Muslim Group Sues Over Denial of Zoning Permit for Mosque

Suit was filed last week in a Tennessee federal district court challenging the denial of a special use permit to a Muslim religious organization that wished to build a mosque on land that it owns. The complaint (full text) in Bartlett Muslim Society v. City of Bartlett, Tennessee, (W TN, filed 7/25/2025),

3. After the Plaintiff complied with these extensive, expensive procedural requirements—and despite City staff’s recommendation of approval—the City denied the Plaintiff’s Special Use Permit application based on arbitrary, predetermined reasons and religious animus. 

4. The City has approved similarly situated churches ... for a Special Use Permit under comparable or less favorable circumstances. 

5. In denying the Plaintiff’s Special Use Permit application, the City has imposed a substantial burden on the Plaintiff’s religious exercise, treated it unequally, and discriminated against it based on religion.... 

7. Accordingly, the Plaintiff files this civil-rights action under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., and Tennessee’s Preservation of Religious Freedom Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-1-407.

Tennessee ACLU issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

RFRA and Free Exercise Clause Apply to Corporate Entities Exercising Religion

In United States v. Safehouse, (3d Cir., July 24, 2025), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the 1st Amendment's Free Exercise clause apply to corporate entities, and to non-religious entities exercising religion. The United States contended that defendant's offering of supervised illegal drug use violates federal law. Defendant argued that its overdose prevention services reflect its Board members' religious belief in the value of human life. The court said in part:

RFRA’s plain text and Free Exercise doctrine are clear that those statutory and constitutional protections extend to non-natural persons, including so-called non-religious entities. In so holding, we express no view about whether threatened prosecution of Safehouse substantially burdens its exercise of religion. We likewise decline Safehouse’s invitation to determine in the first instance whether it has plausibly stated RFRA and Free Exercise claims. We only address the proper object of RFRA’s and the First Amendment’s protections: that object includes a non-natural entity allegedly exercising religion, even if the entity itself is not religious. 

One Plaintiff Has Standing to Challenge Kentucky Abortion Ban on Religious Grounds

In Sobel v. Coleman, (KY App., July 11, 2025), a Kentucky state appeals court partially reversed a trial court's decision and held that one of the plaintiffs challenging Kentucky's abortion ban has standing to pursue her claim that the law violates her rights under Kentucky's Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The court said in part:

The primary argument of this case revolves around the embryos created with IVF.  During IVF, multiple eggs of a woman are fertilized.  This can lead to excess embryos that are not implanted in the woman.  These extra embryos are either frozen and stored, disposed of, or donated.  Appellants claim that the destruction of any unviable or unused embryos could lead to criminal charges relating to the death of an unborn child....

Appellants ... claim that their Jewish faith requires them to increase their family and multiply.  They argue that restricting their access to IVF due to the unclear notion of unborn child and unborn human being violates their religion.  They also claim that their faith prioritizes the life of a mother over the life of a fetus; therefore, restrictions on abortion violate their faith.  Further, they claim that their faith does not support the idea that life begins at conception, rather that a fetus becomes a child only once it exits the mother’s body.  They claim that the laws in Kentucky surrounding abortion are Christian in nature and do not take into consideration their faith....

Ms. Kalb has taken active steps to get pregnant.  She has nine embryos in frozen storage ready for her use and she scheduled, but ultimately canceled, an embryo implantation in 2022.  Ms. Kalb’s actions show imminence in a potential injury sufficient to satisfy standing for her religious-based claims.

The Forward reports on the decision.

Christian Evangelist Challenges Town's Permit Requirement for Carrying Sign

Suit was filed this week in a South Carolina federal district court challenging the application of Chapin, South Carolina's "Parades, Demonstrating, Picketing" Ordinance to plaintiff's carrying of a religious sign on public rights of way. The complaint (full text) in Giardino v. Town of Chapin, South Carolina, (D SC, filed 7/15/2025), alleges in part:

2. Chapin interprets and applies the Ordinance regulating “demonstrations” to engulf Giardino’s use of religious signs while standing on public rights-of-way in town limits, requiring him to (i) apply for a permit to hold a sign on a public way, (ii) supply fourteen-day advance notice of his use of a sign, (iii) divulge identity and content of his sign, (iv) conditioned on standardless approval of the Mayor, and, if approved, (v) limit his time holding a sign to thirty minutes, and (vi) to move to a different spot after fifteen minutes...

