7th Circuit Hears Arguments on Standing to Challenge Indiana Abortion Law

Last week (Oct. 24) the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments (audio of full oral arguments) in Satanic Temple, Inc. v. Rokita, (Docket No. 23-3247). In the case, an Indiana federal district court dismissed The Satanic Temple's challenge under Indiana's Religious Freedom Restoration Act to the state's ban on abortions. The court dismissed for lack of standing, finding that TST failed to identify any of its members who are pregnant and has no clinic of its own operating in Indiana. (See prior posting.)

State RFRA Bars Taxpayer Suit Challenging Church's Property Tax Exemption

 In In re Calvary Chapel Iowa, (IA Adm. Hearings Div., Sept. 17, 2024), an Iowa Administrative Law Judge held that the state's Religious Freedom Restoration Act protects churches from taxpayer suits challenging their property tax exemptions.  The ALJ said in part:

The issue in this case is whether as a matter of statutory (not constitutional) law individuals can use the taxpayer-standing provision of Iowa Code section 427.1 to force a religious organization into litigation and spend the time and resources to prove its entitled to its property-tax exemption already claimed by it.  Prior to the enactment of the Iowa Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) the answer was an unequivocal yes (with individuals having done precisely this for at least a generation); however, with the passage of RFRA, the answer now appears to be no at least under the circumstances of this case. 

As discussed below, this is because this type of litigation imposes a substantial burden on the exercise of religion and because the State’s compelling interest in the appropriate administration of tax law can be met with the lesser restrictive means of having the State (with its constitutional and statutory constraints) enforce tax law.  To hold otherwise would be to allow the unaccountable political opponents of a church the option to use the power of the State to target and/or retaliate against the religious organization for the organization’s activities, thereby creating a chilling effect not only on that specific religious group but also all other similarly oriented religious organizations.  This is precisely the type of religious interference that RFRA was designed to prevent, and until the judiciary provides different guidance on the scope of RFRA, this case must be dismissed.

Christian Post reports on the decision.

6th Circuit Rules on Christian Plaintiffs' Standing to Challenge Michigan's Civil Rights Acts

In Christian Healthcare Centers, Inc. v. Nessel, (6th Cir., Sept. 20, 2024), a Christian membership-based medical service ministry and two Catholic K-12 schools challenged prohibitions on sexual orientation and gender-identity discrimination under Michigan's public accommodation law (EAA) and its Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act. The U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals found that plaintiffs had standing to seek an injunction only as to some of their challenges. The court summarized its holding:

In these three related cases, Plaintiffs allege that Michigan’s laws chill their speech and conduct in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  The district court dismissed each case for want of standing, reasoning that no Plaintiff had shown that Michigan’s laws arguably proscribed its speech or conduct and that, in the alternative, there was no credible threat that Michigan would enforce its laws against any Plaintiff.

We agree only in part....

We express no view regarding the merits of any claim, the appropriate resolution on remand of the motions for preliminary relief, or what conclusions might be warranted concerning any issue after discovery.  We hold only that (a) no Plaintiff has established standing to challenge the EAA, (b) Christian Healthcare has plausibly established standing to challenge the ELCRA’s public-accommodation provision, employment provision, and the publication clauses of each provision, (c) Sacred Heart has plausibly established standing to challenge the same provisions, the ELCRA’s education provision, and the publication clause of that provision, and (d) St. Joseph has failed to plausibly establish standing.

Judge Murphy filed a concurring opinion.

Utah Supreme Court Upholds Preliminary Injunction Against Law Banning Most Abortions

 In Planned Parenthood Association of Utah v. State of Utah, (UT Sup. Ct., Aug. 1, 2024), the Utah Supreme Court, in a 4-1 decision, affirmed a trial court's entry of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of SB174, a trigger law that prohibits all abortions except for death or substantial bodily harm of the mother, lethal defect or brain abnormality of the fetus, or the mother was pregnant as a result of rape or incest. The state Supreme Court said in part:

In re J.P. discussed, among other [state constitutional] rights, the right to marry the person of one’s choosing and the right to establish a home.... The commonality these rights share is not a child, but the right to make certain intimate decisions about one’s life free from government intrusion. At this point in the litigation, we cannot say whether a restriction on the ability to choose to have an abortion infringes the rights we recognized in In re J.P., but there are serious questions regarding the scope of those rights that merit further litigation....

