4th Circuit Debates When the Reason for Seeking an Accommodation Under Title VII Is "Religious"

In Wilkins-Bailey v. Essity Professional Hygiene North America, LLC, (4th Cir., Sept. 1, 2026), the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, held that a North Carolina federal district court wrongly granted summary judgment to an employer charged with religious and racial discrimination under Title VII. The employer denied an exemption from its Covid vaccine mandate to a black female sales administrator who is a Jehovah's Witness. Plaintiff's refusal to be vaccinated led to her dismissal by the company. The company contended that plaintiff's reasons for seeking an exemption were secular, not religious. In rejecting that contention, the 4th Circuit's majority said in part:

... Wilkins-Bailey, by connecting her refusal to vaccinate to her belief that her “body is a temple,” has based her claim on a belief which is religious....  She blends her explanation of her beliefs with numerous references to personal safety and the natural or non-natural character of vaccination and other medical treatments, as well as historical concerns about discriminatory practices in medicine.....

Even so, we think it is plainly clear that Wilkins-Bailey has connected her refusal to receive the COVID-19 vaccine with her religious beliefs by stating that it “is God’s law” that she must “be protective of [her] temple.”... Indeed, a claimant’s mixed secular and religious motives do not preclude protection under Title VII....

Wilkins-Bailey has clearly provided sufficient evidence to permit a jury to find that her refusal to vaccinate is connected to her religious beliefs....

Moreover, “courts should not expect, much less require, exemption requests to sound like they were written by someone with legal training.”...

Even though Wilkins-Bailey’s beliefs are sufficiently religious, it may be that they do not impose on her a “religious obligation to refuse” vaccination....  Essity contends that because Wilkins-Bailey believes she may personally interpret the requirements of her religion, that her interpretation is therefore the product of a “personal decision.”...

We do not agree.  This interpretation of Title VII would leave millions of religious Americans unprotected in their workplaces.  Many religions permit and even encourage their adherents to discern or interpret official texts, teachings, and tenets in order to decide for themselves which actions are required to fulfill religious obligations.  Some religions have no centrally managed canons, nor agreed-upon sacred commandments.... Title VII protects even those religions which do not require strict adherence to a written catechism....

The court, however, affirmed dismissal of plaintiff's racial discrimination claim, saying in part:

Essity has proffered a nondiscriminatory reason for its differential treatment of Wilkins-Bailey and her posited white comparators: it viewed their requests as stating “religious” reasons, while Wilkins-Bailey’s stated “secular” reasons....  For the purposes of a race discrimination claim, that differentiation is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason....

Judge Floyd dissented as to the religious discrimination claim, saying in part: 

I would ... require a plaintiff bringing a religious accommodation claim to put forward more than a mere scintilla of evidence to factually support the conclusion that her belief is connected with her refusal to comply with an employment requirement....

Wilkins-Bailey has not presented the court with a record that could allow a jury to find that her refusal to receive the vaccine is connected to her religious beliefs....

In practice, the majority’s low evidentiary bar would allow any plaintiff who brings a religious discrimination claim to reach a jury so long as they testify that their personal decisions are cloaked in religiosity.  This is improper at summary judgment stage....  Under the majority’s reasoning, an employee who obliquely references Psalm 127:2 ... (“In vain you rise early and stay up late, toiling for food to eat—for he grants sleep to those he loves.”) to refuse to work before noon creates a jury question as to whether the company religiously discriminates when it declines to accommodate that employee’s schedule....

... Wilkins-Bailey prays and then reaches a personal decision, and she concedes that she is not obliged by her religion to come to a particular conclusion.  Her belief that her religion vests her with the ability to make that personal decision is one step removed from her ultimate decision.  Indeed, Wilkins-Bailey “concedes that none of her religious beliefs requires [sic] her to object to the COVID-19 vaccine.”...

9th Circuit: Futile Reassignment Process Did Not Reasonably Accommodate Religious Objections to Covid Vaccine

In Cherry v. Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife, (9th Cir., Aug. 21, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Department of Fish and Wildlife did not make adequate efforts in 2021 to reasonably accommodate employees' religious objections to complying with the state's Covid vaccine mandate as required by Title VII. The court said in part:

The Department merely invited the Employees to participate in a “reassignment process” with the caveat that “opportunities may be limited,” which the Employees—perhaps understandably—did not complete.  Title VII requires that the Department take the initial step of proposing a reasonable accommodation that would then trigger any concomitant duty on the employee’s part to cooperate. We disagree with the district court’s conclusion that offering this reassignment process was, as a matter of law, an offer of a reasonable accommodation....