12. Giardino is an evangelical Christian driven by his faith to share the good news of Jesus Christ (gospel) with others. 

13. He wants to inform others of the salvation they can find by believing in Jesus Christ and accepting Him as their savior.   

14. To convey this evangelistic message, Giardino holds a 20-inch by 24-inch sign attached to a short handle containing a short, pithy statement about the gospel while standing on a public sidewalk or public right-of-way in the town limits of Chapin, South Carolina.

The complaint alleges that enforcement of the Ordinance violates plaintiff's free speech, free exercise and due process rights, as well as South Carolina's Religious Freedom Act. Plaintiff also filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

First Liberty issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Supreme Court Upholds Appointment of Task Force That Recommended Insurance Coverage for Anti-HIV Drugs

In Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc., (Sup. Ct., June 27, 2025), the U.S. Supreme Court in a 6-3 decision held that the method of appointing members of the U. S. Preventive Services Task Force does not violate the Constitution's Appointments Clause. The majority opinion was written by Justice Kavanaugh. Underlying the controversy were the religious objections of plaintiffs to the Task Force's mandate requiring insurance coverage for pre-exposure drugs that prevent the transmission of HIV. Plaintiffs contended that this coverage makes them complicit in facilitating homosexual behavior, drug use and sexual activity outside of marriage. As set out in a footnote by the majority: 

Braidwood also brought a claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.... It prevailed on that claim and secured an injunction against enforcement of the specific requirement that it cover certain HIV-prevention medications without cost sharing. The Government did not appeal that aspect of the District Court’s judgment, and this Court’s decision will not affect the injunction premised on Braidwood’s RFRA claim.

Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Alito and Gorsuch, filed a dissenting opinion. AJMC reports on the decision.

Texas Supreme Court: AG May Begin Proceedings to Close Down Catholic Refugee Agency for Harboring Illegal Migrants

In Paxton v. Annunciation House, Inc., (TX Sup. Ct., May 30, 2025), the Texas Supreme Court held that a state trial court was in error in refusing to allow the state Attorney General to file a quo warranto action as a first step in his attempt to revoke the corporate charter of a Catholic agency serving migrants and refugees in El Paso. The Attorney General claims that the agency is sheltering migrants who have entered the country illegally. The Supreme Court observed:

Bound up in the dispute are a host of serious questions: What kind of conduct constitutes unlawfully harboring illegal aliens?  Has Annunciation House engaged in such conduct?  Under what conditions may the attorney general demand access to Annunciation House’s records?  Can harboring illegal aliens provide a valid basis for the attorney general to file a quo warranto action?  Does Texas law that protects religious liberty forbid the attorney general from proceeding against Annunciation House under these circumstances?  And more still.

Ordinarily, before this Court addresses such significant issues, the parties would have developed a full record.... This case, however, comes to the Court as a direct appeal because, very early in the litigation, the trial court held that several Texas statutes are unconstitutional.  We accordingly must address this dispute far earlier than we typically would. 

Among other defenses, Annunciation House invoked the state's Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Rejecting that defense, the Supreme Court said in part:

... [T]he relevant government action for purposes of applying RFRA here is not the charter revocation that may or may not arrive, but only the filing of the quo warranto information.  Engaging in litigation is generally not itself the sort of burden that RFRA forecloses— RFRA purposefully provides a tool to be deployed within litigation.  In this case, it has been invoked as an affirmative defense focusing not on the mere existence of the litigation but on a potential end result of that litigation.  Undoubtedly, RFRA can be powerful however it is deployed, and its potency often may be felt quite early.  But it is not a tool to convert a proceeding focused on whether litigation may even commence into one that reaches and resolves ultimate issues.  Were we to say more about RFRA at this stage, we would have to reach issues that go well beyond the narrow question of the attorney general’s authority to file a quo warranto counterclaim—and to do so without the benefit of a sufficiently developed record or even the refining that ordinarily comes through the usual litigation and appellate process.

Here are links to the pleadings and numerous amicus briefs filed in the case. Here is a link to video of oral arguments in the case. El Paso Times reports on the decision.

Supreme Court Denies Review of Apache's Loss of Sacred Land

By a vote of 6-2, the U.S. Supreme Court today denied review in Apache Stronghold v. United States, (Sup.Ct., certiorari denied May 27, 2025). In the case, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc, by a vote of 6-5, refused to enjoin the government from transferring to a copper mining company federally-owned forest land that is of significant spiritual value to the Western Apache Indians. Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas, today filed a lengthy dissent to the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, saying in part:

Exactly nothing in the phrase “substantial burden”—or anything else in RFRA’s text—hints that a different and more demanding standard applies when (and only when) the “disposition” of the government’s property is at issue....

