7th Circuit: Prison's Refusal to Provide Muslim Prayer Schedules at State Expense Is Permissible

In Childs v. Webster, (7th Cir., March 4, 2026), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals held that there was not a violation of a Muslim inmate's free exercise rights under RLUIPA or the 1st Amendment when his prison refused to distribute corrected prayer-time schedules to Muslim inmates. Inmates were allowed to purchase corrected schedules with their own funds or by outside donations. Prison policies bar use of taxpayer funds to purchase inmate personal property items. The chaplain had originally made printed schedules available at prison expense to inmates in the chapel, but those schedules turned out to be inaccurate. The court said in part:

The de minimis cost of purchasing a prayer schedule does not rise to the level of a “substantial” burden on religious exercise. Such a “truly negligible” and “unquestionably affordable” financial burden could not realistically coerce Childs to violate his sincerely held religious belief..... Absent a true coercive dilemma, to conclude that Childs’s claim still satisfies the “substantial burden” requirement of RLUIPA would give the word a meaning it cannot bear and render Congress’s choice of the word “substantial” meaningless surplusage.... And because Childs failed to carry his initial burden of persuasion, the government is not required to justify its policy under strict scrutiny....

... [P]rison policy, which does not permit the purchase of personal property for inmates, religious or secular, is a neutral and generally applicable rule that does not violate the Free Exercise Clause...

State Attorney General May Enforce Subpoena Seeking from Archdiocese Evidence of Clergy Sexual Abuse

In State of Washington v. Corporation of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, (WA App, March 2, 2026), a Washington state appellate court allowed enforcement of a subpoena issued by the state Attorney General's Office (AGO) seeking from the Catholic Archdiocese evidence relating to clergy sexual abuse. In issuing the subpoena the Attorney General's Office relied on investigative authority given to it by a provision of the state's Charitable Trust Act. The trial court had quashed the subpoena because the Charitable Trust Act exempts "religious corporations ... operated in good faith as religious organizations" from its provisions. The appeals court, however, held that giving that exemption to religious organizations violates the state constitution's provision barring the granting to any person or corporation privileges or immunities not equally belonging to all citizens or corporations. The court went on to say in part:

Antifavoritism analysis under article I, section 12 subjects legislation to a two-part test.....  First, the court asks whether a challenged law grants a “privilege” or “immunity” for purposes of our state constitution....  If the answer is yes, then the court asks whether there is a “reasonable ground” for granting that privilege or immunity....

The Archdiocese says this case does not involve a ... direct impact on the fundamental right to be free from unwanted bodily interference, because exempting it from the AGO’s statutory subpoena power does not directly condone the invasion of any person’s bodily autonomy,,,,

As the Archdiocese correctly observes, a civil authority in the United States cannot sit in judgment of whether the Archdiocese has conformed to its faith and doctrine.  To the extent, by its subpoena or otherwise, the AGO were to purport to second-guess whether a given action by the Archdiocese was truly “for the use, purpose, benefit and behoof” of the church, the AGO and its use of the subpoena would violate the federal and state constitutional religious protections. ...

At the same time, the subpoena to this point does not implicate a civil authority second-guessing the Archdiocese’s decision-making or good faith, but requires only the production of documents..... The Archdiocese has not pointed to any authority that constitutional religious protections are offended by inquiry into whether criminal or tortious conduct has occurred, including sexual abuse by clergy.  

We perceive in the AGO’s subpoena a scope that, if pursued, would clearly unconstitutionally infringe the Archdiocese’s religious protections, to the extent the AGO seeks to determine whether any given act or expenditure by the Archdiocese was “for the use, purpose, benefit and behoof” of the church.  But we also perceive a scope that clearly does not infringe the Archdiocese’s religious protections, to the extent the AGO seeks evidence relevant to determining that an act occurred that is criminal, tortious, or both, including sexual abuse by clergy.

