School Counselor's Office Display of Anti-Trans Books Is Permissible Only When No Students Are in His Office

In Theis v. Intermountain Education Service Board of Directors, (D ORA, Aug. 20, 2025), a social worker employed by the district to administer standardized tests individually to students sued claiming his constitutional rights were violated when the district found that his display of two particular books in his office violated the district's bias policy. The district found that the display of the books-- titled He is He and She is She--constituted a hostile expression toward a person because of their gender identity. Plaintiff was ordered to stop displaying the books. 

The court concluded that the district's policy did not violate plaintiff's free exercise rights, saying in part:

... Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant’s Speech Policy is not neutral. There is no indication that the ESB Policy restricts any religious practices because of their religious motivations. Indeed, the policy explicitly seeks to prevent discrimination or harassment based on religion. And even if the ESB Policy adversely impacted religious practices, it is addressing the legitimate concern of ensuring an open and welcoming school environment for all students and employees.

Plaintiff also has not shown that Defendants were “hostile” towards his religious beliefs....

The court however agreed in part with plaintiff's free speech claim, saying that "only his display when no students are present is protected under the First Amendment." It explained: 

When no students were present in Plaintiff’s office, the message of the books would not be reasonably attributable to IMESD, and the display could not press Plaintiff’s views on impressionable or captive students.

Court Again Upholds Idaho Law on School Restroom Use by Transgender Students

In Sexuality and Gender Alliance v. Critchfield, (D ID, Aug. 7, 2025), an Idaho federal district court refused to issue a preliminary injunction to bar enforcement of an Idaho statute that requires transgender students in Idaho public schools to use restrooms, changing rooms, and showers that correspond to their biological sex. The 9th Circuit had previously upheld the denial of a broad preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the statute. In this suit, plaintiffs ask for a narrow injunction applicable only to restrooms at Boise High School. Plaintiffs argue that Boise High School has allowed transgender students to use bathrooms consistent with their gender identity for years, and allowing enforcement now would upset the status quo. The court said in part:

Separating restrooms by biological sex has been common for centuries.... And for good reason—there are biological differences between men and women.... Those biological differences are deserving of privacy and S.B. 1100’s segregation of restrooms based on sex is related to that interest. It is not the Court’s role to determine whether S.B. 1100 is a perfect policy; the Court must only address whether it is “substantially related” to the State of Idaho’s interest in protecting student’s privacy. Because S.B. 1100 is substantially related to the State’s legitimate interest in privacy, the Court finds SAGA is unlikely to succeed on its Equal Protection claim....

The Ninth Circuit... concluded: “SAGA failed to meet its burden to show that the State had clear notice at the time it accepted federal funding that Title IX prohibits segregated access to the facilities covered by S.B. 1100 on the basis of transgender status.”... This conclusion applies with equal force to SAGA’s as-applied challenge. Accordingly, the Court finds SAGA is unlikely to succeed on its Title IX claim.

ADF issued a press release announcing the decision.

10th Circuit Upholds Oklahoma's Ban on Gender-Affirming Care for Minors

In Poe v. Drummond, (10th Cir., Aug. 6, 2025), the U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's refusal to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of an Oklahoma law that prohibits furnishing of surgical procedures, puberty blocking drugs or cross-sex hormones to treat gender dysphoria in minors.  Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Skrmetti, the court rejected equal protection and parental rights challenges. The court said in part:

We conclude that Oklahoma’s enactment of SB 613 rationally relates to Oklahoma’s interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of minors in light of the debate among medical experts about the risks and benefits associated with treating a minor’s gender dysphoria with gender transitioning procedures.  We thus affirm the district court’s ruling as to Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim....

In sum, SB 613 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it discriminates based on age and medical purpose and satisfies rational basis review.  We also need not subject SB 613 to heightened scrutiny based on impermissible legislative purpose because no evidence exists that Oklahoma legislature enacted it as a pretext to invidiously discriminate against transgender minors....

We next determine whether the liberty interest—parents’ right to access gender transition procedures for their children—is so deeply rooted in our Nation’s history to establish a fundamental right.  After conducting “a careful analysis of the history of the right at issue,”... we conclude there is no deeply rooted tradition in parents’ right to access gender transition procedures for their children.

News On 6 reports on the decision.

