Cert Granted on Whether Medicaid Beneficiary Can Challenge Cutoff of Funds to Planned Parenthood

The U.S. Supreme Court yesterday granted review in Kerr v. Planned Parenthood, (Docket No. 23-1275, certiorari granted 12/18/2024) on the question of whether individual Medicaid beneficiaries have a private right of action to enforce the Medicaid Act’s any-qualified provider provision. The case arises from a challenge to South Carolina's termination of Medicaid funding to Planned Parenthood. This was Question 1 presented by the petition for certiorari, the issue on which the Supreme Court granted review. Here is the SCOTUSblog case page with links to pleadings and briefs in the case.

South Carolina Supreme Court: State Scholarship Program for Private School Students Violates State Constitution

 In Edison v. South Carolina Department of Education, (SC Sup. Ct., Sept. 11, 2024), the South Carolina Supreme Court in a 3-2 decision held that the state's Education Scholarship Trust Fund Act violates the state constitution insofar as it authorizes use of ESTF funds to pay tuition and fees to private educational institutions.  Article XI, Sec. 4 of the South Carolina Constitution provides:

No money shall be paid from public funds nor shall the credit of the State or any of its political subdivisions be used for the direct benefit of any religious or other private educational institution.

The court said in part:

A parent who chooses to use a scholarship to pay their child's private school tuition is undoubtedly using public funds to provide a direct benefit to the private school....  After we clear away the window dressing, we can see the Act funnels public funds to the direct benefit of private schools.  This is what our constitution forbids.  We conclude Petitioners have carried their burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the portion of the Act that allows tuition payments from public funds for the direct benefit of private educational institutions violates Article XI, Section 4.

Chief Justice Kittredge, joined by Justice Few, filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Under the South Carolina Constitution, the use of public funds for the direct benefit of a private school is impermissible; the use of public funds for the indirect benefit of a private school is entirely permissible....

In my view, ... the structure and operation of the ESTF Act provide an indirect benefit to schools of the families' choice—both private and public alike. Nonetheless, the majority opinion today defines the phrase "direct benefit" so broadly that it swallows any possible meaning of "indirect benefit" in the process.

AP reports on the decision. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

11th Circuit Enjoins New Title IX Rules in 4 States, Pending Appeal

 In State of Alabama v. U.S. Secretary of Education, (11th Cir., Aug. 22, 2024), the U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, issued an injunction pending appeal barring enforcement in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina of the Department of Education's new rules under Title IX.  The new rules define discrimination on the basis of sex as including discrimination on the basis of gender identity. They also reduce the threshold for concluding that conduct amounts to sex discrimination. The majority pointed out:

Before this action, every court to consider the issue across the nation—seven district courts and two courts of appeals— preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the rule.  The district court here, by contrast, refused to enjoin the rule a day before it was supposed to go into effect.

Judge Wilson dissented contending that plaintiffs have not shown the irreparable injury required for obtaining an injunction. ADF issued a press release announcing the decision.

South Carolina Legislature Passes Bill Barring Gender Transition Care for Minors and Mandating Schools Notifying Parents

The South Carolina legislature this week gave final passage to H4624 (full text) which prohibits health care professionals from providing puberty blocking drugs, cross-sex hormones or gender reassignment surgery to individuals under 18 years of age. It also bars use of public funds for gender transition procedures and provides:

(A) A nurse, counselor, teacher, principal, or other official or staff at a public school shall not knowingly: (1) encourage or coerce a minor to withhold from the minor's parent or legal guardian the fact that the minor's perception of his or her gender is inconsistent with his or her sex, as defined in Section 44-42-310; or (2) withhold from a minor's parent or legal guardian information related to the minor's perception that his or her gender is inconsistent with his or her sex, as defined in Section 44-42-310.

(B) The principal, vice principal, or counselor at a public school shall immediately notify in writing a minor's parent or legal guardian if the minor: (1) asserts to any school employee that the minor's gender is inconsistent with his or her sex, as defined in Section 44-42-310; or (2) requests a school employee to address a minor using a pronoun or title that does not align with the minor's sex.

The bill now goes to Governor Henry McMaster for his signature. The Hill reports on the passage of the bill.