Advocacy Group Says Military Commanders Are Describing Iran Operations in Christian Biblical Terms

The Military Religious Freedom Foundation, an advocacy organization dedicated to assuring church-state separation in the armed forces, reported yesterday that it has received numerous complaints from military personnel that, in briefings, their commanders are describing the military operations against Iran in Christian eschatological terms. According to a report on Substack by journalist Jonathan Larsen:

A combat-unit commander told non-commissioned officers at a briefing Monday that the Iran war is part of God’s plan and that Pres. Donald Trump was “anointed by Jesus to light the signal fire in Iran to cause Armageddon and mark his return to Earth,” according to a complaint by a non-commissioned officer.

From Saturday morning through Monday night, more than 110 similar complaints about commanders in every branch of the military had been logged by the Military Religious Freedom Foundation (MRFF).

The complaints came from more than 40 different units spread across at least 30 military installations, the MRFF told me Monday night.

Suit Alleges Unconstitutional Exclusion of Muslim Schools from Texas School Choice Program

A Muslim parent filed suit this week in a Texas federal district court challenging the state's exclusion of accredited Islamic private schools from participation in the Texas Education Freedom Accounts (TEFA) program. TEFA is a publicly funded school choice program. The complaint (full text) in Cherkaoui v. Paxton, (SD TX, filed 3/1/2026), alleges in part:

Since TEFA's inception, Defendants have systematically targeted Islamic schools for exclusion based on their religious identity, perceived "Islamic ties," and alleged connections to organizations Governor Abbott has designated as "foreign terrorist" or "transnational criminal" entities—even where those schools are fully accredited, satisfy all statutory eligibility criteria, and have no actual connection to terrorism or unlawful activity.

The complaint contends that the state has violated the 1st and 14th Amendments, alleging in part: 

85. Defendants' exclusion of Islamic schools is not neutral or generally applicable. It is explicitly based on religious identity (schools are targeted because they are Islamic), perceived religious association (hosting community events with Islamic civil-rights organizations), and religious animus (official statements equating Islamic identity with terrorism)....

89.   By systematically excluding Islamic schools while approving hundreds of Christian, Jewish, and other non-Islamic religious schools for TEFA participation, Defendants have engaged in denominational discrimination that favors non-Islamic religions over Islam in the distribution of a public benefit. 

90. Defendants' policies and public statements evince a purpose and effect of disfavoring Islam and conveying governmental disapproval of the Muslim faith....

Texas Tribune reports on the lawsuit. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Ministerial Exception Doctrine Does Not Apply Where No Ecclesiastical Questions Are at Issue

In Ehrenkranz v. San Francisco Zen Center, (CA App, March 2,2026), a California state appellate court held that the trial court erred in applying the ministerial exception doctrine to the wage-and-hour claims brought against a Zen Center by one of its Work Practice Apprentices. The court said in part:

Ehrenkranz contends that the trial court erred in applying the ministerial exception to bar his wage-and-hour claims because the United States Supreme Court has only applied the exception to bar a minister’s employment discrimination and wrongful termination claims and his wage claims do “not implicate [the Center’s] ability to hire or fire its ministers.”  He claims his case is instead about unpaid minimum wages and does not concern any ecclesiastical matter.  ...

[B]arring a minister’s employment claim without any evidence that the claim would raise an ecclesiastical concern is necessary to comply with the First Amendment only if that claim will inevitably ‘thrust the secular courts into the constitutionally untenable position of passing judgment on questions of religious faith or doctrine.’ ...  Thus, the ministerial exception only bars employment claims that require inquiries into matters that are ‘ “ strictly a matter of ecclesiastical government’ ” ...

... We therefore conclude that the ministerial exception does not apply to Ehrenkranz’s claims in the absence of evidence of an ecclesiastical concern....

In sum and in short, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants.  However, “our ruling here today does not foreclose the Center from presenting evidence at trial that applying wage-and-hour laws to ministers like [Ehrenkranz] raises an ecclesiastical concern and should therefore be barred under the Religion Clauses.” 