7th Circuit: Jury Must Decide Whether Religious Accommodation Would Create Undue Hardship

In a Title VII case that has been in litigation for six years, in Kluge v. Brownsburg Community School Corp., (7th Cir., Aug. 5, 2025), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision reversed a district court's grant of summary judgment to the Brownsburg school district and sent the case back to the trial court for a jury to determine disputed facts. At issue is a music teacher's religious objections to following school policy that requires him to refer to transgender students by the names and pronouns that the students and their parents have asked that the school use. Initially the school accommodated the teacher by permitting him to address transgender students using only their last names. However, this led to student dissatisfaction and the accommodation was rescinded. The primary disputed facts are whether the accommodation created an "undue hardship" under the standard defined by the Supreme Court in its 2023 decision in Groff v. DeJoy, and whether the teacher's religious objections were sincere.  The majority said in part:

... [T]he record contains material factual disputes about whether the accommodation disrupted Brownsburg’s learning environment, precluding summary judgment to the school....

... [T]he complaints ...  all deal with the effects on the two students from Kluge’s use of the last-name-only practice. Nowhere do these documents support an inference that the students had a problem with Kluge’s religion or “the mere fact [of] an accommodation.”...  Instead, the complaints are leveled against the impacts on students and teachers, regardless of whether the accommodation was for religious or secular reasons. 

... [T]here is still a genuine material factual dispute about whether those complaints rose to an undue hardship on the school’s educational mission....

...  [A] genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Kluge’s sincerity. Even though a claimant’s sincerity does not hinge on whether he is “scrupulous in his [religious] observance,” it would still be premature to take this issue away from the jury on this question. ...

Judge Rovner filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Until today, when confronted with a Title VII employment discrimination claim, we have deferred to an employer’s good-faith assessment of how an employee performed in the workplace..... Today the court invites a jury to do what we have always said a federal court will not do, which is to sit as a super-personnel department and second-guess the employer’s good-faith reasoning. In making employment decisions, ... employers will now have to consider not only how successfully an employee is performing his job as modified by a religious accommodation, but how a jury might second-guess its assessment in litigation years down the line. This is an untenable restraint on employers’ decision making. 

Today’s decision also burdens employers in a second important respect. Brownsburg successfully argued below that Kluge’s accommodation proved inconsistent with its mission, which is to provide a supportive learning environment for all of its students. Although the majority accepts this mission for present purposes, it also suggests that evidence of an employer’s mission must be limited to policies that are formally documented and adopted prior to any litigation. I think many employers will be surprised to learn that their ability to define their own missions is restricted to formal policies prepared long before an employment dispute arrives in court....

See prior related posting. ADF issued a press release announcing the decision.

North Carolina Legislature Overrides Governor's Veto of Bill on Transgender Issues, Pornography and Religious School Opt-Outs

On Tuesday, the North Carolina legislature overrode the governor's veto of House Bill 805 (full text). The new law deals with a lengthy list of issues, including: (1) requiring recognition only of biological sex in state rules and policies; (2) requiring consent and age verification for appearance in, and procedures for removal of, online pornographic images; (3) prohibiting use of state funds for gender transition procedures; (4) extending statute of limitations for malpractice, and removing damage cap, in gender transition procedures on non-minors; (5) allowing parents to bar their children from checking out specific books from school libraries. The new law also provides:

Local boards of education shall adopt policies to allow a student or the student's parent or guardian to request that the student be excused from specific classroom discussions, activities, or assigned readings that the student, parent, or guardian believes would (i) impose a substantial burden on the student's religious beliefs or (ii) invade the student's privacy by calling attention to the student's religion.

Earlier this month, Governor Josh Stein had vetoed the bill based on his opposition to the provisions on transgender issues. His Veto Message (full text) reads in part:

The initial version of House Bill 805 protected people from being exploited on pornographic websites against their will. I strongly support that policy.... Instead of preventing sexual exploitation, the General Assembly chooses to engage in divisive, job-killing culture wars. North Carolina has been down this road before, and it is a dead end. My faith teaches me that we are all children of God no matter our differences and that it is wrong to target vulnerable people, as this legislation does. I stand ready to work with the legislature when it gets serious about protecting people, instead of mean-spirited attempts to further divide us by marginalizing vulnerable North Carolinians.

Catholic Vote reports on these developments.

