D.C. Circuit: Religious Organizations Have Standing to Challenge Policy Changes On Immigration Enforcement Near Places of Worship

In Mennonite Church USA v. U.S Department of Homeland Security, (DC Cir., Oct. 20, 2026), the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision held that a group of Christian and Jewish organizations have standing to challenge the rescission of the prior administration's "sensitive locations Policy" which restricted immigration enforcement activities in sensitive locations such as places of worship. The new policy allows case-by-case decisions on enforcement near sensitive locations The majority said in part:

We focus on plaintiffs’ allegations of harm to their members from the imminence of increased enforcement actions, and we hold that all plaintiffs likely have associational standing under that theory to pursue both forms of relief that they seek — i.e., a reversion to the Mayorkas Memo’s Sensitive Locations Policy and an order prohibiting the government from conducting enforcement operations at houses of worship in the absence of a judicial warrant or exigent circumstances....

 Judge Rao filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Plaintiffs have failed to make a clear showing of standing. In particular, the guidance they seek to restore has no effect on the Executive Branch’s legal authority or enforcement discretion. Plaintiffs ultimately offer only speculation that restoring policy guidance from a previous administration will change the enforcement practices of this one. Because redressability requires more than conjecture, the district court correctly denied a preliminary injunction. I respectfully dissent....

... Because plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate any predictable consequences from reinstatement of the Memo, the injunction they seek will not redress their alleged injuries. ...

UM News reports on the decision.

Did Pressure on Foster Child to Be Baptized Amount to Neglect of Child's Emotional Needs?

In A.P. v. Department of Children and Families, (MA App. Ct., Oct. 21, 2016), a Massachusetts state appellate court vacated and remanded a decision of a Department of Children and Families Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer had upheld a staff finding that A.P., a foster mother, had neglected needs of Beth, her foster child. The court said in part:

The hearing officer found that Beth "expressed not feeling safe within the [foster] home" because she was "feeling pressured to be baptized."  Yet the hearing officer also found that A.P. had given "notice to [DCF] prior to [the foster] placement [that Beth] would need to be baptized to remain in placement."  This finding was supported by a DCF supervisor's testimony that A.P. and her husband, before Beth was placed with them, had made clear that Beth would need to be baptized for them to adopt her.  The supervisor further testified that, although the clinical team had warned A.P. that Beth might not accept being baptized, "it's likely that [Beth] told the foster family that she would agree to be baptized so that she could have a family."   

In finding that A.P.'s pressuring Beth to be baptized constituted neglect of Beth's emotional needs, the hearing officer failed to address the "troublesome facts" that (1) DCF and Beth were on notice of A.P.'s commitment to having Beth baptized, (2) DCF nevertheless placed Beth in A.P.'s home, and (3) Beth likely agreed to be baptized.  Again, it is difficult to see how DCF could later find that A.P.'s pressuring Beth to be baptized constituted neglect, without either Beth or DCF having first given notice to A.P. that they had changed their minds and that further pressure was unwelcome and inappropriate. The hearing officer must resolve this issue.

3rd Circuit: Preliminary Injunction Denied Even When Ultimate Success of RLUPA Challenge Is Likely

In Holy Trinity Ukrainian Catholic Church v. Township of Collier, (3d Cir., Oct. 19, 2026), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction to bar enforcement of zoning provisions that prevent a Church from building shrine on land it owns. The majority held that even though the Church is likely to ultimately succeed on the merits of its claim under RLUIPA, it has not shown the risk of irreparable injury necessary to obtain preliminary injunctive relief. The majority said in part:

We think Holy Trinity is likely to show that the township’s rejection effectively bars the project and thus substantially burdens its chosen land use. First, although Holy Trinity was just taking the first step of seeking rezoning (to be followed by project-specific applications), the Board focused on the ultimate shrine project. Second, residents overwhelmingly disapproved of the shrine project, not just the rezoning application. 

