Ministry Loses Challenge to Ban on Sex Offenders Living Near Places That Children Gather

In Hope Prison Ministries v. City of Fort Worth, Texas, (ND TX, Aug. 14, 2026), a Christian ministry that operates transitional housing for former inmates, including sex offenders, challenged a Fort Worth Ordinance that bars registered child sex offenders from residing within 2,000 feet of any premises where children regularly gather. Apparently, this restriction makes it difficult for HPM to locate appropriate housing. Rejecting plaintiff's claim under the Fair Housing Act, the court said in part:

While Plaintiff may house individuals with a disability apart from them being a child sex offender, Plaintiff fails to identify any provision in the Ordinance that discriminates against persons on the basis of a qualifying disability.

The court rejected plaintiff's free exercise claim, saying in part:

Here, Plaintiff fails to plead any facts showing that the Ordinance is not “neutral” or “generally applicable.”....  A plain reading of the Ordinance shows the restriction is not aimed at any religious practice—it is aimed at protecting children from the risks associated with having child sex offenders near areas where children gather. This neither facially discriminates against adherents of any particular faiths nor targets any religious conduct. Moreover, the Ordinance is generally applicable because it does not restrict housing based on any religious or secular conditions. The Ordinance applies universally to residences under the Ordinance’s jurisdiction. Thus, all conduct—secular and religious—is limited equally, without consideration of any religious commitments or individual exceptions....

The court rejected plaintiff's equal protection claim, saying that "sex offenders are not a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause." It rejected plaintiff's RLUIPA claim, saying that the challenged Ordinance is not a land use regulation. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim under the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

4th Circuit Rejects DHS's Elimination of Protection Against Immigration Raids at Churches

In Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, (4th Cir., Aug. 18, 2026), the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a Maryland federal district court's preliminary injunction that rejected DHS's 2025 rescission of a long-standing policy that severely limited immigration enforcement actions at or near houses of worship. The suit was brought by Quaker, Sikh and Baptist housed of worship. The court said in part:

Among other things, DHS’s new policy removed guidelines requiring that immigration officers weigh various considerations before conducting enforcement actions at these sensitive locations.  Instead, the new policy requires only that the officials use their discretion and “common sense” in deciding where to conduct immigration enforcement actions....

We hold that the plaintiffs have standing to pursue their claims.  Based on the evidence before the district court, it reasonably can be predicted that many immigrants will decide not to attend the plaintiffs’ houses of worship because of the new policy.  So, the plaintiffs’ asserted injury of a decline in attendance at worship services and other activities is fairly traceable to the new policy and likely will be redressed by an injunction limiting the policy’s application.  We also hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their RFRA claim, because the plaintiffs adequately demonstrated that DHS’s new policy substantially burdens their religious exercise. Finally, we hold that the government waived its claim that the new policy satisfies the requirements of strict scrutiny by failing to present any legal argument or evidence before the district court.  We therefore affirm the district court’s order imposing the preliminary injunction.

Judge Agee filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

... [I]t’s also important to keep in mind the narrow scope of the preliminary injunction in this case and the Court’s affirmance of it. First, the preliminary injunction enjoins “potential or actual immigration enforcement actions in or near” the identified list of places of worship connected to the plaintiffs.... Neither the preliminary injunction nor this Court’s decision affirming it restrict DHS’s actions at any other places that the 2021 Policy itself identified as sensitive locations or even at other places of worship....

Second, a host of DHS immigration enforcement actions are expressly permitted by the preliminary injunction....

Third, ... our analysis of the merits of plaintiffs’ likelihood to succeed on their RFRA claim is partially driven by DHS’s inexplicable failure in the district court to advance any relevant evidence or legal argument pertaining to the existence of a compelling government interest and use of the least restrictive means to secure it....

CBS News reports on the decision.

2025 Data on Hate Crimes in U.S. Released

Last week, the FBI released its 2025 Reported Crime Statistics. In a summary of the data, the FBI said that "hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 2,703 single-bias offenses reported by law enforcement." 62.3% of the religiously motivated hate crime offenses were anti-Jewish. 9.6% were anti-Muslim. 7% were anti-Sikh. 3% were anti-Catholic. The remaining 18% were spread among 10 other denominations or groups. Some hate-crime incidents involved multiple offenses.so that there were 2,408 religiously-motivated hate crime incidents. (Table 1). A further breakdown (Table 4) shows that 1,179 of the offenses involved property damage or vandalism to property. 749 offenses involved intimidation. 2025 saw a 7% overall decrease in hate crimes from the year before.

