Tuesday, September 15, 2026

9th Circuit: Church Loses Challenge to Washington's Abortion Coverage Mandate

In Cedar Park Assembly of God of Kirkland, Washington v. Kuderer, (9th Cir., Sept. 14, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision (with opinions spanning 110 pages) held that Washington's Reproductive Parity Act taken together with its conscience protection law creates a neutral and generally applicable requirement as to health insurance coverage which survives a claim that the laws violate Cedar Park Church's free exercise rights. Taken together, the two laws require employee health insurance to cover abortions and contraceptives but allow employers who oppose abortion to furnish employees a policy under which the insurer, or the state health department, pays for abortion and contraception coverage. The court said in part:

... Plaintiff argues that, even if the challenged laws do not require it to purchase abortion coverage, the laws have prevented it from obtaining an abortion-excluding group health plan that is “comparable” to the one that it had before the Parity Act took effect.... 

But Plaintiff does not point to any evidence refuting the fact that, in 2019 and 2020, a different health carrier, Cigna, offered to sell Plaintiff a fully insured group health plan that excluded direct coverage for abortion....

Nevertheless, Plaintiff asserts that the conscience statute “allows carriers to force houses of worship—like [Plaintiff]—to pay for nominally ‘excluded’ abortion coverage.”  Plaintiff’s argument goes like this:  Under the conscience statute, carriers cannot deny enrollees in Plaintiff’s health plan “coverage of, and timely access to, any service or services excluded” from Plaintiff’s “benefits package,” ... 

But section 4 of the conscience statute states that “[n]othing in [the statute] requires a health carrier, health care facility, or health care provider to provide any health care services without appropriate payment of premium or fee.” ...Plaintiff contends that section 4 “empowers carriers to pass along the cost of covering abortion and [objectionable contraceptives] to houses of worship in the form of increased premiums, ‘administrative’ or ‘overhead’ expenses, or other fictitious costs.” 

Plaintiff’s conjecture is premised on a plainly erroneous and ungrammatical reading of section 4 ...

The question remains whether the challenged laws coerce Plaintiff into “facilitating access to” abortion services in violation of its religious beliefs....

Plaintiff’s belief that Providence’s plans are religiously permissible undercuts each of the three theories that Plaintiff advances, and on which the dissenting opinion relies, to assert that the challenged laws coerce Plaintiff into facilitating access to abortion, even without any indirect payment for coverage.... Plaintiff’s first theory of burden-via-facilitation posits that the challenged laws burden Plaintiff’s religious practice because Plaintiff’s purchase of a health plan is a but-for cause of its employees having access to covered abortion services....

Plaintiff’s second theory—that the challenged laws would coerce it into facilitating access to abortion under Cigna’s abortion-excluding plan because Plaintiff’s employees would use the same insurance card both for covered services and for services excluded from the plan—falls apart quickly....

Plaintiff’s third and final theory—that the challenged laws would coerce it into facilitating access to abortion because the carrier of an abortion-excluding plan would provide notice to enrollees about how to obtain access to covered abortion services outside the plan—fails for a similar reason....

 Because the challenged laws are neutral and generally applicable, rational basis review applies, and we “must” uphold the laws if they are “rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.”...

Plaintiff does not contest that the challenged laws “easily satisf[y] that forgiving standard.”

Judge Callahan's 47-page dissent says in part:

The Parity Act burdens Cedar Park’s exercise of religion.  It does so by effectively placing religiously coercive conditions upon a State-controlled privilege: the ability to procure a State-approved group health plan....

The problem with the majority’s position is that it fails to recognize the core distinction between Cedar Park’s former Kaiser plan and any Parity Act-compliant health plan that Cedar Park could obtain... —even if the plans are financially comparable, the new plan under the Parity Act must still provide plan enrollees with access to abortion services....  As far as Cedar Park is concerned, this basic fact—that no Parity Act-compliant plan can actually exclude abortion coverage—makes any Parity Act-compliant plan that Cedar Park could purchase insufficiently comparable to its prior Kaiser plan....