Indiana Governor Signs Law Barring State Religious Discrimination in Adoption or Foster Care

On February 26, Indiana Governor Mike Bruan signed House Enrolled Act 1389 (full text) which prohibits governmental discrimination in adoption and foster care matters. It provides that a governmental entity may not discriminate against a person who provides, or declines to provide, foster care or parenting of an adoptive child consistent with that person's sincerely held religious belief, unless required to advance a compelling governmental interest. It similarly protects religious organizations involved in adoption or foster care from governmental discrimination. In making placements, however, it does allow consideration of whether an adopting or fostering family shares the same religious or faith tradition as the child or the child's parents.

Daily Citizen reporting on the new law says it is particularly aimed at policies requiring foster and adoptive parents to affirm a child’s sexual orientation or gender identity in order to be approved.

Supreme Court in Shadow Docket Case Rejects California's Policy on Informing Parents of Student's Gender Transition

On Monday evening, the U.S. Supreme Court in Mirabelli v. Bonta, (Sup. Ct., March 2, 2026), barred enforcement against objecting parents of a controversial California school policy that requires student consent before disclosing to parents a student's gender transitioning in school. A California federal district court had enjoined enforcement of the policy in a challenge by parents and teachers. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, however, stayed the district court's injunction, thus reinstating the policy. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court ruled for the parents.  It vacated the 9th Circuit's stay as to parents who object to the policy, but left the stay in place as to teachers. Justices Thomas and Alito would have vacated the injunction as to teachers as well. Justices Jackson, Kagan and Sotomayor dissented.

The per curiam opinion says in part:

We conclude that the parents who seek religious exemptions are likely to succeed on the merits of their Free Exercise Clause claim.  California’s policies likely trigger strict scrutiny under that provision because they substantially interfere with the “right of parents to guide the religious development of their children.” ...  The parents who assert a free exercise claim have sincere religious beliefs about sex and gender, and they feel a religious obligation to raise their children in accordance with those beliefs....

The same is true for the subclass of parents who object to those policies on due process grounds.  Under long-established precedent, parents—not the State—have primary authority with respect to “the upbringing and education of children.” ... The right protected by these precedents includes the right not to be shut out of participation in decisions regarding their children’s mental health....

Justice Barrett, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh, filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

The dissent questions how the Court can adhere to parental-rights precedent after its decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization..... But Dobbs calls into question neither the doctrine of substantive due process nor the other unexpressed rights that the doctrine protects....

 ... [C]ontrary to the dissent’s charge, granting interim relief is not a sign of the Court’s “impatience” to reach the merits.... Instead, the grant reflects the Court’s judgment about the risk of irreparable harm to the parents.... 

Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Jackson, filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Today’s decision shows, not for the first time, how our emergency docket can malfunction.  A case raising novel legal questions and arousing strong views comes to this Court via an application about whether to stay a district court’s injunction pending appeal. The ordinary appellate process has barely started; only a district court has ruled on the case’s merits. The Court receives scant and, frankly, inadequate briefing about the legal issues in dispute.  It does not hold oral argument or deliberate in conference, as regular procedures dictate. It considers the request on a short fuse—a matter of weeks. And then the Court grants relief by means of a terse, tonally dismissive ruling designed to conclusively resolve the dispute. The Court does all this even though the application of existing law to the case raises tricky questions, and so cries out for reflection and explanation....

As to due process particularly... I have no doubt that parents have rights, even though unenumerated, concerning their children and the life choices they make..... On the other side of ledger, of course, a State has critical interests in the care and education of children.  But California’s policy, in depriving all parents of information critical to their children’s health and well-being, could have crossed the constitutional line.  And that would entitle the parents, at the end of the day, to relief. 

The Court, however, would be far better equipped to draw the appropriate line and to explain its legal basis—in short, to do law in the right way—if it had followed our ordinary processes....

Justice Sotomayor, without writing or joining an opinion, stated that she would have left the 9th Circuit's injunction in place both as to parents and teachers.

SCOTUSblog reports on the decision.