Supreme Court Review Sought in Texas 10 Commandments Cases

 A joint petition for certiorari (full text) was filed yesterday with the Supreme Court in Nathan v. Alamo Heights School District and Cribbs Ringer v. Comal Independent School District, (Sup. Ct., cert. filed 8/17/2026). In Nathan, the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, upheld the constitutionality of the Texas law requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in every public-school classroom. (See prior posting.) Subsequently, on the basis of their Nathan decision, the 5th Circuit in an unpublished Order summarily reversed and vacated a district court's opinion in Cribbs Ringer. The cert. petition frames the Questions Presented as:

1. Whether the Establishment Clause forbids a state from mandating the permanent, conspicuous display of a government-selected version of the Ten Commandments in every public school classroom. 

2. Whether permanently displaying the Ten Commandments in every public-school classroom interferes with parents’ Free Exercise Clause right to direct their children’s religious education and burdens children’s religious freedom.

ACLU of Texas issued a press release announcing the filing of the petition for review.

Police Enforcement of Rules Set by Farmers' Market Does Not Support a Section 1983 Action

In Conwell v. City of Benson, Minnesota, (D MN, Aug. 14, 2026), a Minnesota federal district court denied a motion for a temporary restraining order filed by an anti-abortion preacher who was cited for trespass by police after he insisted on evangelizing at a privately-run farmer's market held on city property without registering as a vendor and paying a vendor's fee. The court held that there was insufficient state involvement to support a claim under 42 USC §1983, saying in part:

... Conwell was initially approached by a volunteer working for the Market.  Then, he was approached and cited by city police working in their official capacity.   

The Court finds that Conwell is unable to show a likelihood of success on these facts.  Neither the City nor the police were involved in the creation of the Market’s vendor rules.  The police did not plan to enforce these rules by providing routine security....  The police merely responded to a call from a private citizen who volunteered at the Market.  Had Conwell ... followed the volunteer’s instruction, there would be no police involvement.  Conwell cannot manufacture a § 1983 claim by refusing to follow the Market’s rules, necessitating the involvement of police.  

Without a strong showing on the merits, the extraordinary measure of a preliminary injunction is inappropriate....

Teacher's Free-Speech Rights Not Infringed by Requirement to Use Students' Preferred Names and Pronouns

In Ellis v. The Brooke Charter Schools, (D MA, Aug. 13, 2026), a Massachusetts federal district court rejected claims by a public charter high school teacher that her free-speech rights were infringed when she was dismissed for refusing on religious grounds to comply with the school's requirement that teachers use students' preferred names and pronouns. While the firing was triggered by the teacher's refusal to use a former student's preferred pronouns in a requested letter of recommendation, the teacher's lawsuit alleged that the firing was because of her refusal to comply more broadly with the school's policy. The court said in part:

... [T]he Court finds that ... the requirement that Plaintiff comply with the BCS policy to use students’ preferred names and pronouns, was part of Plaintiff’s official duties as a BCS employee.... [A]ddressing students, particularly in the classroom, is essential to teaching.  A teacher’s official job-related duties, for which she is compensated, require her to communicate with students at her place of employment, including by addressing them in accord with school policy. ...

... [T]o teach effectively, which is inherent in the job duties, requires a teacher to interact with students in a way that does not create a barrier to learning or an unnecessary distraction....

With regards to the letter of recommendation, which again is not the basis of Plaintiff’s free speech claim, although writing letters of recommendation may not be part of a teacher’s principal responsibilities—that is, instructing students on academic curriculum—it is still within the realm of a teacher’s traditional and typical duties.  Recommendation letters are typically written about and derived from knowledge of a student’s classroom performance, communicated via official school channels such as email or letterhead....

The Court, however, need not reach a conclusion as to whether the speech that Plaintiff would have made in connection with the recommendation letter referenced in her complaint would have been a part of her official duties because Plaintiff does not specifically allege or otherwise argue that her refusal to write the letter was the reason for her termination or the basis for her free speech claim....

Further, even if Plaintiff’s speech fell outside of her official duties, her speech did not involve a matter of public concern.... Put simply, “the act of referring to a particular student by a particular name does not contribute to the broader public debate on transgender issues.”...

The school did not ask the court to dismiss plaintiff's free exercise claims.