Adoptive Parent Rule on Transgender Children Violates Plaintiff's Free Speech and Free Exercise Rights

 In Bates v. Pakseresht, (9th Cir., July 24, 2025), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff Oregon's requirement that to be certified as an adoptive parent, a person must agree to respect and support an adopted child's gender identity and gender expression and use the child's preferred pronouns. Plaintiff contended that it violated her Seventh Day Adventist religious beliefs to use a child's preferred pronouns or take the child for gender transition medical appointments. In a 2-1 decision, the court agreed that the requirement violated plaintiff's free speech and free exercise rights. The majority, in a 50-page opinion, said in part:

We deal here with two vital such rights: the First Amendment’s protections for free speech and the free exercise of religion.  These rights work together, with “the Free Exercise Clause protect[ing] religious exercises, whether communicative or not,” and “the Free Speech Clause provid[ing] overlapping protection for expressive religious activities.”...  Fundamental as basic freedoms, these rights spring from a common constitutional principle: that the government may not insist upon our adherence to state favored orthodoxies, whether of a religious or political variety....

We hold that Oregon’s application of § 413-200-0308(2)(k) to Bates, in denying her certification to be an adoptive parent, triggers strict scrutiny for both her free speech and free exercise claims.  In Part A below, we explain why strict scrutiny applies to Bates’s free speech claim.  In Part B, we do the same for Bates’s Free Exercise Clause claim.  And in Part C, we explain why applying Oregon’s policy to Bates does not survive strict scrutiny.  Bates has therefore shown a likelihood of success on the merits of her claim that denying her certification under § 413-200-0308(2)(k) violates the First Amendment.

Judge Clifton dissented, saying in part in a 40-page opinion:

The only limitation imposed by the state in declining to approve her application to foster a child concerns her treatment of the child, not what she personally believes, how she speaks to the world, or how she practices her faith. Oregon should be permitted to put the best interests of the child for which it is responsible paramount in making the decision to place one of its children in the custody of a foster applicant. Parents would not be expected to entrust their children to caregivers who volunteer that they will not respect the child’s self-determined gender identity, if that is something the parents have decided is important. Oregon should not be powerless to protect children for whom it has parental responsibility and for whom it has decided respect should be given. 

Supreme Court Review Sought on Parents' Rights to Know of School's Social Transitioning of Their Child

 A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed last week with the U.S. Supreme Court in Foote v. Ludlow School Committee, (Sup.Ct., cert. filed 7/18/2025). In the case, the U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals held (full text of opinion) that petitioners' parental right protected by the 14th Amendment were not infringed by a school Protocol requiring staff to use a student's requested name and gender pronouns in school without notifying parents of the request unless the student consents. The petition for review of the 1st Circuit opinion says in part:

Petitioners do not have a religious objection to their school district’s indoctrination and transition of their children without their knowledge. Theirs is a moral belief, backed by well-supported scientific opinion, that a so-called gender transition harms their children. But their constitutional rights to direct the upbringing of their children remain just as fundamental. The Court should grant the petition and make clear that parents’ fundamental rights do not depend on whether they are religious.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the petition for review.

Christian Bookstore Challenges Colorado Anti-Discrimination Law

Suit was filed this week in a Colorado federal district court by a Christian bookstore challenging on free speech, free exercise, equal protection and due process grounds recent amendments to Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Act. The complaint (full text) in Doxa Enterprise, Ltd. v. Sullivan, (D CO, filed 7/16/2025), alleges in part:

2. Colorado recently passed HB25-1312 (the “Act”) and amended the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (“CADA”) to define “gender expression” to include “chosen name” and “how an individual chooses to be addressed.” The Act then declares that Coloradans have a right to access “public accommodations[] and advertising” free of discrimination on that basis— except if the requested language is “offensive” or made for “frivolous purposes.”  Under this revised CADA language, it is now illegal for public accommodations like independent bookstores to refer to transgender-identifying individuals with biologically accurate language in their publications and customer interactions. 

