Indiana Supreme Court Lets Preliminary Injunction Against Abortion Ban When It Violates Religious Beliefs Stand

Last week, the Indiana Supreme Court, by a vote of 3-2, refused to review at this stage in the litigation a preliminary injunction entered by lower courts in a suit claiming that the state's Religious Freedom Restoration Act is violated when plaintiffs are prohibited by Indiana's abortion law from obtaining an abortion that their religious beliefs direct them to obtain. (See prior posting.) In Individual Members of the Medical Licensing Board of Indiana v. Anonymous Plaintiff 1, (IN Sup. Ct., Dec. 10, 2024), the Order denying the petition to transfer the case to the Supreme Court was not accompanied by a majority opinion. However, Justice Molter joined by Justice Rush filed a concurring opinion saying in part:

This case involves an unusual preliminary injunction—the trial court temporarily enjoined state officials from enforcing the State’s abortion law, but only for a particular group of women who are not pregnant and therefore are not seeking an abortion. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court didn’t exceed its discretion by entering a preliminary injunction while the case continues to be litigated. But the panel also directed the trial court to narrow the preliminary injunction on remand. So thus far, this case is not stopping the defendants from doing anything. And we don’t yet know if it ever will, including because the defendants may ultimately prevail in the lawsuit....

I conclude the more prudent course is for the Court to review the case after a final judgment rather than following a preliminary injunction, which remains a work in progress and subject to more deferential appellate review. In essence, it is better that we review the trial court’s final answer rather than its first guess....

Justice Slaughter, joined by Justice Massa, filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Our denial of transfer means the trial court’s “final answer” will lack the benefit of our current thinking. By saying nothing, we may leave the misimpression that the injunction’s only vulnerability is its scope. As my colleagues acknowledge, this case “presents transfer-worthy issues with previously undecided questions of statewide importance”.

Indiana ACLU issued a press release announcing the decision.

2nd Circuit: FBI Agents Had Qualified Immunity From RFRA Damages When Muslim Plaintiffs' Religious Objections Were Undisclosed

In Tanvir v. Tanzin, (2d Cir., Oct. 29, 2024), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed on qualified immunity grounds a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court in 2020 held (see prior posting) that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act permits suits for damages against federal officials. The 2nd Circuit said in part:

... [E]ach of the three Appellants in this case encountered various FBI agents who asked him to serve as an informant in Muslim communities, and each was illegitimately placed or retained on the No Fly List when he declined. Each Appellant possessed a belief, allegedly shared by some other Muslims, that precluded him from serving as an informant in a Muslim community. But no Appellant ever disclosed that view to any agent. Instead, each stated that he: (1) refused to work as an informant because being an informant would endanger himself or his family, or (2) would agree to work as an informant under the right circumstances....

Appellees had no reason to know that their actions encroached on the Appellants’ religious beliefs. As noted above, “[e]ven when we find a right clearly established,” officials are still immune from damages liability if “reasonable persons in their position would not have understood that their conduct was within the scope of the established prohibition.”...

We recognize the Appellants’ view that Muslims in America have been unfairly targeted. But we disagree with their conclusion that a Christian or Jewish plaintiff in like circumstances would have greater success in a RFRA damages suit. No doubt, many would find any effort to recruit informants to infiltrate religious congregations, including Muslim, as well as Christian or Jewish congregations, offensive. We have no reason to assume, however, that a reasonable government official would know that a Christian or Jew could not work with government agents to expose terrorists in her religious community without violating her religious norms. It is far from obvious – indeed, it cannot be the case – that an adherent of either of those (or any) religions could hold an undisclosed religious belief, of which an official had no other reason to know, and then successfully sue the official for monetary damages for pressuring them to act in tension with that undisclosed belief.

Nothing in this ruling should be construed as approving the conduct alleged in the complaint. At its core, the complaint alleges that government agents pressured individuals to serve as informants – at risk to their own and their families’ safety – and to report on the activities of their neighbors and community members by falsely and in bad faith accusing them of terrorism to deny them significant liberties under a program designed to protect lives from genuine terrorists. That is improper behavior, regardless of whether the agents knew of the Appellants’ particular religious beliefs. But in this case, the Appellants’ only remaining legal claim is that the Appellee agents are personally liable in damages for violating their free exercise of religion under RFRA. On the facts alleged, for the reasons discussed above, that claim fails.