PPAU has standing to press its claims and the claims of its patients. 

The district court did not err when it concluded that PPAU had raised serious issues about the constitutionality of SB 174. The court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that PPAU and its patients would be irreparably harmed without the injunction. Likewise, the court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the balance of harms tipped in favor of enjoining SB 174 while the parties litigate its constitutionality. Nor did the court act outside the bounds of its discretion when it concluded that the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.

Chief Justice Durrant filed a dissenting opinion, contended that Planned Parenthood lacked standing to bring the lawsuit.

Utah News Dispatch reports on the decision.

Delaware Supreme Court Dismisses Suits Challenging Prior Covid Restrictions on Houses of Worship

 In In re Covid-Related Restrictions on Religious Services, (DE Sup. Ct., Aug. 1, 2024), the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the dismissal by two lower courts of challenges to restrictions on houses of worship imposed by orders of Delaware's governor during the early stages of the Covid pandemic. Plaintiffs filed suit in the Chancery Court over 18 months after the restrictions were lifted seeking an injunction, and when that was rejected, filed suit in Superior Court seeking damages and a declaratory judgment. The Delaware Supreme Court said in part:

Plaintiffs could not demonstrate reasonable apprehension of future conduct.  As the Court of Chancery noted below, “[a]lthough it is true that the virus continues to circulate and mutate, the possibility of a future surge, much less one that will necessitate emergency measures on par with what the world experienced in the first half of 2020, is speculative at best.”  Appellants do not confront the speculative nature of the future threat they allege, and instead invoke a generalized refrain that any restriction on their religious freedom causes irreparable harm.  This argument, such that it is, does not address the Court of Chancery’s analysis or carry Appellants’ burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction.  The importance of Appellants’ constitutional rights is not disputed, but it also is not dispositive.  The fact remains that, by the time Appellants filed suit, the Challenged Restrictions had been lifted, the Governor had entered into a binding agreement not to impose future restrictions targeting Houses of Worship, and the apprehension of a future pandemic and conditions like those of the early days of the emergency was hypothetical and speculative.  This Court “decline[s] to render an advisory opinion on a hypothetical scenario.”...

... [T]he Superior Court correctly held that Appellants’ injury could not be redressed through a prospective declaratory judgment.  In much the same way that Appellants’ irreparable harm argument crumbled because the Challenged Restrictions no longer were in effect and any future action imposing similar restrictions was speculative, the declaratory judgment sought in the Superior Court would not alter the status quo.  Moreover, Appellants’ constitutional rights would not be restored or further protected by declaratory relief because the complained-of harm had long since ceased and the threat of future harm was speculative....

The Delaware Supreme Court also concluded that a damage action against the Governor was barred by the Delaware State Tort Claims Act and qualified immunity.

States Lack Standing to Challenge FDA's Rules on Dispensing of Abortion Pill

In State of Washington v. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, (9th Cir., July 24, 2024), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals refused to permit the state of Idaho (and 6 other states) to intervene in a lawsuit brought by a group of states led by the state of Washington challenging the FDA's restrictions on pharmacies' dispensing of the abortion pill mifepristone. FDA regulations adopted in 2021 allow mifepristone to be dispensed by pharmacies in retail locations or by mail, but only if the pharmacy is specially certified to do so. Washington's lawsuit contends that the certification and documentation requirements are unnecessary.  Idaho, on the other hand, wants the court to order the FDA to go back to earlier requirements that only allowed mifepristone to be dispensed in person by a physician and did not allow it to be obtained directly from pharmacies. The court concluded that because Idaho seeks fundamentally different relief that does Washington, it must establish its own standing in order to intervene. The court concluded that Idaho did not have separate standing, saying in part:

Idaho first alleges that elimination of the in-person dispensing requirement will cause the state economic injury in the form of increased costs to the state’s Medicaid system.  At oral argument, Idaho stated that this is its “strongest basis” for standing.  Even taking Idaho’s highly speculative allegations as true, the complaint does not demonstrate an injury-in-fact because it depends on an attenuated chain of healthcare decisions by independent actors that will have only indirect effects on state revenue....