Efforts “to engage in the interactive process” is not the test; rather, the test is for the “employer to prove that it made good faith efforts to accommodate [the] employee’s religious belief.”... [W]hether the process here constituted a reasonable accommodation is best left to a jury.  We cannot say that offering this reassignment process constituted offering an accommodation as a matter of law....

Our conclusion is reinforced all the more by the Department’s failure to offer any material facts suggesting that its “reassignment process” would likely yield a reasonable accommodation.  And the bare-bones facts that the Department does offer do little to assure us of such a prospect.  The State’s data about its “reassignment process” show just a 14 percent chance of placement into some job....

The scheme that Title VII sets forth is straightforward.  The Department has a choice.  Either it proposes a reasonable accommodation ... or it must prove that a reasonable accommodation would produce an undue hardship on the conduct of the Department’s business....

DHS's Disqualification of Applicant Who Engages in Protected Religious Use of Psychedelics Supports Title VII Claim

In Reis v. Noem, (SD FL, Aug. 24, 2026), a Florida federal district court refused to dismiss plaintiff's claims under Title VII alleging disparate treatment on the basis of religion and failure to make reasonable religious accommodations. Plaintiff , a Brazilian-American, is a member of  União do Vegetal (UDV), a Christian Spiritist denomination. As part of her religious practices, she uses ayahuasca, a psychedelic tea. In its 2006 Gonzales decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that under RFRA, the government needs to show a compelling interest in order to prosecute for sacramental use of ayahuasca by UDV members.

Plaintiff was provisionally offered a position as a Customs and Border Protection Officer by the Department of Homeland Security. However, the offer was withdrawn when plaintiff told examiners about her use of ayahuasca. Plaintiff sued. The court said in part:

Defendant ... argues that its drug-use policy constitutes a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the Withdrawal Notice because 5 C.F.R. § 731.202(b)(6) authorizes disqualification for "illegal use of narcotics, drugs, or other controlled substances, without evidence of rehabilitation." ... Without a more developed factual record, the Court does not see this argument as a reason to dismiss Plaintiff's remaining claims....  Because classifying Reis's sacramental ayahuasca use as per se "illegal" raises tension with Gonzalez, ..., not sufficiently addressed by Defendant, and because Defendant offers no other argument to buttress its theory on this point, the Court declines to dismiss these claims on the pleadings. Reis has plausibly alleged a disparate treatment claim....

Count II states a plausible claim for failure to make a reasonable accommodation under Title VII. Reis alleges that her sincere religious practice of consuming sacramental ayahuasca tea as a UDV member conflicted with CBP's blanket drug-use policy, that she informed CBP of this conflict and its lawful basis, and that CBP withdrew the offer without engaging in any interactive process or offering any accommodation whatsoever.... The burden of demonstrating undue hardship therefore falls on Defendant.... Defendant offers only generalized assertions that accommodating Reis would create "safety or security" risks.... Generalized assertions are not evidence of a "substantial" burden....

Suit Seeks Religious Accommodation to Obtain Environmentally Friendly 401(k) Option

 A suit was filed this week in a New York federal district court by an employee of Thermo Fisher Scientific alleging that the company is required under Title VII and the New York State Human Rights Law to provide plaintiff an investment option in the company's 401(k) plan that is consistent with plaintiff's religious beliefs. The complaint (full text) in Hartley v. Thermo Fisher Scientific, Inc., (WD NY, filed 8/4/2026) alleges in part:

4. Dr. Hartley sincerely holds the belief that investing his money in fossil fuels is morally wrong and in violation of his religious convictions.

5. Dr. Hartley believes his Christian faith commands him to care for and steward the earth, and that actively investing in and profiting from fossil fuel companies whose work directly harms the earth and its inhabitants violates his religious obligations. 

6. Because each of Thermo Fisher’s current equity-based retirement plan options maintains significant investments in fossil-fuel companies, Dr. Hartley is forced to either compromise his religious beliefs or forego a significant component of his employer-provided benefit. 