Lawsuit Challenges Recent Kansas Law on Sex Designation for Restrooms, Birth Certificates, Driver's Licenses

On Feb.18, the Kansas legislature overrode Governor Laura Kelly's veto of SB 244 which requires the use of biological sex at birth to define usage of rest rooms and locker rooms in public buildings, and the use of biological sex on birth certificates and driver's licenses. It calls for correction of previously issued birth certificates and reissuance of previously issued driver's licenses.

Last week, suit was filed in a Kansas state trial court challenging the constitutionality of SB 244 under various provision of the Kansas state Constitution. The complaint (full text) in Doe v. State of Kansas ex rel. Kobach, (KS Dist. Ct., filed 2/26/2026) alleges in part:

2. The Act targets transgender Kansans across multiple, unrelated domains of their lives. This sweeping law restricts transgender individuals from obtaining driver’s licenses reflecting their gender identity and bans transgender people from accessing restrooms or other single-sex spaces in a range of public places including libraries, courthouses, state parks, hospitals, and interstate rest stops.  SB 244’s restrictions extend beyond just government buildings, applying also to buildings owned by or leased from the government, even if they are controlled by private entities. By targeting transgender Kansans, the Act violates the Kansas Constitution’s guarantees of personal autonomy, privacy, equality under the law, due process, and free expression. It also violates the Kansas Constitution’s single-subject and clear title requirements.  

3. SB 244 is just the most recent law in a shameful litany of statutes enacted by the Kansas Legislature meant to discriminate against and dehumanize transgender people. 

ACLU issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Recent Articles of Interest

 From SSRN:

• Candice Mason Kulbeth, Church Autonomy: A Universal Sequencing Question ,(January 22, 2026).
• Ela A. Leshem, Normative Transplants: The Case of Ships as Legal Persons, (Forthcoming in Legal Personhood in Private Law (Paul B. Miller, Christopher Essert & Eva Micheler eds., Cambridge University Press 2026)).
• Joshua P. Fershee, Reimagining Legal Education: The Role And Purpose Of Law Schools In Modern Society-A Values-Driven Approach To Modern Legal Education, (Toledo Law Review, Volume 57, Issue 2, Winter 2026, pp. 229-42).
• Benjamin Fleshman, Church Autonomy as a Framework for Conditions on Government Benefits, (105 North Carolina Law Review (Forthcoming)).
• Anurag Deb, Lewis Graham & C.R.G. Murray, Religious Education and Indoctrination in Northern Ireland and Beyond After JR87, (Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, 2026).
• Micah Schwartzman, The Asymmetry of Religious Motivation, (135 Y.L.J.F. 467 (2025)).
• Scott Altman, Steering, Subversion, and Rights, (USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 2607 (2026)).
• Lyric Helena Emerson, Abortion, Bodily Sovereignty, and State Power in 2025, (January 30, 2026).
• Dov Fox & Mary Ziegler, Reproductive Abuse, (UCLA Law Review (forthcoming 2026)).
• Rachel Crass, Sex and Gender in Sports: Examining the Constitutionality of Transgender Sports Laws in the United States and the Need for a New Approach to Scrutiny, (July 26, 2024).
• R. George Wright, The Many Constitutional Limits on Government Speech, (February 02, 2026).

From SSSRN (Islamic Law):

• Qazi Irfan, A Critique of Diminishing Musharakah (January 30, 2026).
• Oruj Ismayilov, From Darkness to Light: The Isrā as Divine Pedagogy, (January 25, 2026).
• Rachel Crass, Comparative Sharia Law in Iran and Nigeria: Effects on Athletes and Recommendations for Sports Governing Bodies to Increase Access for Muslim Women and Girls, (May 06, 2024).
• Dhruv B., Legal Enforceability of Smart Contract-Based Mahr Agreements in Online Nikah Platforms: A Comparative Analysis of UAE and Malaysian Jurisprudence, (August 24, 2025).
• Afthah Ashraf K.M., Mawālī in Early Islam: From Subaltern Class to Pioneers of Islamic Scholarship, (September 10, 2025).
• Eddie Ladja, "Zakat as an Instrument of Economic Empowerment: Assessing Its Impact on the Economic Resources of Muslim Residents in Zamboanga City, Philippines", (January 28, 2026).