4th Circuit Hears Oral Arguments on Planned Parenthood Funding Cutoff

The U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals last Friday heard oral arguments (audio of full oral arguments) in Planned Parenthood South Atlantic v. Kerr.  The case, which is on remand from the Supreme Court, involves South Carolina's appeal of an injunction that bars it from terminating Medicaid funding to Planned Parenthood. (See prior posting.) ADF has further background on the case.

Faith-Based Foster Care Agency May Limit Clients to Those with Compatible Religious Beliefs

 In two decisions issued last week, a South Carolina federal district court rejected Establishment Clause challenges to waivers from federal anti-discrimination requirements granted faith-based child placement agencies.  In Rogers v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, (D SC, Sept. 29, 2023), plaintiff challenged an Executive Order issued by the governor of South Carolina allowing licensing of religious child placement agencies that worked only with clients who shared their religious beliefs. At issue in the case was the rejection by Miracle Hill Ministries of a foster-parent application submitted by a same-sex couple who belonged to the local Unitarian-Universalist Church. The court rejected plaintiffs' Equal Protection claim because plaintiffs had not identified any state action involved.  It rejected their Establishment Clause claim, saying in part:

Plaintiffs’ legal premise is based on the now abandoned framework of the “Lemon Test” by focusing their argument on the third factor in Lemon regarding an “excessive government entanglement with religion.” ... Instead, based on historical practices and understandings which Kennedy requires, Establishment Clause protections are more likely triggered “when the government use[s] the established church to carry out certain civil functions, often by giving ‘the established church a monopoly over a specific function.’” ...

Plaintiffs identify but misstate three “hallmarks” of “founding-era religious establishments” that “reflect[] ‘forms of coerc[ion]’ regarding ‘religion or its exercise.’”... Stated in full, they are: 1) “the government punished dissenting churches and individuals for their religious exercise,” 2) “the government provided financial support for the established church, often in a way that preferred the established denomination over other churches,” and 3) “the government used the established church to carry out certain civil functions, often by giving the established church a monopoly over a specific function[.]” ...

Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden to show that these “hallmarks” exist here...

In Madonna v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, (D SC, Sept. 29, 2023), plaintiff was rejected by Miracle Hill because she did not share its evangelical-Christian beliefs and could not affirm its statement of faith. Rejecting plaintiff's Establishment Clause claims, the court said in part:

Defendants did not compel Maddonna to sign Miracle Hill’s statement or leave her without an adequate alternative to signing it. To the contrary, Maddonna could foster the same children at any of twenty-six other private agencies in the State... or with the State itself....  Accordingly, Maddonna has not shown “a historically disfavored establishmentarian practice” based on a claim of “subtle and indirect pressure.”...

Maddonna’s attempt to implicate an impermissible religious accommodation is foreclosed by Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, an analogous case in which the Supreme Court found the denial of a similar religious accommodation for foster care agencies burdened the Free Exercise Clause.

Becket issued a press release announcing the decisions.

South Carolina Supreme Court Upholds Heartbeat Abortion Ban

In Planned Parenthood South Atlantic v. State of South Carolina, (SC Sup. Ct., Aug. 23, 2023), the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the 2023 version of South Carolina's heartbeat abortion ban enacted in response to an earlier decision by the same court striking down an earlier version of the law. The court said in part:

[T]he legislature has found that the State has a compelling interest in protecting the lives of unborn children. That finding is indisputable and one we must respect. The legislature has further determined, after vigorous debate and compromise, that its interest in protecting the unborn becomes actionable upon the detection of a fetal heartbeat via ultrasound by qualified medical personnel. It would be a rogue imposition of will by the judiciary for us to say that the legislature's determination is unreasonable as a matter of law—particularly on the record before us and in the specific context of a claim arising under the privacy provision in article I, section 10 of our state constitution.

As a result, our judicial role in this facial challenge to the 2023 Act has come to an end. The judiciary's role is to exercise our judgment as to whether the legislative weighing of competing interests was within the range of possible, reasonable choices rationally related to promoting the legislature's legitimate interests. Having concluded that it was, we consequently defer to the legislature's gauging of the profound, competing interests at stake. Accordingly, we vacate the preliminary injunction and hold the 2023 Act is constitutional.