7. To remedy this conflict, Dr. Hartley requested that his employer provide him with an accommodation that would allow him to partake of the benefits of his 401(k) plan in a manner consistent with his faith....

44. Defendant Thermo Fisher’s failure to provide the accommodation sought (a retirement fund option that allows Dr. Hartley to invest in a manner consistent with his religious beliefs) violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended....

The complaint also contends that the company's refusal to provide the investment option sought by plaintiff amounts to religious discrimination.

ClientEarth announced the filing of the lawsuit. HR Dive reports on the lawsuit.

Clergy Duties Do Not Excuse Compliance With Forum Selection Clause In Employment Agreement

In Luzingu v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., (D ME, July 31, 2026), a Maine federal district court rejected a claim by a Christian pastor that in a civil rights action under Title VII and state statutes against his former employer, Abbott Laboratories, he should be able to ignore a forum selection clause in his employment agreement that requires any litigation against his employer be brought in state or federal court in northern Illinois. Plaintiff worked in an Abbott Lab facility in the state of Maine beginning in 2016 when he came to the United States from Angola because of persecution in his home country. His Abbott employment was terminated in 2022. He now is employed as a Christian pastor and is pursuing a master's degree online. He filed suit against Abbott in a Maine federal district court. According to the court:

Plaintiff argues that transfer [of the case to Illinois] would be unfair, unjust, and against public policies that favor the free exercise of religion and nondiscrimination.... Plaintiff is “the sole pastor at his church” and “leads three services per week.” ...  Because of his religious calling and his duties, he maintains, “[t]raveling to Illinois for a deposition or trial would make it far more difficult for him to fulfill his pastoral duties than if the deposition or trial occurred in Maine.”...  

I am not persuaded that Plaintiff’s religious practices and duties as a pastor justify giving him a special dispensation to avoid application of the Forum-Selection Clause....  And as for the burden itself, assuming that a special dispensation might be appropriate based on individual needs pertaining to the inconvenience of a particular forum, the Defendant has indicated that Plaintiff’s deposition will take place in Maine.  Moreover, Defendant fairly observes that a trial in Illinois should take only a few days and that telecommunications technology enables Plaintiff to remain connected to his parishioners when court is not in session.  I agree with Defendant that the limited time required to conduct a trial of this case in Illinois will not unduly disrupt Plaintiff’s religious observance, even if religious observance is a proper basis to nullify the consequences of a forum-selection clause. 

... [I]t is unreasonable to suspect that Defendant is enforcing the Forum-Selection Clause against Plaintiff in a selective manner based on the burden that litigation in Illinois would impose on his pastoral duties.  Defendant has similarly moved to enforce its forum-selection clause in cases brought by plaintiffs who do not point to their religious practice as cause to avoid the consequences of the Forum-Selection Clause....

9th Circuit: Employee Adequately Alleged Religious Objections to Covid Vaccine

In Weiss v. The Permanente Group, (9th Cir., July 24, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a California federal district court's dismissal of Title VII and California state law claims alleging that plaintiff's employer failed to accommodate plaintiff's religious objections to the Covid vaccine mandate after initially approving her request. The court said in part:

... TPMG notified Weiss that, due to its findings and concerns about a pattern of insincere religious exemption requests among its employees, it would be conducting additional review of all previously approved exemptions...

Weiss plausibly alleged that she provided notice of her religious conflict with the Mandate in her initial request for a religious exemption. She identified herself to TPMG management as “a Christian Jew” and described specific religious doctrines that she asserted prohibited her from receiving the COVID-19 vaccine. These doctrines included the Torah’s prohibition against “accepting foreign material into our bodies,” Deuteronomy’s counsel against “needle wounds except for direct curative benefit,” and the professed requirement under Jewish law to “maintain [one’s] body and blood uncontaminated.” She also stated that receiving a COVID=19 vaccine would be contrary to her belief that she should not “introduce foreign substances into [her] body temple that change how [her] Creator designed it.”...   

Weiss acknowledged that she had previously received vaccinations, and she explained that her present concern arose not because the COVID-19 vaccine was different, but because her religious commitment had changed....

