Kars4Kids Violated False Advertising and Unfair Competition Laws by Not Disclosing Its Religious Ties

In Puterbaugh v. Kars4Kids, LLC, (CA Super. Ct., May 8, 2026), a California state trial court held that Kars4Kids violated California's Unfair Competition Law and its False Advertising Law through "inherently deceptive" omissions in its ads. The organization runs short repetitive television and radio ads featuring young children playing musical instruments and asking for donations of used cars. The ads make no mention of the actual recipients of funds from the organization or of the organization's religious affiliation. The organization's website says: "Because kids are our future. Learn how you can make a difference in the life of a child." The broadcast ads do not make this statement.

The primary function of Kars4Kids is to fund Oorah, an organization that operates Jewish heritage and summer camps in New York and New Jersey. Oorah also funds matchmaking programs for young adults and gap- year trips to Israel for 17- and 18-year-olds. The court said in part:

2. The Court finds that the First Amendment does not shield the Defendant. While charities have free speech rights, the government may regulate misleading commercial speech. Fraudulent omissions in an inducement to donate property are not protected by “free expression.”...

6. The name “Kars4Kids,” the 8-10-year-old actors in the advertisement, and the repetitive jingle all serve to reinforce the belief that donations are used exclusively for the benefit of children. 

7. Under cross-examination, the COO, Esti Landau, admitted that the organization’s primary purpose is to help “Jewish kids and families throughout their lives.”...

The Court finds that the Defendant disseminated public statements concerning... vehicle donations that were misleading by omission. Under the statutory “knew or should have known” standard, the Defendant is charged with the knowledge that California donors would reasonably assume their contributions benefit a general class of children, including those within their own state. The Court finds that the Defendant’s stated intent to make the advertisement “memorable” through extreme repetition, while simultaneously stripping it of all substantive facts, constitutes an actionable strategy of deception....

The Court finds the Kars4Kids “jingle” creates a false sense of a universal, secular, and local charity. The “Kars4Kids” name, when coupled with an advertisement that “does not mention anything” about its specific mission ... is likely to deceive the public. It improperly narrows the perceived beneficiary class to “kids” to elicit emotional and financial responses, while diverting funds to a much broader religious and familial social-service network....

The court ordered Kars4Kids to end all non-compliant broadcasting in California within 30 days. Inside Radio reports on the decision.

California Court Hears Arguments in Defamation Suit Against Jews for Jesus

On May 15, the California state Court of Appeals, First Appellate District heard oral arguments in Amitay v. Jews for Jesus (video of full oral arguments). Liberty Counsel, which represents Jews for Jesus, describes the case:

Following the attacks on October 7, 2023, Jews for Jesus distributed Bibles to Israeli soldiers to provide comfort and support. On its Facebook page, Jews for Jesus used a stock photo of an Israeli soldier from a popular website that provides millions of stock photographs under a worldwide copyright license to download, modify, and use for free. Jews for Jesus blurred the face, never used Amitay’s name, and even used the pseudonymous name “Nachman” in the photo’s caption. Jews for Jesus had no prior knowledge of Amitay.

Amitay now says that person in the blurred photo was him, although he has presented no proof of where he saw the photo. Despite the blurred face and never being named, Amitay maintains that the photo created such a false impression of him that it caused his employer to terminate him from his “dream” teaching job.

Liberty Counsel argues in its reply brief that holding Jews for Jesus liable for a religious community’s misunderstanding of the facts, and for its “overreaction” and “theological hostility” to a Christian ministry would be an improper remedy for a “regrettable” situation. 

 Amitay filed the lawsuit on Christmas Eve 2024 seeking no less than $5 million in punitive damages.... 

At issue in this appeal is whether the case should be dismissed under California's anti-SLAPP law. The trial court refused to dismiss plaintiff's defamation, false light, and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. (Trial Court's June 23, 2025 Order [scroll to Exhibit A]).

Certiorari Denied In Christian Day Care's Challenge to California's Licensing Requirements

The U.S. Supreme Court today denied review in Foothills Ministries v. Johnson, (Docket No. 25-802, certiorari denied 5/18/2026) (Order List). In the case, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Christian day care center lacks standing to bring a free exercise challenge a California requirement that day care centers ensure that children are free to attend religious activities of their parents' choice. The 9th Circuit held, however, that the day care center does have standing to challenge the state's general licensing requirement and to challenge on free speech grounds required disclosures to parents of the right for their child to attend religious activities of their choice. On the merits, though, the 9th Circuit held that neither of these requirements infringe the day care's 1st Amendment rights. (See prior posting.)

Denial of Burial Permit Did Not Violate 1st Amendment or RLUIPA

In Baxter v. San Berdino County, (CD CA, May 5, 2026), a California federal magistrate judge recommended dismissing plaintiff's challenges to a refusal by the county to grant him a permit to bury the remains of his father on his own property. The court rejected plaintiff's RLUIPA claim. RLUIPA would apply here only if the land use regulation involved the government's making an individualized assessment of the proposed use of the land. According to the court, "Plaintiff's permit was denied pursuant to non-discretionary health and safety statutes."

The court rejected plaintiff's First Amendment free exercise claim because the statute requiring burial of human remains in a cemetery is neutral and generally applicable. It rejected his equal protection argument because there were no facts indicating religious discrimination against him. It rejected his procedural due process claim because Plaintiff did not allege facts that establish a property interest in the human remains.

Candidate's Antisemitic Statements Are Included in California's Official Election Guide

California's Secretary of State this week began sending to voters and posted online its Official Voter Information Guide for the June 2 Primary Election (full text). Every candidate who accepts California's voluntary campaign spending limits is permitted to buy space for a candidate statement in the Guide. Thirty-one candidates for Governor are listed in the Guide. One candidate-- Don J. Grundmann-- posted a virulently antisemitic Candidate Statement. It is the only Candidate Statement in the Guide that is accompanied by a disclaimer that reads: "The views and opinions expressed by the candidates are their own and do not represent the views and opinions of the Secretary of State’s office." Grundmann's Statement reads in part:

Kirk murdered by shaped-charge bomb Israel used. Government knows.... Israel “art students” wired Twin Towers for 9/11.controlled demolition. Planes did NOT destroy towers. Israel did. 3,000 murdered to create new “Pearl Harbor” to justify fghting wars for Israel.... Government knows. Israel (our greatest enemy), NOT Iran, will suitcase nuke U S. via “Samson Option”—false fag attack to blame on Iran/Russia and permanently end our nation.... They call Palestinians AND Christians AND America “Amalek”—their sworn forever enemy. We are “goyim” (less than human animals/cattle) that they will enslave. We are stupid chumps. Israel rules our conquered Republic. Talmud—their Bible—says Christ boiling in in Israel allowed/planned/promoted Hamas attack (they murdered their own people) to justify genocide and steal billion$ in Gaza oil/gas rights. Christian Zionism = soul poison. Talmudic “Judeo-Christian values” don’t exist....

Times of Israel reports on the California publication.

California's Marriage Laws Survive Unusual 1st Amendment Challenge

In Hunter v. State of California, (CD CA, March 31, 2026), a California federal district court accepted the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the United States Magistrate Judge in Hunter v. California, (CD CA, March 5, 2026). In the case, in an unusual challenge to the state's domestic relations law, Kathryn Rose Hunter sued challenging California's "authority to impose and maintain marital status" and "maintenance of marital records." She contended that this violates the 1st Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. According to the federal Magistrate's opinion:

Plaintiff alleges that by "authorizing" her marriages and issuing certificate as proof of her married status, the State was "participating" in her marriages, which is "equivalent to polygamy."... This violates Plaintiff's right to freely exercise of her religious belief that a marriage should only involve "two persons and God."... She asserts a right to be free of any "State-imposed marital status," but she cannot obtain a divorce "without further State involvement." ... Plaintiff contends that by conditioning marital dissolution on "further State participation, the State creates an excessive entanglement between authority and religious doctrine," violating the Establishment Clause...

The Free Exercise Clause absolutely protects the right to believe in a religion; it does not absolutely protect all conduct associated with a religion....

California's statutes concerning civil marriage are neutral and of general applicability. They neither refer to religion nor aim to suppress religious beliefs. They do not restrict or condition civil marriage rights on affirming particular religious beliefs. They do not provide for individualized exemptions, and they operate independently of any religious ceremonies in which a couple getting married or divorced might choose to engage. Since the challenged statutes are neutral and generally applicable, rational basis review applies.... Protection of offspring, property interests, and the enforcement of marital responsibilities are but a few of commanding problems in the field of domestic relations with which the state must deal."... California's Family Code, which establishes a legal framework for recognizing the creation, existence, and dissolution of civil marriages, is rationally related to this legitimate government interest...

"[T]he Establishment Clause must be interpreted by reference to historical practices and understandings."... Courts must draw the line between what is permissible and impermissible in accordance with "the understanding of the Founding Fathers."...

State involvement in civil marriages by enacting laws that define how one becomes legally married or dissolves a legal marriage was permissible in the days of the Founding Fathers.... The California statutes at issue align with this historical tradition. They neither endorse nor coerce the practice of any particular religion....

DOJ Investigating California and Maine for Housing Transgender Women in Women's Prisons

Last Thursday, the Department of Justice announced that it has notified the governors of California and Maine that DOJ is initiating investigations into their housing of transgender women who have not undergone sex reassignment surgery in women's prisons. DOJ's press release reads in part:

“California’s Transgender Respect, Agency, and Dignity Act has provided none of these qualities to the female inmates of state prisons who have been forced to share space with biological men who are violent felons,” said First Assistant United States Attorney Bill Essayli of the Central District of California.  “Our Constitution protects women from having their civil rights violated by harmful state legislation wrapped in the language of ‘equity’ and ‘progress.’”...

In California, the Justice Department will investigate widely reported allegations of deprivation of female prisoners’ rights, including the First Amendment’s guarantees of freedom of speech and free exercise of religion, the Eighth Amendment’s protection from cruel and unusual punishment, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.  There have been allegations of sexual assaults, rape, voyeurism and a pervasive climate of sexual intimidation due to the presence of males in the women’s prison.

Under California law, men in state prisons, including violent felons charged with sex crimes and who have intact genitals, can request transfer to women’s prisons based on self-identification as transgender.

In Maine, the Justice Department will investigate allegations that Maine has allowed a biological male inmate to remain housed with women despite complaints that the male inmate has assaulted or harassed several female inmates.

Husband's Religious Objections to Divorce Were Inappropriate Basis for Sanctions or Restraining Order

Hoch v. Hoch, (CA App., Feb. 17, 2026) (certified for publication 3/12/2026), is an appeal from family court orders relating to sanctions and domestic violence restraining orders (DVRO) issued in marriage dissolution proceedings involving a Jehovah's Witness couple. Among other holdings, the California state appellate court reversed the DVRO issued against the wife and affirmed the DVRO against the husband. The court also reversed monetary sanctions issued against the husband under Section 271 of the Family Code, but affirmed other monetary sanctions issued against him. The court said in part:

Michael contends that imposition of sanctions against him under section 271 violated his rights under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. He claims that as a practicing and devout member of the Jehovah’s Witness faith, he could not stipulate to allowing Marcie to amend her petition for legal separation to allege dissolution instead without violating his religious beliefs. 

We need not address whether the sanctions against Michael under section 271 violated his constitutional right of free exercise of religion. The trial court abused its discretion under section 271 by imposing monetary sanctions against Michael for not stipulating to permit Marcie to amend her petition for legal separation by converting it into one for marital dissolution. Stipulating by its nature is not obligatory. Michael expressed what he believed to be a “conscientious” reason for declining to stipulate: Due to his religious beliefs, he was not comfortable with “facilitating” a divorce. Whether or not that reason amounts to a legitimate claim under the federal constitution’s free exercise of religion clause is a question we need not decide. Michael’s concern was reasonable and, it appears to us, held in good faith. No evidence was presented that would lead us to conclude to the contrary....

Among the actions which the family court cited as giving rise to a restraining order [against the husband] was Michael’s “inappropriate use of religion to control [Marcie], including, but not limited to, in the instant marital dissolution action.”... The only such instance of inappropriate use of religion expressly identified by the family court was “compelling [Marcie]’s filing of a dissolution action because [Michael] wanted to control whether or not [Marcie] could seek a legal separation and, later, a dissolution of marriage.” We need not decide whether the court infringed Michael’s right of free exercise in order to conclude this was an erroneous ground for a restraining order. Michael had a statutory right not to agree to a legal separation if he did not want one. The other grounds cited by the trial court are, however, sufficient in themselves to support the DVRO against Michael.

County Employee Sues Over Denial of Religious Accommodation So He Could Avoid Celebrating Pride Month

Suit was filed yesterday in a California federal district court by an employee of the Los Angeles County Department of Public Works alleging that the county violated Title VII as well as the 1st and 14th Amendments and California law by denying him a religious accommodation so he would not have to celebrate Pride Month. The complaint (full text) in Batman v. Los Angeles County, (CD CA, filed 3/10/2026), alleges in part:

4. Beginning in March 2023, the County directed all of its government departments to ensure that the “Pride Progress Flag” was flown at every government department.... The policy revisions also directed the government offices to adopt ways to demonstrate that all government offices celebrate so-called “Pride Month” and make its celebration overt, express, and universal.  

5. As a result of his sincerely held religious beliefs and a conflict with his employer’s open and notorious celebration of something Batman considers a sin, Batman requested a simple accommodation of working remotely during the one month of the year that his employment requirements conflict with his sincerely held religious beliefs.....

82. Rather than provide Batman a reasonable accommodation that was plainly available and not burdensome to anyone, Batman was instructed that he could simply use the back entrance....  

83. The Department also suggested to Batman that he seek mental health counseling for any distress he may feel as a result of the conflict between his sincerely held religious beliefs and the Department’s denial of his requested accommodation.... In other words, the Department suggested to Batman that his religious beliefs required mental health counseling rather than accommodation.

The complaint sets out at length the Biblical basis for plaintiff's beliefs.

Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Ministerial Exception Doctrine Does Not Apply Where No Ecclesiastical Questions Are at Issue

In Ehrenkranz v. San Francisco Zen Center, (CA App, March 2,2026), a California state appellate court held that the trial court erred in applying the ministerial exception doctrine to the wage-and-hour claims brought against a Zen Center by one of its Work Practice Apprentices. The court said in part:

Ehrenkranz contends that the trial court erred in applying the ministerial exception to bar his wage-and-hour claims because the United States Supreme Court has only applied the exception to bar a minister’s employment discrimination and wrongful termination claims and his wage claims do “not implicate [the Center’s] ability to hire or fire its ministers.”  He claims his case is instead about unpaid minimum wages and does not concern any ecclesiastical matter.  ...

[B]arring a minister’s employment claim without any evidence that the claim would raise an ecclesiastical concern is necessary to comply with the First Amendment only if that claim will inevitably ‘thrust the secular courts into the constitutionally untenable position of passing judgment on questions of religious faith or doctrine.’ ...  Thus, the ministerial exception only bars employment claims that require inquiries into matters that are ‘ “ strictly a matter of ecclesiastical government’ ” ...

... We therefore conclude that the ministerial exception does not apply to Ehrenkranz’s claims in the absence of evidence of an ecclesiastical concern....

In sum and in short, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants.  However, “our ruling here today does not foreclose the Center from presenting evidence at trial that applying wage-and-hour laws to ministers like [Ehrenkranz] raises an ecclesiastical concern and should therefore be barred under the Religion Clauses.” 

Supreme Court in Shadow Docket Case Rejects California's Policy on Informing Parents of Student's Gender Transition

On Monday evening, the U.S. Supreme Court in Mirabelli v. Bonta, (Sup. Ct., March 2, 2026), barred enforcement against objecting parents of a controversial California school policy that requires student consent before disclosing to parents a student's gender transitioning in school. A California federal district court had enjoined enforcement of the policy in a challenge by parents and teachers. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, however, stayed the district court's injunction, thus reinstating the policy. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court ruled for the parents.  It vacated the 9th Circuit's stay as to parents who object to the policy, but left the stay in place as to teachers. Justices Thomas and Alito would have vacated the injunction as to teachers as well. Justices Jackson, Kagan and Sotomayor dissented.

The per curiam opinion says in part:

We conclude that the parents who seek religious exemptions are likely to succeed on the merits of their Free Exercise Clause claim.  California’s policies likely trigger strict scrutiny under that provision because they substantially interfere with the “right of parents to guide the religious development of their children.” ...  The parents who assert a free exercise claim have sincere religious beliefs about sex and gender, and they feel a religious obligation to raise their children in accordance with those beliefs....

The same is true for the subclass of parents who object to those policies on due process grounds.  Under long-established precedent, parents—not the State—have primary authority with respect to “the upbringing and education of children.” ... The right protected by these precedents includes the right not to be shut out of participation in decisions regarding their children’s mental health....

Justice Barrett, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh, filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

The dissent questions how the Court can adhere to parental-rights precedent after its decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization..... But Dobbs calls into question neither the doctrine of substantive due process nor the other unexpressed rights that the doctrine protects....

 ... [C]ontrary to the dissent’s charge, granting interim relief is not a sign of the Court’s “impatience” to reach the merits.... Instead, the grant reflects the Court’s judgment about the risk of irreparable harm to the parents.... 

Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Jackson, filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Today’s decision shows, not for the first time, how our emergency docket can malfunction.  A case raising novel legal questions and arousing strong views comes to this Court via an application about whether to stay a district court’s injunction pending appeal. The ordinary appellate process has barely started; only a district court has ruled on the case’s merits. The Court receives scant and, frankly, inadequate briefing about the legal issues in dispute.  It does not hold oral argument or deliberate in conference, as regular procedures dictate. It considers the request on a short fuse—a matter of weeks. And then the Court grants relief by means of a terse, tonally dismissive ruling designed to conclusively resolve the dispute. The Court does all this even though the application of existing law to the case raises tricky questions, and so cries out for reflection and explanation....

As to due process particularly... I have no doubt that parents have rights, even though unenumerated, concerning their children and the life choices they make..... On the other side of ledger, of course, a State has critical interests in the care and education of children.  But California’s policy, in depriving all parents of information critical to their children’s health and well-being, could have crossed the constitutional line.  And that would entitle the parents, at the end of the day, to relief. 

The Court, however, would be far better equipped to draw the appropriate line and to explain its legal basis—in short, to do law in the right way—if it had followed our ordinary processes....

Justice Sotomayor, without writing or joining an opinion, stated that she would have left the 9th Circuit's injunction in place both as to parents and teachers.

SCOTUSblog reports on the decision.

9th Circuit: Anti-Transgender Comments Justify Mayor's Veto of Membership on Police Advisory Board

In Hodges v. Gloria, (9th Cir., Feb. 26, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected free speech and free exercise challenges to the San Diego mayor's veto of the reappointment of a voluntary member of the city's Police Advisory Board.  The mayor vetoed the reappointment of Dennis Hodges, a correctional officer and pastor, because of Hodges' public comments that he considered “transgenderism” to be a sin just like adultery and fornication. The court said in part:

Hodges asserts that he was not a policymaker and that government officials may not create religious tests for holding public office.  However, a consistent line of cases ... hold that an appointed volunteer may be dismissed for statements that might otherwise be protected by the First Amendment when “commonality of political purpose” is an appropriate requirement for the volunteer’s services....

Hodges has not shown that the district court erred in rejecting his free exercise claim.  To prevail on this claim, Hodges would have to show that even though the veto of his reappointment did not violate his free speech rights, it violated his free exercise rights because of his underlying religious beliefs.  He offers no case law supporting such a proposition.  Moreover, he does not explain how his religious motive for making public statements changes the court’s evaluation of his claim....

Ban on Feeding Feral Animals Did Not Violate Plaintiff's Free Exercise Rights

In Barroca v. Hayward Area Recreation and Parks District, (ND CA, Feb. 23, 2026), a California federal district court dismissed all but a selective prosecution claim in a suit involving activities at a public park in Hayward, California.  Plaintiff, a lover of cats, regularly fed feral and neighborhood cats in the park in violation of an ordinance prohibiting the feeding of wild or feral animals.  He also regularly, to little avail, asked authorities to enforce against dog owners the ordinance requiring dogs in the park to be on leashes. Plaintiff sued the park district and park rangers alleging failure to perform mandatory duties under California law and violations of the Fourteenth, Fourth, and First Amendment.  

One of plaintiff's claims was that the no-feeding ordinance violated his 1st Amendment free-exercise rights. In dismissing that claim, the court said in part:

Plaintiff alleges that under his Catholic faith and the teachings of St. Francis of Assisi, he believes he has “a duty to God to take care of and love all of God’s animals.” ...  Due to these religious beliefs, Plaintiff “takes care of, feeds, shelters, provides medical needs, spay and neuters, play, love, and protect these cats and all of God’s animals.”  ... Plaintiff has alleged that this park ordinance interferes with his ability to feed cats within Meek Park, thus burdening his religious duty to take care of animals, specifically, the cats that frequent Meek Park. 

HARD Ordinance 19(b) is neutral and generally applicable.  Any burden it places on Plaintiff’s ability to exercise his religious beliefs in caring for animals is incidental.  Since the law is neutral and generally applicable, Plaintiff must show that it is not rationally related to any conceivable legitimate government purpose.  But there are many potential legitimate bases for the rule: for example, feeding wild or feral animals attracts them to the park, increasing the risk of conflict with parkgoers and their pets, and the spread of disease.  Since the rule has a conceivable legitimate basis, Plaintiff’s free exercise claim fails.

Various other claims against the park district and park rangers were also dismissed.

9th Circuit: Prison May Not Revoke Religious Diet Privilege Because Inmate Did Not Strictly Adhere to It

In Harris v. Muhammad, (9th Cir., Feb. 4, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals vacated a California federal district court's denial of a preliminary injunction to a Buddhist inmate who had been taken off of the prison's Religious Meat Alternative Program (RAMP) because he often purchased non-Halal food from the prison commissary. Plaintiff was a Nichiren Buddhist. On advice of the prison chaplain, Harris chose RAMP, a halal compliant diet, as the closest to his Nichiren Buddhist belief that he should eat natural foods that are not highly processed. His precise diet that was unavailable did not require halal certification. The district court held that taking Harris off of RAMP was not a substantial burden on his religious exercise since his religion did not require him to limit his intake to halal meat. The 9th Circuit said in part:

By conditioning his ability to receive the diet which most aligns with his beliefs on whether he keeps Islamic dietary laws, Harris has shown a substantial burden on his religious exercise. ...

Holding otherwise imposes a judicial assessment of what diet is required by Harris’s Nichiren Buddhist faith....  

Judges ought not be Pharisees, decreeing from on high what practices are relevant to a prisoner’s understanding of his own faith.  See Matthew 23:23. ...  And if external forces cause Harris to fall short of the exact dictates of his religion, it is for him and his conscience, not us as courts, to decide what compromises are appropriate.  Thus, it is sufficient that Harris asserts that he sincerely believes that the RMAP program “is closest to his spiritual needs.”  In holding that an Islamic diet is not required by Harris’s Buddhist faith, the district court erred by discounting Harris’s own understanding of his faith....

... Harris’s departures from the Islamic diet—or even a Buddhist diet—do not demonstrate that his beliefs do not require him to adhere to that diet if possible. “[A] sincere religious believer doesn’t forfeit his religious rights merely because he is not scrupulous in his observance; for where would religion be without its backsliders, penitents, and prodigal sons?”  ...

Each man’s faith is his own, and judges must avoid questioning whether a prisoner has strictly abided by the letter of his own sincere belief.

The district court erred by considering these backslides as part of a centrality inquiry (i.e., concluding that expulsion from RMAP would not affect Harris’s ability to practice his own religion)....

Although courts may not determine what actions are dictated by a plaintiff’s personal religious beliefs, a court may determine whether those beliefs are sincerely held..... RLUIPA does not entitle insincere believers in the “Church of Surf ‘n’ Turf” to luxury lobster and steak dinners.  But it also protects the rights of sincere believers, who may not fully adhere to their stated beliefs.  

Neither the district court nor the prison inquired into the sincerity of Harris’s beliefs, only their centrality to his religion.  The district court should consider that issue in the first instance....

Parents Seek Emergency Order from SCOTUS Reinstating Trial Court's Voiding of School Policy on Disclosure of Students' Gender Transition

As previously reported, last December in Mirabelli v. Bonta, a California federal district court held unconstitutional the policy of California school boards that bars public school teachers and staff from informing parents about changes in a child’s gender expression unless the child consents. On January 5, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals granted a stay pending appeal of the district court's injunction. Now plaintiffs in the case have filed an Emergency Application with the U.S. Supreme Court asking it to vacate the 9th Circuit's stay. (Mirabelli v. Bonta, (Sup.Ct., filed 1/8/2026). (Full text of 9th Circuit's stay order and Application to Supreme Court).

Education Week reports on these developments.

California's Law Combatting Antisemitism In Public Schools Survives Constitutional Challenge

In Prichett v. Bonta, (ND CA, Dec. 31, 2026), a California federal district court refused to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of California AB 715 which is directed at preventing antisemitism in the curriculum of public schools. Among other things, the new law provides that the Biden Administration's National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism should be a basis to inform schools on how to identify, respond to, prevent, and counter antisemitism. Plaintiffs are California teachers and students who allege that AB 715 violates their free speech rights and is overbroad and void for vagueness. The court said in part:

Teacher Plaintiffs worry that AB 715 exposes them “to charges of unlawful discrimination and corresponding discipline if they convey ideas, information, and instructional materials to their students that may be considered critical of the State of Israel and the philosophy of Zionism—thus, creating a chilling effect and infringing on the First Amendment rights of both the teacher and student.” ...Student Plaintiffs allege ...that AB 715 undermines their “rights to receive information” related to “Palestinian and Arab culture” because teachers will be forced to self-censor to remain within the confines of AB 715....

The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiffs’ argument that the uncertainty created by AB 715’s inexact definition of antisemitism casts an unconstitutional pall over the entire bill....

Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the California legislature’s references in AB 715 to the Biden National Strategy ... were unconstitutional. However, even if Plaintiffs had proved that those two references were unconstitutional, the Court could, and would, properly sever those two references from the remainder of AB 715....

While Teacher Plaintiffs’ claims pass the standing hurdle, those claims are not currently ripe for adjudication....

As public-school education belongs to the government, the government may regulate Teacher Plaintiffs’ speech to accord with the government’s educational goals. It is of no significance that the curricula and the attendant speech required to teach it may advance a single viewpoint to the exclusion of another....

The Court does not find the word antisemitism in AB 715 to be vague....  A reasonable person reading AB 715 would sufficiently understand what the legislature meant by the word “antisemitism.”...

The Forward reports on the decision.

California Policy Barring School's Disclosure of Student's Change in Gender Expression Is Unconstitutional

In Mirabelli v. Olson, (SD CA, Dec. 22, 2025), a California federal district court held unconstitutional the policy of California school boards that bars public school teachers and staff from informing parents about changes in a child’s gender expression unless the child consents. The court concluded:

[The policies] harm the parents by depriving them of the long-recognized Fourteenth Amendment right to care, guide, and make health care decisions for their children, and by substantially burdening many parents’ First Amendment right to train their children in their sincerely held religious beliefs.  And finally, they harm teachers who are compelled to violate the sincerely held beliefs and the parent’s rights by forcing them to conceal information they feel is critical for the welfare of their students.

Justifying its conclusion, the court said: 

The constitutional question is about when gender incongruence is observed, whether parents have a right to be informed and make the decision about whether further professional investigation or therapy is needed.  Put another way, the question is whether being involved in potentially serious medical or psychological decision-making for their school student is a parent’s constitutional right. It is. "Simply because the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a child or because it involves risks does not automatically transfer the power to make that decision from the parents to some agency or officer of the state...."

The State Defendants argue... that a parent “does not possess a religious exercise right to dictate that a school reject their child’s gender identity.”...  Nevertheless, this Court disagrees....

Defendants concede that parents “may find notification that their child is expressing a transgender identity at school helpful in the general exercise of their right to direct a religious upbringing for that child.” ... So, the State Defendants are aware that notification would be helpful to religious parents, but provide no room for those parents to exercise those federal constitutional rights.... [T]he California state education parental exclusion policies provide no exceptions for religious parents....

The four teacher Plaintiffs and class representatives sincerely hold religious beliefs that that are being severely burdened by the imposition of the parental exclusion policies....

The teachers successfully make out a First Amendment freedom of speech claim when they are compelled to speak in violation of the law or to deliberately convey an illegal message....

Daily Wire reports on the decision.

Bagua Mirror on City Property Did Not Violate Establishment Clause

In Ngo v. City of Westminster, (CD CA, Nov. 26, 2025), a California federal district court held that display of a Bagua Mirror on city property did not violate the Establishment Clause. Plaintiff alleged that the Mirror was a religious symbol displayed outside the mayor's office on a city hall wall, and that as a devout Catholic, he was offended by the display of the Mirror.