Texas Judicial Conduct Commission Withdraws Reprimand of Judge Who Refused to Perform Same-Sex Weddings

As previously reported, in 2019 the Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct issued a Public Warning to Justice of the Peace Dianne Hensley because she refused on religious grounds to perform same-sex weddings, while continuing to perform other weddings. The Commission stated that her conduct cast doubt on her capacity to act impartially to persons appearing before her as a judge.  Hensley sued contending that the Commission's action violated the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act as well as her free speech rights. In July 2024, the Texas Supreme Court held that the suit could move forward. (See prior posting.) Now, in Public Statement PS-2024-1, (Sept. 9, 2024), the Commission on Judicial Conduct has withdrawn the prior Public Warning "in light of the decision handed down by the Texas Supreme Court and the underlying facts and evidence...." However, according to a report yesterday by KWTX News, Hensley will continue her lawsuit. Quoting her attorneys, First Liberty Institute:

Unfortunately, Judge Hensley has incurred damages and attorney fees fighting for religious liberty, the Constitution, other judges who feared coming forward and her own reputation. We intend to complete the mission. Other judges who feared retaliation from the Commission and hid in the shadows may now be able to step forward and file their own cases seeking damages up to $10,000, plus costs and fees.

State RFRA Bars Taxpayer Suit Challenging Church's Property Tax Exemption

 In In re Calvary Chapel Iowa, (IA Adm. Hearings Div., Sept. 17, 2024), an Iowa Administrative Law Judge held that the state's Religious Freedom Restoration Act protects churches from taxpayer suits challenging their property tax exemptions.  The ALJ said in part:

The issue in this case is whether as a matter of statutory (not constitutional) law individuals can use the taxpayer-standing provision of Iowa Code section 427.1 to force a religious organization into litigation and spend the time and resources to prove its entitled to its property-tax exemption already claimed by it.  Prior to the enactment of the Iowa Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) the answer was an unequivocal yes (with individuals having done precisely this for at least a generation); however, with the passage of RFRA, the answer now appears to be no at least under the circumstances of this case. 

As discussed below, this is because this type of litigation imposes a substantial burden on the exercise of religion and because the State’s compelling interest in the appropriate administration of tax law can be met with the lesser restrictive means of having the State (with its constitutional and statutory constraints) enforce tax law.  To hold otherwise would be to allow the unaccountable political opponents of a church the option to use the power of the State to target and/or retaliate against the religious organization for the organization’s activities, thereby creating a chilling effect not only on that specific religious group but also all other similarly oriented religious organizations.  This is precisely the type of religious interference that RFRA was designed to prevent, and until the judiciary provides different guidance on the scope of RFRA, this case must be dismissed.

Christian Post reports on the decision.

Tribe Seeks Supreme Court Review of Transfer of Sacred Site to Mining Company

A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed this week with the U.S. Supreme Court in Apache Stronghold v. United States, (Sup. Ct., filed 9/11/2024). In the case, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc, by a vote of 6-5, refused to enjoin the government from transferring to a copper mining company federally-owned forest land that is of significant spiritual value to the Western Apache Indians. (See prior posting.) The petition for review raises issues under both RFRA and the 1st Amendment's Free Exercise clause. Becket Fund issued a press release announcing the filing of the petition seeking Supreme Court review.

Connecticut Supreme Court: Constitutional (But Not Statutory) Challenges to Removal of School Vaccination Religious Exemptions Barred by Sovereign Immunity

In Spillane v. Lamont, (CT Sup. Ct., July 30, 2024), the Connecticut Supreme Court in a complicated opinion held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars constitutional claims asserted in a class action suit by school parents against the governor, the commissioners of education and of public health, and two boards of education. Plaintiffs were challenging the legislature's removal of previously available religious exemptions from school vaccination requirements. Under Connecticut law, sovereign immunity for constitutional claims is waived only when actions for declaratory relief or an injunction allege a substantial claim that the state or a state official has violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Here plaintiffs did not have a substantial claim that their free exercise or equal protection rights under the federal constitution were violated, nor that their right to education under the Connecticut constitution was violated.

However, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that plaintiffs' statutory claim under the Connecticut Religious Freedom Restoration Act was not barred by sovereign immunity. Connecticut's RFRA waived sovereign immunity for violations and applying the Act here does not violate the principles that one legislature may not bind the authority of a later one or that enactments are presumed to repeal inconsistent portions of prior legislation.

(See prior related posting.) WTNH News reports on the decision.

Religious College Loses RFRA Challenge to SBA's Loan Forgiveness Rules

 In Gordon College v. U.S. Small Business Administration, (D DC, July 18, 2024), the D.C. federal district court dismissed claims by a religious nonprofit college that its rights under RFRA as well as the 1st and 14th Amendments were infringed when it was denied forgiveness of a $7 million loan that it received under the Covid era Paycheck Protection Program. Loan forgiveness was available to qualifying small businesses. Gordon College's loan forgiveness application was denied because it had over 500 employees and thus did not meet the SBA's small-business size standard. Rejecting plaintiff's RFRA claim, the court said in part:

... [P]laintiff fails to identify a “sincere religious belief” that has been infringed by application of the PPP’s 500-employee cap to plaintiff.... Absent here ... is any articulated connection between plaintiff’s asserted need to have more than 500 employees and its exercise of religion.  Plaintiff, for example, does not allege that “any religious group” has “as one of its tenets” the requirement that an associated religious institution have more than 500 employees ... or that it has treated having more than 500 employees to “ris[e] to [any] level of significance in [its] religion.”...

As to plaintiff's Constitutional challenges, the court said in part: 

... [T]he application of the PPP’s 500-employee cap to plaintiff is neutral and generally applicable, thereby triggering rational basis review, rather than strict scrutiny.  Plaintiff has failed to bring a rational-basis challenge by not plausibly alleging that no reasonable set of facts could provide a rational basis for the PPP’s 500-employee cap.  Accordingly, plaintiff’s Free Exercise and Equal Protection claims are dismissed....

Here, plaintiff alleges that “[d]efendants have interfered with the autonomy of [plaintiff] to define its own doctrine, membership, employment, staffing, affiliation, and other internal requirements” by “insisting on certain requirements [sic] for determining staffing and employment.... [P]laintiff has failed ... to explain why the PPP’s 500-employee cap... interfered with any “matters of faith and doctrine.”  Plaintiff’s religious autonomy claim is thus dismissed.

School's Exclusion of Fellowship of Christian Athletes Violates RFRA and 1st Amendment

 In Fellowship of Christian Athletes v. District of Columbia, (D DC, July 11, 2024), a D.C. federal district court issued a preliminary injunction requiring D.C.'s Jackson Reed High School to reinstate Fellowship of Christian Athletes as a recognized student organization for the school year 2024-2025. FCA's recognition had been suspended because it required its student leaders to affirm its Statement of Faith which bars sexual relations outside of heterosexual marriage and bars any sexually immoral act including homosexuality. This was seen as a violation of the school's anti-discrimination policy. The court concluded that applying the anti-discrimination policy in this manner violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act because it substantially burdens FCA's exercise of religion. The court said in part:

[T]he District’s interest is unjustifiably speculative.  It seeks to “protect[] the safety and well-being of its students by promoting an equitable environment free of discrimination.”... [T]he District readily admits that a student in noncompliance with FCA’s Statement of Faith—whether an atheist, Jewish, gay, or lesbian student—is unlikely to seek a leadership position....  The District can thus offer “only speculation” that FCA’s reinstatement would pose an actual threat of discrimination against any Jackson-Reed student based on a protected characteristic.... Such a speculative goal does not pass muster under strict scrutiny.  