Justice Few filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

Ultimately, the General Assembly did not attempt to simply re-enact the same legislation, as Planned Parenthood argues. Rather, it amended the 2021 Act in what appears to be a sincere attempt to comply with the narrowest reading of this Court's ruling in Planned Parenthood I. The question now before the Court, therefore, is whether the attempt was successful; do the changes the General Assembly made from the 2021 Act to the 2023 Act make it possible for this Court to find the 2023 Act constitutional under article I, section 10, despite the fact the threshold for banning most abortions did not change....

When this Court evaluated the constitutionality of the 2021 Act, we balanced the State's interest in protecting unborn life against the statutory countervailing interest of "informed choice" and the privacy interests arising from article I, section 10. As there is no "informed choice" provision in the 2023 Act, the State's interest in protecting unborn life is now balanced against only the constitutional privacy interests.

Chief Justice Beatty filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

In my view, because the material terms of the 2023 Act have not changed from the 2021 Act, logic and respect for the doctrine of stare decisis dictate that the 2023 Act should likewise be declared unconstitutional.

 AP reports on the decision.

Supreme Court GVR's South Carolina Planned Parenthood Defunding Case

In Kerr v. Planned Parenthood, (Sup. Ct., Docket No. 21-1431, June 20, 2023) (Order List), the Supreme Court remanded for further consideration South Carolina's appeal of a 4th Circuit decision that barred South Carolina from terminating Medicaid funding to Planned Parenthood. The Court's action today granted certiorari, vacated the judgment below and remanded the case in light of the Court's June 8, decision in Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion Cty. v. Talevski. That case held that 42 USC §1983 may be used to enforce rights created by statutes enacted under Congress' spending power, a holding consistent with the 4th Circuit's decision below in Kerr. Here is the SCOTUSblog's case page for the Kerr case, with links to all the pleadings and briefs in the case. Reuters reports on today's Supreme Court ruling.

South Carolina Legislature Approves School Voucher Bill

 On Tuesday, the South Carolina legislature gave final passage to S0039 (full text) which gives lower income families access to school vouchers of up to $6000 per student through the newly created Education Scholarship Trust Fund. The funds may be used at approved public or private schools for tuition, textbooks, computers and tutoring. In the first year of the program, vouchers will be available to 5,000 students. By the third year this increased to 15,000. The State reports on the legislation.

South Carolina Supreme Court Invalidates Fetal Heartbeat Abortion Ban

In Planned Parenthood South Atlantic v. State of South Carolina, (SC Sup. Ct., Jan. 5, 2023), the South Carolina Supreme Court in a 3-2 decision held that the state's Fetal Heartbeat and Protection from Abortion Act violates a woman's right to privacy protected by Art. I, Sec. 10 of the South Carolina Constitution. Each Justice wrote a separate opinion in the case. The opinions span 147 pages.  Justice Hearn, holding the law unconstitutional, said in part:

We hold that the decision to terminate a pregnancy rests upon the utmost personal and private considerations imaginable, and implicates a woman's right to privacy. While this right is not absolute, and must be balanced against the State's interest in protecting unborn life, this Act, which severely limits—and in many instances completely forecloses—abortion, is an unreasonable restriction upon a woman's right to privacy and is therefore unconstitutional....

The State unquestionably has the authority to limit the right of privacy that protects women from state interference with her decision, but any such limitation must be reasonable and it must be meaningful in that the time frames imposed must afford a woman sufficient time to determine she is pregnant and to take reasonable steps to terminate that pregnancy. Six weeks is, quite simply, not a reasonable period of time for these two things to occur, and therefore the Act violates our state Constitution's prohibition against unreasonable invasions of privacy.

Chief Justice Beatty concurred in a separate opinion, saying in part:

Although our determination turns on the right to privacy, I believe the Act is also void ab initio and denies state constitutional rights to equal protection, procedural due process, and substantive due process. Therefore, the Act violates our state constitution beyond a reasonable doubt. For the foregoing reasons, I concur with Justice Hearn's lead opinion regarding the right to privacy, and I write separately to address all of Petitioners' issues because our decision today will likely not be the final resolution of the quandary....