Suit Claims Head of Georgian Orthodox Church in North America Is Attempting To Wrongfully Take Property of 3 Monasteries

Suit was filed last week in a New York federal district court against the presiding bishop of the Georgian Orthodox Church in North America by three Georgian Orthodox monasteries-- two in Maryland and one in Oklahoma. The abbots who head the monasteries are also plaintiffs. They contend that the bishop (Bishop Saba) engaged in a series of actions, including defamation of two abbots, designed to take for himself the properties of the three monasteries. The complaint (full text) in Hanson v. Intskirveli, (SD NY, filed 8/14/2026), alleges in part:

4. The Defendants began their public campaign to discredit and besmirch the Monastic Plaintiffs immediately after the Monastic Plaintiffs voiced conscientious objections to certain actions that Bishop Saba had taken, including his proposal to enact a church constitution that would facilitate seizing for himself any and all monastic property.  

5. The campaign against Monastic Plaintiffs featured the Defendants falsely declaring that the Monastic Plaintiffs had been deposed and laicized (i.e., ... that Abbot Christophoros and Abbot Athanasios were to be stripped of their priestly and monastic status). Such sanctions are among the most severe and stigmatizing in the Orthodox community. 

6. The Defendants knew their declarations were false because they knew such declarations were baseless....

8....   Bishop Saba never suspended either abbot from conducting their clerical duties; nor did he appoint substitutes for them. Yet, despite knowing that the process was unsound, Bishop Saba ...purported, through broadly publicized declarations, to laicize Abbot Christophoros and Abbot Athanasios....

10. The Defendants’ defamatory acts are part of a larger course of conduct involving Bishop Saba’s attempts to control and claim title to the Monastery Plaintiffs’ property. Before the defamatory campaign, Bishop Saba drafted and advocated for language that would ultimately form Article 21.7 of GAOCNA’s constitution. Article 21.7 provides that, upon an alleged “heresy, schism, or defection, . . . title, management, administration and control” of the property of an affected monastery “shall immediately revert to the Diocesan Bishop.”....

12. The Plaintiffs dispute that Article 21.7 gives Bishop Saba any right to claim title over the Monastery Plaintiffs’ property...  A declaration is necessary to resolve that present property dispute and prevent Bishop Saba from unlawfully seizing the Monastery Plaintiffs’ property. 

13. Through this action, the Plaintiffs seek redress for the Defendants’ false, defamatory, and misleading statements, a declaration that Bishop Saba has no right to claim title to their property under Article 21.7 of GAOCNA’s constitution, and justice for the profound injuries the Defendants have inflicted upon them....

[Thanks to Eugene Volokh via Reigionlaw for the lead.]

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

• Wenfu Zheng, The Dynamics of Redemption: From Sovereign Decree, Intercession, Compassion, Justice, Calling, Leading, and the Centripetal Rest of Grace-A Chiastic Exegetical and Doctrinal Study of Genesis 18:20-19:38, (August 05, 2026).
• Jennifer S. Bard, A Dangerous Can of Worms: Viewpoint-Based Exemptions from Professional Standards of Care After Chiles v. Salazar, (August 06, 2026).
• Peter J. Smith & Robert W. Tuttle, The Mistaken Turn to Church Autonomy, (14 Texas A&M L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming 2027)).
• Michael Conklin, The Dobbs Dissent Delay: Examining Allegations of Intentional Delay Amid Threats to the Justices, (August 06, 2026). 
• Jack Thorlin, Thou Shalt Not: Free Exercise Originalism and the Ten Commandments in Public Schools, (July 31, 2026).
• Yurii Sheliazhenko, When Will the European Court of Human Rights Rule on the Right to Conscientious Objection to Military Service in Wartime?, (August 12, 2026).

From SSRN (Canada and Latin America):

• Shanaz Joan Parsan, Protecting All Canadians: Hate for None. Equal Protection for All. Combating Hate While Preserving Freedom of Conscience, Political Belief and Lawful Dissent, (August 08, 2026).
• Shanaz Joan Parsan, Taxing Faith? The Catholic Church, Public Value and the Fiscal Logic of Religious Exemption: A Canadian Historical, Economic and Interfaith Assessment, (August 01, 2026).
• Atile Dos Santos, Black Lgbti+ Pentecostal Families and Affect of Resistance: Decolonial Perspectives from The Brazilian Periphery, (August 02, 2026).
• Agustina Ramón Michel & Dana Repka, Medical Conscientious Objection in Latin America 30 Years After Cairo, (August 30, 2025).