Finally, and most troubling, both community and Board members objected to the shrine’s pro-life message....

... Preliminary relief does not automatically follow whenever a party is likely to win on the merits. That is because the “goal of preliminary injunctive relief” is not to decide the case, but merely to “preserv[e] the status quo” as it proceeds....

... [A] preliminary injunction is not a shortcut to that final relief. It is a temporary patch to ensure that a court can see a case through to final judgment.... Holy Trinity wants to raise funds for a shrine, secure in the knowledge that it can build it. But that is a promise that preliminary relief cannot make. What the parish needs is expedited final judgment. The District Court has moved with admirable swiftness, proceeding from complaint to preliminary-injunction ruling in three months. We trust that it will continue with that speed....

Judge Matey dissented, criticizing the majority for relying on a recent decision refusing to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of campaign finance laws.  He said in part:

It might be easy to lament today’s opinion as another curia dedit, curia abstulit with one panel decision washing away the foundation of another before the ink dried. ... That is how the majority is able to acknowledge that Holy Trinity is likely to succeed on the merits of its RLUIPA claim and that re-application would be futile,yet still force the Church to return to municipal purgatory to await the inevitable denial of their proposed religious shrine. That result would have been impossible at the beginning of August under our decision in Anash, Inc. v. Borough of Kingston.... But thirty days changed the world—of equity, RLUIPA, the First Amendment, and perhaps all constitutional claims raised in our Circuit—because, writes the majority, the freshly minted decision in Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Albence, ... insists on preserving the status quo of religious discrimination....

Religion is the “duty which we owe to our Creator and the Manner of discharging it,” consisting of “offering service and ceremonial rights to a superior nature that men call divine.” What a strange place to plant new equitable vines that will entangle efforts to honor that solemn duty and choke the virtuous impulse to worship from our collective will....

4th Circuit Refuses to Expand Exemptions from Anti-Discrimination Laws for Religious Employers

In Doe v. Catholic Relief Services, (4th Cir., Oct. 16. 2026), the U.S.4th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision affirmed a Maryland federal district court's holding that Catholic Relief Services violated Title VII and the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act by denying health insurance coverage to an IT analyst's same-sex spouse. In a 66-page majority opinion, the court said in part:

Here, CRS asks us to expand both statutory and constitutional protections for religious employers.  CRS argues that either Title VII’s exemption or the Religion Clauses should immunize all employment decisions by religious organizations so long as the decision is based on the employer’s religious belief, regardless of whether race, sex, or national origin is a but-for cause of the decision or whether the employee plays a ministerial role.  We will not.  The extremely broad and nearly unbounded immunity CRS seeks is not required by any statute or constitutional provision.

Judge Wynn also filed a concurring opinion responding in length to the dissent. Judge Wynn said in part:

Constitutional doctrines require boundaries. The dissenting opinion offers none that can reliably confine its principle to the circumstances it evidently has in mind. If a religious employer possesses constitutional immunity whenever an adverse employment decision confronts sincerely held religious doctrine, it is difficult to see why the principle would stop with objections concerning sexual orientation or gender identity. A sincere religious belief might likewise be asserted for an employment decision based on sex, race, national origin, or some other characteristic protected by law. 

Recognizing the problem, the dissenting opinion simply asserts that employers would not do such a thing—at least when it comes to race....  [C]onstitutional law cannot rest so comfortably upon assurances of self-restraint....

Judge Quattlebaum filed an 88-page dissenting opinion, saying in part: 

Rooted in the text, history and tradition of the First Amendment, the church autonomy doctrine prevents courts from reviewing a religious organization’s conduct based on its faith, doctrine or governance. John Doe’s lawsuit against Catholic Relief Services (CRS) asks the federal courts to do just that....

Recent Supreme Court precedent makes clear that regulations that burden the exercise of religion must satisfy strict scrutiny if their exceptions favor secular interests over religious ones. The majority interprets the statutes to do just that, and none are narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest....