Moreover, the District’s exclusion of FCA as a means of eliminating discrimination is “fatally underinclusive.”... [T]he District permits student groups besides FCA to continue operating at Jackson-Reed even though they restrict membership on the basis of protected characteristics and/or ideological alignment....  The District’s “interest” in nondiscrimination “cannot justify” a nondiscrimination policy “that requires only religious” groups to “bear [its] weight.” ...

The court also concluded that the school had violated the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, concluding that the school's policy was not generally applicable and thus was subject to strict scrutiny. It said in part:

[T]he District permits secular groups to limit their membership to ideologically aligned students while denying the same right to FCA with respect to its leadership. The Court can find “no meaningful constitutionally acceptable distinction between the types of exclusions at play here.”

Jewish Women Lack Standing in Religious Freedom Challenge to Kentucky Abortion Restrictions

In Sobel v. Cameron, (KY Cir. Ct., June 28, 2024), plaintiffs, three Jewish women, alleged, among other things, that the lack of exceptions for complications during pregnancy and lethal fetal anomalies in Kentucky's restrictive abortion laws impinge on their willingness to follow their religious obligations to expand their families in a manner that does not jeopardize their health or the health of their unborn children. Plaintiffs say that "In Judaism, having children is considered a blessing, and the commandment to be fruitful and multiply is paramount." Plaintiffs alleged that the abortion statutes are unconstitutionally vague, violate the Kentucky Religious Freedom Restoration Act and reflect sectarian Christian views that denigrate Jewish practice. A Kentucky state trial court dismissed the case, saying in part:

... [T]he alleged injuries of the three Plaintiffs are hypothetical as none are currently pregnant or undergoing IVF at the present time. Accordingly, the Court simply cannot find that the plaintiffs have shown "the existence of an actual controversy respecting justiciable questions which is a required condition precedent for a declaratory judgment action.... Therefore, the Court must conclude that the Plaintiffs here lack standing to proceed in this action.

NPR reports on the decision. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Certiorari Denied In Religious Broadcasters Challenge to Royalty Rates

The U.S. Supreme Court yesterday denied review in National Religious Broadcasters Noncommercial Music License Committee v. Copyright Royalty Board, (Docket No. 23-927, certiorari denied 6/24/2024). (Order List.) At issue in the case was whether the Copyright Royalty Board violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act when the royalties it set for non-commercial religious broadcasters that stream copyrighted songs over the Internet were 18 time higher than the rates it set for the secular National Public Radio. (See prior related posting and ADF's press release for additional details.) Here are links to all the documents filed in the case.

DC Circuit: No Tax-Exempt Status for Church Promoting Psychedelics Unless It Has Received DEA or Judicial Exemption

In Iowaska Church of Healing v. Werfel, (DC Cir., June 21, 2024), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the IRS's denial of tax-exempt status to a church whose practices revolved around the use of the psychedelic Ayahuasca.  According to the court:

The Church’s purpose and mission revolve primarily around the consumption of Ayahuasca and embracing certain spiritual benefits that the Church’s members believe follow from Ayahuasca consumption.  

The church contended that denial of tax-exempt status violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. However, the court concluded that the church lacked standing to assert a RFRA claim because it did not show sufficient economic injury, and it had waived other theories of standing.

Additionally, the church argued that it qualified for an exemption under Internal Revenue Code §501(c)(3) because it was organized for religious purposes. The court said, however, that tax-exempt status can be denied if its purposes or activities are illegal.  Use of Ayahuasca in religious ceremonies is legal only if the Drug Enforcement Agency or a federal court has issued the church an exemption from the Controlled Substances Act. The church had received no exemption. The court rejected the church's argument that the Supreme Court's 2006 O Centro decision made the use of Ayahuasca presumptively legal for churches. the court concluded:

... [T]he IRS was correct in concluding that the Church’s Ayahuasca use foreclosed its eligibility for tax-exempt status.