Judge Paez filed two unpublished partial dissenting opinions, one concluding that the district court should not have dismissed plaintiff's claim that TPMG's vaccination requirement and its intrusive questions about her religious and medical history constituted an invasion of privacy under the California Constitution. Plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to state a prima facie claim for invasion of privacy. The second unpublished dissent contended that the court should certify to the California Supreme Court the question of whether a health care provider’s requirement that employees obtain either a COVID-19 vaccination or an exemption constitutes a serious invasion of privacy under the California Constitution.

Becket issued a press release announcing the decision.

2nd Circuit: Supreme Court's Title VII Test Was Not Applied by Trial Court in Religious Accommodation Case

In Bergin v. New York State Unified Court System, (2d Cir., July 15, 2026), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals vacated a York federal district court's ruling in favor of a court officer who was denied a religious exemption from the New York State Court System's Covid vaccine mandate. The 2nd Circuit held that the district court had applied an old Title VII test developed by the 2nd Circuit instead of the test developed by the Supreme Court in its 2015 Abercrombie & Fitch case. It remanded the case for the district court to apply the correct test.  The court said in part:

In Abercrombie, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff need not inform her employer of the need for accommodation in order to state a Title VII claim, but that she must demonstrate that the employer acted out of a desire to avoid offering an accommodation.  Our prior rule—which did include an employer-knowledge requirement and did not expressly require a showing of motive—was abrogated by Abercrombie.

The Western New York Daily Record reports on the decision.

11th Circuit Rejects Claim That Covid Requirements Violated Employees' Religious Beliefs; Criticizes Counsel's Briefing

 In Akerlund v. Atlas Air, Inc., (11th Cir., July 10, 2026), the U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by four employees of Atlas Air complaining about the company's policies on masks, testing and vaccination during the Covid pandemic. The court said in part:

The plaintiffs first allege that Atlas Air created a work environment hostile to their religious beliefs, in violation of Title VII.  They say that Atlas Air’s “repeated attempts to coerce” them into getting vaccinated constituted “unwelcomed harassment.”...

... [P]laintiffs do not allege any facts indicating that Atlas Air intended to discriminate against their religious beliefs.  In fact, the allegations suggest the opposite.  Under its policy, Atlas Air exempted from its vaccine requirement employees who professed a sincere religious objection to the Covid-19 vaccine.  Instead, they had to wear a mask at work and test once a month. The plaintiffs now seem to assert that these accommodations are also hostile to their religion.  The problem with this argument is that there is nothing to back it up in the pleadings....

... [W]e have saved the worst for last.  The plaintiffs’ counsel Anthony F. Sabatini’s filings are riddled with citations to nonexistent, “hallucinated” cases.  His opening brief relies on at least eight such cases, including one purportedly decided by this Court.  After the defendants identified this problem, Sabatini acknowledged in his (untimely) proposed reply brief that those citations were “erroneous or unverifiable,” and sought to withdraw his reliance on eight listed cases.  At this point, things go from bad to worse: the eight cases Sabatini “withdrew” did not match a single one of the eight hallucinated cases in his opening brief.  And not only were they not the right cases—all eight were also hallucinated....

Whatever the merits of artificial intelligence, it is no substitute for actual intelligence....

In a separate order, this Court, through the Chief Judge, will refer the matter to the Committee on Lawyer Qualifications and Conduct.

Suit Seeks Accommodation for Christian Library Employee Who Objects To Using Co-Workers' Preferred Names and Pronouns

Suit was filed yesterday in a Louisiana federal district court by a Library Technician who was fired for refusing to comply with the library's Inclusivity Policy that requires employees to refer to fellow employees by their chosen name and pronoun.  Plaintiff Luke Ash is also a Christian pastor. The complaint (full text) in Ash v. City of Baton Rouge Louisiana, (MD LA, filed 7/9/2026) alleges in part:

Ash has sincerely held religious beliefs that God created mankind in his own image, and that each individual is created either male or female.... Ash also has sincerely held religious beliefs that biological sex is immutable....  Because of his sincerely held religious beliefs, Ash has sincere religious convictions and beliefs that referring to a person by pronouns inconsistent with their biological sex both dishonors God’s design for that person and constitutes a lie and a grave sin....  Ash believes that he is compelled to tell the truth, even to those who may disagree....

Ash had never, at any point, referred to any co-worker directly using pronouns inconsistent with their preference, and he had certainly never done so after being told by such individual that the pronoun he used was incorrect....