From SSRN (Islamic Law):

• Muhammad Irfan Haroon, Nurture, Not Liberty: Habeas Corpus, the Guardian Court, and the Limits of Constitutional Jurisdiction in Pakistani Child Custody Disputes, (August 07, 2026).
• Jalil Abbasi, Introducing Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Nekounam's "Wisdom-Oriented Jurisprudence" (Fiqh-i Ḥikmat-Garā) to Western Academic Audiences, (August 06, 2026).
• Muhammad Irfan Haroon, Second Marriage and Polygyny in Pakistan: Reconciling Qur'anic Conditionality, Hanafi Doctrine, and Statutory Regulation, (June 08, 2026).
• Muhammad Irfan Haroon, Aurat March, Women's Rights, and Islamic Legal Principles: Toward a Principled Reform Agenda in Pakistan. (August 07, 2026).
• Syed Raheel Shahzad, Testing Qur’anic Coherence Claims: A Pilot Method for Evaluating Structure, Placement, and Thematic Continuity, (August 13, 2026).
• Abideen Ajibade, A Comparative Analysis of Inheritance Under Islamic Law and the Customary Laws of the Igbo and Yoruba Peoples in Nigeria, (August 10, 2026).
• Jalil Abbasi, The Methodology of Executing Ḥudūd: A Critical Translation and Commentary on the Emancipatory Jurisprudence of Grand Ayatollah Nekounam, (May 27, 2026).

From SmartCILP:

• Maya Kreimer, British Imperial Constitutional Law and the Zionist Campaign against the Legislative Council in Mandatory Palestine, 43 Law & History Review 339-363 (2025).
• Saumyashree Ghosh, Between Law and Politics: Islamic Judges in the South Indian Littoral, 1808–1885, 43 Law & History Review 557-585 (2025).
• Book Reviews from Vol. 43, Issue 3, Law & History Review: R.H. Helmholz, Criminal-Inquisitorial Trials in English Church Courts: From the Middle Ages to the Reformation, by Henry Ansgar Kelly; Ilkay,Yilmaz, Empire of Refugees: North Caucasian Muslims and the Late Ottoman State, by Vladimir Hamed-Troyansky; Paul R. Katz, Buddhism in Court: Religion, Law, and Jurisdiction in China, by Cuilan Liu.

Arizona Supreme Court Defines Elements of Clergy-Penitent Privilege

In Rodriguez-Ramirez v. State of Arizona, (AZ Sup. Ct., Aug. 12, 2026), the Arizona Supreme Court held that a conversation which the pastor of a Phoenix church had with his co-pastor in which the pastor discussed a sexual impropriety he committed was not a "confession" and so was not protected by Arizona's Clergy-Penitent Privilege statute.

The Arizona Supreme Court adopted a 4-part test to determine whether the privilege applies: (1) Is the person who received the confession a clergyman or priest as defined by the church's customs and laws. This is not limited to members of religious organizations with ordained clergy. (2) Was the confession made while the clergyman or priest was acting in his professional capacity? (3) Was the confession made in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which the clergyman or priest belongs? (4) Was the communication at issue a "confession"? The Court said in part:

Doe [v. Corporation of the President] defined “confession” consistent with the First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment Clause jurisprudence, as “a confidential acknowledgment or admission of a crime, sin, or fault to a member of the clergy, priest, or Christian Science practitioner for the purpose of absolution.” ... We construe ”absolution” by its function, not by denomination.  A confession need not follow a formal sacramental rite; it is enough that the penitent discloses a crime, sin, or fault to a member of the clergy while seeking spiritual absolution, consolation, or guidance....  The dispositive question is not whether the penitent’s tradition observes a rite of absolution, but whether the communication sought spiritual absolution, consolation, or guidance.  Accordingly, a party invoking the Clergy-Penitent Privilege must first establish that the communication constitutes a confession....  Only if that threshold requirement is satisfied do we consider the remaining requirements governing the privilege.

Applying this definition does not require the kind of doctrinal analysis we held impermissible in Doe....  The test we describe here does not run afoul of that holding.  A factfinder applying our definition does not assess whether a communication satisfies any particular faith’s theological requirements; it asks only whether the communication sought spiritual absolution, consolation, or guidance.  That question is factual—it asks what the communication was for, not whether it complied with the tenets of any religion—and it therefore does not implicate the constitutional concerns identified in Doe....