The record strongly suggests that the law operates as a counter to federal regulations that expanded employers’ religious exemptions from paying for or facilitating abortion services in their group health care plans.  In my view, the evidence at minimum raises a serious dispute as to that question, making summary judgment inappropriate.  And while Washington’s overt motivation may not have been specifically hostile towards religion, that does not necessarily make the Parity Act neutral towards religion....

 In addition to its lack of neutrality, the Parity Act is not generally applicable and therefore requires strict scrutiny review for this reason as well....

Imam's Contract and Defamation Claims Dismissed on Ecclesiastical Abstention Grounds

In Ahmed v. American Muslim Diversity Association, (MI App., Sept. 11, 2026), a Michigan state appellate court upheld the dismissal on ecclesiastical abstention grounds of defamation, breach of contract and related claims filed by an assistant Imam against his mosque and its board of trustees. The court said in part:

According to Ahmed, beginning in 2021 the individual defendants engaged in a “smear campaign” against him by falsely accusing him of lying while performing his duties as a religious leader and refusing to lead certain prayers.  He also alleged that defendants disparaged his character by discussing his recent divorce and the allegations of domestic violence that had been made against him....

The trial court correctly determined that resolution of Ahmed’s breach-of-contract claim would require the court to delve into ecclesiastical matters.  The contract stated that the board of trustees reserved the right to cancel the contract “if there are any violation [sic] in contractual agreement, any activities against principles of Islam, or any activity subversive to the mission and objective of AMDA by the Qa’ari Imam as determined by the Board of Trustees.”  Although the board of trustees determined the domestic-violence allegations could not be substantiated, it may have also determined that Ahmed violated the contract or engaged in activity contrary to the principles of Islam or subversive to AMDA’s mission and objective.  The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine precluded the trial court from examining and second-guessing the decision of the board of trustees that it would be best for AMDA if Ahmed no longer served as an assistant Imam....

... Ahmed alleged that defendants falsely stated he was not so qualified and lacked the character required and expected of an assistant Imam.  ... [T]his Court will not second-guess a religious entity’s investigation and evaluation of allegations involving its leaders or its method of communicating matters relevant to such allegations.  Because Ahmed’s intentional infliction of emotional distress and concert of action claims also involve evaluating defendants’ decisions and method of reaching their decisions, those claims fail for the same reasons.  Accordingly, the trial court did not err by granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition with respect to Ahmed’s tort claims.

Monday, September 14, 2026

In Covid Vaccine Case, 9th Circuit Concurrence Argues for Overruling Smith v. Employment Division

In Lewis-Williams v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District, (9th Cir., Sept. 11, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a jury's verdict against the Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART). The jury found BART failed to show that accommodating employees' religious objections to the Covid vaccine would have imposed undue hardship on BART. The jury awarded 6 former employees $7.8 million in damages. The court said in part:

Given that BART is not in the health and safety business, that the Six Former Employees all had roles that required minimal close-quarters interaction with other individuals, and that no evidence suggests that the Six Former Employees were unable or unwilling to wear a mask or take similar precautions, substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict....

Because we affirm the jury’s verdict on the Six Former Employees’ Title VII and FEHA claims, we need not address the now-moot conditional cross-appeal of the order granting summary judgment for BART on their Free Exercise claim....

Judge Nelson filed a lengthy concurring opinion focusing on plaintiffs' free exercise claim, saying in part:

... The district court concluded that BART’s review process did not violate general applicability under Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), because the review process did not allow “unfettered discretion permitting discretionary treatment of religion....

The real problem is that Smith is demonstrably erroneous....

Smith is inconsistent with history and tradition.  The Free Exercise Clause represented a powerful promise in 1791: the federal government would not interfere with the exercise of Americans’ religious faith....    Sadly, Smith shirked relevant history and tossed the fullness of the Constitution’s free-exercise protections to the wayside for its regime of neutral and general applicability.   

This constitutional guarantee should one day be vindicated, and Smith should be relegated to the annals of history alongside other demonstrably erroneous precedents....

Underlying the district court’s conclusion is a deep circuit split.  The Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits agree with our view that discretion—rather than unfettered discretion—can suffice to render a government policy not generally applicable..... On the other side, the Second and Tenth Circuits hold that if exemption policies do not grant “unfettered” discretion and exemptions are “objectively defined,” those policies remain generally applicable....