... [A]t bottom, it seems the Ninth Circuit was concerned that a ruling for Apache Stronghold would effectively afford tribal members a “‘religious servitude’” on federal land at Oak Flat....  And, the argument goes, those who adopted RFRA could not have intended to afford Tribes or others that kind of power over the disposition of federal property....  But unexpressed legislative intentions are not the law. And even if we were to abandon the statutory text in favor of guesswork about unenacted congressional purposes, it is far from clear why we should make the guess the Ninth Circuit did....

While this Court enjoys the power to choose which cases it will hear, its decision to shuffle this case off our docket without a full airing is a grievous mistake—one with consequences that threaten to reverberate for generations.  Just imagine if the government sought to demolish a historic cathedral on so questionable a chain of legal reasoning.  I have no doubt that we would find that case worth our time. Faced with the government’s plan to destroy an ancient site of tribal worship, we owe the Apaches no less.  They may live far from Washington, D. C., and their history and religious practices may be unfamiliar to many.  But that should make no difference. “Popular religious views are easy enough to defend. It is in protecting unpopular religious beliefs that we prove this country’s commitment to . . . religious freedom.”

AP reports on the Court's action.

Plaintiff May Move Ahead with Claim That Iowa RFRA Protects His Religious Use of Cannabis

In Olsen v. State of Iowa, (IA Dist. Ct., May 22, 2025), an Iowa state trial court allowed plaintiff, a member of the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church, to move ahead with his suit seeking an injunction to bar enforcement of Iowa's controlled-substance laws against his religious use of cannabis.  The suit contends that his religious use of marijuana is protected by Iowa's Religious Freedom Restoration Act enacted last year. That Act contains its own definition of "compelling governmental interest." Even though in federal court litigation in 2008 plaintiff lost his claim that the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act exempts his religious use of marijuana from federal and state controlled-substance laws, the Iowa state court rejected the state's argument that this suit should be dismissed on collateral estoppel grounds, saying in part:

The issue raised in this litigation is the same as the Petitioner’s prior actions as cited in the briefing, that being whether the compelling state interest test was met regarding the restriction of the Petitioner’s use of cannabis. This issue was central to the Petitioner’s prior cases. 

The Petitioner argues the legal landscape has changed since the prior rulings were issued. Collateral estoppel does not apply if controlling facts or legal principles have changed significantly since the Petitioner's prior judgments. Olsen v. Mukasey, 541 F.3d at 831. The court finds that based on this particular argument, that the Petitioner’s should not be dismissed at this time....

In this case, the Petitioner is asserting the claim under Iowa Code Chapter 675. Although it is markedly similar to the federal RFRA and the Petitioner has made similar unsuccessful claims in the past, this court cannot conclude to a certainty that there is no possibility of success under the newly-passed Iowa RFRA. 

Plaintiff, who is litigating pro se, issued a press release announcing the decision.

Cremation of Body When Next of Kin Were Unknown Did Not Violate State RFRA

In Doe v. Marion County, Arkansas, (WD AR, May 5, 2025), an Arkansas federal magistrate judge recommended dismissing a suit brought under the Arkansas Religious Freedom Restoration Act. At issue in the case is the manner in which an Arkansas county coroner disposed of the body of plaintiff's father after the coroner was unable to locate any next of kin.  The body was cremated.  When plaintiff discovered this, she sued alleging in part that cremation violated her strongly held religious beliefs. In recommending judgment for defendants on this claim, the magistrate judge said in part:

Simply using the term "sincerely held religious beliefs" ... without stating any accompanying factual detail, is insufficient to state a plausible claim. See Stephens v. Legacy-GoHealth Urgent Care, ... (“[g]eneral references to Christianity.... fail to plausibly suggest that a plaintiff’s anti-vaccination beliefs are in fact religious”)...  While it is not for the court to determine the reasonableness of Doe’s alleged religious beliefs, we are not required to take her conclusory assertions of violation at face value....

Even if Doe had pled facts sufficient to state an ARFRA claim, Defendants have sustained their burden of showing that their actions, in accordance with state law, were in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest....  Burial is markedly more expensive, and there is no lesser restrictive means to further the government’s interest.... Requiring the state to bury all unclaimed bodies simply because an unknown family member might have a religious belief against cremation would certainly constitute an undue hardship....