GAO Says DEA Should Improve Its Process for Granting Religious Exemptions for Psilocybin Use

Last Week, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released an 80-page Report to Congressional Committees (full text) titled DEA Should Improve its Religious Exemptions Petition Process for Psilocybin (Mushrooms) and Other Controlled Substances. The Report says in part:

Selected stakeholders reported several barriers to the legal access and use of psilocybin for religious practices under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. For example, DEA established a process for parties to petition for a religious exemption from the Controlled Substances Act to use controlled substances for religious purposes. However, DEA’s guidance does not inform petitioners on its timeframes to make determinations on completed petitions. DEA officials stated the agency is aware of public concerns on the need to better understand its policies and processes that impact the petitions for religious exemptions. In 2019, DEA initiated a draft notice of proposed rulemaking related to its process for petitioning for religious exemptions. Four years later, in February 2023, the final draft notice was submitted to DEA’s Office of the Administrator, according to DEA officials; but there is no timeframe for issuance of the notice or final regulations....

Including timeframes to make determinations about religious exemption petitions in DEA’s guidance will provide better transparency about the agency’s process.

Filter has additional details.

Medicaid Limit on Reimbursing for Family Care Did Not Violate Muslim Family's Free Exercise Rights

In Alsyrawan v. Department of Human Services, (PA Commonwealth Ct., May 20, 2024), a Pennsylvania state appellate court held that Medicaid rules limiting reimbursement of family members providing in-home and companion services to a total of 60 hours per week did not violate a Muslim family's rights under Pennsylvania's Religious Freedom Protection Act. The Medicaid recipient was a non-verbal adult male with Down syndrome and several other disabilities who was being cared for by his mother and sister. According to the court:

... [The] family, including Petitioner, follows Islamic law set forth in the Quran, which forbids ... unrelated males and females from being alone together, and unrelated males from providing personal care involving nudity or exposed private areas....  Therefore, to protect Petitioner from sin, only Mother, Sister, or other closely related female relatives may be alone with Petitioner, and only a father, brother, uncle, or grandfather could provide his more intimate bathroom and shower care....  Mother added that the prohibition of unrelated males and females being alone together likewise prohibits her from being alone with an unrelated male caretaker while he is tending to Petitioner....

... Petitioner also asserts that the Department’s refusal to grant him an exception to the 40/60 Rule violates the RFPA, where he has shown by clear and convincing evidence that placement of an unrelated caregiver in his home would burden his and his family’s religious exercise, and the Department cannot show that its denial of an exception is the least burdensome way to serve a compelling interest....

... [S]substantial record evidence supports that Islamic law allows an unrelated, non-Islamic male aide to assist Petitioner outside Mother’s presence (i.e., either outside the home or when Mother leaves the home to attend to personal business), before and after which Mother could provide Petitioner’s necessary intimate personal care.... 

... Because Petitioner has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the 40/60 Rule “[s]ignificantly constrains or inhibits conduct or expression mandated by [his] sincerely held religious beliefs[,]” “[s]ignificantly curtails [his] ability to express adherence to [his] faith[,]” “[d]en[ies] [him] reasonable opportunity to engage in activities . . . fundamental to [his] religion[,]” nor “[c]ompels conduct or expression which violates a specific tenet of [his] religious faith[,]” 71 P.S. § 2403, he has failed to meet his initial burden of proving that the application of the 40/60 Rule substantially burdens his free exercise of religion under the Free Exercise Clause or the RFPA.

Civil Rights Commission Holds Briefing on Prisoners' Religious Freedom

Last Friday, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights held a lengthy hearing on The Federal Role in Enforcing Religious Freedom in Prisons. A video of the full hearing is available on YouTube. In announcing the hearing, the Commission said:

The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights will hold a briefing on, Friday, May 17, 2024, on whether prisoners’ religious freedom rights are being protected and enforced in accordance with constitutional and statutory provisions. This is an update to the Commission’s 2008 statutory enforcement report, Enforcing Religious Freedom in Prison.

Specifically, the Commission will review the constitutional and federal statutory provisions of the First Amendment, the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980 (CRIPA), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990 (RFRA), the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), and the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).

At this public briefing, the Commission will hear from subject matter experts such as government officials, religious leaders, academics, prisoners’ rights advocates, religious liberty organizations, and legal experts. The Commission will accept written materials from the public for consideration as we prepare our report....