In part, the reason discretionary mechanisms in government policies trigger strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause is because of the inherent hostility the administrative state has historically demonstrated against religion.  “Religious discrimination is structurally embedded within administrative power”—even if unintentionally— because agency administrators, like those at BART, necessarily predicate their operations on an ethos of rationalism and secularism....

A mechanism that allows agency administrators to exercise discretion, individually judge the religious beliefs of dissenters, and grant exemptions necessarily means such a policy is not generally applicable....

The Fourteenth Amendment framed Free Exercise as a right that allowed for exemptions to neutral and generally applicable laws.  In doing so, the Radical Republicans sought to allow freedom of religion to extend to areas where such rights were sidelined for ostensibly neutral and generally applicable laws. 

The Reconstruction Framers sought to combat generally applicable laws in the antebellum South that made it a crime to disseminate anti-slavery religious ideas and teach African Americans how to read....

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

From SmartCILP:

Friday, September 11, 2026

President Sends Rosh Hashanah Greetings

Rosh Hashanah begins this evening at sundown. Today the White House posted a Presidential Message (full text) offering greetings to the Jewish community on the occasion. The Message reads:

Melania and I send our warmest greetings to the entire Jewish community on Rosh Hashanah—the Jewish New Year and the first of the High Holy Days.

The Jewish community around the world marks the anniversary of when the Almighty created Adam and Eve and the story of humanity began.  These two days open a solemn season of prayer, repentance, and spiritual renewal in preparation for Yom Kippur. 

My Administration reaffirms our steadfast commitment to ushering in a historic renewal of faith across our country, eliminating the scourge of anti-Semitism, and defending the sacred right of religious liberty for every single American.

May you be inscribed in the Book of Life. Wishing you a Happy, Healthy, and Sweet New Year!

Court Enjoins Enforcement Against Synagogue's Voluntary Security Team of Ban on Firearms in Houses of Worship

In Silver Spring Jewish Center, Inc. v. Montgomery County, Maryland, (D MD, Sept. 10, 2026), a Maryland federal district court granted a preliminary injunction barring enforcement against plaintiffs of Montgomery County's ban on possession of firearms in their place of worship. The court however refused to issue a broader injunction against other portions of the Ordinance.  Silver Spring Jewish Center is an Orthodox synagogue that has implemented its own security plan which includes a trained, armed security team made up of volunteer synagogue members. The county Ordinance impacts those volunteers and also prevents the synagogue's rabbi who walks to synagogue on the Sabbath for religious reasons from carrying a firearm because he walks past other places of public assembly. The court concluded that a portion of the Ordinance likely violates both the Second Amendment and the 1st Amendment's Free Exercise clause. The court said in part:

... [T]he sources on which Defendants rely do not demonstrate that the historical analogues for firearm restrictions in places of worship were well-accepted....

Therefore, SSJC and Rabbi Shapiro, at this preliminary stage, have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits as to their as-applied Second Amendment claim of the Code’s firearm restrictions as to places of worship....

SSJC and Rabbi Shapiro allege that “[h]alachically, reliance on volunteer members of the community, rather than outsourcing the religious obligation to others, is preferred under Jewish Law” and cite the following sources in support: Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Kiddushin 41a; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 250:1....

... The beliefs of SSJC and Rabbi Shapiro are sincere.  Accordingly, at this stage, SSJC and Rabbi Shapiro have demonstrated a burden on their sincere religious practice. Because SSJC and Rabbi Shapiro have shown a burden on their religious exercise, the next step is to evaluate whether the law is neutral and generally applicable....

... [B]ecause the challenged provisions of Chapter 57 apply differently as to places of worship in comparison to not only fraternal lodges, but numerous other privately owned businesses and properties, these portions of the Code are not neutral and generally applicable....

Overall, Plaintiffs demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits as to their as-applied Free Exercise challenge to Section 57-1(1)(B) and Section 57-11(a) regarding the restriction of firearms in their respective place of worship....