3. This puts CADA on a collision course with the First Amendment rights of Plaintiff Doxa Enterprise, Ltd (“Born Again Used Books” or the “Bookstore”), a Christian bookstore in Colorado Springs that sells Christian literature, homeschool curricula, and classics. The Bookstore also publishes a website and social media accounts to promote its Christian faith and products.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Justice Department Sues California Over Its Gender Identity Policy in School Sports

Last week, the Department of Justice sued California, alleging that it violates Title IX by permitting transgender girls to compete in girls' interscholastic athletics. The complaint (full text) in United States v. California Interscholastic Federation, (CD CA, filed 7/9/2025), alleges in part:

1. Across the State of California, girls must compete against boys in various sports pursuant to policies enforced by the California Department of Education (“CDE”) and the California Interscholastic Federation (“CIF”).  These discriminatory policies and practices ignore undeniable biological differences between boys and girls, in favor of an amorphous “gender identity.”  The results of these illegal policies are stark: girls are displaced from podiums, denied awards, and miss out on critical visibility for college scholarships and recognition.  In the words of the Governor of California, it is “deeply unfair” for girls to compete against boys. 

2. This discrimination is not only illegal and unfair but also demeaning, signaling to girls that their opportunities and achievements are secondary to accommodating boys.  It erodes the integrity of girls’ sports, diminishes their competitive experience, and undermines the very purpose of Title IX: to provide equal access to educational benefits, including interscholastic athletics.  Despite warnings from the United States Department of Education, Defendants continue to require California schools to allow boys to compete against girls.  The United States accordingly files this action to stop Defendants’ illegal sex discrimination against female student athletes....

26. Title IX and the Implementing Regulations use the term “sex” to mean biological sex; the term “sex” thus does not mean “gender identity.”...

47. The California Sex Equity in Education Act, Cal. Educ. Code § 221.5(f), referenced in the CDE’s “Gender Equity/Title IX” guidance, states in part:  “A pupil shall be permitted to participate in sex-segregated school programs and activities, including athletic teams and competitions, and use facilities consistent with his or her gender identity, irrespective of the gender listed on the pupil’s records.”  Cal. Educ. Code § 221.5....

The Justice Department issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Cert. Granted in Challenge to Ban of Transgender Women on Women's Sports Teams

Yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court granted review in two cases raising the issue of whether laws that bar transgender women from participating on women's sports teams in public schools and colleges violate Title IX or the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. (Order List). The cases are Little v. Hecox, (Docket No. 24-38, certiorari granted 7/3/2025) involving a challenge to Idaho's Fairness in Women's Sports Act, and West Virginia v. B.P.J., (Docket No. 24-43, certiorari granted 7/3/2025) involving West Virginia's Save Women's Sports Act. Links to all the briefs and pleadings in the Hecox case are available here. Links to all the briefs and pleadings in the West Virginia case are available here. SCOTUSblog reports on the Court's action.

11th Circuit: Florida Can Bar Transgender Teacher's Use of Preferred Pronouns to Refer to Herself in Classroom

In Wood v. Florida Department of Education, (11th Cir., July 2, 2025), the U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, held that a transgender woman teacher's right to free speech was not violated by a Florida statute that  prohibits her from using the title “Ms.” and the pronouns “she,” “her,” and “hers” in exchanges with her high school students during class time. The majority concluded that the teacher "cannot show, with respect to the expression at issue here, that she was speaking as a private citizen rather than a government employee." The majority said in part:

... [W]e needn’t—and don’t—consider whether Wood has a First Amendment right to use gendered identifiers or don a “she/her” pin when conversing with colleagues in the faculty lounge, or, for that matter, even whether she has a right to do those things in her classroom after the students have departed for the day....

When a public-school teacher addresses her students within the four walls of a classroom—whether orally or in writing—she is unquestionably acting “pursuant to [her] official duties.”  Interacting with students during class time, quite literally, is a teacher’s “official dut[y].”  We reiterate that our decision is a narrow one.  We hold only that when Wood identified herself to students in the classroom using the honorific “Ms.” and the pronouns “she,” “her,” and “hers,” she did so in her capacity as a government employee, and not as a private citizen....

Judge Jordan dissented, saying in part:

The preferred personal title and pronouns of a teacher are, like her name, significant markers of individual identity.  They exist outside of, and do not depend on, the school or the government for their existence.... 

The majority’s expansive application of the government speech doctrine essentially leaves the First Amendment on the wrong side of the schoolhouse gate.  As this case demonstrates, “the government speech doctrine [is being] used as a subterfuge for favoring certain private speakers over others based on viewpoint.” ...

The statute at issue here, § 1000.071(3), has nothing to do with curriculum and everything to do with Florida attempting to silence those with whom it disagrees on the matter of transgender identity and status.

