Church Autonomy Doctrine Is Not Broader Than Ministerial Exception in Title VII Cases

In Ference v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Greensburg, (WD PA, Sept. 30, 2026), a Pennsylvania federal district court refused to dismiss a Title VII suit brought by a secular teacher at a Catholic school who was fired from his position because he was in a same-sex marriage. The school claimed that the exception in Title VII for religion-based hiring by religious institutions protected it from Title VII liability. The court said in part:

Was Mr. Ference’s firing permissible religious discrimination, or prohibited sex discrimination?...

The central question is how expansive Congress intended the religious exemptions to be....

... [T]he Court now turns to whether application of Title VII in this case raises serious constitutional questions.  The Court concludes that it does.  More precisely, it raises a single serious question: whether religious employers are subject to employment discrimination laws that “directly conflict” with their religious doctrine.... Mr. Ference’s claim implies that Title VII prohibits Aquinas Academy’s “right to implement Catholic teachings on marriage.”...

... [T]he Court finds that Congress clearly intended for Title VII’s religious exemptions not to apply to religiously motivated sex discrimination.  The Court therefore concludes that the exemptions don’t apply to Mr. Ference’s firing.  But that doesn’t mean religious employers will always face liability in such cases; the First Amendment provides them with its own robust protections....

... [T]he church autonomy doctrine does not protect employees who are not “ministerial” under the exception.  An employee cannot be non-ministerial for purposes of the exception but still occupy a role “important” enough to trigger the church autonomy doctrine....

Outside the possible applicability of the ministerial exception, the only burden on Aquinas’s religious autonomy in this case stems from Title VII’s direct conflict with the school’s ability to implement Catholic views on marriage.  And that burden is not heavy enough to trigger the church autonomy doctrine.  Holding otherwise would effectively give religious employers constitutional carte blanche to discriminate on any basis—not just sex—in the name of religious autonomy, so long as their beliefs require such discrimination.  The Court declines to take such a radical step.

Furthermore, such an expansive interpretation of the church autonomy doctrine “would render the ministerial exception superfluous.”...

The expressive-association analysis in this case involves balancing the “burden imposed on the school’s associational expression” against the government’s compelling interest in combatting sex discrimination in the workplace....  But the Court concludes that applying Title VII in Mr. Ference’s case would not “significantly affect” Aquinas Academy’s ability to advocate its viewpoints....  For that reason, the burden on the school’s expressive freedom does not outweigh the compelling government interest in this case....

... [A]ll the burden on Aquinas Academy’s freedom of expressive association flows from Mr. Ference’s marriage status alone....  Until the incidental disclosure on the waiver form, his marriage status was apparently a complete secret at Aquinas; and nothing about the circumstances of that disclosure imply that Mr. Ference would not, or could not, remain discreet about his marriage at work.  The Court therefore concludes that applying Title VII to this case would not significantly affect Aquinas Academy’s expressive interest....

Justice Department Brief Says Johnson Amendment Violates Church Autonomy Doctrine When Applied to Sermons

As previously reported, a Texas federal district, citing the Tax Anti-Injunction Act, refused to enter a consent judgment in a suit by religious groups challenging the constitutionality of the Johnson Amendment. In the appeal of that case to the Fifth Circuit, the Justice Department in a brief filed September 21 (full text) argues:

The Williams Packing test pushes the claim addressed in the proposed consent judgment outside the jurisdiction-limiting gates of the AIA. That test is satisfied if "it is clear under no circumstances could the Government ultimately prevail...,"

In the District Court, the Government agreed that the Johnson Amendment does not reach the speech covered by the proposed consent judgment because “[w]hen a house of worship in good faith speaks to its congregation, through its customary channels of communication on matters of faith in connection with religious services, concerning electoral politics viewed through the lens of religious faith, it neither ‘participate[s]’ nor ‘intervene[s]’ in a ‘political campaign,’ within the ordinary meaning of those words.”... Because the plain terms of the Johnson Amendment do not reach such speech, the church plaintiffs would certainly prevail on the merits in litigation based on enforcement of the Johnson Amendment against this narrowly defined category of speech.....