The claim regarding all buffer zones, however, fails at this stage.  Because Rabbi Shapiro must walk to the synagogue on certain days, and thus cannot avail himself of the provisions in Section 57-10—which allows vehicle transportation of firearms even within 100 yards of a place of assembly ...he contends that the buffer zones for other places of public assembly suffer from the same constitutional infirmities as the ban on firearm possession within a place of worship.  That does not necessarily follow.  A different provision is at work—one that applies to all designated places of public assembly.  The 100-yard restriction is a neutral and generally applied provision and only a rational basis must be shown. 

SSJC and Rabbi Shapiro allege that the prohibition on carrying firearms at houses of worship violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by “telling religious institutions what items worshippers may ‘possess’ in places of worship and how religious institutions may (and may not) protect worshippers during their worship.” ...  Plaintiffs argue that the choice of how a religious institution protects itself is an internal management matter that is “essential to [its] central mission.”...

... [A] single trial court decision is an insufficient basis on which to conclude that a religious organization’s need to provide security translates into the absolute right to provide that security through an armed volunteer group.  In any event, at this early stage, with the likelihood of success findings on the other First Amendment claim and the Second Amendment claim as to houses of worship, it is not necessary to proceed further on this claim....

Links to some of the pleadings in the case are available here. New Civil Liberties Alliance issued a press release announcing the decision.

LDS Church Not Negligent in Failure to Act Against Sex Abuse by Church Elder Against His Daughter

In Doe v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, (D OR, Sept. 8, 2026), an Oregon federal district court dismissed negligence claims against the LDS Church brought by the survivor of sexual abuse perpetrated by her father, Craig Ford, while he was an Elder in the Church. Plaintiff was adopted by the Ford family in 2014 and Craig Ford began sexually abusing her a year later when she was 15 years old. In April 2016, Jennifer Ford reported her husband's misconduct” to an LDS Stake President. In February 2017, an LDS bishop was informed about allegations against Craig and that he was living alone with his daughter. No LDS official took any action. The court said in part:

Plaintiff argues that there are several sources that create a duty that required Defendants to protect her from her father’s abuse: (1) common law ordinary negligence; (2) special relationship or circumstances, including a statutory duty to report and negligent performance of an undertaking; and (3) a failure to warn.... However, Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to show Defendants owed Plaintiff a legal duty to protect her from abuse by her father that occurred outside of any church function or facility....

Plaintiff unconvincingly argues that Defendants’ failure to act was in fact an affirmative action that created a foreseeable risk of additional sexual, verbal, mental, and emotional abuse.  No reasonable factfinder could agree based on the alleged facts....

Because Plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient for an ordinary negligence claim, she must allege the existence of a special relationship or special circumstances that imposed a duty on Defendants....

An allegation of church membership by itself does not create a special relationship.... 

While at times Plaintiff was under the supervision of Defendants, she does not allege that any of the abuse she suffered occurred during those times of supervision. Any special duty of care that existed when Plaintiff was under the control of Defendants ended when she returned to her father’s custody....

... And Plaintiff does not point to controlling authority that convinces this Court that Oregon’s reporting statutes alone are sufficient to manufacture a negligence claim under a special negligence theory....

If Plaintiff’s claim was permitted to advance, any well-intentioned entity with generalized policies aimed at preventing and responding to sexual abuse could be subject to liability for harm caused outside their supervisory control. Plaintiff’s preferred understanding of negligence law would likely discourage such entities from developing or maintaining any sexual abuse-related policies at all. This Court is not willing at this time to test such a prediction....

Finally, Plaintiff asserts that because Defendants had specialized knowledge of the abuse and its severe, foreseeable consequences, they had a duty to warn Plaintiff of long-term emotional and psychological injuries resulting from continued abuse....

... [A] trier of fact could not reasonably find that a warning from Defendants would have prevented the harm. Plaintiff already knew of the harm (e.g., continued sexual abuse by her father) by the time Defendants learned about the abuse. Moreover, government authorities were already investigating the alleged abuse by the time Defendants first learned about it....

[Thanks to Eugene Volokh via Religionlaw for the lead.]