5th Circuit Denies Further Relief to Native American Church Objecting to Park Modifications

As previously reported, last year a Texas federal district court held that members of the Lipam-Apache Native American Church should be given access for religious services to a point on the San Antonio River which is a Sacred Site for them.  The court refused to grant plaintiffs' request that the proposed improvements to the park in which the Sacred Site is located be limited so that the spiritual ecology of the Sacred Area would be preserved by minimizing tree removal and allowing cormorants to nest. Plaintiffs appealed the injunction denials.  In Perez v. City of San Antonio, (5th Cir., April 11, 2024), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. Rejecting appellants' claim under the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the court said in part:

In analyzing Appellants’ contention that the destruction of the tree canopies, where cormorants nest, and the driving away of the cormorants themselves will burden their religions, we consider whether the presupposed burden is real and significant....

Appellants continue to have virtually unlimited access to the Park for religious and cultural purposes. Appellants’ reverence of the cormorants as sacred genesis creatures from the Sacred Area is not implicated here because the City’s rookery management program does not directly dictate or regulate the cormorants’ nesting habits, migration, or Park visitation. For example, the record shows that, regardless of the rookery management program, no cormorants, due to their migration patterns, inhabit the area for extended periods of time each year. Moreover, the City’s rookery management program does not substantially burden Appellants’ religious beliefs because cormorants can still nest elsewhere in the 343-acre Park or nearby. The deterrent activities are deployed only within the two-acre Project Area and only to persuade the birds to nest elsewhere....

The record indicates that various areas of the Park “become nearly unusable for 10 months of the year due to the bird density/habitat.”...

 [T]he City’s tree removal plan is narrowly tailored to achieve the City’s compelling governmental interest of making the Project Area safe for visitors to the Park....

Appellants assert that the City’s plan violates the religious-service protections provision of the Texas Constitution....

Even accepting that the “relatively new provision bars any government action that prohibits or limits religious services,” Appellants do not sufficiently brief the question of whether a compelled “preservation of spiritual ecology” was envisioned in the statute’s definition of a “religious service” protected from state sanctioned prohibitions or limitations.

Judge Higginson dissented in part, contending that the city should have done more to accommodate plaintiffs as to tree removal and anti-nesting matters.

Apaches Seek Review of Their RFRA Claim by 29-Judge Panel

As previously reported, last month the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc, by a vote of 6-5, refused to enjoin the government from transferring to a copper mining company federally-owned forest land that is of significant spiritual value to members of the Western Apache tribes. The land sits on the third largest deposit of copper ore in the world. The case generated six separate opinions spanning 241 pages which created separate majority alignments on different aspects of the interpretation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Yesterday, plaintiffs filed a petition (full text) seeking review by a panel of all 29 judges on the 9th Circuit. The petition states in part:

If any case warrants full-court review, it is this one—where one en banc panel has overruled another, this Court’s judges are split 6-6, and a fractured decision has contradicted Supreme Court precedent on a question of existential importance to Native Americans. That question is whether the government “substantially burdens” religious exercise when it physically destroys a Native American sacred site, ending religious exercise forever. And the answer is plain: yes.

Becket Fund for Religious Liberty issued a press release announcing the filing.

Religiously Motivated Aid for Drug Abusers Not Protected by RFRA or 1st Amendment

In United States v. Safehouse, (ED PA, April 3, 2024), a Pennsylvania federal district court held that neither the Religious Freedom Restoration Act nor the Free Exercise Clause of the 1st Amendment is violated by prosecuting Safehouse for violating 21 USC §856 (Maintaining Drug-Involved Premises). Safehouse is a nonprofit corporation that plans to open a safe injection site for those struggling with opioid abuse. Its founders were religiously motivated, but the corporation's articles do not set out any religious purpose. The court said in part:

Here, the organizers and leaders of Safehouse profess religious motivation, but the work of Safehouse itself is in no respect religious....