The superior court reasonably found that the discussion centered on protecting Rodriguez-Ramirez’s reputation, addressing church administration, and minimizing the legal and practical consequences of the allegations made against him.  The discussion even turned to the logistics of Rodriguez-Ramirez’s flight from law enforcement, in case Padron’s efforts to dissuade the victim’s parents from pursuing charges failed.  The record contains reasonable evidence supporting those findings, and the court of appeals therefore erred in declining to defer to them. 

Collectively, those findings establish that Rodriguez-Ramirez neither sought absolution from Padron nor intended that their communication remain confidential.  His communication with Padron, therefore, did not constitute a confession as defined in Doe. 

DOJ's Title VI Suit Against Harvard Is Dismissed

 As previously reported, in March the Justice Department filed suit against Harvard University alleging discrimination against Jewish and Israeli students in violation of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Among other things, the suit sought injunctive relief, cutting off of future payments under existing grants to Harvard and recovery of all grant payments made to the University during the period that Title VI violations occurred. Now in United States v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, (D MA, Aug. 13, 2026), a Massachusetts federal district court dismissed the government's suit.  It found injunctive relief inappropriate, saying in part:

The Amended Complaint focuses almost entirely on incidents that took place during the 2023-2024 school year.  Only three incidents are alleged to have occurred after this period, all of which took place nearly a full year later (and more than one full academic year before this case was filed) in March of 2025.  Without diminishing any concern arising from these occurrences, the court finds them, singly and collectively, to be too isolated and episodic to support a plausible inference that any institutionalized noncompliance with Title VI persists at Harvard to this day....

It found cutting off of grants inappropriate, saying in part: 

... [T]he controlling statute unequivocally authorizes the Government to take action only if and after it “has advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means.”...  The Government provided the requisite notice underlying this action on June 30, 2025.... [T]he Amended Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations plausibly establishing that any events that might be construed as evidence of noncompliance occurred after June 30, 2025.

... Congress’s intent was not to penalize a wayward funding recipient but instead to incentivize it to bring itself into compliance with Title VI....

Harvard Crimson reports on the decision.

Certiorari Petition Seeks Overruling of Locke v Davey

 A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed Tuesday with the U.S. Supreme Court seeking review of the 4th Circuit's decision in Hall v. Fleming.  In the case, the U.S. 4th Circuit upheld the constitutionality of a Virginia Tuition Assistance Grant Program that denies grants to undergraduate students studying in programs that provide religious training or theological education.  The petition for review asks the Supreme Court to overrule its 2004 decision in Locke v. Davey, the precedent on which the 4th Circuit relied in upholding Virginia's program.

ADF announced the filing in a press release that said in part that Josh Davey, who was the respondent in Locke v. Davey, is a co-counsel in this appeal.

Fellowship of Christian Athletes Sues to Challenge School's Ban on Outside Adults at Student Religious Club Meetings

Suit was filed this week in a New Jersey federal district court by the Fellowship of Christian Athletes (FCA) challenging a New Jersey school district's ban on outside adults attending on-campus meetings of student religious groups. The ban was put in place after a complaint from the Freedom from Religion Foundation.  Fellowship of Christian Athletes organizes student chapters called "huddles" in which students pray, engage in Bible study, support one another in their faith and athletics, and eat pizza. FCA staff and adult volunteers also attend the huddles. The complaint (full text) in Fellowship of Christian Athletes v. Board of Education of the Hopewell Valley Regional School District, (D NJ, filed 8/11/2026), alleges in part:

... [T]he District’s new religious-clubs-only volunteer ban does indeed discriminate against religious clubs and single them out for disfavored treatment. While FFRF had claimed that FCA’s adult supporters were being given “unique access” to students, this is simply false. The District expressly permits adult visitors on its campuses for a variety of different reasons. And other non-religious student groups are allowed to—and regularly do—take advantage of this permission as a matter of course....

... FCA’s student leaders want to meet with fellow students and adult volunteers on campus so they can model to fellow students and coaches what it looks like to follow Christ in their school communities—something they cannot do if they’re forced to meet elsewhere.  

Having adult staff and volunteers present on campus is also critical to FCA’s religious mission because it allows FCA to see how student leaders are doing and give the students invited feedback and guidance....

Plaintiffs allege that the school's action violates their free exercise, free speech and equal protection rights as well as the federal Equal Access Act and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. 