Moreover, IRS enforcement of the Johnson Amendment against such speech would be constrained by the “church autonomy doctrine,” as interpreted in this circuit....

Based on this precedent, the Government could not prevail in a tax-enforcement action premised on the type of speech described in the consent judgment: “speech by a house of worship to its congregation in connection with religious services through its customary channels of communication on matters of faith, concerning electoral politics viewed through the lens of religious faith.”... Deciding whether such speech violates the Johnson Amendment, such that a church should lose its tax-exempt status, would require picking apart the religious and political elements of a sermon, which contravenes the church autonomy doctrine.....

Religion News Service reports on the DOJ brief.

Court Enjoins Enforcement Against Synagogue's Voluntary Security Team of Ban on Firearms in Houses of Worship

In Silver Spring Jewish Center, Inc. v. Montgomery County, Maryland, (D MD, Sept. 10, 2026), a Maryland federal district court granted a preliminary injunction barring enforcement against plaintiffs of Montgomery County's ban on possession of firearms in their place of worship. The court however refused to issue a broader injunction against other portions of the Ordinance.  Silver Spring Jewish Center is an Orthodox synagogue that has implemented its own security plan which includes a trained, armed security team made up of volunteer synagogue members. The county Ordinance impacts those volunteers and also prevents the synagogue's rabbi who walks to synagogue on the Sabbath for religious reasons from carrying a firearm because he walks past other places of public assembly. The court concluded that a portion of the Ordinance likely violates both the Second Amendment and the 1st Amendment's Free Exercise clause. The court said in part:

... [T]he sources on which Defendants rely do not demonstrate that the historical analogues for firearm restrictions in places of worship were well-accepted....

Therefore, SSJC and Rabbi Shapiro, at this preliminary stage, have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits as to their as-applied Second Amendment claim of the Code’s firearm restrictions as to places of worship....

SSJC and Rabbi Shapiro allege that “[h]alachically, reliance on volunteer members of the community, rather than outsourcing the religious obligation to others, is preferred under Jewish Law” and cite the following sources in support: Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Kiddushin 41a; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 250:1....

... The beliefs of SSJC and Rabbi Shapiro are sincere.  Accordingly, at this stage, SSJC and Rabbi Shapiro have demonstrated a burden on their sincere religious practice. Because SSJC and Rabbi Shapiro have shown a burden on their religious exercise, the next step is to evaluate whether the law is neutral and generally applicable....

... [B]ecause the challenged provisions of Chapter 57 apply differently as to places of worship in comparison to not only fraternal lodges, but numerous other privately owned businesses and properties, these portions of the Code are not neutral and generally applicable....

Overall, Plaintiffs demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits as to their as-applied Free Exercise challenge to Section 57-1(1)(B) and Section 57-11(a) regarding the restriction of firearms in their respective place of worship....

The claim regarding all buffer zones, however, fails at this stage.  Because Rabbi Shapiro must walk to the synagogue on certain days, and thus cannot avail himself of the provisions in Section 57-10—which allows vehicle transportation of firearms even within 100 yards of a place of assembly ...he contends that the buffer zones for other places of public assembly suffer from the same constitutional infirmities as the ban on firearm possession within a place of worship.  That does not necessarily follow.  A different provision is at work—one that applies to all designated places of public assembly.  The 100-yard restriction is a neutral and generally applied provision and only a rational basis must be shown. 

SSJC and Rabbi Shapiro allege that the prohibition on carrying firearms at houses of worship violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by “telling religious institutions what items worshippers may ‘possess’ in places of worship and how religious institutions may (and may not) protect worshippers during their worship.” ...  Plaintiffs argue that the choice of how a religious institution protects itself is an internal management matter that is “essential to [its] central mission.”...

... [A] single trial court decision is an insufficient basis on which to conclude that a religious organization’s need to provide security translates into the absolute right to provide that security through an armed volunteer group.  In any event, at this early stage, with the likelihood of success findings on the other First Amendment claim and the Second Amendment claim as to houses of worship, it is not necessary to proceed further on this claim....

Links to some of the pleadings in the case are available here. New Civil Liberties Alliance issued a press release announcing the decision.