Supreme Court Upholds Tennessee's Ban on Gender Affirming Care for Minors

In United States v. Skrmetti,(Sup.Ct., June 18, 2025), the U.S. Supreme Court today by a vote of 6-3 upheld Tennessee's law that bars both hormonal and surgical gender transition procedures for minors. The case generated 5 separate opinions spanning 118 pages. Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion held that the Tennessee law does not trigger heightened scrutiny. He said in part:

This Court has not previously held that transgender individuals are a suspect or quasi-suspect class. And this case, in any event, does not raise that question because SB1 does not classify on the basis of transgender status. As we have explained, SB1 includes only two classifications: healthcare providers may not administer puberty blockers or hormones to minors (a classification based on age) to treat gender dysphoria, gender identity disorder, or gender incongruence (a classification based on medical use). The plaintiffs do not argue that the first classification turns on transgender status, and our case law forecloses any such argument as to the second....

... [T]here is a rational basis for SB1’s classifications. Tennessee concluded that there is an ongoing debate among medical experts regarding the risks and benefits associated with administering puberty blockers and hormones to treat gender dysphoria, gender identity disorder, and gender incongruence. SB1’s ban on such treatments responds directly to that uncertainty....

Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, saying in part: 

This case carries a simple lesson: In politically contentious debates over matters shrouded in scientific uncertainty, courts should not assume that self-described experts are correct.

Deference to legislatures, not experts, is particularly critical here. Many prominent medical professionals have declared a consensus around the efficacy of treating children’s gender dysphoria with puberty blockers, cross-sex hormones, and surgical interventions, despite mounting evidence to the contrary. They have dismissed grave problems undercutting the assumption that young children can consent to irreversible treatments that may deprive them of their ability to eventually produce children of their own. They have built their medical determinations on concededly weak evidence. And, they have surreptitiously compromised their medical recommendations to achieve political ends.

Justice Barrett, joined by Justice Thomas, filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

Because the Court concludes that Tennessee’s Senate Bill 1 does not classify on the basis of transgender status, it does not resolve whether transgender status constitutes a suspect class.... I write separately to explain why, in myview, it does not....

Beyond the treatment of gender dysphoria, transgender status implicates several other areas of legitimate regulatory policy—ranging from access to restrooms to eligibility for boys’ and girls’ sports teams. If laws that classify based on transgender status necessarily trigger heightened scrutiny, then the courts will inevitably be in the business of “closely scrutiniz[ing] legislative choices” in all these domains....

Justice Alito filed an opi nion concurring in part, saying in part:

I do notjoin Part II–A–2 of the opinion of the Court, which concludes that SB1 does not classify on the basis of “transgender status.” There is a strong argument that SB1does classify on that ground, but I find it unnecessary to decide that question. I would assume for the sake of argument that the law classifies based on transgender status, but I would nevertheless sustain the law because such a classification does not warrant heightened scrutiny. I also do not join Part II–A–3 of the Court’s opinion because I do not believe that the reasoning employed in Bostock v. Clayton County ... is applicable when determining whether a law classifies based on sex for Equal Protection Clause purposes.

Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Jackson and joined in part by Justice Kagan, saying in part:

Tennessee’s law expressly classifies on the basis of sex and transgender status, so the Constitution and settled precedent require the Court to subject it to intermediate scrutiny. The majority contorts logic and precedent to say otherwise, inexplicably declaring it must uphold Tennessee’s categorical ban on lifesaving medical treatment so long as “‘any reasonably conceivable state of facts’” might justify it... Thus, the majority subjects a law that plainly discriminates on the basis of sex to mere rational-basis review. By retreating from meaningful judicial review exactly where it matters most, the Court abandons transgender children and their families to political whims....

Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

I take no view on how SB1 would fare under heightened scrutiny.... So I would both start and stop at the question of what test SB1 must satisfy. As JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR shows, it is heightened scrutiny...

SCOTUSblog reports on the decision.