As an entity unaffiliated with any specific faith or religious institution, Safehouse claims protection for its non-religious actions, based solely upon the religious motivation of its founders.  Neither RFRA nor the free exercise clause extends that far, as religion cannot provide a “limitless excuse for avoiding all unwanted obligations.” ...  That is necessarily so, because “‘the very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing’ [a plaintiff], or any other person, a blanket privilege ‘to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests.’”...  The noble intentions of Safehouse and its founders are self-evident, and the public health crisis they seek to address continues unabated, but their religious inspiration does not provide a shield against prosecution for violation of a federal criminal statute barring its operation.

WHYY News reports on the decision.

Iowa Enacts Religious Freedom Restoration Act

Yesterday Iowa Governor Kim Reynolds signed SF 2095, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. (Governor's press release.) (Full text of Act.) It provides in part:

State action shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that applying the burden to that person's exercise of religion is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

The Gazette reports on the bill.

Denial of Temporary Religious Worker Visa Upheld

In Calvary Albuquerque Inc. v. Blinken, (D NM, March 13, 2024), a New Mexico federal district court dismissed challenges to the denial of an R-1 (Temporary Religious Worker) visa for Stefen Green, a South African citizen who was to be hired as Calvary Church's Worship Director. At issue was the fact that Green received honoraria and allowances from Calvary Church while in the United States on a B-1 visitor's visa before the R-1 visa was approved. Green and Calvary Church both contended that the denial violated their rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Denying Green's claim, the court said in part:

Because the doctrine of consular nonreviewability is a long-standing “no trespass rule” for judicial review, and Congress has not expressly provided for judicial review of consular visa decisions, this Court may not infringe upon the consular officer’s decision to deny Mr. Green’s visa except where the constitutional rights of an American citizen are implicated....

Moving on to the RFRA claim by the Church, the court said in part: 

Calvary Church is a United States church making a free exercise claim under RFRA, so this Court must next determine whether the consular officer’s visa denial was made for a facially legitimate and bona fide reasons....

Here, the consular officer cited a valid statutory reason for denial.... [T]he consular officer made a factual determination that Mr. Green willfully misrepresented the purpose of his April 9, 2022, visit to a border official as commensurate with a B-1/B-2 visa and then violated that status by intending to engage in unauthorized employment for hire as an independent contractor at Calvary Church within 90-days of his entry into the United States.

9th Circuit En Banc Refuses to Bar U.S. Transfer of Sacred Apache Site to Copper Mining Company

In Apache Stronghold v. United States, (9th Cir., March 1, 2024), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc, by a vote of 6-5, refused to enjoin the government from transferring to a copper mining company federally-owned forest land that is of significant spiritual value to the Western Apache Indians. The land sits on the third largest deposit of copper ore in the world. The case generated six separate opinions spanning 241 pages. The court's per curiam opinion summarizes the holding:

A majority of the en banc court ...concludes that (1) the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ... and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ... are interpreted uniformly; and (2) preventing access to religious exercise is an example of substantial burden.  A majority of the en banc court therefore overrules Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service to the extent that it defined a “substantial burden” under RFRA as “imposed only when individuals are forced to choose between following the tenets of their religion and receiving a governmental benefit (Sherbert) or coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs by the threat of civil or criminal sanctions (Yoder).”...   

A different majority ...concludes that (1) RFRA subsumes, rather than overrides, the outer limits that the Supreme Court’s decision in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n ... places on what counts as a governmental imposition of a substantial burden on religious exercise; and (2) under Lyng, a disposition of government real property does not impose a substantial burden on religious exercise when it has “no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs,” does not “discriminate” against religious adherents, does not “penalize” them, and does not deny them “an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.”... The same majority holds that Apache Stronghold’s claims under the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA fail under these Lyng-based standards and that the claims based on the 1852 Treaty fail for separate reasons.  

We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s order denying the motion for a preliminary injunction.

Becket issued a press release announcing the decision and saying in part: "With the help of Becket, Apache Stronghold has vowed to appeal the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court." Los Angeles Times reports on the decision.

UPDATE: On May 14, 2024, the Court issued an amended opinion, clarifying some of the reasoning of the majority.