Idaho next alleges that elimination of the in-person dispensing requirement will harm its sovereign interest in law enforcement by making illegal mifepristone use harder to detect.  This allegation is insufficient to convey standing because nothing in the 2023 REMS impairs Idaho’s sovereign authority to enact or enforce its own laws regulating chemical abortion....

Finally, Idaho alleges that elimination of the in-person dispensing requirement will harm its “quasi-sovereign interest” in maternal health and fetal life.  Idaho cannot sue FDA on this basis because the allegations concern the interests of individual citizens—not the separate interests of the state itself....

Courthouse News Service reports on the decision. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Court Says States Lack Standing to Challenge EEOC's New PWFA Abortion-Accommodation Rule [CORRECTED]

In States of Tennessee et. al. v. EEOC, (ED AR, June 17, 2024), an Arkansas federal district court held that 17 states that are plaintiffs in the case lack standing to challenge an EEOC Final Rule implementing the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act.  At issue is the Rule's requirement that employers provide reasonable accommodation for employees' elective abortions. The court said in part:

[The states] press dual theories of injury -- sovereign harms and economic harms. The sovereign harms, the States say, are twofold: the rule will abridge their ability to regulate abortions and their interests in maintaining a pro-life message in dealing with state employees. The economic harms are the rule-related compliance costs the States say they will incur in response to potential enforcement....

The sovereign harms are not imminent because there is no credible threat of enforcement. ...

Even assuming an injury in fact, though, the States' sovereign-injury theory still fails for lack of causation and redressability. ...

Unlike in situations involving private employers, the EEOC cannot bring enforcement actions against state employers....  If an agreement isn't reached within thirty days after a charge is filed, the EEOC "shall take no further action and shall refer the case to" the Department of Justice"....

That leaves the alleged economic harms. The States don't claim any sunk costs. They only say that their compliance costs are imminent.. This economic-harm theory fails for two reasons.

First, the challenged costs-- those resulting only from rule-related compliance activities associated with illegal, elective abortions are neither concrete nor particularized. ...

Second, even assuming some concrete and particularized compliance costs related to illegal, elective abortions, these costs are not fairly traceable to any threat of enforcement....

Beyond the intense controversy surrounding abortion, there are no signs that this is a major questions case. Chevron's general rule applies.

CORRECTION: An earlier version of this post incorrectly said this was decided by a Tennessee federal district court. 

A Louisiana federal district court has just reached the opposite conclusion (see prior posting.) [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

6th Circuit: DOE's Interpretive Letter on Title IX Should Have Gone Through Notice and Comment Procedure

In State of Tennessee v. Department of Education, (6th Cir., June 14, 2024), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision held that a "Dear Educator" Letter and accompanying Fact Sheet from the Department of Education interpreting Title IX should be set aside because they amount to a legislative rule which did not go through the required notice and comment procedure.  At issue are documents from DOE interpreting Title IX's ban on sex discrimination as covering discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in education programs and activities that receive federal financial aid. The suit challenging these documents was brought by 20 states whose policies on separate sex programs are based on biological sex.  In a footnote, the majority added:

We are aware that the Federal Register recently published a final rule amending the Department of Education’s Title IX regulations.... This new rule does not moot this case for two reasons.  First, the final rule does not go into effect until August 2024.  Second, the final rule does not cover everything that is covered by the documents, like housing and athletics.

Judge Boggs dissented, contending that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the lawsuit, saying in part:

... [T]he Interpretation, “Dear Educator” Letter, and Fact Sheet ,,, are interpretative rules or policy statements, which are generally not final for purposes of judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act.....