[Thanks to Eugene Volokh via Religionlaw for the lead.]

3rd Circuit: Consular Decisions Cannot Be Challenged Under RFRA

 In Calvary Albuquerque Inc. v. Rubio, (10th Cir., May 6, 2025), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision upheld a consular officer's denial of an R-1 (non-immigrant religious worker) visa to a South African minister who wanted to serve as the worship leader at an Albuquerque, New Mexico church.  Plaintiff contended that the visa denial violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, but the majority concluded that it could not reverse the decision of a consular officer under the consular nonreviewability doctrine. The majority said in part:

RFRA’s cause-of-action provision plainly does not expressly authorize judicial review of consular officers’ visa decisions.  Also, whether the provision stating RFRA applies to “all Federal law” expressly authorizes judicial review of consular officers’ visa decisions is ambiguous.  Applying statutory construction tools to that clause, we conclude that RFRA does not do so.....

Calvary argues the constitutional claim exception to the consular nonreviewability doctrine applies because it brought a free exercise claim under RFRA, and RFRA is analogous to a constitutional right.... Even if a RFRA claim could qualify for the exception, Calvary has not plausibly alleged that (a) the consular officer failed to provide a facially legitimate and bona fide reason to deny Mr. Green’s visa application or (b) the officer acted in bad faith....

Judge Bacharach dissented, contending that RFRA's language authorizes review of consular decisions.

3rd Circuit Hears Arguments on Whether Religious Motivation of Founders Allows Nonprofit Corporation to Assert Free Exercise Claims

On April 9, the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments (audio of full oral arguments) in United States v. Safehouse. In the case, a Pennsylvania federal district court held that a nonprofit corporation that plans to open a safe injection site for those struggling with opioid abuse cannot claim protection from federal prosecution under the free exercise clause or RFRA merely because its founders had a religious motivation. The corporation's articles do not set out any religious purpose. (See prior posting.) Courthouse News Service reports on the oral arguments.

Georgia Legislature Passes Religious Freedom Bill

On April 3, the Georgia legislature gave final passage to SB36, the Georgia Religious Freedom Restoration Act (full text). The Act requires the government to justify any substantial burden on the exercise of religion by a compelling interest implemented by the least restrictive means. The Act adds:

Granting government funding, benefits, or exemptions, to the extent permissible under the Establishment Clause, shall not constitute a violation of this chapter. As used in this Code section, the term "granting," used with respect to government funding, benefits, or exemptions, does not include the denial of government funding, benefits, or exemptions.

If signed by Governor Brian Kemp, Georgia will be the 30th state to enact a religious freedom law.  Baptist Press reports on the bill.

UPDATE: On April 4, Govenor Kemp signed the bill.

Covid Era Mask Mandate Did Not Violate Free Exercise

In Robol v. City of Columbus, (OH App., March 20, 2025), an Ohio state appellate court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's claims that the city infringed his free exercise rights when during the Covid pandemic it required individuals to wear a mask in public spaces.  The court said in part:

Ordinance 1643-2020, the City’s mask ordinance, required all persons to wear a mask in public spaces.  The ordinance did not regulate, or even mention, any religious activity, religious creed, or religious affiliation.  Thus, the face mask policies Mr. Robol challenges are both neutral and generally applicable....

Despite the general applicability and neutrality of the mask ordinance, Mr. Robol nonetheless asserts the City violated his rights under the Free Exercise Clause because the ordinance violated his Christian beliefs, forced him to worship a false god, and had the effect of mocking the tenets of his faith.  Though we do not question the sincerity of Mr. Robol’s interpretation of his religion, we are mindful that a government action is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally burdens religious practices.

Mr. Robol also brought a religious exercise claim under 42 U.S.C. 2000bb, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act....

Not every imposition on religious exercise is a substantial burden....

Without doubting the sincerity of Mr. Robol’s belief that wearing a face mask violates his religious beliefs, we note that Mr. Robol does not allege, much less demonstrate through Civ.R. 56 evidence, that the face mask policies imposed any more than a mere inconvenience to his religious beliefs.....