Ash contends that his firing violated his federal and state free speech, free exercise and equal protection rights and that under Title VII the Library was required to provide him a reasonable accommodation from the Inclusivity Policy. The complaint alleges in part:

Permitting Ash to maintain respectful communications to those with whom he interacts at the Library while maintaining compliance with his sincerely held religious beliefs would have been a reasonable accommodation that would impose no hardship whatsoever on the Defendants or the Library. 

The complaint also asks for an injunction barring enforcement of the Inclusivity Policy and asks for reinstatement of plaintiff. Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Cert. Denied Over Dissent of 3 Justices in Covid Vaccine Mandate Controversy

The U.S. Supreme Court yesterday denied review in Doe v. Hochul , (Docket No. 24-1015, certiorari denied 6/29/2026) over a dissenting opinion by Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito. At issue in the case was New York's refusal to grant state healthcare workers a religious exemption from the state's Covid vaccine mandate. Justice Gorsuch dissenting said in part:

... [T]he Court of Appeals did not assess the reasonableness of the plaintiffs’ requested accommodations.  In fact, the court took as given that the plaintiffs had “plausibly alleged a prima facie case of Title VII religious discrimination.” ... Still, the court held, the defendants had presented a successful “undue hardship” defense as a matter of law....  More specifically, the court reasoned that granting the plaintiffs’ requested religious accommodations would have imposed an “undue hardship” on their employers because it “would have required the [employers] to violate the state [vaccine] regulation” and “subjected the [employers] to financial penalties or a suspension or revocation of their operating licenses.”... 

Soon after it decided this case, the Second Circuit reiterated its understanding of Title VII’s undue hardship defense, holding that “an accommodation that would require an employer to violate” a state law necessarily “imposes an undue hardship”—and does so even when the state law is “unconstitutional as applied” to the plaintiff....

... [I]t seems to me that state law cannot control whether an employer faces an “undue hardship” for purposes of federal antidiscrimination laws, just like it cannot conclusively resolve what constitutes a “reasonable accommodation”.... To hold otherwise would appear to leave States free to strip individuals of the protections guaranteed by so many federal civil rights statutes....

9th Circuit: Question of Fact Remains on Whether Airline Flight Attendants Were Fired Because of Their Religious Beliefs

In Brown v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., (9th Cir., June 24, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that there is a genuine dispute of material fact that precludes dismissing before trial a suit by two Alaska Airlines flight attendants (Brown and Smith) who were fired after they posted comments on an internal intranet communications network opposing the Airline's support for the proposed federal Equality Act. That proposed Act protected LGBTQ+ rights. At issue is whether the firings were because of the flight attendants' religious beliefs or instead because their comments violated the company’s anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies. The court said in part:

... [T]he issue is not whether Alaska can punish employees who engage in discrimination and harassment (it can).  The issue here is instead a factual one of whether Brown was in fact fired for engaging in discrimination or harassment, or whether Alaska instead used the cover of its employee policies to fire Brown because of her religious beliefs.  Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Brown, there is a genuine dispute of material fact on this point, and so summary judgment for Alaska was improper....

Under our cases, a union under Title VII “has an affirmative obligation to oppose employment discrimination against its members,” and if the union instead “acquiesce[s] or join[s] in the Company’s discrimination practices, it too is liable to the injured employees.”

The record raises factual questions about whether AFA’s representation of Brown was colored by potential disagreement with her religious views....

Judge Christen dissented in part, saying in part:

I dissent from my colleagues’ decision to reverse the district court’s entry of summary judgment on Lacey Smith’s claims against Alaska because I do not agree that Smith demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact about whether Alaska terminated her because of her religion...

During Alaska’s investigation, Smith insisted that she was merely posing a philosophical question rather than asserting to the investigators that her Christian beliefs caused her to conclude that the Equality Act was immoral.  The majority posits that “‘morality’ is often associated with religious beliefs,” but references to morality are not inherently religious....

First Liberty Institute issued a press release announcing the decision.

U.S. and Florida Launch Investigations of Religious Discrimination by Major League Baseball

Major League Baseball's apparent selective enforcement of its rules regarding players' uniforms has led to religious discrimination investigations by both the EEOC at the behest of the Department of Justice and by Florida's Attorney General.  A June 18 letter (full text) from the U.S. Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Harmeet Dhillon to Commissioner of Baseball Robert Manfred says in part:

According to media reports, Major League Baseball ("MLB") has warned and/or is considering disciplining three players on the San Francisco Giants who refused to participate in "Pride Night." The three players expressed their opposition to MLB's pro-Pride orthodoxy by inscribing Bible verses on their rainbow-colored hats....