I agree that the Documents are intended to have in terrorem effect on states and school districts such as the plaintiffs.  They clearly can be interpreted as desiring a change in voluntary policies by recipients of federal funding.  However, the same could be said of a major Presidential address or a Secretarial campaign targeting the States with speeches and public statements.

Louis Farrakhan's Suit Against ADL Dismissed

 In Farrakhan v. Anti-Defamation League, (SD NY, April 5, 2024), a New York federal district court dismissed defamation claims asserted by Louis Farrakhan against the Anti-Defamation League. The court describes Farrakhan's allegations:

The [complaint], which details nearly a century's worth of grievances, alleges several instances of defamation and, as against the ADL, various violations of the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. At their core, plaintiffs' claims are that by repeatedly referring to plaintiffs as antisemitic, defendants have defamed them and created a chilling effect on their religious practices. Plaintiffs seek $4.8 billion in damages as well as a declaratory judgment that the term "anti-Semite" is defamatory per se and that the ADL is a quasi-governmental actor that violated plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. Plaintiffs also seek to enjoin defendants from calling them antisemitic or taking any steps to urge third parties to disassociate with them.

A number of claims were dismissed on standing grounds, finding that Farrakhan did not allege concrete injuries traceable to ADL. Farrakhan's defamation claims were dismissed because Farrakhan, a public figure, did not plead actual malice. Others were dismissed because they were merely statements of opinion or Farrakhan had not alleged facts showing falsity.

2nd Circuit: Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Challenge Zoning Law That Accommodates Jewish Worship Sites

In Citizens United to Protect Our Neighborhoods v. Village of Chestnut Ridge, New York, (2d Cir., April 5, 2024), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals held that neither the organizational nor the individual plaintiffs had standing to bring an Establishment Clause challenge to the Village's 2019 zoning law applicable to places of worship.  According to the court:

... [A]t the urging of the Orthodox Jewish Coalition of Chestnut Ridge ..., the Village began the process of amending its zoning laws so that places of worship could more easily be built in Village neighborhoods, accommodating the need of Orthodox Jewish observers “to pray within walking distance of their homes.”...

In sum, even if it could be argued that the challenged law improperly promotes religion, Plaintiffs point to no cognizable harm that is actual or imminent.  They claim that the Village spent tax money in passing the law yet fail to allege how those funds were anything more than a routine use of the Village’s planning budget....  They claim that they will be directly exposed to newly authorized religious structures without asserting that they have even seen one of those structures or when and where they might ever do so in the future.  And while they contend that the law denies them the same opportunity as religious groups to host large gatherings, they do not assert that they have any particular interest in holding such events....  Ultimately, even if Plaintiffs have a sincere objection to the challenged law, our Article III standing doctrine requires them to first establish a real stake in their challenge before bringing it in federal court.

2nd Circuit En Banc: Athletes Have Standing To Sue Under Title IX Over Transgender Girls on Girls' Teams

In Soule v. Connecticut Association of Schools, Inc., (2d Cir., Dec. 15, 2023), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc held that four cisgender female track and field athletes (plus two intervenors) have standing to sue a Connecticut high school athletic conference under Title IX for allowing transgender girls to compete in girls' track and field meets. Plaintiffs claimed that this deprived them of equal athletic opportunity. the court summarized its holding as follows:

We do not consider whether Plaintiffs’ Title IX claims have any merit or whether they would be entitled to the relief that they seek as a matter of equity, but rather whether the district court has jurisdiction to hear their claims in the first instance. We conclude that it does.... Plaintiffs have established Article III standing at this stage in the litigation. They have pled a concrete, particularized, and actual injury in fact that is plausibly redressable by monetary damages and an injunction ordering Defendants to alter certain athletic records. Second, the district court was not required to determine whether Defendants had adequate notice of a Title IX violation to be liable for monetary damages before reaching the merits of Plaintiffs’ Title IX claims.