Mr. Robol argues the City’s face mask requirement violated his freedom of speech and expression because the choice not to wear a face mask is a form of expressing his opposition to the City’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.  The City’s mask ordinance is content-neutral, and nothing in the terms of the ordinance suggests the purpose is to regulate speech.  And we agree with appellees the face mask policy promotes an important governmental interest in controlling the spread of COVID-19 that is unrelated to the suppression of speech.....

Wyoming Enacts State RFRA

Last week, Wyoming Governor Mark Gordon signed HB 0207, the Wyoming Religious Freedom Restoration Act (full text). The Act requires strict scrutiny of state action that substantially burden's a person's right to the exercise of religion. Wyoming is the 29th state to enact a similar statute. Catholic World Report covers these developments.

6th Circuit: Public Official Engaging in State Action Cannot Assert 1st Amendment Defense

In Ermold v. Davis, (6th Cir., March 6, 2025), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a $100,000 damage award to a same-sex couple who were refused a marriage license by Rowan County, Kentucky Clerk Kim Davis who had religious objections to same-sex marriage. The court said in part:

Government officials “have private lives and their own constitutional rights.” ...  But when a public official wields the “authority of the state,” she “engage[s] in state action,” which, by definition, cannot be protected by the First Amendment....

Davis alternatively argues that her Free Exercise rights were violated by a different state action:  Kentucky’s delay in granting her a religious accommodation.  But Plaintiffs had nothing to do with the timing of the accommodation, and Davis’s argument is irrelevant to Plaintiffs’ claim.  Either way, Davis has been found liable for state action—not private conduct—so she cannot raise a First Amendment defense...

 As Davis sees it, a public official can wield the authority of the state to violate the constitutional rights of citizens if the official believes she is “follow[ing] her conscience.” ...  That cannot be correct.  “The very purpose of a Bill of Rights” is to place certain freedoms “beyond the reach of . . . [government] officials.”  ...  Thus, when an official’s discharge of her duties according to her conscience violates the constitutional rights of citizens, the Constitution must win out.  The Bill of Rights would serve little purpose if it could be freely ignored whenever an official’s conscience so dictates....

Davis also argues that Kentucky’s RFRA shields her from liability.  But that statute does not apply here....

Judge Readler filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.  Louisville Courier Journal reports on the decision.

Utah RFRA Protects Psilocybin-Using Religious Sect

In Jensen v. Utah County, (D UT, Feb. 20, 2025), a Utah federal district court issued a preliminary injunction under Utah's Religious Freedom Restoration Act barring law enforcement personnel from interfering with the sincere religious use of psilocybin by members of a new religious group known as Singularism. The court also ordered return of items that had been seized from the group. The court said in part:

Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the Utah Controlled Substances Act as applied to their psilocybin ceremonies....

Based on the evidence in this case, Plaintiffs have established that the government has substantially burdened their sincere religious exercise. Simply put, Plaintiffs offer a sacramental psilocybin tea to their voyagers, who then embark on a spiritual journey by which they write their own scripture. A law that categorically prohibits the possession and use of the psilocybin sacrament—thereby preventing Singularism’s adherents from pursuing their spiritual voyages and hindering them from producing their sacred scripture—substantially burdens the free exercise of Singularism and its adherents....

Defendants observe that Singularism “does not claim special access to divine truths,” instead encouraging its practitioners to more deeply “discover and define their own beliefs,” and explicitly states that “no organization, including [it], has all the answers to life’s most difficult questions.” In Defendants’ view, these features weaken Singularism’s claim to be a religion because they show that Singularism’s beliefs are not comprehensive....  As the court sees it, however, these features less so detract from Singularism’s religious nature than they illustrate Singularism’s commitment to existential humility...

From all the evidence in the record, the court is hard-pressed to find, as Defendants urge, that Singularism is essentially a drug-dealing business cloaked in a minister’s robe. To the contrary, the court is convinced that Singularism is a legitimate religion and that Plaintiffs are sincere practitioners of it. This is not a case where a group of people claim a religious right to do little more than use and distribute large quantities of drugs.... By establishing the sincerity of their religious beliefs, Plaintiffs have fulfilled their responsibility of establishing a prima facie case under the Utah RFRA, shifting the burden to the government to demonstrate that the Utah Controlled Substances Act accomplishes a compelling state interest using the least restrictive means....