Thursday, September 10, 2026

Religious Greetings at Gate of Air Force Base Provokes Controversy with Defense Secretary

 A new controversy over religion in the military has erupted between Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and the advocacy group Military Religious Freedom Foundation (MRFF). According to an MRFF, by Sept. 2 it had received 27 complaints from military personnel at Kirtland Air Force Base that guards at the base entrance were greeting everyone entering with "God bless you." MRFF in turn complained to the Air Base and the greetings stopped.

Responding on Sept. 4 with posts on X, Secretary of War Hegseth said:

The MRFF is a radical anti-Christian, pro-atheist group that attacks any/all faith inside the @DeptofWar. We will never cave to them. The @usairforce will confront this.

And Air Force Chief of Staff, General Ken Wilsbach posted:

Defenders at our gates not only protect our installations by also welcome everyone entering courteously and professionally. The Department of the Air Force's Policies are unchanged. We are not restricting the use of common greetings while entering our bases.

Military.com reports on the controversy.

Maine's Compulsory School Vaccination Law Upheld

In We the Patriots USA, Inc. v. Makin, (D ME, Sept. 8, 2026), a Maine federal district court rejected free exercise and Establishment Clause challenges to Maine's compulsory vaccination law for school children. Plaintiff contended that Maine's removal of religious exemptions from the law render it unconstitutional. The court said in part:

Plaintiffs argue 20-A M.R.S. § 6355 is neither neutral nor generally applicable and, separately, that even if it is neutral and generally applicable, it substantially interferes with Mr. Childs’s right to direct his son’s religious upbringing .... 

... [W]hen the Maine Legislature repealed the religious and philosophical beliefs exemption in 2019, it repealed all personal belief exemptions, “and thus did not single out religion alone.” ... Neither the Legislature’s choice to eliminate certain exemptions, nor the process by which it did so, demonstrates hostility to religion....

... [T]he medical exemption serves rather than undermines Maine’s interest in health and safety. ...

Second, the medical exemption is bounded in a way a religious exemption is not. It rests on an individualized, evidence-based judgment from a licensed provider—subject to professional discipline—and statewide medical exemption rates have stayed below 1.5% in every surveyed grade cohort since 2018....

... [B]ecause Plaintiffs have identified neither a comparable secular activity treated more favorably than religious conduct nor a mechanism for individualized exemptions, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on their claim that § 6355 is not generally applicable. ...

Mr. Childs ... argue[s] that § 6355 burdens his right to direct his son’s religious upbringing because compliance would require him to authorize a vaccination he considers an act of sin, thereby undermining his ability to instruct his son in their shared faith and its demands.... On this record, the Court finds that Mr. Childs holds this belief sincerely. Even so, Plaintiffs have not shown that the burden Mr. Childs describes shares the same character of the burden Yoder, Mahmoud, and Mirabelli address. Those cases do not measure a burden by how heavily it presses on the parent who bears it. They measure whether the State has stepped into the relationship between parent and child to compete for the child’s own beliefs. In each case, the challenged practice reached the child directly, through the school itself, by exposing the child to—or facilitating—values contrary to those the parents sought to instill.....

5th Circuit Hears Arguments on Ending Mailing of Mifepristone While Litigation Over FDA Rule Moves Forward

The U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals yesterday heard oral arguments in State of Louisiana v. FDA, (5th Cir., argued 9/9/2026) (audio of full oral arguments). In the case, Louisiana challenged the FDA's 2023 ruling that removed the requirement that the abortion drug mifepristone be prescribed only after an in-person visit with a doctor. Initial skirmishing that went up to the Supreme Court focused on whether a court would freeze the FDA's 2023 ruling while litigation went forward. The 5th Circuit had barred telehealth prescribing and mail order delivery of the abortion drug mifepristone while it considered the case. The Supreme Court granted a stay of the 5th Circuit's order. In yesterday's argument, Louisiana again asked the 5th Circuit to issue an order under 5 USC §705(a) that would suspend while appeals move forward the FDA's removal of the requirement for in-person dispensing of the abortion drug.

Courthouse News Service reports on the arguments.