This majority arose from splintered views expressed in 8 separate opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part from each other and spanning 142 pages. NBC News reports on the decision.

2nd Circuit: Jewish School Prevented From Purchasing Site Meets Standing and Ripeness Requirements To Sue

In Ateres Bais Yaakov Academy of Rockland v. Town of Clarkston, (2d Cir., Dec. 8, 2023), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals held that an Orthodox Jewish school that was prevented by town officials and a citizens' group from purchasing property on which to build met the standing and ripeness requirements to bring suit under RLUIPA, civil rights laws and state tort law. The court said in part:

ABY argues on appeal that its claims were ripe because nothing more than de facto finality is required for us to review them, and that such finality attached when the Zoning Board informed ABY that it would not entertain its appeal. ABY also argues that the district court erred in holding that ABY failed to satisfy the traceability requirement of Article III standing as to its tortious interference claim because it adequately pleaded that the Town Defendants’ conduct caused its contractual injuries. We agree with ABY and, therefore, we REVERSE the judgement of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

6th Circuit Hears Arguments on Standing to Challenge Gender Identity Ban in Health Care

On Wednesday, the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of appeals heard oral arguments in American College of Pediatricians v. Becerra. (Audio of full oral arguments.) In the case, a Tennessee federal district court dismissed for lack of standing a challenge to a rule promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services that barred discrimination on the basis of gender identity in the furnishing of health care. The court also concluded that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge an HHS rule requiring grant recipients to recognize same-sex marriages. (See prior posting.) 

Hindu Organization Lacks Standing to Challenge State's Caste Discrimination Charges

In Hindu American Foundation, Inc. v. Kish,(ED CA, Aug. 31, 2023, a California federal district court held that a national education and policy organization that promotes religious freedom for Hindu Americans lacks standing to sue the California Civil Rights Department for asserting in enforcement actions that the caste system and caste discrimination is part of Hindu teachings and practices.

... [P]laintiff’s complaint fails to allege facts that, if proven, would show that plaintiff is “sufficiently identified with and subject to the influence” of the individuals it seeks to represent in this lawsuit.... Indeed, it is unclear even which specific individuals plaintiff seeks to represent in this action because its complaint merely alleges that it seeks to protect the constitutional rights of “all Hindu Americans” and “all Americans of faith.”...

See prior related posting.  Courthouse News Service reports on the decision.

Challenge To Maine's Past Covid Restrictions on Churches Is Dismissed

In In re COVID-Related Restrictions on Religious Services, (DE Super., Aug. 28, 2023), a Delaware Superior Court dismissed a suit challenging now-rescinded restrictions that limited the number of attendees and the activities in houses of worship during the Covid pandemic. The court concluded that the governor had qualified immunity from damage claims because at the time it was not clearly established that these types of restrictions violated the U.S. Constitution. The State Tort Claims Act gives the governor immunity from damage actions for violation of the Delaware Constitution. The court also concluded that there is no case or controversy to give it jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment and that plaintiffs lack standing to bring their claims, saying in part:

The Court can have no influence on the alleged past harm caused by the Restrictions when they have already been terminated years ago.

WDEL News reports that plaintiffs plan an appeal to the state Supreme Court.

Hindu Profs May Move Ahead with Some Challenges To "Caste" In Anti-Discrimination Policy

In Kumar v. Koester, (CD CA, July 25, 2023), a California federal district court dismissed for lack of standing plaintiffs' free exercise and equal protection challenges to California State University's inclusion of the term "caste" in its Interim Non-discrimination Policy. However, the court concluded that plaintiffs-- South-Asian, Hindu CSU professors-- may move ahead with their Establishment Clause and vagueness claims. 

