Arizona Supreme Court Defines Elements of Clergy-Penitent Privilege

In Rodriguez-Ramirez v. State of Arizona, (AZ Sup. Ct., Aug. 12, 2026), the Arizona Supreme Court held that a conversation which the pastor of a Phoenix church had with his co-pastor in which the pastor discussed a sexual impropriety he committed was not a "confession" and so was not protected by Arizona's Clergy-Penitent Privilege statute.

The Arizona Supreme Court adopted a 4-part test to determine whether the privilege applies: (1) Is the person who received the confession a clergyman or priest as defined by the church's customs and laws. This is not limited to members of religious organizations with ordained clergy. (2) Was the confession made while the clergyman or priest was acting in his professional capacity? (3) Was the confession made in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which the clergyman or priest belongs? (4) Was the communication at issue a "confession"? The Court said in part:

Doe [v. Corporation of the President] defined “confession” consistent with the First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment Clause jurisprudence, as “a confidential acknowledgment or admission of a crime, sin, or fault to a member of the clergy, priest, or Christian Science practitioner for the purpose of absolution.” ... We construe ”absolution” by its function, not by denomination.  A confession need not follow a formal sacramental rite; it is enough that the penitent discloses a crime, sin, or fault to a member of the clergy while seeking spiritual absolution, consolation, or guidance....  The dispositive question is not whether the penitent’s tradition observes a rite of absolution, but whether the communication sought spiritual absolution, consolation, or guidance.  Accordingly, a party invoking the Clergy-Penitent Privilege must first establish that the communication constitutes a confession....  Only if that threshold requirement is satisfied do we consider the remaining requirements governing the privilege.

Applying this definition does not require the kind of doctrinal analysis we held impermissible in Doe....  The test we describe here does not run afoul of that holding.  A factfinder applying our definition does not assess whether a communication satisfies any particular faith’s theological requirements; it asks only whether the communication sought spiritual absolution, consolation, or guidance.  That question is factual—it asks what the communication was for, not whether it complied with the tenets of any religion—and it therefore does not implicate the constitutional concerns identified in Doe....

The superior court reasonably found that the discussion centered on protecting Rodriguez-Ramirez’s reputation, addressing church administration, and minimizing the legal and practical consequences of the allegations made against him.  The discussion even turned to the logistics of Rodriguez-Ramirez’s flight from law enforcement, in case Padron’s efforts to dissuade the victim’s parents from pursuing charges failed.  The record contains reasonable evidence supporting those findings, and the court of appeals therefore erred in declining to defer to them. 

Collectively, those findings establish that Rodriguez-Ramirez neither sought absolution from Padron nor intended that their communication remain confidential.  His communication with Padron, therefore, did not constitute a confession as defined in Doe. 

DOJ's Title VI Suit Against Harvard Is Dismissed

 As previously reported, in March the Justice Department filed suit against Harvard University alleging discrimination against Jewish and Israeli students in violation of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Among other things, the suit sought injunctive relief, cutting off of future payments under existing grants to Harvard and recovery of all grant payments made to the University during the period that Title VI violations occurred. Now in United States v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, (D MA, Aug. 13, 2026), a Massachusetts federal district court dismissed the government's suit.  It found injunctive relief inappropriate, saying in part:

The Amended Complaint focuses almost entirely on incidents that took place during the 2023-2024 school year.  Only three incidents are alleged to have occurred after this period, all of which took place nearly a full year later (and more than one full academic year before this case was filed) in March of 2025.  Without diminishing any concern arising from these occurrences, the court finds them, singly and collectively, to be too isolated and episodic to support a plausible inference that any institutionalized noncompliance with Title VI persists at Harvard to this day....

It found cutting off of grants inappropriate, saying in part: 

... [T]he controlling statute unequivocally authorizes the Government to take action only if and after it “has advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means.”...  The Government provided the requisite notice underlying this action on June 30, 2025.... [T]he Amended Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations plausibly establishing that any events that might be construed as evidence of noncompliance occurred after June 30, 2025.

... Congress’s intent was not to penalize a wayward funding recipient but instead to incentivize it to bring itself into compliance with Title VI....

Harvard Crimson reports on the decision.

Certiorari Petition Seeks Overruling of Locke v Davey

 A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed Tuesday with the U.S. Supreme Court seeking review of the 4th Circuit's decision in Hall v. Fleming.  In the case, the U.S. 4th Circuit upheld the constitutionality of a Virginia Tuition Assistance Grant Program that denies grants to undergraduate students studying in programs that provide religious training or theological education.  The petition for review asks the Supreme Court to overrule its 2004 decision in Locke v. Davey, the precedent on which the 4th Circuit relied in upholding Virginia's program.

ADF announced the filing in a press release that said in part that Josh Davey, who was the respondent in Locke v. Davey, is a co-counsel in this appeal.

Fellowship of Christian Athletes Sues to Challenge School's Ban on Outside Adults at Student Religious Club Meetings

Suit was filed this week in a New Jersey federal district court by the Fellowship of Christian Athletes (FCA) challenging a New Jersey school district's ban on outside adults attending on-campus meetings of student religious groups. The ban was put in place after a complaint from the Freedom from Religion Foundation.  Fellowship of Christian Athletes organizes student chapters called "huddles" in which students pray, engage in Bible study, support one another in their faith and athletics, and eat pizza. FCA staff and adult volunteers also attend the huddles. The complaint (full text) in Fellowship of Christian Athletes v. Board of Education of the Hopewell Valley Regional School District, (D NJ, filed 8/11/2026), alleges in part:

... [T]he District’s new religious-clubs-only volunteer ban does indeed discriminate against religious clubs and single them out for disfavored treatment. While FFRF had claimed that FCA’s adult supporters were being given “unique access” to students, this is simply false. The District expressly permits adult visitors on its campuses for a variety of different reasons. And other non-religious student groups are allowed to—and regularly do—take advantage of this permission as a matter of course....

... FCA’s student leaders want to meet with fellow students and adult volunteers on campus so they can model to fellow students and coaches what it looks like to follow Christ in their school communities—something they cannot do if they’re forced to meet elsewhere.  

Having adult staff and volunteers present on campus is also critical to FCA’s religious mission because it allows FCA to see how student leaders are doing and give the students invited feedback and guidance....

Plaintiffs allege that the school's action violates their free exercise, free speech and equal protection rights as well as the federal Equal Access Act and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. 

Becket Fund issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Massachusetts Liberalizes Access to Late Term Abortions

On Monday, Massachusetts Governor Maura Healey signed H.5595, titled An Act Prioritizing Patient Access To Care (full text). Under previous law, abortions after 24 weeks of pregnancy were permitted only where necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother, or where there is lethal fetal anomaly or grave fetal diagnosis that is incompatible with sustained life outside of the uterus. The new law instead allows abortions to be performed by physicians after 24 weeks "based upon the professional judgment of the physician." It provides further that "no medical review process shall override the professional judgment of a treating physician and a patient or the patient’s health care proxy to provide an abortion.... " And it eliminates the requirement that abortions after 24 weeks be performed in a hospital authorized to provide obstetrical services.

A press release from the Governor's office says in part:

The legislation updates Massachusetts' abortion law by allowing physicians to rely on their professional medical judgment, consistent with accepted standards of care, when providing abortion care later in pregnancy. The law is intended to ensure that patients facing devastating fetal diagnoses, serious pregnancy complications or other complex medical circumstances can receive timely care without unnecessary legal uncertainty.

NBC Boston reports on the new law.

UPDATE: The conservative political action organization CatholicVote has issued a Public Statement (full text) urging the Catholic bishops of Massachusetts to declare that Governor Healey has incurred automatic excommunication for signing the abortion bill.

Suit Challenges Illinois End of Life Options Act

Suit was filed yesterday in an Illinois federal district court by four Catholic doctors, a Catholic bishop and a Lutheran skilled nursing facility objecting to the requirement that they comply with Illinois' recently enacted End of Life Options Act. The complaint (full text) in Kirchoff v. Treto, (ND IL, filed 8/11/2026), alleges in part:

... Illinois’s “End-of-Life Options” Act ...—which takes effect on September 12th—both legalizes assisted suicide and mandates that doctors who conscientiously object to it nonetheless promote its alleged “benefits” to “terminally ill” patients and, if requested, refer or transfer those patients to someone who is “able and willing” to help them commit suicide..... 