Whatever legal regime a society chooses, however, it must apply its protections equally to unpopular or unfamiliar religious groups as to popular or familiar ones if that commitment to religious liberty is to mean anything. As sang Jonas Gwangwa, a South African jazz musician who was exiled by the apartheid government, “Freedom for some is freedom for none.” Indeed, the very founding of the State of Utah reflects the lived experience of that truth by members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Perhaps it is ironic then that not long after enacting its RFRA to provide special protections for religious exercise, the State of Utah should so vigorously deploy its resources, particularly the coercive power of its criminal-justice system, to harass and shut down a new religion it finds offensive practically without any evidence that that religion’s practices have imposed any harms on its own practitioners or anyone else. 

7th Circuit: Visa Regulations for Temporary Religious Workers Do Not Violate RFRA or 1st Amendment

In Society of the Divine Word v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, (7th Cir., Feb. 24, 2025), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals held that USCIS regulations that makes the process for obtaining a immigrant worker status and subsequent permanent residence more difficult for temporary religious workers than other categories of temporary workers does not violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act or the 1st Amendment.  The court said in part:

Plaintiffs do not identify a belief or set of beliefs they have to violate because of the regulation. Instead, they offer a broader, structural argument—that the regulation places a substantial burden on their religious exercise because it allows for “undue Government interference” with their ability to “select and employ their own ministers.” Taking this claim on its own terms, it does not rise to the level of a substantial burden for purposes of stating a RFRA violation. There is no assertion that the regulation prevents Plaintiffs from practicing their religion. It does not require them to select or refrain from selecting any particular minister. And it does not otherwise pressure or coerce Plaintiffs into violating any tenet of their religion, as far as we can tell from the complaint and declarations. We agree with the district court that, at most, the regulation “requires employers to plan the timing of employment decisions based on immigration status, and potentially limits the pool of qualified applicants that plaintiffs can choose from if they fail to plan accordingly.” ... That is not a substantial burden on religious beliefs or practice....

Court Preliminarily Enjoins Enforcement Against Plaintiffs of New Guidelines for Immigration Raids at Churches

In Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, (D MD, Feb. 24, 2025), a Maryland federal district court issued a preliminary injunction barring immigration authorities from enforcing against the Society of Friends, Baptist, and Sikh plaintiffs the January 2025 policy change on immigration enforcement at sensitive locations such as places of worship. Instead, they must comply with the previous 2021 Guidelines. The court found that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their 1st Amendment Freedom of Association claim as well as their claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. It concluded that enforcement of the new policy would likely significantly burden both plaintiffs' right to expressive association and their religious exercise. The court said in part:

... Plaintiffs have provided facts showing that, in light of their religious beliefs and practices relating to immigrants, they can reasonably expect to face immigration enforcement actions at their places of worship pursuant to the 2025 Policy, that such actions will likely result in declines in attendance at their worship and ministry services, and that such declines are, in fact, already occurring.... They have further demonstrated that, as a result ..., certain core religious beliefs and practices will be significantly burdened, including the beliefs that each of the Plaintiffs' religions require regular, communal worship; that at least CBF requires, as part of its religious exercise, that its congregations engage in services to support immigrants and refugees; and that, for the Quaker Plaintiffs in particular, the presence of any firearms in worship services, such as those of armed law enforcement officers, violates their faith.

CBS News reports on the decision.

Title VII Applies to Liberty University's Firing of Transgender Employee

In Zinski v. Liberty University, Inc., (WD VA, Feb. 21, 2025), a Virginia federal district court refused to dismiss a Title VII sex discrimination lawsuit against Liberty University brought by a former employee whose employment as an IT Apprentice was terminated because she underwent a male to female sex transition. In an extensively reasoned 70-page opinion, the court rejected several defenses asserted by the University. First the University contended that §§702 and 703 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act allow a religious employer to discriminate on the basis of transgender status when that is consistent with the employer’s religious belief. Those section allow a religious employer to discriminate "with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion." The court said in part:

Having determined that no source of law—from statutory text to legislative history to precedent—answers the question before us, the Court is left to weigh the imperfect arguments above, alongside the potential legal and social consequences of our decision. Drawing upon all of these considerations, we conclude that Sections 702 and 703 must be narrowly construed so as to permit discrimination only on the basis of an employee’s espoused religious belief or practice, such that religious employers have no license to discriminate on the basis of any other protected class. Where a religious employer discriminates on the basis of any other protected class in a but-for fashion, a statutory violation occurs, even if the decision was religiously motivated....