Plaintiffs object to the University's policy that treats "caste" as a social and religious hierarchy created by the Hindu religion. They contend that caste is no part of Hinduism and that its inclusion in the University policy promotes racial and religious stereotypes and subjects plaintiffs' Hindu religious beliefs to public ridicule. The court dismissed plaintiffs' equal protection challenges because "abstract stigmatic injuries" are not sufficient to create standing.  Insofar as plaintiffs argue that the Policy provides insufficient protection to non-Asian victims of caste discrimination, plaintiffs allege no injury to themselves. As to plaintiffs' free exercise challenges, the court said in part:

Plaintiffs emphatically denounce the caste system and reject the notion that it is part of their religion. Thus, the Policy does not threaten any of Plaintiffs' rights to practice their religion.

As to plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claims, the court said in part:

To evaluate the merits of an Establishment Clause claim, a court must reference historical practices and understandings.... A government practice that unevenly impacts religion may nevertheless be constitutional if it is supported by history and tradition.... Defendant contends that inclusion of the term "caste" is supported by a long history and tradition of disallowing racial discrimination in schools. While Defendant is correct that there is a long history of preventing racial discrimination in education, Defendant has not adequately demonstrated that there is a history or tradition of incorporating words with religious connotations to curb racial discrimination. Therefore, Defendant has failed to demonstrate that implicating Hinduism through the Policy's inclusion of the term "caste" is supported by history and tradition.

[Thanks to Glenn Katon for the lead.]

Court Says HHS Used "Smurfing" To Avoid Review of Guidance To Pharmacies

In State of Texas v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, (WD TX, July 12, 2023), a Texas federal district court refused to dismiss a challenge by the state of Texas and a pharmacy company to the Department of Health & Human Service's July 14, 2022, Guidance to Nation's Retail Pharmacies: Obligations under Federal Civil Rights Laws to Ensure Access to Comprehensive Reproductive Health Care Services.  Texas claims that the Guidance is an attempt to pre-empt Texas' abortion bans. Plaintiffs contend that the Guidance exceeds HHS's statutory authority and violates the Administrative Procedure Act. HHS alleges the plaintiffs lack standing. According to the court:

Plaintiffs’ standing in this case turns on the answer to a single question: does the Pharmacy Guidance require pharmacies to dispense drugs for abortion purposes? Defendants argue now that the Pharmacy Guidance only “addresses situations in which a pharmacy would fail to fill a prescription for non-abortion purposes.” What’s more, Defendants argue that “Texas cannot point to any language in the guidance that purports to require pharmacies to dispense drugs for abortion purposes.” Thus, in Defendants’ view, because the Pharmacy Guidance is not about abortion, it “does not conflict with, or purport to preempt, Texas laws that restrict abortion.” But that argument perfectly evidences agency smurfing—an executive branch breaking up a policy goal into silos, hoping to sever the threads that link the compartmentalized pieces to the executive’s goal....

This administration has, before and since Dobbs, openly stated its intention to operate by fiat to find non-legislative workarounds to Supreme Court dictates. This Court will not play along with such a breach of constitutional constraints.

Earlier in its opinion, the court set out at greater length its concern about "smurfing":

A recent trend among federal agencies appears to be borrowing a technique common among money launderers to avoid judicial review. The technique known as “smurfing” in the financial arena occurs when the launderer divides a large transaction—which might otherwise trigger a bank’s reporting requirements—into various smaller transactions to avoid detection....

Agency smurfing, similar to financial smurfing, occurs when the executive branch smurfs one policy goal into multiple, supposedly “unreviewable” and “unchallengeable” pieces. Consider an executive branch, who, immediately following a Supreme Court decision, seeks to achieve a policy goal contrary to the Court’s holding. The executive branch knows, however, that courts will likely view that policy goal as incompatible with the Supreme Court’s reasoning. In its efforts to avoid scrutiny, and eventual discovery of their true purpose, the executive branch breaks up the policy goal into separate, seemingly unrelated and innocent pieces—an executive order here, a press release and guidance there.

Mayo Pharmacy, a co-plaintiff, also alleged violation of its free exercise rights under RFRA. The court held that the case was brought in the wrong venue to assert that claim, and it transferred that claim to the District of North Dakota where venue lies. ADF issued a press release announcing the decision.