When life begins is a theoretical and religious question upon which there is no universal agreement among various religious faiths. In fact, because there are differing views on abortion and when life begins among religious faiths, challenges are already being made to some abortion laws on the basis they violate religious freedom by elevating one faith's views over the views of others. The question of when life begins is distinguishable from the constitutional questions raised here regarding whether a woman has the right to make her own medical decisions regarding her reproductive health (in consultation with her medical provider and based on scientific evidence). At its core, the question the Court faces today is can the government—by force of law—force a woman to give birth without her consent? As will be discussed, for a reasonable period of time, a woman, rather than the government, retains this important right to choose whether to become a mother.

Justice Few filed an opinion concurring only in the result, saying in part:

Political questions surrounding abortion have produced as much impassioned disagreement as any issue of our time. When those political questions intersect with questions of law, advocates on both sides of the political questions seem to believe that the more fervently they hold their political views, the more likely those views will become someone else's legal views. We have been asked in this case to ignore well-established principles of law in order to uphold the Fetal Heartbeat Act, and to create new and novel principles of law to strike down the Act. The parties who made these requests derive their positions not from sound legal reasoning, but from fervent political advocacy. These well-intentioned parties act on the basis of their politics. The Court must act on the basis of law. The article I, section 10 prohibition on "unreasonable invasions of privacy" is a principle of law. The six-week ban in the Fetal Heartbeat Act violates the provision because—as a matter of law—it is an unreasonable intrusion into a pregnant woman's right of privacy. The Fetal Heartbeat Act is, therefore, unconstitutional.

Justice Kittredge filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Petitioners' due process claim fails. Abortion is not "deeply rooted" in our state's history, and it could not be reasonably suggested that abortion is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." To the contrary, it is the regulation and restriction of abortion that is deeply rooted in our state's history....

Justice Few and I have a fundamental difference of opinion on the reach and meaning of the state constitutional privacy provision. Justice Few views the privacy provision expansively; I view the privacy provision in line with its understood meaning at the time it was adopted, along with caselaw interpreting the provision. Yet Justice Few and I agree on a person's general privacy interest in his or her medical autonomy. It is the source of that privacy interest where we part company. Justice Few finds the source of the privacy interest in article I, section 10—the privacy provision. I believe this privacy interest in healthcare decisions is embedded in the due process concept of liberty from our nation's and state's foundings. That is why I find the source of that interest in article I, section 3—due process. This position aligns with my view that the most basic forms of privacy arise from natural law....

Justice James filed a dissenting opinion, agreeing in part with Justice Kittredge, saying in part:

Like Justice Kittredge, I would uphold the Act. However, I disagree with Justice Kittredge on one point: I would hold the privacy provision in article I, section 10 provides citizens with heightened Fourth Amendment protections, especially protection from unreasonable law enforcement use of electronic devices to search and seize information and communications. It goes no further.

CNN reports on the decision.

Appropriation To Christian School Challenged Under South Carolina Constitution

Suit was filed yesterday in a South Carolina state trial court contending that a state budget appropriation of $1.5 million to  Christian Learning Centers of Greenville County violates the provision in South Carolina's constitution that bars the use of public funds "for the direct benefit of any religious or other private educational institution." The complaint (full text) in Parker v. McMaster, (SC Com. Pl., filed 9/20/2022) asserts that the appropriation also contravenes the state constitution's Establishment Clause. The appropriation is aimed at partially funding a $14 million residential school for disadvantaged and at-risk youth. Freedom From Religion Foundation issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

South Carolina Adopts Law Protecting Conscience Rights Of Health Care Personnel and Institutions

As reported by WPDE News, on Friday South Carolina Governor Henry McMaster signed H4776, the Medical Ethics and Diversity Act (full text). The new law provides in part:

A medical practitioner, health care institutions, and health care payers have the right not to participate in or pay for any health care service which violates the practitioner's or entity's conscience....

... [A] religious medical practitioner, health care institutions, and health care payers that hold themselves out to the public as religious, state in their governing documents that they have a religious purpose or mission, and have internal operating policies or procedures that implement their religious beliefs, have the right to make employment, staffing, contracting, and admitting privilege decisions consistent with their religious beliefs....

No physician, nurse, technician, medical student, or other employee of a hospital, clinic or physician shall be required to recommend, perform or assist in the performance of an abortion if he advises the hospital, clinic or employing physician in writing that he objects to performing, assisting or otherwise participating in such procedures.