This appeal involves the use of secular laws to regulate churches and religious organizations, not the general use of religion to justify discriminatory conduct. That’s why I attempted to describe the history of conflict between governments and the church on the church’s autonomy. On that point, it’s accurate that until recently, the government’s use of antidiscrimination laws to interfere with the internal doctrinal decisions of churches and religious organizations on issues that relate to their mission was uncommon. It’s also accurate that until recently, religious employers have not commonly faced claims under antidiscrimination laws for setting employment terms that require compliance with their sincerely held beliefs....

[Thanks to Eugene Volokh via Religionlaw for the lead.] 

Oklahoma Board Rejects Religious Charter School on Non-Constitutional Grounds

According to an Oct. 15 press release from Oklahoma Attorney General Centner Drummond, the Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board at its Oct. 12 meeting rejected the application of the Ben Gamla Jewish Charter School. If the Board had approved the school, it would have been the first fully publicly funded religious charter school in the nation.  A federal district court has already in a preliminary injunction action held that Oklahoma may not enforce a provision in its Charter Schools Act that requires a charter school to be “nonsectarian.” (See prior posting.)  At last week's meeting, four board members voted to approve the school and 3 voted against, but a vote of 5 members of the 7-member board is required for approval. One member was absent from the meeting and there is one vacancy on the Board. The application was apparently rejected on grounds of financial viability and community need. The rejection led the Attorney General to voluntarily dismiss without prejudice his complaint in Drummond v. Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board (Notice of Dismissal, (OK Dist. Ct., filed 10/15/2026- full text) which sought to have the Board to reject the school's application on non-constitutional grounds. The Attorney General's Notice of Dismissal says in part:

The federal action challenged the Board's rejection of this application on account of Ben Gamla's religious character. That rejection has been superseded by one resting on non-religious grounds, no application by Ben Gatnla is pending before the Board, and the Board is applying no religious criterion to Ben Gamla. The action is therefore moot.... An injunction against the nonsectarian requirement can no longer redress Ben Gamla's claimed injury, because that requirement is no longer what stands between Ben Gamla and a charter. The Attorney General expects the federal action to be dismissed on that basis.

When it is, the federal court's preliminary ruling will carry no continuing legal force. A preliminary injunction is not an adjudication on the merits....

All of this will presumably prevent the question of the constitutionality of publicly funded religious schools getting quickly to the U.S. Supreme Court which previously split evenly on the issue. (See prior posting.) Oklahoma's Attorney General has previously opposed religious charter schools on the ground that the state will then be required to fund schools promoting tenets opposed to the beliefs of most Oklahomans. (See prior posting.)

 The Oklahoman reports on these developments.

Ohio's School Choice Program Violates State Constitution

In Columbus City School District v. State of Ohio, (OH App., Oct. 15, 2026), an Ohio state appellate court held that Ohio's Education Choice Scholarship Program, which is available to almost all Ohio K-12 students, regardless of family income or quality of their public school district, violates Ohio's state Constitution. The court said in part:

EdChoice, as presently structured and funded, secures with taxpayer funds a competing system of uncommon schools that is not subject to the same obligations imposed on Ohio’s system of common schools.  This system of uncommon schools violates the mandate of Ohio Const. art. VI, § 2 to secure “a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the state.”  Although statutes are entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality, that presumption has been overcome here.  Participating non-public schools are subject to materially less extensive state oversight, they cherry-pick students from public schools, they are geographically isolated in Ohio’s urban centers, and they receive taxpayer funding in a manner that operates at the expense and detriment of Ohio’s public schools, and, consequently, the children who depend on those public schools for instruction, support, and opportunities that shape their future.

The court however stayed enforcement of its decision pending an anticipated appeal to the state Supreme Court.

AP reports on the decision.