MLB has asserted that its warning to the Giants players "had absolutely nothing to do with the content of the message" and that it merely is enforcing a policy that prohibits writing on uniforms. Yet MLB has allowed players to wear uniform patches reading "Black Lives Matter."  This double standard-- under which players may not inscribe Bible verses on hats for one game only but may wear "Black Lives Matter" patches for one game only-- calls MLB's true motives into question and raises serious concerns about MLB's compliance with Title VII....

I have referred this matter to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for further investigation.

A June 19 press release from Florida Attorney General James Uthmeier says that his office has sent a letter and issued an investigative subpoena to MLB, indicating that Florida is also launching a formal probe into whether MLB is engaging in religious discrimination in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act by selectively enforcing its rules regarding uniforms.

DOJ Opinion Says EEOC's Title VII Rules on Disparate Impact Are Unconstitutional

Yesterday, the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel issued a 25-page opinion (full text) concluding that the EEOC's regulations and guidance documents on disparate-impact liability under Title VII are unconstitutional. The OLC's opinion focuses on disparate impact in racial discrimination cases. However, the same rules apply to religious discrimination cases, even though those rules are seldom used in that context. The OLC Opinion says in part:

... Rather than treating disparate impact as an evidentiary mechanism to smoke out intentional discrimination—imposing liability only when disproportionate adverse effects give rise to a strong inference of intentional discrimination—EEOC’s historic interpretations contemplate liability based on disproportionately adverse effects alone, without regard to an employer’s likely intent. Because EEOC’s historic approach divorces liability from circumstances giving rise to a strong inference that intentional discrimination occurred, it functions as a qualified racial-proportionality mandate and spurs employers to engage in race-based decisionmaking to avoid liability. That approach is unlawful and unconstitutional.

Three corrections to that approach are necessary.... First, the business-necessity defense is not a high bar; it requires employers to demonstrate only that the challenged practice is rational, convenient, or helpful for serving a valid business purpose. Employment practices are presumptively job related, and only irrational or arbitrary practices with no plausible job-relatedness can create disparate-impact liability. Second, plaintiffs must satisfy a robust causality requirement by demonstrating ... that the challenged employment practice itself (not external factors or other employer practices) caused the alleged disparate impact. Third, plaintiffs must establish with particular evidence that there is an available alternative practice that causes less disparate impact and would be equally effective for serving the employer’s valid business purpose....

Workplace requirements and selection procedures—such as background checks, aptitude tests, knowledge-based tests, SAT scores, high-school graduation requirements, or blind auditions—are presumptively job-related. Only practices that establish truly “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers”—i.e., those that have no plausible job-relatedness—can create liability....

The Justice Department issued a press release announcing the issuance of the OLC Opinion.

Will Next Battles for Religious Accommodation Be Objections To AI?

An article last week in Business Insider suggests that the next battlefield for religious accommodation under Title VII may be artificial intelligence. Business Insider reports in part:

Opposed to using AI for her software-engineering job, Erin Maus secured something of a miracle from her employer: a religious exemption.

Maus, a Unitarian Universalist, said she proposed the special treatment in April, citing environmental and ethical objections to AI that don't align with her religious beliefs. She also said she consulted an employment lawyer and her local chapter's minister to help make her case.

Maus was granted the accommodation in mid-May, according to an email seen by Business Insider....

... The technology has also recently drawn scrutiny from Pope Leo XIV, who warned last month that AI could undermine human dignity and displace workers if left unchecked, in a more than 42,000-word encyclical.

Some people have interpreted the pontiff's letter as grounds for religious objections to using AI in the workplace. It's a stance that carries real legal weight, given that federal law requires employers to consider faith-based requests....