Illinois’s conscription of objecting practitioners into its new assisted suicide regime blatantly violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Indeed, EOLO plainly compels or restricts speech based on content and viewpoint by requiring such practitioners to (a) discuss assisted suicide’s alleged “benefits” and make specific “referrals” for the same....

EOLO also violates the First Amendment right of expressive association by forcing health care entities to hire and otherwise associate with health care professionals who promote or even directly participate in assisted suicide. 

EOLO additionally violates the First Amendment’s protection for the free exercise of religion and church autonomy. Put simply, requiring only a narrow class of “health care professionals” to discuss the “benefits” of and “refer” for assisted suicide with respect only to “terminally ill” patients, contrary to those professionals’ deeply held religious beliefs, is neither neutral nor generally applicable. And requiring health care entities to hire and retain employees who promote and even participate in assisted suicide violates the internal governance of religious institutions in deciding whom they authorize to carry out their religious mission to save and promote the dignity of every patient’s life....

Thomas More Society issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Court Grants Reconsideration in Free Exercise Challenge to School's Policy on Student Social Transitioning

In Mead v. Rockford Public School District, (WD MI, Aug. 7, 2026), a Michigan federal district court granted a motion for reconsideration of its earlier decision which held that parents' free exercise rights are not violated by a school's policy that encourages teachers and staff to use a student's preferred name and pronouns and does not necessarily require disclosure of this to the student's parents.  The court relied on the Supreme Court's shadow docket opinion in Mirabelli v. Bonta in granting reconsideration. The court said in part:

Like the policies at issue in Mirabelli, the policies here likely created a substantial burden on the Meads’ free-exercise rights.  The Meads share religious beliefs similar to the parents in Mirabelli about the permanency of biological sex and the fixed relationship between sex and gender.  At the time of the alleged violation, the Meads’ child was also around the same age (seventh and eighth grades) as one of the children in Mirabelli (eighth grade).  And like the parents in Mirabelli, the Meads did not have an opportunity to opt their child out of Defendants’ policies.   

Defendants’ policies therefore trigger strict scrutiny.... 

ADF issued a press release announcing the decision.

Cert. Filed by Korean Spa That Only Admits Biological Women

A petition for review (full text) in Olympus Spa v. Armstrong, (Sup. Ct., certiorari filed 8/10/2026), was filed with the Supreme Court yesterday.  In the case, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld against 1st Amendment challenges enforcement of Washington state's anti-discrimination law. Defendant is a family-run, Christian, Korean style spa. The spa admits only "biological women", including transgender women who have received gender confirmation surgery, but excludes transgender women who have not completed that surgery. ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the certiorari petition.

6th Circuit: Inmate's Requests to Observe Ramadan Fast Did Not Meet Requirements of Prison Rules

In Perry v. Curtis, (6th Cir., Aug. 5, 2026), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a RLUIPA claim by a Michigan inmate who was denied arrangements for a religious fast for the last 10 days of Ramadan. The court said in part:

From 2016 until the end of March 2022, Perry's religious designation was listed as "Nation of Islam," which is one of three religious groups that MDOC has approved to participate in a Ramadan fast. On March 29, 2022, Perry changed his religious designation to "Melanic Islamic Faith," which is not on the list of approved religious groups and instead is considered by MDOC to be a "Security Threat Group."... 

... Perry argues that he followed the prison's policy to enable him to fast for Ramadan. That policy required a prisoner "who wants to observe a religious fast or feast [and who] has not already been approved" for one to "submit a written request to do so to the Warden or designee that shall include information"—i.e., "supporting documents"—"regarding the religion's beliefs and practices."...

The defendants met their burden of showing that Perry did not properly request a religious fast in accordance with the policy. Specifically, they presented evidence showing that, although Perry sent three separate kites concerning his desire to fast during Ramadan in 2022, none of those kites qualified as a proper request under the policy. The first kite was not a proper request for an unapproved fast because, at that time, Perry's religious designation was "Nation of Islam," a designation the MDOC had approved for participation in a Ramadan fast; thus, no additional approval was needed.... The second and third kites were not proper requests because Perry merely declared that he was "required to fast the last ten days during the Arabic month of Ramadan," and did not formally request approval to fast.,,,, Nor did the kites provide the required "supporting documents" about Perry's newly proclaimed "Melanic Islamic Declaration of Faith.....

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

• Essien Oku Essien, Cumulonimbus Cloud System and Indigenous Spirituality: A Comparative Semiotic Theology of Convective Storms in the Anthropocene, (July 30, 2026).
• Russell Powell, Framing Religious Constitutionalism, (25 Rutgers Journal of Law & Religion 63 (2026)).
• Mark Edward Blankenship Jr., IP Portfolios Within the Biblical Timeline, (July 14, 2026).
• Travis Gilly, The Selection Criterion: Attenuated Design, Sequence Evidence, and What Deregulation Cannot Explain About Federal Civil Rights Policy, (July 24, 2026).
• Amy J. Sepinwall, The New Speech-Conduct Equivalence, (July 28, 2026).
• Russell Powell, Religious Approaches to Constitutionalism: Empirical Scholarship and Exceptionalism, (July 24, 2024).
• Jaime Levin, Reframing Parental Rights in the Wake of Skrmetti, Columbia Journal of Gender and Law (forthcoming 2026-2027).
• Christian Edmonds, Mark David Hall & S. Ernie Walton, History, Tradition, and the Right of Parents to Direct the Education and Moral Formation of Their Children (July 29, 2026).
• Joseph Griffith, Is the Right of Parents to Direct Their Children's Education "Deeply Rooted" in our "History and Tradition"? , (Texas Review of Law and Politics¸ Vol. 28, No 3. (Summer 2024), 795).

From SSRN (Legal Issues in Europe, Asia and the Middle East):

• Mohammed Rida Nour, Religion and Conflict in the Middle East : Competing Narratives, Political Legitimacy, and the Erosion of the Social Contract, (June 30, 2026).
• Rob Kahn, Reforming European Hate Speech Jurisprudence (Book Review)(reviewing Natalie Alkiviadou, Hate Speech and the European Court of Human Rights, Routledge 2025), (21 Intercultural Human Rights Law Review (forthcoming)).
• Arvind P. Bhanu, Niharika Julka & Sonia Sthapak, Human Rights and Reproductive Choice: Developments in India and The United States, (March 01, 2026).
• Gergely Dezideriu, The Dynamics of  "Hate Crimes” in the Ecosystem of Discrimination and the Factors Influencing the Investigation of Acts Motivated by Discrimination in the Logic of ECtHR Case Law and Academic Perspectives. Data Set No. 2:  "Violation”, (Noua Revista de Drepturile Omului (New Human Rights Journal), 22(1), 93-120 (2026).
• Bilal Saleem, Silence and Spectacle: A Content Analysis of Religious Minority Coverage in Pakistan's English and Urdu Press, (July 6, 2026).
• 
  

From SSRN (Non-Profit Organizations):

• Mustafa Batman & Timur Kuran, The State Waqfs of Ottoman Istanbul, 1453-1923, (July 20, 2026).
• Sushil K. Jain, In the Best Interests of the Nonprofit: A Fiduciary Framework for Litigation Decision-Making, (June 10, 2026).
• Scott Hodge, Closing the $2.8 Trillion Nonprofit Business Loophole: A Tax Reform Proposal for Congress, (August 5, 2026).

From SSRN (Denomination-Specific Subjects):

• Tayson DeLengocky, D.O., Pilgrimage Under Siege: The Complete Story of Thích Minh Tuệ, Part IV—The Economy of Trust: Value without Capture in the Age of Institutional Distrust;     (Part V): Religious Freedom, System-Generated Harm, and Non-Institutional Authority in the Digital Age—Thích Minh Tuệ, the Walk for Peace, and the Future of Transnational Religious Mobility, (July 21, 2026).
• Russell Powell, The Relevance of Catholic Social Thought for Law, (23 Seattle Journal for Social Justice 1 (2025)).
• Carlos Alberto Dutra Fraga Filho, Progressive Revelation and the Omission of Information in the Process of Joining the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints: Information Omitted from Digital Religious Marketing and Door-to-Door Missionary Proselytism, Lack of Institutional Transparency, and Limited Access to Essential Information Prior to Religious Affiliation, (July 20, 2026).
• Yamin Salahi & Tanina Rostain, Brief of Amici Curiae 50 Jewish Scholars of Jewish Studies, Holocaust Studies, Middle East Studies, and Antisemitism in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Prichett v. Newsom, (N.D. Cal. San Jose Div. Dec. 9, 2025).
• Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Hindu Nationalism as Authoritarian Law, (Forthcoming, Oxford Handbook of Law and Authoritarianism (Cora Chan, Madhav Khosla, Benjamin L. Liebman, and Mark Tushnet, eds.).

From SSRN (Religion and Technology):

• Lloyd George Banda, Digital Technology and Models of Demand for and Supply of Religion: Empirical Evidence from World Values Surveys, (Cambridge Politics and Religion, Forthcoming).
• Russell Powell, Skynet and the Holy See: Magnifica Humanitas and Legal Norms for the AI Revolution, (Indiana Law Journal Supplement (forthcoming)).
• Mulima Owen, The Singularity and the Sacred: Navigating Theological Frontiers in the Age of Superintelligence, (July 28, 2026).

From SSRN (Islamic Law and Thought):

• Syed Muaz Shah, The Objectives Resolution -An Unfulfilled Objective? An Analysis of Its Constitutional and Judicial Impact in Pakistan Since 1949, (Policy Perspectives, volume 23, issue 2 (2026)).
• Muhammad Irfan Haroon, Khula in Name, Nashuz in Substance: Dower Entitlement After Arslan v. Nisha Shahid (2026 LHC 4758), (July 23, 2026).
• Abu Hayyan Saeed, Rationality, Qur'anic Thought, and Modern Secularization: A Critical and Analytical Review in the Light of International Scholars' Views, (July 22, 2026).
• Intisar A. Rabb, The Past and Future of Islamic Legal Canons, 7th-21st Century: A Storied History, An Emerging Field, (Cambridge Companion to Islamic Law, edited by Sohaira Siddiqui and Mariam Sheibani (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming)).
• Intisar A. Rabb, Testing Ordinary Meaning in Islamic Law, (August 01, 2026).
• Muhammad Sarim Tahir, Khutba No. 4 of Khutbaat-E-Bahawalpur "Islamic International Law: A Historical Analysis, Development and Systematic Codification", (September 12, 2025).
• Dr. Mohammad Tareque, Turning Qur'an 2:280 into Prudential Policy: Forbearance Rules for Non-Performing Islamic Financing, (July 28, 2026).
• Muhammad Abrar, The Concept of Torts in Islamic Jurisprudence and English Common Law: A Comparative Study of Convergence and Divergence, (July 05, 2026).
• Armine Saakyan, Definition and Meaning of Fatwa in Islamic Law, (III All-Russian Scientific and Practical Conference, (2026)).

Sex Abuse Claimants May Sue to Access Parish and School Assets in Vermont Diocese Bankruptcy

In In re Roman Catholic Diocese of Burlington Vermont, (Bkrptcy VT, July 28, 2026), a Vermont federal bankruptcy court issued an order allowing the Creditors Committee representing more than 100 sex abuse claimants to sue to attempt to recover assets of 70 Vermont parishes, Parish Trusts, schools and other Catholic-related social and community service organizations. The Committee claims that these organizations are not separate legal entities from the Diocese and that their assets should be available to satisfy creditors' judgments against the Diocese. The litigation authorized by the court will determine whether this claim is valid. The court warned however:

Regardless of its outcome, the proposed litigation will be expensive and time consuming. Unless settled, there may be years of litigation ahead and millions of dollars spent in attorneys’ fees and costs that could have been paid valid abuse claims. 

More clarity about the rights of the parties and what constitutes estate property could help the ongoing efforts to reach a global settlement in this case. For that reason, some litigation is necessary. Its cost may eventually outweigh the benefit if no settlement is reached and as one Court has recognized, “Debtor, the parishes and the abuse victims will be the poorer for it.” 