From SSRN (Law of East Asia):

• Advaith Sri Krishna Datta Mamidanna, The Constitutional Experiment in Matrimonial Justice: A Critical Study of India's Matrimonial Justice Regime and Its Jurisprudential Paradox, (September 17, 2025).
• Sunil Sondhi, Dandaniti in the Indian Tradition, (October 18, 2025).

From SmartCILP:

•  3rd Annual Law v. Antisemitism Conference, FIU Law Review, Vol. 19, Number 3 (2025).
• Heidar Piri & Niaz A, Shah, The Application of Human Rights Treaties as Domestic Law in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 47 Human Rights Quarterly 282-307 (2025).

EEOC Says Federal Agencies May Base Restroom Access on Biological Sex

 In a February 26 press release, the EEOC announced:

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) voted 2-1 today to approve a federal sector appellate decision adjudicating an appeal regarding access to intimate spaces, including bathrooms and locker rooms, in federal workplaces under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended....

 “Today’s opinion is consistent with the plain meaning of ‘sex’ as understood by Congress at the time Title VII was enacted, as well as longstanding civil rights principles: that similarly situated employees must be treated equally,” said EEOC Chair Andrea Lucas. “When it comes to bathrooms, male and female employees are not similarly situated. Biology is not bigotry.”

When adjudicating appeals of alleged employment discrimination in the federal sector, the EEOC applies longstanding precedent, including relevant Supreme Court decisions, to the facts of the case. In this case, however, such precedent does not exist, as federal courts have not determined whether Title VII requires employers to permit trans-identifying employees to access bathrooms and other intimate spaces otherwise reserved for the opposite sex. In the absence of authoritative court precedent, the EEOC used the traditional tools of statutory construction, turning first to the ordinary meaning of the statute’s text and ensuring that the decision is further anchored by the Supreme Court’s precedents in comparable areas of law.

In applying the traditional tools of statutory construction, the EEOC found that Title VII permits a federal agency employer to maintain single-sex bathrooms and similar intimate spaces; and permits a federal agency employer to exclude employees, including trans-identifying employees, from opposite sex-facilities. Today’s opinion overturns a prior EEOC federal sector appellate decision (Lusardi v. Department of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133395, 2015 WL 1607756 (2015)) with respect to the portion of that opinion addressing a federal employee’s access to an opposite-sex bathroom based on “gender identity.”

As with all of the EEOC’s appellate decisions adjudicating federal agency employment discrimination complaints, this decision applies only to federal agencies subject to the EEOC’s administrative complaint process for federal employees. It does not apply to private sector employers, nor does it bind any federal court.

The Agency's action approved a 23-page Federal Sector Appellate Decision, Selina S. v. Driscoll, (EEOC Federal Sector Appeal, Feb. 26, 2026), a case brought by a civilian employee of the Army.

9th Circuit: Anti-Transgender Comments Justify Mayor's Veto of Membership on Police Advisory Board

In Hodges v. Gloria, (9th Cir., Feb. 26, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected free speech and free exercise challenges to the San Diego mayor's veto of the reappointment of a voluntary member of the city's Police Advisory Board.  The mayor vetoed the reappointment of Dennis Hodges, a correctional officer and pastor, because of Hodges' public comments that he considered “transgenderism” to be a sin just like adultery and fornication. The court said in part:

Hodges asserts that he was not a policymaker and that government officials may not create religious tests for holding public office.  However, a consistent line of cases ... hold that an appointed volunteer may be dismissed for statements that might otherwise be protected by the First Amendment when “commonality of political purpose” is an appropriate requirement for the volunteer’s services....

Hodges has not shown that the district court erred in rejecting his free exercise claim.  To prevail on this claim, Hodges would have to show that even though the veto of his reappointment did not violate his free speech rights, it violated his free exercise rights because of his underlying religious beliefs.  He offers no case law supporting such a proposition.  Moreover, he does not explain how his religious motive for making public statements changes the court’s evaluation of his claim....