Contractor Lacks Standing to Sue Texas AG In Challenge To Anti-BDS Law

In A&R Engineering and Testing, Inc. v. Scott, (5th Cir., July 10, 2023), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals held that a company and its Palestinian owner, both of whom boycott Israel, lack standing to sue the Texas Attorney General in a challenge to Texas' anti-Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) Act. The law requires government contracts to include a clause certifying that the contractor does not and will not boycott Israel during the duration of the contract. Plaintiff wanted to renew its long-standing $1.5 million contract with the city of Houston without the anti-BDS clause in it. The court said in part:

[I]t’s unclear how A&R can trace its economic injury to the Attorney General.... Traceability is particularly difficult to show where the proffered chain of causation turns on the government’s speculative future decisions regarding whether and to what extent it will bring enforcement actions in hypothetical cases....

The court said that the anti-BDS statute does not expressly provide a way for the Attorney General to enforce it, and the Attorney General has not taken any action suggesting that he might enforce it. The court went on:

The City told the district court it would follow state law and include the provision. But the City never attributed its actions to any enforcement or threatened enforcement by the Attorney General. A&R’s injury depended on the “unfettered,” “independent” choices of the City ..., so the injury isn’t traceable to the Attorney General.... And A&R does not have standing to sue him.

(See prior related posting.) Jerusalem Post reports on the court's decision.

Court Tells Catholic Bookstore to Litigate Over Religious Organization Exception to Nondiscrimination Law

In The Catholic Bookstore, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, (MD FL, June 9, 2023), a Florida federal district court found that a Catholic bookstore has standing to challenge Jacksonville's Human Rights Ordinance on free speech grounds.  It also concluded that the claim is ripe. The bookstore wants to publicize its policy requiring its staff to address co-workers and customers only by "pronouns and titles that align with the biologically originating sex of the person being referenced...." The city's Ordinance provides in part that it is unlawful to publish, circulate or display any communication indicating that service will be denied, or that patronage is unwelcome from a person because of sexual orientation or gender identity. The court, however, concluded that it is unclear whether the Human Rights Ordinance's religious organization exception applies to the bookstore.  The court went on to deny plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, dismiss plaintiff's complaint without prejudice, and ordered plaintiff to file an amended complaint followed by a motion for summary judgment limited to the religious exception issue so it can resolve that issue before dealing with the rest of the case.

COVID Order Violated Priest's Free Exercise Rights

 In Urso v. Mohammad, (D CT, March 10, 2023), a Catholic priest sued a town's health director over COVID orders that cancelled religious gatherings and congregational prayers. The court concluded that the health Directive violated plaintiff's free exercise rights, but left for trial the question of whether plaintiff suffered an injury, saying in part:

[N]ot all secular businesses in the Town of Orange were closed, and the Directive itself is unquestionably stricter than the Governor’s Executive Orders, which imposed capacity limits on religious institutions in line with those imposed on other secular businesses, and never cancelled all religious services completely.... In Agudath Israel, the Second Circuit applied strict scrutiny when businesses such as retail stores, news media, financial services, and construction were not as restricted as houses of religious worship.... Thus, the Second Circuit has already made the determination there is no meaningful difference between a retail store and a house of worship in terms of COVID-19 risk.... Regardless of how well intentioned it might have been and the difficult circumstances under which it was issued, the Directive “expressly singles out religion for less favored treatment” by subjecting religious services to complete cancellation while not imposing such strict measures on other businesses regardless of their size or the length of time people were gathering there ... and is thus subject to strict scrutiny....

The Court determines therefore as a matter of law both that the Directive is subject to strict scrutiny, and that it fails that scrutiny, thus violating the First Amendment....

The court concluded that plaintiff's equal protection claim is tied to the free exercise claim.  The court found that claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were now moot. It rejected plaintiff's Establishment Clause claim saying that the health directive did not "establish religion or espouse a religious message." It rejected plaintiff's free speech and freedom of assembly claims, relying on the Supreme Court's 1905 decision in Jacobson v. Massachusetts.