Teacher's Refusal to Use Student's Preferred Pronouns Justified Her Being Fired

 In Ramirez v. Oakland Unified School District, (ND CA, May 27, 2025), a California federal district court dismissed claims by a former kindergarten teacher that her free speech and free exercise rights were violated by her termination for refusing to refer to a student using male pronouns when the student appeared to be biologically female. Both school officials and the student's parents requested that male pronouns be used. Plaintiff contended that her Catholic faith does not allow her to refer to a person using pronouns that differ from the person’s “divinely-intended gender.” The court held that the school district itself was protected by sovereign immunity and that the individual plaintiffs have qualified immunity as to any action for damages. The court went on to hold that plaintiff also failed to adequately allege either a speech or religious exercise claim, saying in part:

The complaint fails to state a claim because the alleged speech was not protected. Ms. Ramirez agreed to serve as an elementary school teacher at a public school. To do the job, a teacher must address and interact with their students. As other courts have observed, while addressing students is not part of the curriculum itself, “it is difficult to imagine how a teacher could perform [their] teaching duties on any subject without a method by which to address individual students.”,,, 

The plaintiff’s main argument in opposition — that the above analysis does not apply because this case concerns compelled speech — fails both legally and factually. While the Supreme Court has suggested that compelled speech outside of an employee’s official duties warrants heightened protection, the government may insist that the employee deliver any lawful message when the speech is part of the employee’s official duties....

Here, the plaintiff does not contest that the district’s anti-discrimination policy is facially neutral. Instead, she contends that school officials were impermissibly hostile towards her religious beliefs when enforcing the policy. The argument fails because, even accepted as true, the well-pleaded facts do not plausibly allege hostility. 

Sports Apparel Company Challenges Colorado's Public Accommodation Law Protection of Transgender Athletes

Suit was filed this week in a Colorado federal district court by an online athletic apparel company, "XX-YY Athletics," that promotes banning of transgender women from women's sports through logos on its apparel and through advertisements.  The company claims that Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Act violates the 1st and 14th Amendments when its public accommodation provisions declare that Coloradans have a right to access advertising that is free from discrimination on the basis of gender expression and chosen name. The complaint (full text) in Committee of Five, Inc. v. Sullivan, (D CO, filed 5/27/2025), alleges in part:

191. The most common way that XX-XY Athletics demonstrates why male competition in women’s sports is unfair or unsafe is by reference to specific transgender-identifying male athletes....

206. Although CADA prohibits XX-XY Athletics from speaking consistently with its view that sex is immutable, the law allows other businesses that also qualify as public accommodations to speak according to their view that sex can be changed.  

207. This distinction in treatment is based on a particular view that the business holds about human sexuality and gender identity....

222. The First Amendment’s Free Speech, Press, and Assembly Clauses protect XX-XY Athletics’ ability to speak, create, publish, sell, and distribute speech; to associate with others and with their messages for expressive purposes; to adopt and act on certain speech-related policies; to decline to associate with others and their message for expressive purposes; to decline to create, publish, sell, and distribute speech; to be free from content-based and viewpoint-based discrimination; and to be free from overbroad and vague restrictions on speech that give enforcement officials unbridled discretion....

225. As applied to XX-XY Athletics, CADA impermissibly discriminates against the company’s speech based on content and viewpoint by prohibiting it from referring to individuals by their given name and with pronouns and terminology consistent with their biological sex.  

226.  As applied to XX-XY Athletics, CADA impermissibly inhibits the company’s ability to form expressive associations it desires to form and to avoid expressive associations it desires to avoid by requiring the company to refer to individuals by their preferred name, pronouns, and other terminology and prohibiting the company from referring to individuals by their given name and with pronouns and terminology consistent with their biological sex....

The complaint also alleges that the Colorado law is void for vagueness and violates the Equal Protection clause. ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Supreme Court Denies Cert. In School's Ban on Anti-Transgender T-Shirt

The U.S. Supreme Court yesterday denied review in L.M. v. Town of Middleborough, Massachusetts, (Sup. Ct., certiorari denied May 27, 2025).  In the case, the U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals upheld middle school officials' decision that a student was in violation of school rules by wearing a T-shirt that proclaims: "There Are Only Two Genders." Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas filed an opinion dissenting from the denial of certiorari, saying in part:

The First Circuit held that the school did not violate L. M.’s free-speech rights. It held that the general prohibition against viewpoint-based censorship does not apply to public schools. And it employed a vague, permissive, and jargon-laden rule that departed from the standard this Court adopted in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 (1969). 

The First Circuit’s decision calls out for our review....