United Methodist Parent Body Sues Local Church Over Amendments to Governing Documents

Last month, the parent body of the United Methodist church in Texas filed suit in a Texas state trial court against a Dallas Methodist congregation alleging that the congregation improperly amended its governing documents to eliminate its affiliation with the parent body. The amended petition (full text Petition) in Horizon Texas Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church v. Highland Park Methodist Church, Inc., (TX Dist. Ct., filed 8/18/2026) alleges in part:

24. On November 16, 2022, without seeking or obtaining consent from the District Superintendent as required by the [Book of] Discipline or providing any notice to the Charge Conference or the Conference, HP Corporation filed its Restated Certificate of Formation .... In pertinent part, the Restated Certificate changed the corporation's name to Highland Park Methodist Church and removed all references to The United Methodist Church, the Conference, and the Discipline.

25. HP Corporation also adopted amended bylaws in November 2022 which ... i) removed all references to the United Methodist Church, the Conference and the Discipline; ii) removed the rights of HP Church's Professing Members to participate in any matter "affecting or involving the church"; iii) reserved for the Church Council the right to determine the denomination of HP Church; and iv) provided that the Church Council is chosen only by itself and answerable only to itself....

27. Despite [this]... HP Church still holds itself out as a United Methodist Church....

30. ... The Conference maintains that a decision to withdraw from a religious faith or denomination is a personal one, guaranteed by both the United States Constitution, and -- in Texas-- by the Texas Constitution. However, the question here is whether a governing body of a local church may formally attempt to sever the church's connection to a denomination while continuing to accept the benefits and identity of that denomination.

Plaintiff asks for a declaratory judgment setting out the rights, status and other legal relations between the congregation and the parent Conference. After asking for that relief, the Petition goes on to say:

34. The matters above involve initial determination of neutral questions of law regarding he rights and status of the entities involved.... However, answers to certain of these questions implicate ecclesiastical matters; the internal affairs..., the governance..., and the administration of the United Methodist Church and its local churches.

D Magazine reports on the lawsuit.

2nd Circuit: Church Autonomy Doctrine Bars Defamation Suit Against Church Leaders by Former Priest

In Belya v. Kapral, (2d Cir., Aug. 18, 2026), a defrocked priest in the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR) sued church leaders and church entities for defamation. He claimed that defendants wrongly accused him of forging three letters from church leaders. The letters stated that Belya had been elected Bishop of Miami. Defendants say that no such election took place. The court said in part:

 The church autonomy doctrine bars Belya’s claims in at least two respects. First, Belya’s claims interfere with ROCOR’s autonomy in selecting, supervising, and terminating its clergy. Second, evaluating the merits of Belya’s claims would impermissibly require a jury to address numerous questions regarding ROCOR’s governance and protocols for selecting its bishops....

Catholic Sisters Sue To Invalidate New York's Assisted Suicide Counseling Requirement

Last week, four Orders of Catholic Sisters along with the Catholic Diocese and Bishop of Rockville Centre, New York, filed suit in a New York federal district court challenging, at least as applied to them, the constitutionality of New York's Medical Aid in Dying Act as it interacts with the state's Palliative Care Information Act. Labelling these a "Suicide Counseling Mandate", the 102-page complaint (full text) in Carmelite Sisters for the Aged and Infirm, Inc. v. James, (ND NY, filed 7/17/2026) alleges in part:

13. The many New York nurse practitioners, doctors, mental health professionals, hospitals, and care homes with religious or moral objections to participating in assisted suicide will have nowhere to go, because New York’s purported “opt-out” is among the narrowest in the nation, and doesn’t apply at all to independent assisted living facilities, including those run by the Benedictine Sisters. The Catholic patients who wish to die without being offered the chance to kill themselves at their lowest moment will be left out in the cold.....

15. First, the First Amendment’s protected sphere of church autonomy requires the government to respect and stay out of matters of governance within religious institutions, such as how the Catholic Church chooses to implement its beliefs on the sanctity of human life and the decision of religious communities to form themselves around those same principles. 

16. Second, its protection of the free exercise of religion prohibits the government from burdening the sincere religious beliefs of Plaintiffs and the patients they serve unless the state is furthering an interest of the highest order and using the least restrictive means to do so—an exceedingly high bar Defendants cannot meet.  

17. Third, its protections against religious gerrymanders prohibit the government from enacting legal burdens that fall uniquely on religious adherents—such as those who object to providing assisted suicide. 

18. Fourth, its protections against compelled speech prevent the government from forcing Catholic doctors and nurses to speak the government’s preferred, supportive message of assisted suicide. 

19. And fifth, its protections for freedom of association allow the Catholic Church, its various communities, and the patients they serve, to organize themselves into like-minded communities with the same values and beliefs—the mission of which is to live faithfully according to those beliefs, for however long or short a time....

Becket issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Church Autonomy Doctrine Prevents Review of Salvation Army's Ban on Certain Methadone Treatments in Its Rehab Centers

In Tassinari v. The Salvation Army, (D MA, July 6, 2026), a Massachusetts federal district court dismissed claims that The Salvation Army (TSA) violated the federal Rehabilitation Act and the Fair Housing Act when it denied plaintiffs residing in its Adult Rehabilitation Centers (ARCs) access to certain medications for their opioid use disorder. The Salvation Army disallowed treatment with methadone or buprenorphine because they are addictive narcotics, even though they have been approved by the FDA as Medications for Opioid Use Disorder (MOUD) and are not addictive when used in treatment. The court said in part:

TSA’s primary argument is that the church-autonomy doctrine shields its Medication Policy from government regulation and judicial scrutiny.... Specifically, TSA argues it is entitled to summary judgment because adjudication of this case involves matters of “faith and doctrine” that the First Amendment places beyond the ken of civil courts.... The undisputed facts establish that ARCs are residential churches with an evangelical mission in which Salvationist doctrine—including the prohibition on use of narcotics as MOUDs— determines the message TSA preaches and the rules by which beneficiaries must abide.  The relief the Injunction Class Plaintiffs seek would require the Court to evaluate and potentially invalidate TSA’s religious doctrine.  The First Amendment bars the Court’s interference in the challenged portions of TSA’s Medication Policy, and TSA is entitled to summary judgment....

TSA’s rehabilitation-through-conversion program requires beneficiaries to both engage in Salvationist practices—weekly chapel services and Bible studies, biweekly spiritual counseling, and daily devotions—and adhere to Salvationist rules—including the Medication Policy’s prohibition on use of narcotic MOUDs....  TSA sincerely believes, as a core tenet of Salvationist doctrine, that “abstinence and the power of God unto salvation” is the “only form of successful rehabilitation,” and that the long-term use of narcotics—including methadone and buprenorphine—to treat addiction is not true rehabilitation....

9th Circuit Grants En Banc Review in Church Autonomy Case

In  Union Gospel Mission of Yakima Washington v. Brown, (9th Cir., June 18, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals voted to review en banc the 3-judge panel's decision that barred enforcement of Washington's Law Against Discrimination against a Christian ministry that gives hiring preference to co-religionists for non-ministerial positions. (See prior posting.)

Judge Bumatay, joined by Judges VanDyke and Tung, filed an opinion dissenting from the grant of en banc review, saying in part:

... [T]he Ninth Circuit has relegated religious liberty to a second-class right.  In case after case, our court has condoned governmental interference with the rights of the religious to practice their faith as they believe. 

Now, with this en banc vote, we continue down this disturbing path.  In what is likely a foregone conclusion, our court steps toward endorsing the view that States can force a religious organization to hire individuals who openly flout its religious beliefs and teachings.  As a matter of constitutional first principles and precedent, that’s wrong.... 

5th Circuit: Federal Diversity Jurisdiction Exists In Lutheran Church's Suit Against Concordia University

 In Lutheran Church- Missouri Synod v. Christian, (5th Cir., June 4, 2026), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision held that in a suit by the Lutheran Church Missouri Synod (LCMS)-- an entity incorporated under Missouri law-- against Concordia University and its Board of Regents, LCMS was the proper plaintiff for purposes of determining whether the parties to the lawsuit are citizens of different states. Concordia had claimed that an unincorporated association, also known as the Lutheran Church Missouri Synod (Synod) is the real party in interest and had to be joined as a party to the lawsuit. The Synod is a resident of Texas, the same state as the residence of Concordia University and its regents. If it became a party, this would destroy complete diversity between plaintiffs and defendants so that the suit would have to be brought in state court rather than federal court.

LCMS sued Concordia after Concordia's Board of Regents voted change its governing documents to reject LCMS's authority over it. According to the court: "The Synod manages Church spiritual affairs like supervising doctrine and religious practice and governing the church body.  LCMS manages the Synod’s civil affairs including its property, bank accounts, contracts, assets, and employees.  In the same vein, LCMS is the Church’s legal representative and is the proper party to litigation...." 

Judge Jones in the court's main opinion wrote that the church autonomy doctrine requires courts to respect the Church's internal governance structure. She described the district court's erroneous conclusion that the suit should be dismissed in part as follows:

[The district court] reached this result only by overlaying a secular corporate law interpretation on the church’s spiritually crafted governance documents, and then imposing Texas unincorporated association law on the Lutheran Church, whose special status has been recognized by Missouri law for more than a hundred years.  The district court’s ruling quintessentially violated the church autonomy doctrine....

Judge Jones continued, in part:

... [T]he Synod and LCMS are designed as separate but integrated entities based on the Lutherans’ interpretation of Biblical Scripture.  By imposing its own interpretation, the district court changed the meaning of the governing documents. Regardless, “change” is not the line at which the church autonomy doctrine begins to apply.  Second, the district court essentially denied the Church’s self-identity, rooted in the “two kingdoms” doctrine, by finding that LCMS does not represent the Synod or does not share the same interest as the Synod.  Yet “matters of religious ‘faith and doctrine’ are ‘closely linked to . . . matters of church government.’” ...

 Though the Synod has legal interests, LCMS formally and fully represents these interests....

Chief Judge Elrod filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

I agree with much of Judge Jones’s reasoning.  However, I believe that this is a straightforward case that can be decided by relying upon the Church’s corporate documents and declarations.  The district court opinion focuses on one subsection of the Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod’s Policy Manual to arrive at a conclusion that conflicts with both the best reading of the Church’s corporate documents as well as the Church’s own understanding of its structure.  This was error. When considering the documents together and in context, it is clear that the LCMS is the real party to the controversy for purposes of diversity jurisdiction....

Judge Graves filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

The Synod’s status as a necessary party to the suit is evident just from the Church’s briefs—its own representations—where it states that “the Church makes its universities [like Concordia] ‘agencies’ of the Synod, subject to the Synod’s ecclesiastical governance and LCMS’s civil oversight.”... 

One other reason to be concerned with this application of the church autonomy doctrine is that it may lead to disparate treatment among differently structured religious groups. Groups that do not have a corporate representative like LCMS may be unable to disentangle their ecclesial bodies from litigation, and may be less likely to take their disputes to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. The church autonomy doctrine should not apply differently according to how a religious group is organized....

St. John's Challenges Jurisdiction of NY PERB Over Its Relations with Its Faculty Union

St. John's University filed suit this week in a New York federal district court challenging on 1st Amendment grounds jurisdiction of the New York State Public Employment Relations Board over the University's relations with it faculty's union. The complaint (full text) in St. John's University v. Connick, (ED NY, filed 6/1/2026), alleges in part:

1. For over 150 years, St. John’s University operated as an institution of Catholic and Vincentian higher education—a Mission-driven religious institution founded by the Congregation of the Mission of St. Vincent de Paul to provide the youth of New York with intellectual and moral formation rooted in the Gospel and the teachings of St. Vincent de Paul....

5. New York’s Public Employment Relations Board (“PERB”), however, seeks to subject St. John’s to a regime of mandatory collective bargaining that impermissibly entangles the government (and the faculty Union) in its internal governance of religion- and Mission-related matters....

6. Under St. John’s expired collective bargaining agreement with the faculty Union, faculty committees controlled significant aspects of hiring, tenure, promotion, discipline, and curricular decisions—the very decisions that define how St. John’s carries out its Mission.  

7. When St. John’s sought to reassert its First Amendment right to govern itself in accordance with its Catholic and Vincentian identity by withdrawing recognition from the faculty Union, the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge with PERB—asking the state agency to force this religious institution back to the bargaining table under New York’s State Employment Relations Act (“SERA”). ...

10. The First Amendment, the church autonomy doctrine, the prohibition against excessive government entanglement with religion, the ministerial exception, and the Free Exercise Clause all forbid precisely what PERB seeks to do here: transfer St. John’s authority to govern its religious affairs and to fulfill its sacred educational Mission from its religious leaders to PERB and the faculty Union.

EWTN News reports on the lawsuit.

Children's Minister May Not Sue Church for Wrongful Discharge

In Elmore v. Mount Vernon Baptist Church, (WV App, May 27, 2026), a West Virginia state appellate court affirmed the dismissal of a suit by the former Children’s Minister at Mount Vernon Baptist Church claiming that she was unlawfully terminated by a vote of the Board of Deacons and subsequently a vote of the congregation. Plaintiff contends that she was terminated because she reported another employee for suspected child abuse and accused the church's male youth minister of sexually harassing her daughter. The majority said in part:

We find it unnecessary to resolve the parties’ dispute over the extent to which the “ministerial exception” recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court bars Ms. Elmore’s claims in this matter. As noted, the circuit court found that Ms. Elmore’s claims stemming from her termination were also barred by respondents’ constitutional right to freedom of religion under the SCAWV’s decision in Gillespie v. Elkins Southern Baptist Church....

While it is true that the SCAWV recognized that the Gillespie petitioner alleging wrongful discharge did not assert that his termination violated a substantial public policy, the Court further explained that it could not have addressed the merits of his claim even if he had....

Chief Judge Greear filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

I fully concur with the majority’s decision holding that Ms. Elmore’s claims are barred. I write separately because I would resolve this case under the “ministerial exception” recognized in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012).

Certiorari Denied in Interlocutory Appeal of Church Autonomy Ruling

The Supreme Court yesterday denied review in Conference of Catholic Bishops v. O'Connell, (Docket No. 25-849, certiorari denied 5/26/2026) (Order List). Plaintiff in the case charged the USCCB with fraudulent solicitation of donations, claiming that it misrepresented where money donated to Peter's Pence Collection would go. USCCB sought dismissal of the suit on church autonomy grounds. The district court refused. A 3-judge panel of the DC Circuit held that the district court's ruling could not be appealed until the district court had rendered a final decision in the case. Subsequently (over a lengthy dissenting opinion) the 3rd Circuit denied en banc review. (See prior posting.).

Certiorari Denied in Unification Church Dispute

Yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court denied review in Family Federation for World Peace and Unification International v. Moon, (Docket No. 25-634, certiorari denied 3/9/2026) (Order List). In the case, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's final dismissal of a lawsuit surrounding a long-running schism and succession dispute in the Unification Church. (See prior posting.) The Petition for Certiorari identified the Question Presented as:

Where necessary to resolve a church-property dispute, does the First Amendment prohibit courts from examining church-related facts to determine who leads the church?

Cert. Denied In Church Autonomy Case

 The U.S. Supreme Court today denied review in McRaney v. North American Mission Board, (Docket No. 25-807, certiorari denied 2/23/2026). In the case, the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision, held that the church autonomy doctrine bars civil courts from adjudicating tortious interference, defamation and infliction of emotional distress claims by a Baptist minister who was fired from his position as Executive Director of the Baptist Convention of Maryland/ Delaware. (See prior posting.) First Liberty Institute issued a press release commenting on the Court's action.

Child Abuse Claim Against Archdiocese Moves Ahead

In Doe XXV v. Archdiocese of New York, (NY Sup.Ct. NY Cty., Jan. 21, 2026), a New York state trial court denied a motion to dismiss a suit under the Child Victims Act in which plaintiff alleged that he was sexually abused as a child by a janitor at a Catholic school operated by the Archdiocese. The court rejected defendant's free exercise defense, saying in part:

Plaintiff’s cause of action asserts liability against the Archdiocese for the negligent hiring, retention and supervision of Tremaroli, a janitor. The Archdiocese fails to demonstrate why the present dispute cannot be adjudicated “solely upon the application of neutral principles of law, without reference to religious principles”....

The court also rejected other defenses raised by the Archdiocese, saying in part: 

The Archdiocese further argues that it owed Plaintiff no duty under theories of negligent hiring, retention and supervision because the Archdiocese did not directly hire, retain or supervise Tremaroli. The Court disagrees.  

Generally, an element of negligent hiring, retention and supervision is that the defendant was the employer of the alleged tortfeasor. However ... agency relationships between a junior organization and a senior organization may impute liability onto a senior organization when the senior organization could also have been responsible for the hiring, retention or supervision of an employee....

Tremaroli was ... employed as a janitor at the Church; however, his employment as conditional upon the authority of the pastor, who was appointed to the Church by the Archdiocese. The Archdiocese has thus failed to eliminate triable issues of fact that it lacked an employer/employee-like relationship with Tremaroli....

In any event, issues of fact also exist as to the Archdiocese’s notice of Tremaroli’s propensity for abuse or actual abuse of children....

Thus, if certain employees at the Church or School were “acting on the . . . Archdiocese defendants’ behalf” when they learned of the subject abuse, their knowledge would be imputed to the Archdiocese....

Supreme Court Review Sought In Church Autonomy Case

 A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed with the U.S. Supreme Court this week in McRaney v. North American Mission Board of the Southern Baptist Convention, Inc., (Sup. Ct., cert. filed 1/6/2026). In the case, the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision, held that the church autonomy doctrine bars civil courts from adjudicating tortious interference, defamation and infliction of emotional distress claims by a Baptist minister who was fired from his position as Executive Director of the Baptist Convention of Maryland/ Delaware. The certiorari petition frames the Question Presented as follows:

In the decision below, the Fifth Circuit held that the “church autonomy doctrine” provides a defendant “immunity” from claims by a plaintiff who never worked for the defendant, never served as a minister for the defendant, and never submitted to the authority of the defendant with respect to any ecclesiastical or secular matter.   

The Question Presented is:  Does the church autonomy doctrine apply to, and foreclose, civil law claims which are not disputes about the internal affairs or self-governance of a religious institution?

[Thanks to Scott Gant for the lead.]

9th Circuit: Church Autonomy Doctrine Allows Churches to Hire Only Co-Religionists Even for Non-Ministerial Positions

In Union Gospel Mission of Yakima, Washington v. Brown, (9th Cir., Jan. 6, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of Washington's Law Against Discrimination against a Christian ministry that gives hiring preference to co-religionists for non-ministerial positions. The court said in part:

The freedom of religious institutions to establish their own doctrine and faith is so fundamental that they may categorically hire and fire their ministers without regard to anti-discrimination laws—even if the termination is for non-religious reasons.  Simply, the government has no business in policing who spreads the word on behalf of churches, synagogues, mosques, religious organizations, and other similar institutions.  

But the church autonomy doctrine is not so narrowly drawn.  The First Amendment may also shield religious institutions’ hiring of non-ministerial employees when it involves matters of faith and doctrine.  For example, a religious institution may decide that its religious mission is best served by hiring only employees who adhere to and follow its religious beliefs—even for those not acting in ministerial roles. The religious institution may also believe that it can more effectively promote its view of moral and spiritual well-being if its own employees do not lead lives contrary to the institution’s teachings....

But unlike with the ministerial exception, the church autonomy doctrine only protects Union Gospel’s non-ministerial hiring decisions based on religious beliefs.  So Union Gospel cannot discriminate on any other ground.  And our decision is limited to religious organizations like Union Gospel.  We do not consider the scope of the doctrine on other types of entities run by religious institutions, such as businesses or hospitals....

Yakima Herald Republic reports on the decision. 

Church Autonomy Doctrine Requires Dismissal of Catholic School Employee's Discrimination Claim

In MoChridhe v. Academy of Holy Angels, (MN App. Dec. 1, 2025), a Minnesota state appellate court rejected an employment discrimination claim by a former media specialist/librarian at a Catholic school. The school refused to renew her contract when she disclosed that she was undergoing gender transition to present as a female. The school based its decision on MoChridhe's refusal to abide by the "Guiding Principles for Catholic Schools and Religious Education Concerning Human Sexuality and Sexual Identity." The court said in part:

Does the First Amendment protect a religious employer from discrimination claims by a terminated non-minister employee if the termination was based on a religious reason?  Given the facts alleged in MoChridhe’s complaint and the absence of any binding precedent suggesting otherwise, we discern no basis to conclude that the broader religious protections of the First Amendment church autonomy doctrine are not available to the religious employer in that situation....

... [C]onsideration of MoChridhe’s claims would require consideration of the Archdiocese’s religious reason for the employment decision, would interfere with the Archdiocese’s internal decision to require compliance with the Guiding Principles in the school setting—which relates to the church’s mission to educate young people in its faith— and would foster excessive governmental entanglement with religion.  The potential inapplicability of the ministerial exception does not change that conclusion, and there is no precedent indicating that it must...

Ministerial Exception Doctrine Does Not Bar Wage-and-Hour Claim

In Lorenzo v. San Francisco Zen Center, (CA App., Nov. 21, 2025), a California state appellate court held that neither the ministerial exception doctrine nor the church autonomy doctrine bars a wage-and-hour claim for past services by an employee who is a "minister" under the ministerial exception doctrine. The court held that the ministerial exception doctrine does not apply because plaintiff's wage claims do not raise an ecclesiastical concern. The court said in part:

 ... Lorenzo only challenges the Center’s failure to pay her a minimum wage and overtime wages for work that she has already performed as part of the Center’s commercial activities.  She does not challenge the Center’s decision to terminate her employment or seek reinstatement.  Despite this, the Center asserts that the enforcement of California’s wage-and-hour laws would inevitably result in excessive entanglement with religion in violation of the Religion Clauses solely because Lorenzo is a minister.  But the Center does not explain why, and its omission is telling. ...

“[T]he aspect of the church-minister employment relationship that warrants heightened constitutional protection—a church’s freedom to choose its representatives”—is not “present” in every employment claim....  For example, not every aspect of a minister’s compensation is “an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself.”...  Indeed, “[t]he constitutional rationale for protecting some of a church’s [autonomy to choose its representatives] . . . does not apply . . . where what is at issue is not who the [church] will select to educate its youngest students, but only whether it will provide the people it has chosen with meal breaks, rest breaks, and overtime pay.”...

...[T]he Center has not pointed to and we have not come across anything in the history of the Religion Clauses to suggest that a minister’s compensation, much less the minimum compensation that a minister should receive to subsist, was a concern of the founders....

Award of Attorney's Fees Not Barred by Church Autonomy Doctrine

In Coronado-Arrascue v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Colorado Springs, (CO App., Nov. 13, 2025), a Colorado state appellate court held that the dismissal on church autonomy grounds of a priest's defamation suit against his former diocese does not preclude the award of attorney's fees by the court to the Diocese. The court said in part:

[Plaintiff] contends that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the award.  In support of this contention, he reasons that because the court determined that the church autonomy doctrine divested it of subject matter jurisdiction to consider the substance of his claims, it follows that the church autonomy doctrine also divested the court of subject matter jurisdiction to consider the Diocese’s request for an award of fees and costs.  Second, Coronado-Arrascue contends that resolving the Diocese’s request for fees and costs would require the court to become “excessively entangled” with religion in violation of the church autonomy doctrine.  We reject both contentions....

... [T]he unambiguous language of section 13-17-201 and section 13-16-113(2) provides that an award of fees and costs is mandatory regardless of whether a complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  ...

 So, regardless of the court’s decision on the merits of Coronado-Arrascue’s claims, its assessment of whether there was a basis to award the Diocese its fees and costs was a separate determination.

... [I]t wasn’t necessary, as Coronado-Arrascue claims, for the court to “probe internal ecclesiastical matters” to determine whether there was a basis to award fees and costs.  Rather, the court was only required to examine the face of his complaint to determine whether the substance of Coronado-Arrascue’s claims were pleaded in tort.

[Thanks to John Melcon for the lead.]