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

• Krishna Janni & Ruchit Yadav, The Wall of Places of Worship Act, 1991 (December 09, 2025).
• Zalman Rothschild, Anti-Zionism, Antisemitism, Antidiscrimination , 6 Am. J.L. & Equal. 137 (2026).
• Abdul Aziz Meslat, The Jurisprudence Of Constitutional Conscience: Religious Exemptions, Third-Party Harms, and Equality in Modern U.S. Supreme Court Jurisprudence, (October 13, 2026).
• Cemal Yilmaz, Islamic University of Rotterdam: From Interfaith Dialogue to Pluralistic Cooperation (October 08, 2026).
• Larry Backer, Catá, God, Golem, Monster, or Instrument: Belief, Cognition, and the Covert Premises of AI Regulation, (October 10, 2026).
• Muhammad Irfan Haroon, Shiqaq Recognised: The Supreme Court on Khula, Dower and the Residuary Ground in Section 2(ix) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, (October 10, 2026).
• Bhargav Umathe, The Concept of Hiba (Gift) in Muslim Law vis-à-vis the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, (September 10, 2026).

From SmartCILP:

• Shahar Lifshitz, Nonmarriage? Rethinking Religious Marriage in Modern States, 47 Cardozo Law Review 1589-1622 (2026).

India's Supreme Court Says Backward Class Benefits Do Not Remain After Religious Conversion

In Secretary to Government v. Sameer Ahamed N., (Sup. Ct. India, Oct. 15, 2026), India's Supreme Court held that when a Hindu who is entitled to affirmative action benefits as a member of a Hindu "backward class" converts to Islam, he loses the Hindu backward class benefits. Moreover, the convert cannot acquire membership in any of the seven Notified Backward Class Muslim communities merely by converting to Islam. The court said in part:

39. Where a person was entitled to affirmative action under Article 16(4) of the Constitution by reason of the social backwardness within the Hindu social order, such entitlement is founded upon the disabilities which arose within, and were produced by, that social structure. Upon conversion to Islam or Christianity, or to any other non-Hindu social order in which caste is not recognised as the basis of social status and classification, that foundational basis ceases to operate in the same manner. The fact that the consequences of the earlier disability may continue in the form of educational deprivation, occupational disadvantage, economic hardship or other material circumstances cannot carry the antecedent social backwardness into the new religion. To permit such continuation would be to detach the consequences from the social structure which produced them and to transpose social backwardness of one religion into another religion in which such backwardness is not recognised as the basis of social classification. The constitutional benefit cannot be made to travel in this manner from the religion in which the relevant backwardness arose to a religion whose basic theological structure or otherwise does not recognise caste as its foundational basis...

41. Consequently, where a person was receiving affirmative action under Article 16(4) of the Constitution in the Hindu social order, upon conversion to Islam, Christianity or to any other non-Hindu social order brings such entitlement norms to an end.

42, The fundamental premise of G.O. dated 09.03.2024 is that a person belonging, before conversion, to a Backward Class, Most Backward Class, Denotified Community or Scheduled Caste, who thereafter embraces Islam, may be treated as a Backward Class Muslim and may be issued a community certificate under one of the seven Muslim communities notified by the State for which the State has reserved 3.5% of seats and posts for Backward Class Muslims under Tamil Nadu Act 33 of 2007.  

56. .... There is no doubt on the proposition that the issuance of a statutory community certificate is a public function, but the State cannot abdicate the statutory determination to a private body like Jamath. The responsibility for determining entitlement of a person to a statutory reservation must remain with the competent public authority...

62.. A person who converts to Islam does not, by that act alone, become a member of any one of the seven notified Backward Class Muslim communities in the State. His former caste or community status cannot automatically be transposed into the Muslim Backward Class category, nor can a private religious body conclusively determine such statutory entitlement....

The Economic Times reports on the decision.