AP reports on the court's decision. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Suit Seeks Religious Accommodation to Obtain Environmentally Friendly 401(k) Option

 A suit was filed this week in a New York federal district court by an employee of Thermo Fisher Scientific alleging that the company is required under Title VII and the New York State Human Rights Law to provide plaintiff an investment option in the company's 401(k) plan that is consistent with plaintiff's religious beliefs. The complaint (full text) in Hartley v. Thermo Fisher Scientific, Inc., (WD NY, filed 8/4/2026) alleges in part:

4. Dr. Hartley sincerely holds the belief that investing his money in fossil fuels is morally wrong and in violation of his religious convictions.

5. Dr. Hartley believes his Christian faith commands him to care for and steward the earth, and that actively investing in and profiting from fossil fuel companies whose work directly harms the earth and its inhabitants violates his religious obligations. 

6. Because each of Thermo Fisher’s current equity-based retirement plan options maintains significant investments in fossil-fuel companies, Dr. Hartley is forced to either compromise his religious beliefs or forego a significant component of his employer-provided benefit. 

7. To remedy this conflict, Dr. Hartley requested that his employer provide him with an accommodation that would allow him to partake of the benefits of his 401(k) plan in a manner consistent with his faith....

44. Defendant Thermo Fisher’s failure to provide the accommodation sought (a retirement fund option that allows Dr. Hartley to invest in a manner consistent with his religious beliefs) violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended....

The complaint also contends that the company's refusal to provide the investment option sought by plaintiff amounts to religious discrimination.

ClientEarth announced the filing of the lawsuit. HR Dive reports on the lawsuit.

Montana Supreme Court: Parenting Plan May Restrict Mother from Exposing Children to Cultic Religious Beliefs

In In re the Marriage of Acacia Jensen and Timothy Jensen, (MT Sup. Ct., Aug. 4, 2026), the Montana Supreme Court in a 5-2 decision upheld a trial court's order modifying a parenting plan for a divorced couple's three children. The mother objected to various provisions in the modified plan, including a provision that the children not to be influenced by Liana Shanti or the Lemurian Mystery School. According to the court, Liana Shanti is an online based spiritual teacher and mentor who promotes the recovery of suppressed memories, and who leads the Lemurian Mystery School that believe they can recover memories of their previous lives on the lost continent of Lemuria. The modified Plan also prohibits the use of Lemurian Mystery School nicknames for the children. The court said in part:

We turn now to the claim that the nickname restriction violated Alihana’s First Amendment and fundamental parenting rights....

The evidence in the record makes it clear that Liana Shanti and her group are known to encourage followers to discover and act upon false “repressed memories” of abuse.  Once these false abusive memories are uncovered, followers are encouraged to sever ties with family and friends and become more closely involved in the group.  Here, a preponderance of evidence shows that Alihana has engaged in embracing false memories of abuse.  She has repeatedly accused Tim and her parents of abusive behavior for which no evidence exists....

... While it is a constitutional right of a parent to provide spiritual education and teaching to their child, it is not the right of a parent to inflict abusive memories upon their child, be those memories fictional or actual.  This Court ... cannot hold, then, that it is the constitutional right of a parent to expose their children to fictionalized sexual abuse....

Chief Justice Swanson, joined by Justice Shea dissented, saying in part:

... This limitation, which precludes exposure to the teachings of the Lemurian Mystery School,effectively prevents Alihana from practicing the tenets of her faith in front of her children and therefore prevents her from freely exercising her faith for days at a time....

It is worth noting the parenting plan singles out a particular faith as offensive and forbidden, thus discriminating against that religion.  Although the Lemurian Mystery school is not a mainstream religion and appears to be controversial, Alihana’s right to practice her religion is no less protected.  Had the District Court imposed equivalent restrictions on a parental adherent to Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, or Christianity, we would likely not be having this conversation.  An obscure minority faith—even or perhaps especially with abnormal beliefs—deserves the same legal protections as those mainstream systems of belief....

This parenting plan ... unduly burdens Alihana’s right to educate her children concerning her religion. ...

... [T]he Opinion spends pages reciting Alihana’s harmful conduct toward the children, Tim, and other family members, and documenting the harmful conduct of Lemurian Mystery School or Liana Shanti followers.  That proves my point.  If Alihana is engaged in such harmful conduct, then the District Court should restrict the conduct.  If it is impossible to prohibit the harmful conduct while still awarding Alihanapartial unsupervised custody, then the District Court must fashion a parenting plan in the best interests of the children, which may mean awarding full custody to Tim....