I would grant the petition for two reasons. First, we should reaffirm the bedrock principle that a school may not engage in viewpoint discrimination when it regulates student speech. Tinker itself made that clear.... Curiously, however, the First Circuit declined to follow Tinker in this regard, instead cherry-picking which First Amendment principles it thought worthy of allowing through the schoolhouse gates.  By limiting the application of our viewpoint-discrimination cases, the decision below robs a great many students of that core First Amendment protection.

Second, we should also grant review to determine whether the First Circuit properly understood the rule adopted in Tinker regarding the suppression of student speech on the ground that it presents a risk of material disruption.

Justice Thomas also filed a separate brief dissenting opinion.  NBC News reports on the Court's action.

Supreme Court Gives Emergency Relief to State Legislator Who Was Disenfranchised After Anti-Transgender Social Media Post

In Libby v. Fecteau, (Sup. Ct., May 20, 2025), the U.S. Supreme Court by a vote of 7-2 granted an injunction pending appeal to a member of the Maine House of Representatives.  Petitioner's Emergency Application for an Injunction describes the issue before the Court:

Maine State Representative Laurel Libby spoke out on social media about an intensely debated issue—the participation of transgender athletes in girls’ high school sports. Maine requires girls to compete alongside transgender athletes; Libby criticized that policy after a transgender athlete won the girls’ pole vault at the state track-and-field championship. Displeased with Libby’s criticism, the Maine House voted along party lines to censure her.  

The verbal censure (unwise as it may be) is not what Applicants challenge here. It’s what happened next. The Speaker declared Libby was barred from speaking or voting until she recants her view. This means her thousands of constituents in Maine House District 90 are now without a voice or vote for every bill coming to the House floor for the rest of her elected term, which runs through 2026.....

In this application, Petitioners seek an injunction pending appeal requiring the Clerk to count Libby’s votes. That interim relief simply restores the status quo of equal representation, bringing the Maine House back into conformity with every other State and Congress. 

The Supreme Court granted the injunction in a one-paragraph order that did not give reasons for the decision. Justices Sotomayor and Jackson voted to deny the injunction. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Not very long ago, this Court treaded carefully with respect to exercising its equitable power to issue injunctive relief at the request of a party claiming an emergency.  The opinions are legion in which individual Justices, reviewing such requests in chambers, declined to intervene—reiterating that “such power should be used sparingly and only in the most critical and exigent circumstances.” ...

Those days are no more. Today’s Court barely pauses to acknowledge these important threshold limitations on the exercise of its own authority.  It opts instead to dole out error correction as it sees fit, regardless of the lack of any exigency and even when the applicants’ claims raise significant legal issues that warrant thorough evaluation by the lower courts that are dutifully considering them....

SCOTUSblog and The Washington Stand report on the decision.

Suit Challenges School District's Speech Policy

Suit was filed this week in an Oregon federal district court by a clinical social worker employed by an Oregon school district challenging the application of the district's Speech Policy to his display on a shelf in his office of three books that reject notions of transgender identity. The complaint (full text) in Theis v.  InterMountain Education Service District Board of Directors, (D OR, filed 5/21/2025), alleges in part:

He is He and She is She ... explain how every child should embrace and love herself exactly as God made her to be....

... [A]n employee at one of Mr. Theis’ schools saw the covers of the Books and complained that they were “transphobic.” IMESD labeled the display as “a hostile expression of animus toward another person relating to their actual or perceived gender identity” and ordered Mr. Theis to remove them. IMESD then warned him that “further conduct of this nature” may result in discipline, including termination of his employment....

2. Plaintiff is ... a professing Christian who bases his beliefs on the Bible and strives to live out his Christian faith at work and in the community.

3. Plaintiff’s sincerely held religious beliefs govern his views about all aspects of life, including human nature, sex, and gender....

217. Defendants’ censorship of Plaintiff’s display of the Books while permitting books and other decorations with different messages on related topics is content and viewpoint discrimination, which is unconstitutional in any type of forum....

220. Defendants’ Speech Policy and practice also impose an unconstitutional heckler’s veto because they permit the restriction of protected employee expression merely because school officials deem an employee’s expression “offensive” to others....