South Carolina Governor Signs Law On Transgender Students In Sports

On Monday, South Carolina Governor Henry McMaster signed  H4608, the Save Women's Sports Act (full text). The law requires school athletic teams to be designated based on biological sex at birth of team members, and provides in part:

(2)    Athletic teams or sports designated for males, men, or boys shall not be open to students of the female sex, unless no team designated for females in that sport is offered at the school in which the student is enrolled.

(3)    Athletic teams or sports designated for females, women, or girls shall not be open to students of the male sex.

The law applies to interscholastic, intercollegiate, intramural, or club athletic teams or sports that are sponsored by a public elementary or secondary school or public postsecondary institution, and to private school teams that compete against public schools. Washington Examiner reports on the new law.

Court Says South Carolina's Ban On Aid To Private And Religious Schools Was Not Discriminatory

In Bishop of Charleston v. Adams, (D SC, Feb. 10, 2022), a South Carolina federal district court rejected federal Constitutional free exercise and equal protection challenges to Art. XI, Sec. 4 of the South Carolina Constitution which bars the use of public funds to directly benefit religious or other private educational institutions. The court held that plaintiffs failed to prove that the provision was motivated by either religious or racial discriminatory intent, saying in part:

[A]ccording to Plaintiffs, the 1895 provision was a so-called “Blaine Amendment” motivated by anti-Catholic animus....

Plaintiffs’ own expert, conceded that the national Blaine Amendment movement was not a significant factor in South Carolina.... The similarity in language between South Carolina’s 1895 provision and Blaine Amendments in other States is not enough to make up for Plaintiffs’ failure to demonstrate the existence of pervasive anti-Catholic animus in South Carolina, much less Plaintiffs’ failure to establish any corresponding discriminatory intent.....

Even assuming the 1895 provision was connected in some way to racial or religious prejudice, Plaintiffs’ claim still cannot succeed. The original 1895 provision no longer governs. Instead, the relevant provision was incorporated into the South Carolina Constitution by a vote of the people in 1972....

Plaintiffs mainly argue that racial and religious prejudice from the 1895 provision tainted Section 4, while also arguing that “[t]he ‘historical backdrop’ of the 1972 Amendment really started in 1619, when the first slaves came to America’s shores.”...

But Plaintiffs’ reliance on these other racist or anti-religious views or policies is unavailing because Plaintiffs do not connect them with Section 4’s adoption.

HHS Rescinds Trump Era Religious Exemptions For Child Welfare Agencies In Three States

Yesterday, the Department of Health and Human Services announced that it is rescinding waivers of non-discrimination requirements issued during the Trump Administration to South Carolina, Texas and Michigan, along with certain child welfare agencies in those states. The waivers allowed faith-based foster care placement agencies to receive federal funds even though they select foster parents on the basis of religion. (See prior posting.) In its release yesterday, HHS summarized the background for its action:

Through these waivers, States and child welfare agencies – including States and organizations that did not make such requests - were granted exemptions from program nondiscrimination requirements in a rule that was not in effect. In taking today's actions, HHS is reestablishing its long-standing Department practice of evaluation of religious exemptions and modifications of program requirements on a case-by-case basis, as needed, and as is required by law—which was unprecedently changed in 2017 by the previous Administration. Today, HHS reaffirms its important commitment to core American values:  HHS will not condone the blanket use of religious exemptions against any person or blank checks to allow discrimination against any persons, importantly including LGBTQ+ persons in taxpayer-funded programs.

Conviction and Sentence of Mother Emanuel Church Shooter Uphehld

In United States v. Roof, (4th Cir., Aug. 25, 2021), the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 149-page opinion, affirmed the hate crime and obstructing religion convictions of Dylan Roof who shot and killed nine members of Charleston, South Carolina's Mother Emanuel Church who were attending a Bible study group. Roof's attorneys raised 19 separate issues on appeal. The court concluded that proof of religious hostility is not required for a conviction under the religious obstruction statute, 18 USC § 247(a)(2). It also concluded that Congress did not exceed its powers under the 13th Amendment when it enacted the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 249. The court also upheld the death sentence imposed, saying in part:

No cold record or careful parsing of statutes and precedents can capture the full horror of what Roof did. His crimes qualify him for the harshest penalty that a just society can impose. We have reached that conclusion not as a product of emotion but through a thorough analytical process, which we have endeavored to detail here. In this, we have followed the example of the trial judge, who managed this difficult case with skill and compassion for all concerned, including Roof himself.