Becket Fund issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Massachusetts Liberalizes Access to Late Term Abortions

On Monday, Massachusetts Governor Maura Healey signed H.5595, titled An Act Prioritizing Patient Access To Care (full text). Under previous law, abortions after 24 weeks of pregnancy were permitted only where necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother, or where there is lethal fetal anomaly or grave fetal diagnosis that is incompatible with sustained life outside of the uterus. The new law instead allows abortions to be performed by physicians after 24 weeks "based upon the professional judgment of the physician." It provides further that "no medical review process shall override the professional judgment of a treating physician and a patient or the patient’s health care proxy to provide an abortion.... " And it eliminates the requirement that abortions after 24 weeks be performed in a hospital authorized to provide obstetrical services.

A press release from the Governor's office says in part:

The legislation updates Massachusetts' abortion law by allowing physicians to rely on their professional medical judgment, consistent with accepted standards of care, when providing abortion care later in pregnancy. The law is intended to ensure that patients facing devastating fetal diagnoses, serious pregnancy complications or other complex medical circumstances can receive timely care without unnecessary legal uncertainty.

NBC Boston reports on the new law.

UPDATE: The conservative political action organization CatholicVote has issued a Public Statement (full text) urging the Catholic bishops of Massachusetts to declare that Governor Healey has incurred automatic excommunication for signing the abortion bill.

Suit Challenges Illinois End of Life Options Act

Suit was filed yesterday in an Illinois federal district court by four Catholic doctors, a Catholic bishop and a Lutheran skilled nursing facility objecting to the requirement that they comply with Illinois' recently enacted End of Life Options Act. The complaint (full text) in Kirchoff v. Treto, (ND IL, filed 8/11/2026), alleges in part:

... Illinois’s “End-of-Life Options” Act ...—which takes effect on September 12th—both legalizes assisted suicide and mandates that doctors who conscientiously object to it nonetheless promote its alleged “benefits” to “terminally ill” patients and, if requested, refer or transfer those patients to someone who is “able and willing” to help them commit suicide..... 

Illinois’s conscription of objecting practitioners into its new assisted suicide regime blatantly violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Indeed, EOLO plainly compels or restricts speech based on content and viewpoint by requiring such practitioners to (a) discuss assisted suicide’s alleged “benefits” and make specific “referrals” for the same....

EOLO also violates the First Amendment right of expressive association by forcing health care entities to hire and otherwise associate with health care professionals who promote or even directly participate in assisted suicide. 

EOLO additionally violates the First Amendment’s protection for the free exercise of religion and church autonomy. Put simply, requiring only a narrow class of “health care professionals” to discuss the “benefits” of and “refer” for assisted suicide with respect only to “terminally ill” patients, contrary to those professionals’ deeply held religious beliefs, is neither neutral nor generally applicable. And requiring health care entities to hire and retain employees who promote and even participate in assisted suicide violates the internal governance of religious institutions in deciding whom they authorize to carry out their religious mission to save and promote the dignity of every patient’s life....

Thomas More Society issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Court Grants Reconsideration in Free Exercise Challenge to School's Policy on Student Social Transitioning

In Mead v. Rockford Public School District, (WD MI, Aug. 7, 2026), a Michigan federal district court granted a motion for reconsideration of its earlier decision which held that parents' free exercise rights are not violated by a school's policy that encourages teachers and staff to use a student's preferred name and pronouns and does not necessarily require disclosure of this to the student's parents.  The court relied on the Supreme Court's shadow docket opinion in Mirabelli v. Bonta in granting reconsideration. The court said in part:

Like the policies at issue in Mirabelli, the policies here likely created a substantial burden on the Meads’ free-exercise rights.  The Meads share religious beliefs similar to the parents in Mirabelli about the permanency of biological sex and the fixed relationship between sex and gender.  At the time of the alleged violation, the Meads’ child was also around the same age (seventh and eighth grades) as one of the children in Mirabelli (eighth grade).  And like the parents in Mirabelli, the Meads did not have an opportunity to opt their child out of Defendants’ policies.   

Defendants’ policies therefore trigger strict scrutiny.... 

ADF issued a press release announcing the decision.

Cert. Filed by Korean Spa That Only Admits Biological Women

A petition for review (full text) in Olympus Spa v. Armstrong, (Sup. Ct., certiorari filed 8/10/2026), was filed with the Supreme Court yesterday.  In the case, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld against 1st Amendment challenges enforcement of Washington state's anti-discrimination law. Defendant is a family-run, Christian, Korean style spa. The spa admits only "biological women", including transgender women who have received gender confirmation surgery, but excludes transgender women who have not completed that surgery. ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the certiorari petition.