To decide that sex discrimination is acceptable so long as it is religiously motivated would allow employers to achieve all manner of discrimination under the banner of religion. So long as the religious institution can show that its view—despite directly implicating sex, race, or national origin—is a sincerely held religious belief, the religious institution would have free license to discriminate at will and evade the scrutiny of civil law. Not only would this subject potentially thousands of people to discrimination..., but it would supply religious institutions with a power not afforded to secular institutions, thereby generating favorites under the law and raising Establishment Clause questions....

The court also rejected the University's RFRA defense, concluding first that RFRA applies only to suits in which the government is a party. It added:

And even if Liberty were entitled to raise RFRA as a defense, we find that Title VII likely passes strict scrutiny....

On the record before us, enforcing this statute in Zinksi’s case merely requires Liberty to maintain an employee who has not followed the university’s Doctrinal Statement to the letter, i.e., an employee who has sinned. It does not require Liberty to change its belief, to endorse Zinksi’s behavior, or to allow Zinksi to spread a new message within the organization.... The minimal inroad on religious liberty here is easily justified by the exceedingly compelling governmental interest in eradicating sex discrimination in employment. Accordingly, we find that Liberty’s brief argument as to burden is insufficient to show substantial burden at this stage of litigation. Thus, strict scrutiny does not apply, and our analysis can come to an end.....

The court rejected the ministerial exception defense, saying in part that "nothing in the record suggests that Zinski was a minister." The court also rejected the University's freedom of expressive association claim, saying in part:

... [W]e must defer Liberty’s claim that it opposes transgender identification and seeks to avoid any promotion of transgender status as an appropriate form of behavior. However,... we cannot conclude that Zinksi’s presence at Liberty would “force the organization to send a message” that Liberty accepts transgender conduct as a “legitimate form of behavior.”... Zinksi is an IT employee who has limited to no interactions with students, has no role in influencing or promoting Liberty’s value system, and has no role in Liberty’s religious curriculum or programming. The only inference that we can draw for Liberty is that Liberty may be seen as a hypocrite for employing a transgender person when it opposes transgender identity; but the same could be said for Liberty’s employment of any other type of person who “sins” despite Liberty’s opposition to sin in general....

Finally, the court rejected the University's ecclesiastical abstention defense, saying in part:

Zinski’s complaint asks the Court to determine whether Title VII prohibits a religious institution from firing a transgender person, not whether a religious institution, like Liberty, has properly interpreted its religious doctrine when determining that a transgender person violates religious law and must be fired.

27 Religious Denominational Groups Sue DHS Over Rescission of Sensitive Locations Policy

Yesterday, 27 Christian and Jewish denominational bodies and organizations filed suit in a D.C. federal district court challenging the rescission by the Department of Homeland Security of its "Sensitive Locations Policy." The policy severely limited the situations under which immigration enforcement actions could take place at churches, synagogues, mosques and other institutions of worship, as well as at various other locations. The complaint (full text) in Mennonite Church, USA v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, (D DC, filed 2/11/2025), says in part:

1. [Plaintiffs] bring this suit unified on a fundamental belief: Every human being, regardless of birthplace, is a child of God worthy of dignity, care, and love. Welcoming the stranger, or immigrant, is thus a central precept of their faith practices....

7. ... Consistent with their call to welcome and serve all people, many have undocumented congregants and many offer social service ministries— such as food and clothing pantries, English as a Second Language (“ESL”) classes, legal assistance, and job training services—at their churches and synagogues that serve undocumented people.  An immigration enforcement action during worship services, ministry work, or other congregational activities would be devastating to their religious practice. It would shatter the consecrated space of sanctuary, thwart communal worship, and undermine the social service outreach that is central to religious expression and spiritual practice for Plaintiffs’ congregations and members.

8. The rescission of the sensitive locations policy is already substantially burdening the religious exercise of Plaintiffs’ congregations and members.  Congregations are experiencing decreases in worship attendance and social services participation due to fear of immigration enforcement action.  For the vulnerable congregants who continue to attend worship services, congregations must choose between either exposing them to arrest or undertaking security measures that are in direct tension with their religious duties of welcome and hospitality. Likewise, the choice that congregations currently face between discontinuing social service ministries or putting undocumented participants at risk of arrest is no choice at all: Either way, congregations are forced to violate their religious duty to serve and protect their immigrant neighbors.

The suit alleges that the rescission of the policy violates plaintiffs' free exercise rights under RFRA as well as their 1st Amendment rights to expressive association.

The Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection issued a press release announcing the lawsuit. 

[Caption of lawsuit corrected.]