249. Plaintiff’s sincerely held religious beliefs motivated him to display the Books in his office. 

250. Defendants substantially burdened Plaintiff’s religious exercise when they forced Plaintiff to choose between exercising his religious beliefs and being dismissed or violating his conscience.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Colorado Law Banning Deadnaming and Misgendering Challenged as Free Speech Violation

Suit was filed this week in a Colorado federal district court challenging on free speech and vagueness grounds provisions in recently enacted Colorado HB25-1312. The lawsuit focuses on provisions that define deadnaming and misgendering as discriminatory acts under Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Act. The complaint (full text) in Defending Education v. Sulivan, (D CO, filed 5/19/2025), alleges in part:

5. ... H.B. 25-1312 amends the definition of “gender expression,” a protected category under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act, to include the use of a “chosen name” and other words by which an individual “chooses to be addressed.”...

30. Under H.B. 25-1312, then, someone who operates in a public accommodation commits a discriminatory act when they refer to a transgender-identifying individual using the individual’s birth name or biological pronouns instead of their chosen name or preferred pronouns ... because that speech supposedly denies the transgender individual the “full and equal enjoyment” of the place of public accommodation based on their “gender expression.” ...

86. ... Colorado’s public accommodation laws as amended by H.B. 25-1312 make it impossible for [plaintiffs} ... to effectively exercise their constitutionally protected right to speak in a manner that reflects their sincere belief that sex is immutable and fixed at birth....

122. That H.B. 25-1312 does not literally require Coloradans to speak is of no consequence. Even if Plaintiffs and their members could avoid the law’s penalties by holding their tongues, compelled silence is compelled speech..... In any event, using pronouns and names is a “‘virtual necessity’” for engaging in any conversation....

136. The Unwelcome Provision clearly prohibits speech based on content and viewpoint. It prohibits all speech that makes someone feel “unwelcome, objectionable, unacceptable, or undesirable.” But “[g]iving offense is a viewpoint.”... It also compels speech by, for example, requiring published speech to be “[w]elcom[ing]” and “[un]objectionable.” Even assuming this provision only regulated speech based on content, Defendants have no compelling interest for prohibiting this type of speech....

The Lion reports on the lawsuit.

Suit Challenges Minnesota Policies Allowing Transgender Girls to Compete on Girl's High School Teams

A Title IX suit was filed this week in a Minnesota federal district court by an advocacy organization challenging Minnesota's high school policies on participation in sports by transgender women. The complaint (full text) in Female Athletes United v. Ellison, (D MN, filed 5/19/2025), alleges in part:

120.  Minnesota allows athletes to participate in sports solely based on gender identity. There are no limitations based on testosterone level, whether male puberty has been started or completed, or other metrics know to magnify the physiological advantage males have over women, advantages raising safety concerns for female athletes....

180. Under Title IX, Defendants are required to provide competitive opportunities for females that accommodate them by “equally reflect[ing] their abilities” and offer “equal opportunity in . . . levels of competition” as compared to the competitive opportunities enjoyed by boys. 

181. Because of the measurable physical advantages that male athletes enjoy both before and after puberty, regardless of whether puberty blockers or testosterone suppression was administered, the athletic opportunities of girls are unequal when males are allowed to compete against them or compete with them for spots or playing time on their team....

187. Providing equivalent treatment and opportunities entails ensuring that both sexes have equal opportunities to participate and compete in competitive athletics, both in-season and post-season. Further, it precludes policies that are “discriminatory in language or effect” or have the effect of denying “equality of athletic opportunity.”  

188. Minnesota’s Policy has a detrimental effect on girls’ opportunities to compete safely and on a level playing field....

ADF issued a press release announcing the filling of the lawsuit.

Court Invalidates EEOC Guidance on Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation Discrimination

In State of Texas v. EEOC, (ND TX, May 15, 2025), a Texas federal district judge held that portions of the EEOC's 2024 Enforcement Guidance on Harassment in the Workplace are contrary to law.  The court held that Guidance requiring bathroom, dress and pronoun accommodations for transgender employees are inconsistent with the text, history and tradition of Title VII. The court said in part:

First, the Enforcement Guidance contravenes Title VII's plain text by expanding the scope of "sex" beyond the biological binary: male and female....

The court invalidated the portions of the Enforcement Guidance which define "sex" in Title VII to include "sexual orientation" and "gender identity" and which define sexual orientation and gender identity as protected classes. The court also specifically invalidated an Example of a Hostile Work Environment that focused on regular and intentional misgendering (using pronoun that does not match gender identity) of a transgender employee by supervisors, coworkers, and customers. AP reports on the decision.