9th Circuit: Requested Religious Exemptions from Vaccine Mandate Would Have Imposed Undue Hardship

In Williams v. Legacy Health, (9th Cir., May 6, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a hospital system's refusal to grant religious exemptions from its Covid vaccine mandate to Vancouver, Washington hospital employees whose duties put them in close contact with patients or staff. The court upheld the dismissal of plaintiffs' Title VII religious discrimination claims.  It concluded that granting the requested religious exemptions would have imposed "undue hardship" on Legacy Health. The court said in part:

At the time it denied Employees’ exemption requests, Legacy forecast an acute strain on its business of providing safe and effective medical care to the public. The COVID-19 Delta variant had just emerged, and Legacy predicted a surge of hospitalizations across its eight locations. In that context, Legacy reasonably sought to ensure that its employees were vaccinated. The statistical evidence available to Legacy revealed that high vaccination rates, while not a panacea, reduced overall transmission risk. Vaccination also proved highly effective at preventing infection in the healthcare setting, where other measures like social distancing were impractical or “impossible,” as one expert explained. By contrast, Legacy’s unrebutted epidemiological expert evidence showed that unvaccinated “frontline workers,” like Employees, faced a unique risk of infection—and that any infections could contribute to “significant outbreaks among patients [and] colleagues.” 

Vital Law reports on the decision.

Cert. Petition Filed in Covid Religious Exemption Case

A petition for certiorari (full text) has been filed in Petersen v. Snohomish Regional Fire & Rescue, (Sup. Ct., filed 4/16/2026). In the case, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected claims by eight firefighters that the Snohomish fire department violated Title VII and Washington state law by refusing to accommodate their requests for religious exemptions from the state's Covid vaccine mandate for all healthcare providers. (See prior posting.) The petition seeking Supreme Court review frames the Question Presented as follows:

Whether an employer can defeat a Title VII religious accommodation claim by establishing merely that it had a reasonable basis for believing that a requested accommodation would inflict an undue hardship on the employer or whether the employer must establish that the requested accommodation would have actually imposed an undue hardship.

The Center Square reports on the filing.

9th Circuit Denies En Banc Rehearing in Vaccine Mandate Case

In Detwiler v. Mid-Columbia Medical Center, (9th Cir., April 15, 2926), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals denied both a panel rehearing and an en banc rehearing in a case involving a medical center employee's claimed religious objections to both a Covid vaccine requirement and to the accommodation granted by her employer. A 3-judge panel affirmed the district court's dismissal of the employee's Title VII lawsuit, concluding that her objections were secular, not religious. (See prior posting.) Her religious exemption from vaccination was conditioned, in part, on her having weekly antigen testing. She objected to that accommodation because she believed the ethylene oxide used in obtaining a nasal swab for the test was carcinogenic and her religion prohibited her from defiling her body in this manner.

In two dissenting opinions, a total of eight judges dissented from the denial of an en banc rehearing, some joining in both dissenting opinions. Judge Forrest's dissent, joined by five other judges, said in part:

Our role in assessing whether a plaintiff has shown a bona fide religious belief is a “narrow function.”... Generally, we may determine only whether the religious conflict identified by the plaintiff “reflects an honest conviction.”... This is because anything more extends beyond a judge’s competence....

The court’s reasoning gives no credence to Detwiler’s claim that she received revelation from God that informed her health choices. For those who believe that God can provide individualized guidance for daily living, whether that guidance relates to “secular” or “spiritual” matters is often a distinction without a difference—both emanate from beliefs about deity and its relationship with humanity. That is, many believers do not perceive that the spiritual and the secular are capable of neat separation as relates to matters of revelation....

Judge Tung, joined by six other judges, filed a dissenting opinion which said in part:

Detwiler properly alleged the religious basis of her objection to testing—namely, that her religion forbade her from ingesting a carcinogen, which she viewed as a defilement upon the temple of her body.  That her objection was based in part on a medical finding—that the testing is carcinogenic—did not negate her religious motivation in refusing to submit to such testing....

... [T]he panel majority misapplied Title VII’s text and precedent interpreting “religion,” misconstrued Detwiler’s allegations, and split with the holdings of several other circuits....  But perhaps most problematic, the panel majority’s approach would recast as “purely secular” a person’s religious practices whenever those practices turn also on secular considerations.  It is hard to imagine, frankly, what religious practice would not turn on secular considerations to some degree.