ABC reports on the decision.                       

South Carolina City Bans Conversion Therapy for Minors

According to The State, yesterday the Columbia, South Carolina City Council, by a vote of 4-3, passed a ban on licensed professional therapists offering conversion therapy for minors. Violations will result in a $500 civil fine. The paper reports:

A number of people spoke on the conversion therapy ban during Tuesday’s [City Council] meeting. Eleven of the 14 speakers were against the measure, with several saying they believed it infringed on religious liberties and First Amendment rights. Several of the speakers against the ordinance were connected to Columbia International University, a Christian college in North Columbia.

[Councilman Howard] Duvall said the ordinance would not interfere with conversations between a pastor and a resident.....  "It is clearly aimed at licensed practitioners. Most of the pastors in South Carolina are not licensed practitioners licensed by the state of South Carolina."

By a vote of 6-1, Council also passed a resolution supporting statewide legislation outlawing conversion therapy for minors.

Court Wil Not Enjoin South Carolina "No Aid" Clause

In Bishop of Charleston v. Adams, (D SC, May 11, 2021), a South Carolina federal district court refused to grant a preliminary injunction in a suit challenging the constitutionality of the "no aid" clause in South Carolina's Constitution. That clause bars the use of public funds to benefit any religious or other private educational institution. Plaintiffs, which include a diocese representing 33 Catholic schools, sought access to federal CARES Act funds that had been directed to South Carolina. The court distinguished this case from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue which struck down Montana's "no aid" clause.  The court said in part:

[T]he Supreme Court struck down Montana’s no-aid provision precisely because it discriminated against religious schools but not other private schools, creating an implicit contrast with no-aid provisions like South Carolina’s that encompass both religious and private non-religious schools. Unlike the provision at issue in Espinoza, South Carolina’s no-aid provision prohibits the use of public funds for the direct benefit of religious and non-religious private schools alike. In other words, South Carolina’s provision discriminates along the private/public divide, not the religious/non-religious divide.

Lawsuit Claims South Carolina's Blaine Amendment Is Unconstitutional

Suit was filed yesterday in a South Carolina federal district court asking the court to declare that South Carolina's Blaine Amendment (Art. XI, Sec. 4 of the South Carolina Constitution) violates the Equal  Protection and Free Exercise clauses of the U.S. Constitution.  The complaint (full text) in Bishop of Charleston v. Adams, (D SC, filed 4/14/2021) reads in part:

1. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic ravaging our state and nation, the U.S. Congress and South Carolina General Assembly have appropriated substantial sums of public funds to provide relief to local governments, employers, non-profit organizations, schools, and colleges.

2. However, because the South Carolina Constitution contains a provision, a so-called Blaine Amendment, which prohibits public funds from being allocated to private or religious schools, the schools and universities represented by Plaintiffs are legally prohibited from accessing these relief funds.

3. Because the Blaine Amendment was born in bigotry and prejudice based on race and religion, it violates the equal protection and free exercise clauses of the U.S. Constitution, and should no longer bar Plaintiffs’ schools from equal access to these essential relief funds.

The complaint goes on to trace the specific history of the Blaine Amendment in South Carolina.  Plaintiffs in the case are a Catholic diocese that operates 33 schools and an association of private colleges. The Center Square reports on the lawsuit.

South Carolina Fetal Heartbeat Abortion Act Enjoined

As previously reported, earlier this week (Feb. 18), South Carolina Governor Henry McMaster signed into law the Fetal Heartbeat Protection from Abortion Act, prohibiting an abortion if a fetal heartbeat is detected. One day later, in Planned Parenthood South Atlantic v. Wilson, (D SC, Feb. 19, 2021), a South Carolina federal district court issued a temporary restraining order barring enforcement of the Act, saying in part:

Because the Act bans abortion months before any fetus could be viable, ... Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that the Act is unconstitutional. Indeed, courts have “universally” invalidated laws that ban abortions beginning at a gestational age prior to viability.

CNN reports on the decision. [Thanks to Tom Rutledge for the lead.]