3rd Circuit: Chilling Effect of Unadopted Proposal Does Not Give Standing for Free Exercise or Establishment Clause Claim

In Bagal v. Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, (3rd Cir., Oct. 14, 2026), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal for lack of standing of a suit alleging that Rutgers University discriminated against Hindus. The court said in part:

Bagal’s complaint stemmed from an August 2024 report issued by a Rutgers University Task Force ... which recommended that the university include “caste” as a protected category in Rutgers’ Policy on Discrimination and Harassment...  Rutgers did not adopt the Report’s recommendation and did not add caste to the Policy because Rutgers concluded that caste-based discrimination was already covered by the Policy’s prohibition of discrimination based on religion, ancestry, national origin, and race.... 

...  Bagal’s alleged injury for his First Amendment free exercise claim is that he has been inhibited from practicing his religious beliefs.  But he cannot establish standing “simply by claiming [he] experienced a ‘chilling effect’ that resulted from a governmental policy that does not regulate, constrain, or compel any action on [his] part.”...  Because the Report has not been adopted into Policy, has not been enforced, and has not been discussed by the defendants in any of Bagal’s engagements with them, he also lacks standing for his Establishment Clause claim....

Bagal similarly lacks standing for his Equal Protection, Due Process, and remaining statutory discrimination claims....

Judge May Not Bar Parents from Influencing Child's Religious Participation When There Is No Threat of Harm to Child

In Lajara v. McMenamin, (PA Super. Ct., Oct. 14, 2026), a mother appealed an order entered by a Pennsylvania trial court awarding limited joint legal custody to both parents of their 11-year-old child. The appellate court vacated the portion of the trial court's final custody order that prohibits either parent from influencing, restricting or limiting their child's participation in religious services, events or activities. The order also provides that the child may decline to attend any religious service, event or activity once the child reaches the age of 14. Neither parent had asked the trial court to enter an order regarding religious exercise, but the trial judge did so because "the tumultuous history of this case does not produce any optimism on the part of this trial court that they will be able to communicate and cooperate if religious participation becomes an issue.  As such, it is in … Child’s best interests to preemptively place parameters on his attendance and participation in religious activities…. " The appellate court rejected that reasoning, saying in part:

... [T]he restrictions set forth in paragraph 111 are contrary to our case law since there is no indication the parties’ religious beliefs or practices present a “grave threat of harm,” “a substantial threat of present or future, physical or emotional harm to the child[,]” or that the physical or mental health, or safety of the child would be jeopardized absent a restriction....  Consistent with precedent, both parents shall be permitted to practice his or her religion with Child during their respective periods of custody, so long as there is no substantial threat of present or future physical or emotional harm to Child.

Britain Issues Statistics on Hate Crimes in 2025-26

On October 8, the United Kingdom's Home Office released the Official Statistics on Hate Crimes in England and Wales for the Year Ending March 2026. The total number of hate crimes was 146,825, up 7% from the prior year. Religion-based hate crimes for 2025-26 totaled 11,419, up 13% from the prior year. The largest number of religion-based hate crimes targeted Muslims-- 5,132, up 15% from the prior year. The next largest number targeted Jewish individuals-- 3,162, up 10% from the prior year.  However, based on the rate per 10,000 population, anti-Muslim hate crimes were 13 per 10,000. Anti-Jewish hate crimes were 117 per 10,000. By far, the largest number of hate crimes-- 73.5%-- were racially motivated. [Thanks to Law & Religion UK for the lead.]

California Requires Employers to Provide Anti-Hate Speech Training to Employees

On September 27, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed A.B. 1803 (full text) which amends Cal. Gov. Code §12950.1 to require that beginning January 1, 2028, employers must provide anti-hate speech training to employees every two years. The training must provide supervisors and employees with "practical guidance on recognizing, reporting, and confronting workplace speech that vilifies, humiliates, or incites hatred against people based on"  race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, reproductive health decision making, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age, sexual orientation, or veteran or military status. The training requirement applies to any employer having five or more employees. Calif. Gov. Code §12926(d), however, provides that "employer" as used in these civil rights provisions does not include a non-profit religious association of corporation. 

ReligiousLiberty.tv discusses the impact of the new provisions on religious organizations.