Street Preachers Can Move Ahead with Free Exercise Claims Against Police

In Raio v. City of Chicago, (ND IL, Feb. 24, 2026), two street preachers and a Gospel singer who had been cited and, on another occasion, arrested for violating Chicago's sound ordinance brought a civil rights action against the city. The three use a microphone connected to a battery-operated speaker for their preaching and music. Ruling on the city's motion to dismiss, the court said that Plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged First Amendment retaliation, free exercise, false arrest, retaliatory arrest, and IRFRA claims, but dismissed plaintiffs' vagueness, equal protection, and free speech claims. The court said inn part:

Plaintiffs allege that Chicago police officers “cite all street preachers, regardless of whether they meet the requirements of the [Amplification Ordinance] and regardless of the evidence,”... and “engag[e] in a targeted practice of enforcing their interpretation of the [Amplification Ordinance] against only religious speakers,”... Defendants argue that the Amplification Ordinance is instead a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation....

Plaintiffs have failed to allege a single instance in which they, or anyone similarly situated, used amplification to communicate a non-religious message without consequence.  Nor do they allege that secular speakers regularly violate the Amplification Ordinance without any police intervention.  Plaintiffs instead include only conclusory allegations ... extrapolated from the two instances in which the Defendant Officers interacted with them.  Thus, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that Defendants have selectively enforced the Amplification Ordinance....

Plaintiffs do not allege that the Amplification Ordinance burdens their religious exercise....  Plaintiffs instead contend that Defendants violated their First Amendment free exercise rights by burdening their religious beliefs via an unwritten policy and custom of targeting religious activity....

... Plaintiffs provide enough facts that Defendants’ unwritten policy targeting amplified religious speech imposes, at least plausibly, an unjustifiably substantial burden on Plaintiffs’ free exercise of religion for the claim to move forward....

... Plaintiffs have not alleged any instances where police officers declined to cite or arrest any similarly situated secular individuals under similar conditions....  As such, Plaintiffs’ non-conclusory allegations fail to suggest that Defendants acted with a discriminatory intent and, consequently, the Court must dismiss Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim...

Canadian Province Awards $750,000 In Damages to LGBTQ Teachers For Trustee's Hate Speech

In the Canadian province of British Columbia, the province's Human Rights Tribunal has ordered a Board of Education trustee to pay damages of $750,000 (Canadian) to compensate LGBTQ teachers in the Chilliwack School District for injury to their dignity, feelings and self-respect caused by respondent's discriminatory and hate speech that violated the British Columbia Human Rights Law.  In Chilliwack Teachers’ Association v. Neufeld, (BC HRT, Feb. 18, 2026), the Tribunal (in a 141-page opinion) said in part:

... In 2017, the Ministry approved resources and tools aimed at fostering a SOGI [Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity]-inclusive education environment in all schools....

The backlash to SOGI 1 2 3 was immediate. One of its loudest critics was the Respondent, Barry Neufeld. At the time, Mr. Neufeld was an elected trustee of the Chilliwack Board of Education ....  For the next five years of his tenure as a trustee, Mr. Neufeld engaged in a high-profile public campaign against SOGI 1 2 3 and the values underlying it. He did this through social media posts, as well as in statements made in Board meetings, rallies, and interviews. Throughout these publications, 30 of which are at issue here, Mr. Neufeld broadcast the message that SOGI 1 2 3 is a “weapon of propaganda”, which threatens “traditional family values” and instructs children about the “absurd theory” that “gender is not biologically determined, but a social construct”. This “lie”, he warned, alienates children from their parents and primes them for sexual abuse....

 We declare that Mr. Neufeld violated ss. 7(1)(a), (b) and 13 of the Code....

... [A]lthough Mr. Neufeld occasionally alluded to his religion, at no point in this complaint did he assert, or lead evidence to support, that his right to freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter was engaged. In our view, it would not be appropriate to speculate about s. 2(a) of the Charter without a factual foundation or proper argument. For that reason, we have not considered whether our decision appropriately balances Mr. Neufeld’s religious freedoms....

Christian Post reports on the decision.