Ministerial Exception May Not Apply to Non-Catholic 1st Grade Teacher in Catholic School

In Coates v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Savannah, (MD GA, April 6, 2026), a Georgia federal district court refused at this point in the litigation to dismiss on ministerial exception grounds claims of racial discrimination in employment brought against a Catholic school by an African American 1st grade teacher. The court said in part:

... [T]he amended complaint plausibly alleges Coates did not serve a ministerial function at SPCCS [St. Peter Clavar Catholic School].  Coates alleges that before her employment with SPCCS even began, Coates told Hillig [the school's principal] she was not Catholic and would not accept employment if it would require her to “participate in Catholic doctrine or worship services.”... Hillig responded by assuring Coates that religious instruction would not be her responsibility and that she would only need to escort the students to Mass on Wednesdays and monitor behavior.... During Coates’ employment, Coates did not teach religion or lead students in worship or prayer.... Nor did she participate in “Catholic worship or practices.” ... Yet, Coates received positive performance reviews....

To be sure, the complaint also alleges facts suggesting Coates may have served a ministerial role at SPCCS. Coates signed an employment contract designating her role as “ministerial” and requiring her to model the Catholic faith regardless of religion..... Still, on a motion to dismiss, Coates’ need only plausibly allege she served a non-ministerial function.... Coates has alleged facts suggesting that, despite SPCCS’ formal designation of Coates’ position as ministerial, SPCCS did not actually expect Coates to perform ministerial functions at the school, and ...accepted Coates until she participated in a police investigation against another teacher. Perhaps, as discovery develops, the undisputed facts will show that SPCCS, like most religious schools, has a sincere mission to promote religious education, and that Coates, even as a non-Catholic, served a vital role in that mission. But because the amended complaint plausibly alleg[es] that Coates’ position was non-ministerial, Defendants’ motion to dismiss her employment claims on the basis of the ministerial exception is DENIED...

The court dismissed plaintiff's Title VII religious discrimination claims on the basis of the religious institution exclusion in Title VII.

Court Enforces EEOC Subpoena for Information on Jewish Employees at Penn

In U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania, (ED PA, March 31, 2026), a Pennsylvania federal district court enforced the EEOC's subpoena for information about Jewish employees of the University of Pennsylvania. The EEOC is investigating a charge that Penn engaged in harassment of Jewish employees in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The court said in part:

... [U]unlike investigations into ... sexual harassment or racial discrimination, the subpoena sought information pertaining to people’s faith, making its requests more intrusive and calling for greater sensitivity, something the EEOC now acknowledges. 

One of those requests in particular sought ... lists of school groups and organizations “related to the Jewish religion,” including personal contact information for Penn employees in those groups.  Though ineptly worded, the request had an understandable purpose—to obtain in a narrowly tailored way ... information on individuals in Penn’s Jewish community who could have experienced or witnessed antisemitism in the workplace....

Penn and other groups and associations the Court permitted to intervene significantly raised the dispute’s temperature by impliedly and even expressly comparing the EEOC’s efforts to protect Jewish employees from antisemitism to the Holocaust and the Nazis’ compilation of “lists of Jews.”  Such allegations are unfortunate and inappropriate.  They also obfuscate the Court’s limited role and the discrete legal issues before it.  And the EEOC no longer seeks any employee’s specific affiliation with a particular Jewish-related organization on campus.... 

Politico reports on the decision.

4th Circuit Hears Oral Arguments In 3 Employment Discrimination Cases Involving Religiously Affiliated Institutions

On March 17, the U.S.4th Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments in three cases of interest:

(1) In Zinski v. Liberty University, Inc., (audio of full oral arguments) the court heard an appeal in a Virginia federal district court case. The district court had refused to dismiss a Title VII sex discrimination lawsuit against Liberty University brought by a former employee whose employment as an IT Apprentice was terminated because she underwent a male to female sex transition. (See prior posting).

(2) In Doe v. Catholic Relief Services, (audio of full oral arguments), the court heard an appeal in a Maryland federal district court case that held that the religious corporation exemption from the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act does not apply to the termination of spousal health care benefits of the same-sex spouse of a data analyst and advisor working for Catholic Relief Services. (See prior posting.)

(3) In General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Horton, (audio of full oral arguments) the court heard an appeal in a Maryland federal district court case which denied a preliminary injunction in a suit challenging the Maryland Supreme Court's interpretation of the religious exemption in the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act. The Maryland Supreme Court has held that the exemption is limited to claims brought by employees who perform duties that directly further the core mission of the religious entity. (See prior posting).