Wednesday, September 09, 2026

EEOC Outlines Its Progress in Fighting Religious Discrimination

On Monday, the EEOC issued a press release (full text) titled EEOC Delivers on Administration Priorities and President Trump’s Executive Orders. A significant portion of the release is devoted to the EEOC's protection of religious freedom since the beginning of the Trump Administration. The press release says in part:

Since January 2025, the EEOC has filed 16 religious discrimination lawsuits and recovered over $63 million on behalf of religious workers via public and private pre-litigation voluntary resolutions, as well as litigation settlements.

It goes on to detail over 30 cases involving anti-Christian bias or antisemitism in which the EEOC since January 2025 has filed suit or in which it has obtained a significant settlement in conciliation proceedings or after filing suit or in which it has obtained a favorable court judgment.

Other portions of the press release deal with the EEOC's attacks on DEI-related race and sex discrimination; its protection of American workers from preferences for foreign workers; protection of women's sex-based rights at work; and reform of the complaint process for federal workers.

Supreme Court Review Sought in Denial of Religious Exemption from Vaccine Requirement for Student Attending Online School

A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed last week with the U.S. Supreme Court in Perry v. Marteney, (Sup.Ct., cert. filed 9/4/2026). In the case, the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, held that West Virginia's law that requires children attending school in the state to be vaccinated against a number of infectious diseases may be constitutionally applied to a student attending the state's online public school over the religious objections of the student's parents, even though the vaccination requirement does not apply to home schooled children or those educated in learning pods or in microschools. The 4th Circuit said in part: "[T]he Perrys do not allege that K.P.’s desire to attend the Virtual Academy is religiously motivated, so this is merely an instance of West Virginia treating some secular activity more favorably than other secular activity...." (See prior posting.) ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the petition for review.

Tuesday, September 08, 2026

New Jersey Expands Protections for Providers and Recipients of Reproductive Health Care; Catholic Conference Provides Guidance for Protesters

On August 20, New Jersey Governor Mikie Sherrill signed S2260 (full text) into law. The governor's press release announcing the signing of the bill describes it:

The legislation, S2260/A2218, signed today expands existing protections for reproductive healthcare patients and providers. New protections include:

Helping patients physically access care by making it a crime to injure, threaten, intimidate, or physically block patients or providers, or to damage property in an effort to interfere with reproductive healthcare services;

Empowering patients and providers by allowing them to take legal action against individuals who interfere with their access to or delivery of protected care; and

Protecting healthcare providers from professional penalties or adverse actions involving their medical malpractice insurance for providing reproductive healthcare that is legal in New Jersey. 

The legislation also expands New Jersey’s shield laws by expressly including gender-affirming care in the definition of protected reproductive healthcare services. This extends existing protections to patients seeking and providers delivering gender-affirming care in New Jersey. These protections include:

Protecting patient information related to reproductive healthcare from disclosure without prior authorization, as provided by law;

Restricting State entities from assisting certain out-of-state investigations or legal proceedings that seek to impose liability for providing or receiving protected reproductive healthcare; and

Protecting professional licenses by preventing licensing boards from taking action against a provider solely for providing protected reproductive healthcare.

In response, the New Jersey Catholic Conference has issued guidance for anti-abortion protesters in a document titled FAQs Regarding S2260 & Pro-life Activities. It advises in part:

Our call to be a peaceful, prayerful presence for mothers and their children has not changed. This new law does not stop you from praying, witnessing, or offering help outside a facility — it simply draws a clear line around a small set of specific actions. You are encouraged to be aware of that line, stay confidently on the right side of it, and continue this important ministry without fear....

YOU ARE FREE TO: Stand and pray on the public sidewalk; Hold signs; Offer a pamphlet or speak to someone once, as they approach; Sing, read Scripture, or hold a peaceful, stationary vigil; Film, photograph, or post about your own vigil

SIMPLY AVOID: Blocking or standing in a driveway, entrance, or exit; Following or continuing to talk to someone after they say no; Touching, grabbing, or making physical contact with anyone; Threatening, or using/threatening force against, anyone; Physically stopping someone from moving; Making it difficult for someone to access the facility; Damaging the facility's or anyone's property....

Monday, September 07, 2026

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

From SSRN (Legal Issues in Europe, Asia, Africa, South America):

From SmartCILP: