Noise Ordinance Is Constitutional as Applied to Anti-Abortion Sidewalk Advocacy

In Knotts v. City of Cuyahoga Falls. (ND OH, March 31, 2026), an Ohio federal district court upheld the application of a noise ordinance to anti-abortion sidewalk counselors who engage in sidewalk advocacy based on their religious beliefs. The court rejected plaintiffs' free speech, free exercise, and vagueness challenges to the ordinance, saying in part:

The Court notes that on its face 1) the Ordinance does not regulate speaker identity, but rather the amplification of the speaker, 2) it does not regulate the content of speech, but rather the amplification of said speech, and 3) the Ordinance exempts certain locations holding specific events (concerts, live outdoor musical or theatrical performances) from amplification restrictions, not content.  For example, under this Ordinance, a religious organization hosting a theatrical performance on its property is exempt from the amplification restrictions whether that performance is pro-life or pro-choice.  The Ordinance is content neutral. ...

The Ordinance applies to everyone, and does not regulate nor mention any religious activity, creed or affiliation.....  It does not distinguish among religions or between religion and non-religion.  Accordingly, it is neutral and generally applicable.  

Plaintiffs summarily assert that the Ordinance violates their first Amendment right to free exercise as it applies to them.... Plaintiffs explain that they “hold sincere religious convictions that compel them to engage in sidewalk advocacy to save the lives of the unborn, which they express through amplified speech.”... However, “‘a generally applicable law that incidentally burdens religious practices usually will be upheld.’” 

... [T]he burden does not infringe “free exercise unless it places a substantial burden on a central religious belief or practice[.]”   There is no such burden here.  Plaintiffs were not denied the right to speak on their religious views or otherwise express their views, they merely were not permitted to engage in amplified speech over the complaint of neighbors....

New Case Challenges Oklahoma's Rejection of Religious Charter School Application

The battle over the constitutionality of Oklahoma authorizing and funding a religious charter school took another step forward on Monday. As previously reported, in May 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court split evenly, 4-4, on the constitutionality of such a school. The even split was caused by Justice Barrett recusing herself. Subsequently, a new test case was created as the National Ben Gamla Jewish Charter School Foundation. applied to create for a statewide virtual high school. The Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board voted to reject the application and gave as its formal reason only that under Oklahoma law, a charter school is a public school and must be nonsectarian. 

The Oklahoma Attorney General, apparently in an attempt to create a record that would allow the Supreme Court to avoid the constitutional issue, filed suit against the Charter School Board in a state trial court seeking a writ of mandamus to require the Board to identify and incorporate into the record other valid, non-constitutional grounds for the rejection that exist. (See prior posting). With that case apparently still pending, on Monday the Ben Gamla school filed suit in an Oklahoma federal district court against the Charter School Board and the Attorney General, seeking to overturn the Charter School Board's rejection of its application 

The complaint (full text) in National Ben Gamla Jewish Charter School Foundation, Inc. v. Drummond, (WD OK, filed 3/24/2026), alleges in part:

... Under the Free Exercise Clause ...  a system that precludes religious entities from obtaining generally available state benefits solely because of an organization’s religious character or conduct is unconstitutional unless the government can satisfy strict scrutiny. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 591 U.S. 464, 484 (2020)...

... The exclusion of Plaintiffs serves no compelling, substantial, or legitimate government interest....

The Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion. 

... Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 70, § 3-136(A)(2) discriminates against religion on its face because it excludes applicants seeking to run religious charter schools from the charter school program. 

... Defendants must therefore satisfy strict scrutiny. 

Becket Fund issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

3rd Circuit: Prison Officials Have Qualified Immunity in Inmate's Lawsuit Over Right to Receive Religious Pamphlets

In Cordero v. Kelley, (3rd Cir., March 19, 2026), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals held that prison officials who refused to allow an inmate to receive a bulk mailing of religious pamphlets had qualified immunity in a damage action against them alleging violation of the 1st Amendment. The court said in part:

Cordero asserts that his Christian religion requires him to spread the Word of God by sending religious pamphlets, or tracts, to friends and family.  Prior to 2015, Cordero was able to receive hundreds of pamphlets at a time via mail at NJSP without incident.  However, from 2015 to 2017, Gregory Kelley, a correctional officer working in the NJSP mailroom, rejected multiple bulk mailings containing 100 or more religious pamphlets....

We agree with the District Court that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on Cordero’s First Amendment claim for damages.  We have found no caselaw clearly establishing a right to either receive through the mail bulk quantities of religious materials, or the right to receive a yearly bulk order of Christian tracts....

Cordero also argues that the New Jersey Administrative Code mandates that he “be permitted to receive, retain and send out religious literature without quantity limitations.”... However, “[o]fficials sued for constitutional violations do not lose their qualified immunity merely because their conduct violates some statutory or administrative provision.”  Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 (1984).  Rather, the “clearly established right must be the federal right on which the claim for relief is based.”  Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 319 (3d Cir. 2001).  And a “state statute cannot ‘clearly establish’ the federal right for qualified immunity purposes.”  Id.  

1st Circuit: Equal Benefit Requirement for Religious Schools Does Not Extend to All Private Schools

 In Hellman v. Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, (1st Cir., March 20, 2026), parents contended that their children who are enrolled in private schools should be entitled to identical special education services as public school students. Under Massachusetts law, private school students only received such services at off-site locations, while public school students received them in their normal school buildings. Rejecting the parents' due process, equal protection and privileges or immunities claims, the court said in part:

The crux of the Parents' argument is that once the state establishes an otherwise generally available benefit, it may not deny that benefit to a student simply because their parents exercise their fundamental right to enroll their child in private school.  But every case they cite arises under the Free Exercise Clause, not the parental rights doctrine involved here.  (The Parents did not bring a Free Exercise claim; the Place Regulation applies to all private schools, secular and religious alike.)  And those holdings have no bearing on their parental rights claim.  They rest on a distinct, First Amendment principle that prohibits the state from imposing even indirect coercion or penalties on religious exercise... 

That principle does not apply to the parental right.....  [I]t does not require the state to extend public benefits on identical terms to private and public school students to protect the parents' choice of forum.

Detroit Abortion Clinic Buffer Zone Ordinance Challenged

Suit was filed last week in a Michigan federal district court challenging a Detroit ordinance that bans picketing within 15-feet of abortion clinics and bans sidewalk counselors from approaching closer than 8 feet from persons entering clinics. The complaint (full text) in Sidewalk Advocates for Life v. City of Detroit, (ED MI, filed 3/18/2026) alleges in part:

The Ordinance, which is enforceable through criminal penalties, violates the Free Speech, Free Exercise, and Freedom of Assembly Clauses of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as the Michigan Constitution....

... The legislative record contains no evidence that the City attempted to address its asserted interests through less restrictive means before enacting the Ordinance. The City did not pursue targeted injunctions against specific individuals. It did not increase enforcement of existing harassment, assault, obstruction, or trespass statutes. It did not seek dispersal orders. It moved directly to a blanket ordinance outlawing an entire category of expressive activity on public sidewalks....

...The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment ... prohibits the government from imposing substantial burdens on the exercise of sincerely held religious beliefs unless the burden is imposed by a neutral law of general applicability....

The Ordinance is not generally applicable because § 31-14 4(b)(2) exempts “[a]uthorized security, personnel, employees, or agents” of healthcare facilities who are “engaged in assisting patients and other persons to enter or exit” the facility. This exemption permits clinic employees and escorts to engage in the precise conduct the Ordinance forbids for everyone else: standing within 15 feet of the entrance, approaching patients, speaking to them, and walking alongside them within the buffer zone. Under the framework of Tandon v. Newsom ... and Fulton v. City of Philadelphia ... whenever the government treats comparable secular activity more favorably than religious exercise, the law is not generally applicable and strict scrutiny applies automatically. One exemption suffices to create constitutional infirmity.

Thomas More Society issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Husband's Religious Objections to Divorce Were Inappropriate Basis for Sanctions or Restraining Order

Hoch v. Hoch, (CA App., Feb. 17, 2026) (certified for publication 3/12/2026), is an appeal from family court orders relating to sanctions and domestic violence restraining orders (DVRO) issued in marriage dissolution proceedings involving a Jehovah's Witness couple. Among other holdings, the California state appellate court reversed the DVRO issued against the wife and affirmed the DVRO against the husband. The court also reversed monetary sanctions issued against the husband under Section 271 of the Family Code, but affirmed other monetary sanctions issued against him. The court said in part:

Michael contends that imposition of sanctions against him under section 271 violated his rights under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. He claims that as a practicing and devout member of the Jehovah’s Witness faith, he could not stipulate to allowing Marcie to amend her petition for legal separation to allege dissolution instead without violating his religious beliefs. 

We need not address whether the sanctions against Michael under section 271 violated his constitutional right of free exercise of religion. The trial court abused its discretion under section 271 by imposing monetary sanctions against Michael for not stipulating to permit Marcie to amend her petition for legal separation by converting it into one for marital dissolution. Stipulating by its nature is not obligatory. Michael expressed what he believed to be a “conscientious” reason for declining to stipulate: Due to his religious beliefs, he was not comfortable with “facilitating” a divorce. Whether or not that reason amounts to a legitimate claim under the federal constitution’s free exercise of religion clause is a question we need not decide. Michael’s concern was reasonable and, it appears to us, held in good faith. No evidence was presented that would lead us to conclude to the contrary....

Among the actions which the family court cited as giving rise to a restraining order [against the husband] was Michael’s “inappropriate use of religion to control [Marcie], including, but not limited to, in the instant marital dissolution action.”... The only such instance of inappropriate use of religion expressly identified by the family court was “compelling [Marcie]’s filing of a dissolution action because [Michael] wanted to control whether or not [Marcie] could seek a legal separation and, later, a dissolution of marriage.” We need not decide whether the court infringed Michael’s right of free exercise in order to conclude this was an erroneous ground for a restraining order. Michael had a statutory right not to agree to a legal separation if he did not want one. The other grounds cited by the trial court are, however, sufficient in themselves to support the DVRO against Michael.

Court Permanently Enjoins Enforcement of Arkansas Law Requiring 10 Commandments in Every Classroom

In Stinson v. Fayetteville School District , (WD AR, March 16, 2026), an Arkansas federal district court issued a permanent injunction barring the state from enforcing Arkansas' statute that requires the posting of a particular version of the Ten Commandments in every public-school classroom. The court, finding both Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause problems with the law, said in part:

... [T]he State makes three important factual stipulations about Act 573:    

(1) “Act 573 does not direct teachers to provide instruction about the Ten Commandments or about the displays.”  

(2) “Act 573 does not require classroom instruction, and it does not require that the Ten Commandments be incorporated into public school curriculum.”  

(3) “There is no requirement for teachers, other school officials, or students to interact with, bring attention to, or even acknowledge the posters in any way.” 

In other words, the State admits there is no educational purpose in displaying the Ten Commandments—no teaching, no learning, and no curricular integration.  

The Court is “reluctan[t] to attribute unconstitutional motives to the State[ ], . . . when a plausible secular purpose . . . may be discerned from the face of the statute.”... But here, a plausible secular purpose is expressly disavowed. Act 573’s purpose is only to display a sacred, religious text in a prominent place in every public-school classroom. And the only reason to display a sacred, religious text in every classroom is to proselytize to children. The State has said the quiet part out loud....

Act 573 is subject to strict scrutiny because it is denominationally preferential and burdens parent-Plaintiffs’ right to direct their children’s religious upbringing.

Arkansas Advocate reports on the court's decision.

9th Circuit Again Upholds Transfer of Apache Religious Site to Copper Company

In Arizona Mining Reform Coalition v. U.S. Forest Service, (9th Cir., March 13, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals once again upheld the transfer of 2500 acres of National Forest land that includes Apache ceremonial religious ground to Resolution Copper Mining LLC. The land, for which Resolution Copper will transfer 5000 acres of land located elsewhere, contains nearly 2 billion metric tons of copper. The San Carlos Apache Tribe claimed that the transfer violates their free exercise rights protected by the 1st Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The 9th Circuit, sitting en banc, had previously rejected similar claims brought by Apache Stronghold, a non-profit organization representing the interests of certain members of the Tribe. (See prior posting.) Plaintiffs in the current litigation unsuccessfully attempted to discredit the continuing viability of that prior decision.  The court said in part:

... [T]he Lopez Plaintiffs ... argue that the Supreme Court’s decision in Mahmoud v. Taylor ... abrogated Apache Stronghold by clarifying the meaning of a “religious burden.”  In their view, Mahmoud stands for the proposition that the court must determine if “looking to ‘the specific religious beliefs and practices asserted,’ the challenged government actions pose an ‘objective danger,’ or ‘very real threat’ to the claimant’s religious exercise, thus ‘substantially interfer[ing]’ with it.”... By contrast, the Lopez Plaintiffs argue, the Apache Stronghold majority rejected an inquiry into the relative objective or subjective nature of an asserted interference with religious practice in favor of an inquiry focused on coercion.   

But this view of Mahmoud does not survive scrutiny.  As an initial matter, the Supreme Court itself declined to rehear its denial of certiorari in Apache Stronghold... Regardless, the Lopez Plaintiffs misrepresent the thrust of Mahmoud by selectively quoting from it.  Their focus on the “objective danger” language ignores that Mahmoud centers on (1) the education context and (2) policies that directly coerce or indirectly compel behavior at odds with individual religious beliefs or practices, not involving the disposition of government property....

 ... We nonetheless recognize that this land transfer will fundamentally alter the nature of the land, including destruction of those sites sacred to the Tribe, the Lopez Plaintiffs, and similarly situated Native individuals.  Despite those grave harms to Native religious practice, Congress has chosen to transfer this land, and Plaintiffs have not raised any viable challenges to that decision....

UPDATE: On March 19, Justice Kagan denied petitioners' application for an injunction pending appeal. The petition, pleadings and ruling are available from the Supreme Court's website here.

Oklahoma AG Sues to Overturn Charter School Board's Strategic Factual Record In Rejecting Religious School

As previously reported, in May 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court split evenly, 4-4, on the constitutionality Oklahoma funding a religiously sponsored charter school. The even split was caused by Justice Barrett recusing herself, apparently because of her connection to those promoting the school. Subsequently, a new test case was created, as the National Ben Gamla Jewish Charter School Foundation applied to create for a statewide virtual high school. (See prior posting.) This Tuesday, the Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board voted to reject the Ben Gamla School's most recent application and gave as its formal reason only that under Oklahoma law, a charter school is a public school and must be nonsectarian.  The next day, Oklahoma's Attorney General filed suit against the Charter School Board in an Oklahoma state trial court contending that there were additional unrelated reasons for rejection of Ben Gamla's application. The suit seeks a writ of mandamus to require the Board to identify and incorporate into the record other valid, non-constitutional grounds for the rejection.

The petition (full text) in Drummond v. Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board, (OK Dist. Ct., filed 3/11/2026), alleges in part:

[T]he Board's refusal to list all of the reasons for rejecting the revised application is not coincidental. It is a deliberate decision designed to avoid issues of state law when Ben Gamla files a lawsuit seeking to overturn the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in Drummond v. Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board.... Oklahoma law does not permit the Board to strategically withhold valid grounds for rejection....

Presumably, if other grounds for the application denial were included, the U.S. Supreme Court might refuse to decide the federal constitutional issue posed by state funded religious schools on the ground that there were other reasons for the Board's rejection of the Ben Gamla application.

VINnews reports on the lawsuit.

Cemetery Loses Free Exercise and Establishment Clause Challenges to Permit Denial

In Steelmantown Church v. Carlton County, Minnesota, (D MN, March 11, 2026), a Minnesota federal district court dismissed claims under the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses, RLUIPA, and Minnesota law brought by a nonprofit corporation that was refused permission to establish a cemetery that would perform "green burials." While Minnesota law allowed "religious corporations" to establish private cemeteries, Steelmantown was not formed as a Minnesota religious corporation. The court, explaining its rejection of Steelmantown's 1stAmendment claims, said in part:

... [E]stablishing and operating a cemetery of any sort is not inherently or exclusively a religious practice, and Section 307.01 on its face does not “aid or oppose particular religions” or “establish[] a denominational preference.”...  The statute expressly authorizes “any private person” or “any religious corporation,” regardless of whether they adhere to any religious faith, to establish a private cemetery on land the person or corporation owns....  The statute’s reference to “any religious corporation,” meaning those incorporated under Chapter 315, establishes only a preference toward a specific type of incorporated entity, not a particular religious faith or denomination.... 

Steelmantown effectively seeks preferential treatment because of its religious beliefs that a secular but otherwise identical institution—that is, a foreign nonprofit corporation whose “identity and mission” are not “derived from religious or spiritual traditions,” ... would not receive in the same circumstances.  If anything, that outcome would appear to be closer to a violation of the Establishment Clause than the conduct Steelmantown challenges here....

Steelmantown’s claim, in essence, appears to be that its religious practices are burdened by the requirement to incorporate (or reincorporate) under Chapter 315....  But nowhere does Steelmantown allege any facts that show this requirement “significantly inhibit[s] or constrain[s]” any “conduct or expression that manifests some central tenet” of its religious beliefs, “meaningfully curtail[s]” its “ability to express adherence” to those beliefs, or denies it a “reasonable opportunity to engage in those activities.” ... It does not explain, for instance, why maintaining its status as a foreign nonprofit corporation under Chapter 303 is central to its ability to express its religious beliefs or engage in its religious practices.  Nor does Steelmantown allege facts that suggest the requirement “operates so as to make the practice of [its] religious beliefs more expensive.”...

5th Circuit: Principal Lacks Qualified Immunity for Barring Teachers' Praying in View of Students

In Barber v. Rounds, (5th Cir., March 9,2026), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals held that Texas high school principal Bryan Rounds does not have qualified immunity as to a teacher's First Amendment claims in a suit challenging his prohibition on teachers' engaging in any prayer that students might observe. The dispute grew out of the principal cautioning teachers in connection with a staff "See You At the Flagpole" event.  The court said in part:

Barber asserts that the complaint alleges a blanket prohibition by Rounds on teachers engaging in any prayer that students might observe—regardless of whether the prayer was connected to a student-led event.  Rounds, on the other hand, urges a narrower, contextual reading:  that his directives were limited to ensuring teachers did not participate in the student-initiated SYATP gathering.   

Barber’s reading is consonant with the complaint’s language.  Her pleading alleges that Rounds told her she could not pray “in the presence of students” and could not engage in prayer where she would be “visible to students,” even away from the flagpole and even “when the teachers [are] not on school time.” ...

The second question is whether the First Amendment rights at issue were clearly established when Rounds’s challenged conduct occurred....

Barber contends that Kennedy [v. Bremerton School District] supplied the requisite clarity.  Again, it does.  As Barber points out, Kennedy expressly rejected the proposition that religious expression by a public-school employee may be restricted merely because students might observe it.  The Kennedy Court rejected the rule that “visible religious conduct by a teacher or coach” may “be deemed—without more and as a matter of law—impermissibly coercive on students.”  597 U.S. at 540.

Vital Law reports on the decision.

Suit Challenges Library's Policy on Use of Meeting Room

Suit was filed this week in an Alabama federal district court by Eagle Forum, a Christian community educational organization, challenging the policy of the Tuscaloosa Public Library that bars use of its large meeting room by "religious or sectarian groups for the purpose of preaching or otherwise demonstrating the beliefs of their members." The complaint (full text) in Eagle Forum of Alabama v. Tuscaloosa Public Library Bord of Trustees, (ND AL, filed 3/10/2026), alleges in part:

101. By putting Eagle Forum to a choice between exercising its religious beliefs through faith-based programming at its events and using the Rotary Room, the Defendants burden and “penalize[ ] the free exercise of religion.” ...

112. There is no compelling government interest to justify these content- and viewpoint-based restrictions, and the Reservation Policy is not narrowly tailored to advance any compelling governmental interest.

113. Even if the Rotary Room could only be considered a limited public forum ...  it is well established that “speech discussing otherwise permissible subjects cannot be excluded from a limited public forum on the ground that the subject is discussed from a religious viewpoint.”

The complaint also alleges that the library's policy violates the Equal Protection clause and the Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

County Employee Sues Over Denial of Religious Accommodation So He Could Avoid Celebrating Pride Month

Suit was filed yesterday in a California federal district court by an employee of the Los Angeles County Department of Public Works alleging that the county violated Title VII as well as the 1st and 14th Amendments and California law by denying him a religious accommodation so he would not have to celebrate Pride Month. The complaint (full text) in Batman v. Los Angeles County, (CD CA, filed 3/10/2026), alleges in part:

4. Beginning in March 2023, the County directed all of its government departments to ensure that the “Pride Progress Flag” was flown at every government department.... The policy revisions also directed the government offices to adopt ways to demonstrate that all government offices celebrate so-called “Pride Month” and make its celebration overt, express, and universal.  

5. As a result of his sincerely held religious beliefs and a conflict with his employer’s open and notorious celebration of something Batman considers a sin, Batman requested a simple accommodation of working remotely during the one month of the year that his employment requirements conflict with his sincerely held religious beliefs.....

82. Rather than provide Batman a reasonable accommodation that was plainly available and not burdensome to anyone, Batman was instructed that he could simply use the back entrance....  

83. The Department also suggested to Batman that he seek mental health counseling for any distress he may feel as a result of the conflict between his sincerely held religious beliefs and the Department’s denial of his requested accommodation.... In other words, the Department suggested to Batman that his religious beliefs required mental health counseling rather than accommodation.

The complaint sets out at length the Biblical basis for plaintiff's beliefs.

Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Federal Jury Awards Muslim Inmates $667,000 After Guards Violently Disrupted Their Prayers

In a press release, CAIR Legal Defense Fund announced that on Monday a jury in federal district court in the Eastern District of Missouri has awarded $667,000 in damages to eight Muslim inmates whose prayer gathering was broken up by prison guards who pepper-sprayed them. The complaint (full text) in Clemons v. Precythe, (ED MO, filed 3/2/2023), alleged in part:

1. With the permission of state prison guards and officials, nine Muslims gathered for prayer on the evening of February 28, 2021. They did so in their housing unit, just as they had hundreds of times in the months preceding the sadistic, violent attack that gives rise to this action. 

2. As Plaintiffs ... stood shoulder to shoulder in prayer, out of the blue, Defendant Basham ordered that there be no more praying in the housing unit. Two plaintiffs—Kent and Smith—abruptly stopped their prayers and stepped away. The others sought to quickly finish up. Nevertheless, five were pepper sprayed and one was viciously beaten, just because they prayed. 

3. Viewing Muslims as nothing more than a gang, more than a dozen guards participated in this violent episode. The brutality began as an effort to disrupt Muslims praying together but morphed into a protracted effort to punish those who prayed—dispersing Plaintiffs throughout the state via transfers and otherwise retaliating against them.

Father's Rights Not Violated by School's Refusal to Dismiss Son Early on Fridays for Religious Services

In Sapp v. Trenton Board of Education, (D NJ, March 6, 2026), a New Jersey federal district court dismissed a suit brought pro se against school officials who refused to allow plaintiff to pick up his fourth-grade son every Friday two-and-one-half hours early to take the son to Muslim religious services. Plaintiff had joint custody of his son. The son's mother, as well as school officials, objected to the father's request, even though the father had court-ordered parenting time with the son on Fridays. When plaintiff persisted, the Board of Education barred him from school premises. Plaintiff asserted nine causes of action against school officials. Dismissing his due process claim, the court said in part:

Courts have held that “[t]he right of parents to raise their children without undue state interference is well established.”...  Moreover, the Third Circuit has held that “[i]t has long been recognized that parents have a constitutional right to control the education of their children.”...  But such a right is “neither absolute nor unqualified.”... 

Liberally construed, the SAC [second amended complaint] asserts that Defendants deprived Plaintiff of his right to be on school grounds without affording him due process.  However, the Third Circuit has declined to find that such a right exists....

Dismissing Plaintiff's 1st Amendment claims, the court said in part:

Plaintiff next alleges that Defendants violated his First Amendment rights by “unduly preferring non-religion over religion and interfering with [his] right to peaceably assemble for religious purposes.”...

To support his First Amendment claim, Plaintiff alleges that after picking his son up from school early two Fridays in a row for prayer and submitting a letter to the school seeking a religious exemption, he was turned away by security the next Friday....  Plaintiff also alleges that [school principal] Ramcharan told Plaintiff that his son could pray at school because two-and-a-half hours once per week was too much time for Plaintiff’s son to miss....  Plaintiff was banned from school grounds shortly afterwards....  Even accepting these allegations as true, Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that Defendants violated his First Amendment rights.  Plaintiff fails to allege how the inability to remove his son from school impacts Plaintiff’s right to assemble and to exercise his religious rights.  

Moreover, there is no suggestion that Defendants acted to suppress Plaintiff’s religious views or ideas....  As a result, the Court finds that Plaintiff does not plausibly allege a First Amendment freedom of assembly violation....

The court then added a lengthy footnote which reads in part:

Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim also fails if construed under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment....  “[T]he First Amendment is only implicated if the governmental burden on religion is ‘substantial,’ which essentially means that the state may not compel an individual to act contrary to his religious beliefs.” ... Here, Plaintiff has pled no facts upon which the Court could infer that Plaintiff’s religious rights were substantially burdened based on his inability to pick up his son from school on two occasions.

7th Circuit: Prison's Refusal to Provide Muslim Prayer Schedules at State Expense Is Permissible

In Childs v. Webster, (7th Cir., March 4, 2026), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals held that there was not a violation of a Muslim inmate's free exercise rights under RLUIPA or the 1st Amendment when his prison refused to distribute corrected prayer-time schedules to Muslim inmates. Inmates were allowed to purchase corrected schedules with their own funds or by outside donations. Prison policies bar use of taxpayer funds to purchase inmate personal property items. The chaplain had originally made printed schedules available at prison expense to inmates in the chapel, but those schedules turned out to be inaccurate. The court said in part:

The de minimis cost of purchasing a prayer schedule does not rise to the level of a “substantial” burden on religious exercise. Such a “truly negligible” and “unquestionably affordable” financial burden could not realistically coerce Childs to violate his sincerely held religious belief..... Absent a true coercive dilemma, to conclude that Childs’s claim still satisfies the “substantial burden” requirement of RLUIPA would give the word a meaning it cannot bear and render Congress’s choice of the word “substantial” meaningless surplusage.... And because Childs failed to carry his initial burden of persuasion, the government is not required to justify its policy under strict scrutiny....

... [P]rison policy, which does not permit the purchase of personal property for inmates, religious or secular, is a neutral and generally applicable rule that does not violate the Free Exercise Clause...

State Attorney General May Enforce Subpoena Seeking from Archdiocese Evidence of Clergy Sexual Abuse

In State of Washington v. Corporation of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, (WA App, March 2, 2026), a Washington state appellate court allowed enforcement of a subpoena issued by the state Attorney General's Office (AGO) seeking from the Catholic Archdiocese evidence relating to clergy sexual abuse. In issuing the subpoena the Attorney General's Office relied on investigative authority given to it by a provision of the state's Charitable Trust Act. The trial court had quashed the subpoena because the Charitable Trust Act exempts "religious corporations ... operated in good faith as religious organizations" from its provisions. The appeals court, however, held that giving that exemption to religious organizations violates the state constitution's provision barring the granting to any person or corporation privileges or immunities not equally belonging to all citizens or corporations. The court went on to say in part:

Antifavoritism analysis under article I, section 12 subjects legislation to a two-part test.....  First, the court asks whether a challenged law grants a “privilege” or “immunity” for purposes of our state constitution....  If the answer is yes, then the court asks whether there is a “reasonable ground” for granting that privilege or immunity....

The Archdiocese says this case does not involve a ... direct impact on the fundamental right to be free from unwanted bodily interference, because exempting it from the AGO’s statutory subpoena power does not directly condone the invasion of any person’s bodily autonomy,,,,

As the Archdiocese correctly observes, a civil authority in the United States cannot sit in judgment of whether the Archdiocese has conformed to its faith and doctrine.  To the extent, by its subpoena or otherwise, the AGO were to purport to second-guess whether a given action by the Archdiocese was truly “for the use, purpose, benefit and behoof” of the church, the AGO and its use of the subpoena would violate the federal and state constitutional religious protections. ...

At the same time, the subpoena to this point does not implicate a civil authority second-guessing the Archdiocese’s decision-making or good faith, but requires only the production of documents..... The Archdiocese has not pointed to any authority that constitutional religious protections are offended by inquiry into whether criminal or tortious conduct has occurred, including sexual abuse by clergy.  

We perceive in the AGO’s subpoena a scope that, if pursued, would clearly unconstitutionally infringe the Archdiocese’s religious protections, to the extent the AGO seeks to determine whether any given act or expenditure by the Archdiocese was “for the use, purpose, benefit and behoof” of the church.  But we also perceive a scope that clearly does not infringe the Archdiocese’s religious protections, to the extent the AGO seeks evidence relevant to determining that an act occurred that is criminal, tortious, or both, including sexual abuse by clergy.

Suit Alleges Unconstitutional Exclusion of Muslim Schools from Texas School Choice Program

A Muslim parent filed suit this week in a Texas federal district court challenging the state's exclusion of accredited Islamic private schools from participation in the Texas Education Freedom Accounts (TEFA) program. TEFA is a publicly funded school choice program. The complaint (full text) in Cherkaoui v. Paxton, (SD TX, filed 3/1/2026), alleges in part:

Since TEFA's inception, Defendants have systematically targeted Islamic schools for exclusion based on their religious identity, perceived "Islamic ties," and alleged connections to organizations Governor Abbott has designated as "foreign terrorist" or "transnational criminal" entities—even where those schools are fully accredited, satisfy all statutory eligibility criteria, and have no actual connection to terrorism or unlawful activity.

The complaint contends that the state has violated the 1st and 14th Amendments, alleging in part: 

85. Defendants' exclusion of Islamic schools is not neutral or generally applicable. It is explicitly based on religious identity (schools are targeted because they are Islamic), perceived religious association (hosting community events with Islamic civil-rights organizations), and religious animus (official statements equating Islamic identity with terrorism)....

89.   By systematically excluding Islamic schools while approving hundreds of Christian, Jewish, and other non-Islamic religious schools for TEFA participation, Defendants have engaged in denominational discrimination that favors non-Islamic religions over Islam in the distribution of a public benefit. 

