (2024).
• Steven H. Sholk, A Guide to Election Year Activities of Section 501(c)(3) Organizations, (2025 edition).

New Federal Law Allows Tax Deduction for Contributions to Tuition Assistance Organizations

H.R. 1, One Big Beautiful Bill Act (full text), signed into law by the President on July 4, provides federal tax credits up to $1700 for contributions to private-school scholarship granting organizations in states that do not provide a state tax credit for such contributions. States must elect in to participate in this program. Sec. 70411 of the new law provides in part::

(a) Allowance of Credit.--In the case of an individual who is a citizen or resident of the United States ... there shall be allowed as a credit against the tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable year an amount equal to the aggregate amount of qualified contributions made by the taxpayer during the taxable year.

 (b) Limitations.--   ``(1) In general.--The credit allowed under subsection (a) to any taxpayer for any taxable year shall not exceed $1,700.  ``(2) ...The amount allowed as a credit ... shall be reduced by the amount allowed as a credit on any State tax return of the taxpayer for qualified contributions made by the taxpayer during the taxable year.

 (c) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--  ``(1) ...The term `covered State' means one of the States ... that ...voluntarily elects to participate under this section and to identify scholarship granting organizations in the State.... `

(2) ... The term `eligible student' means an individual who-- (A) is a member of a household with an income which, for the calendar year ...is not greater than 300 percent of the area median gross income.... and (B) is eligible to enroll in a public elementary or secondary school.

(3) ... The term `qualified contribution' means a charitable contribution of cash to a scholarship granting organization that uses the contribution to fund scholarships for eligible students solely within the State in which the organization is listed pursuant to subsection (g).

News media describe the provision as a national school voucher plan. [Thanks to Scott Mange for the lead.]

Secular Officiants Lack Standing to Bring Pre-Enforcement Challenge to Texas Law Barring Them from Performing Weddings

McCutchan v. Nicholson, (ND TX, July 2, 2025), involves a challenge to the Texas statute that sets out who may conduct marriage ceremonies in the state.  The statute limits officiants to judges, Christian clergy, Jewish rabbis or "a person who is an officer of a religious organization and who is authorized by the organization to conduct a marriage ceremony." The Center for Inquiry that certifies secular marriage celebrants along with one of its certified celebrants brings the challenge, seeking to have secular officiants recognized.  However, the state Attorney General intervened in the case and took the position that the Center for Inquiry qualifies as a "religious" organization as that term is used in the Texas statutes and that its officiants are therefore already permitted to officiate at marriages. The Attorney General argued:

CFI is not secular because it adopts clear, specific, and overt religious beliefs, namely that it “denies that a supernatural source is required for life to have and for people to be guided by values and ethics.” The rejection of God and the supernatural is a religious belief; a truly secular organization would take no stance on the issue....

However, the Court disagreed, concluding that CFI is neither a religious organization nor a religion, saying in part:

At oral argument, the Attorney General discarded the history and tradition of the Texas law, stating that Satanism and Atheism were “religion[s]” and “religious organization[s]” under the Texas Family Code. Interpreting the terms “religion” and “religious organization” to cover Satanism and Atheism not only ignores history and tradition but distorts their plain meaning and risks setting a dangerous precedent.

The court went on, though, to hold that plaintiffs lack standing to bring a pre-enforcement action against the District Attorney (one of the defendants in the case), saying in part:

Individual Plaintiff provides no examples of past enforcement, no public statements regarding enforcement of the statute, and no facts about how the District Attorney could know a secular celebrant violated the law.

This led to the court's final conclusion:

Even if the Court rules on behalf of Individual Plaintiff against Defendant Nicholson, thereby enjoining the County Clerk, his injuries would not be redressed without a favorable judgment against the District Attorney. A ruling in Individual Plaintiff’s favor, thus, would not amount to “relief that directly redresses the injury suffered.”... Accordingly, the Court rules that Individual Plaintiff’s action is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Because individual members of CFI lack standing, so does the organization.

Cert. Granted in Street Preacher's Suit Challenging Protest Zone

Yesterday the U.S. Supreme Court granted review in Olivier v. City of Brandon, Mississippi, (Docket No. 24-993, certiorari granted 7/3/2025). (Order List.) In the case, a Christian street preacher challenges a city ordinance that limits demonstrations to a designated area within three hours of an event at the city's amphitheater. The certiorari petition frames the question in part as follows:

Gabriel Olivier is a Christian who feels called to share the gospel with his fellow citizens.  After being arrested and fined for violating an ordinance targeting “protests” outside a public amphitheater, Olivier brought a § 1983 suit under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to declare the ordinance unconstitutional and enjoin its enforcement against him in the future.   

The Fifth Circuit, applying its precedent construing this Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), held that Olivier’s prior conviction barred his § 1983 suit because even the prospective relief it seeks would necessarily undermine his prior conviction....

Links to briefs and pleadings in the case are available here.

Cert. Granted in Challenge to Ban of Transgender Women on Women's Sports Teams

Yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court granted review in two cases raising the issue of whether laws that bar transgender women from participating on women's sports teams in public schools and colleges violate Title IX or the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. (Order List). The cases are Little v. Hecox, (Docket No. 24-38, certiorari granted 7/3/2025) involving a challenge to Idaho's Fairness in Women's Sports Act, and West Virginia v. B.P.J., (Docket No. 24-43, certiorari granted 7/3/2025) involving West Virginia's Save Women's Sports Act. Links to all the briefs and pleadings in the Hecox case are available here. Links to all the briefs and pleadings in the West Virginia case are available here. SCOTUSblog reports on the Court's action.