90. Defendants' policies and public statements evince a purpose and effect of disfavoring Islam and conveying governmental disapproval of the Muslim faith....

Texas Tribune reports on the lawsuit. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Supreme Court in Shadow Docket Case Rejects California's Policy on Informing Parents of Student's Gender Transition

On Monday evening, the U.S. Supreme Court in Mirabelli v. Bonta, (Sup. Ct., March 2, 2026), barred enforcement against objecting parents of a controversial California school policy that requires student consent before disclosing to parents a student's gender transitioning in school. A California federal district court had enjoined enforcement of the policy in a challenge by parents and teachers. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, however, stayed the district court's injunction, thus reinstating the policy. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court ruled for the parents.  It vacated the 9th Circuit's stay as to parents who object to the policy, but left the stay in place as to teachers. Justices Thomas and Alito would have vacated the injunction as to teachers as well. Justices Jackson, Kagan and Sotomayor dissented.

The per curiam opinion says in part:

We conclude that the parents who seek religious exemptions are likely to succeed on the merits of their Free Exercise Clause claim.  California’s policies likely trigger strict scrutiny under that provision because they substantially interfere with the “right of parents to guide the religious development of their children.” ...  The parents who assert a free exercise claim have sincere religious beliefs about sex and gender, and they feel a religious obligation to raise their children in accordance with those beliefs....

The same is true for the subclass of parents who object to those policies on due process grounds.  Under long-established precedent, parents—not the State—have primary authority with respect to “the upbringing and education of children.” ... The right protected by these precedents includes the right not to be shut out of participation in decisions regarding their children’s mental health....

Justice Barrett, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh, filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

The dissent questions how the Court can adhere to parental-rights precedent after its decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization..... But Dobbs calls into question neither the doctrine of substantive due process nor the other unexpressed rights that the doctrine protects....

 ... [C]ontrary to the dissent’s charge, granting interim relief is not a sign of the Court’s “impatience” to reach the merits.... Instead, the grant reflects the Court’s judgment about the risk of irreparable harm to the parents.... 

Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Jackson, filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Today’s decision shows, not for the first time, how our emergency docket can malfunction.  A case raising novel legal questions and arousing strong views comes to this Court via an application about whether to stay a district court’s injunction pending appeal. The ordinary appellate process has barely started; only a district court has ruled on the case’s merits. The Court receives scant and, frankly, inadequate briefing about the legal issues in dispute.  It does not hold oral argument or deliberate in conference, as regular procedures dictate. It considers the request on a short fuse—a matter of weeks. And then the Court grants relief by means of a terse, tonally dismissive ruling designed to conclusively resolve the dispute. The Court does all this even though the application of existing law to the case raises tricky questions, and so cries out for reflection and explanation....

As to due process particularly... I have no doubt that parents have rights, even though unenumerated, concerning their children and the life choices they make..... On the other side of ledger, of course, a State has critical interests in the care and education of children.  But California’s policy, in depriving all parents of information critical to their children’s health and well-being, could have crossed the constitutional line.  And that would entitle the parents, at the end of the day, to relief. 

The Court, however, would be far better equipped to draw the appropriate line and to explain its legal basis—in short, to do law in the right way—if it had followed our ordinary processes....

Justice Sotomayor, without writing or joining an opinion, stated that she would have left the 9th Circuit's injunction in place both as to parents and teachers.

SCOTUSblog reports on the decision.

9th Circuit: Anti-Transgender Comments Justify Mayor's Veto of Membership on Police Advisory Board

In Hodges v. Gloria, (9th Cir., Feb. 26, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected free speech and free exercise challenges to the San Diego mayor's veto of the reappointment of a voluntary member of the city's Police Advisory Board.  The mayor vetoed the reappointment of Dennis Hodges, a correctional officer and pastor, because of Hodges' public comments that he considered “transgenderism” to be a sin just like adultery and fornication. The court said in part:

Hodges asserts that he was not a policymaker and that government officials may not create religious tests for holding public office.  However, a consistent line of cases ... hold that an appointed volunteer may be dismissed for statements that might otherwise be protected by the First Amendment when “commonality of political purpose” is an appropriate requirement for the volunteer’s services....

Hodges has not shown that the district court erred in rejecting his free exercise claim.  To prevail on this claim, Hodges would have to show that even though the veto of his reappointment did not violate his free speech rights, it violated his free exercise rights because of his underlying religious beliefs.  He offers no case law supporting such a proposition.  Moreover, he does not explain how his religious motive for making public statements changes the court’s evaluation of his claim....