The court said in part:

Neither party has briefed in any detail how the Bagua Mirror display fits in the historical understandings and practices of this nation regarding the Establishment Clause.  However, the Supreme Court has noted there “is an unbroken history of official acknowledgment by all three branches of government of the role of religion in American life from at least 1789.”...

In Lynch v. Donnelly, the Supreme Court held that a city owned and displayed Christmas nativity scene including the Infant Jesus, Mary and Joseph did not violate the Establishment Clause....  In that opinion, the Supreme Court opined on the long history and tradition of government sponsored and displayed religious symbols.  For example, “[a]rt galleries supported by public revenues display religious paintings of the 15th and 16th centuries, predominantly inspired by one religious faith.”...  

From the Supreme Court’s recounting, it is clear that government-sponsored and displayed religious symbols have long been part of this nation’s history and practices, without violating the Establishment Clause.  Therefore, the Court finds the allegation that a Bagua Mirror was displayed on City property insufficient to state a claim for violation of the Establishment Clause.  In addition, the SAC’s allegation that Plaintiff was offended at the sight of the Bagua Mirror does not amount to any degree of governmental coercion.  Offense does not equate to coercion....  The SAC’s Establishment Clause Claim is dismissed.

[Thanks to Eugene Volokh via Religionlaw for the lead.] 

Camping Ordinance Does Not Violate Free Exercise Rights of Homeless Resident

In Hebbe v. City of Folsom, (ED CA, Dec. 3, 2025), plaintiff who is an unhoused resident of Folsom, California, challenges on numerous grounds a Folsom Ordinance that prohibits public camping between 9:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m.  One of his claims-- rejected by the decision of a California federal magistrate judge-- is that the public camping ban violates his 1st Amendment free exercise rights. The court said in part:

To state a claim under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, a plaintiff must allege that the government action substantially burdens the plaintiff’s sincerely held religious beliefs.... A substantial burden exists when the government puts significant pressure on a person to modify their behavior and violate their religious beliefs....

Here, Plaintiff alleges that the Ordinance, which prohibits camping between 9:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m., forces him to sleep during the day, which prevents him from attending church service....  These allegations, even liberally construed, fail to state a cognizable Free Exercise Clause claim.  Plaintiff does not allege facts showing the Ordinance targets religion or is applied in a discriminatory manner.  Neutral, generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religious exercise do not violate the Free Exercise Clause.... Plaintiff has not pleaded facts showing the Ordinance places a substantial burden on his ability to practice his faith.  Conclusory statements that he cannot go to church service are insufficient....

Ministerial Exception Doctrine Does Not Bar Wage-and-Hour Claim

In Lorenzo v. San Francisco Zen Center, (CA App., Nov. 21, 2025), a California state appellate court held that neither the ministerial exception doctrine nor the church autonomy doctrine bars a wage-and-hour claim for past services by an employee who is a "minister" under the ministerial exception doctrine. The court held that the ministerial exception doctrine does not apply because plaintiff's wage claims do not raise an ecclesiastical concern. The court said in part:

 ... Lorenzo only challenges the Center’s failure to pay her a minimum wage and overtime wages for work that she has already performed as part of the Center’s commercial activities.  She does not challenge the Center’s decision to terminate her employment or seek reinstatement.  Despite this, the Center asserts that the enforcement of California’s wage-and-hour laws would inevitably result in excessive entanglement with religion in violation of the Religion Clauses solely because Lorenzo is a minister.  But the Center does not explain why, and its omission is telling. ...

“[T]he aspect of the church-minister employment relationship that warrants heightened constitutional protection—a church’s freedom to choose its representatives”—is not “present” in every employment claim....  For example, not every aspect of a minister’s compensation is “an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself.”...  Indeed, “[t]he constitutional rationale for protecting some of a church’s [autonomy to choose its representatives] . . . does not apply . . . where what is at issue is not who the [church] will select to educate its youngest students, but only whether it will provide the people it has chosen with meal breaks, rest breaks, and overtime pay.”...

...[T]he Center has not pointed to and we have not come across anything in the history of the Religion Clauses to suggest that a minister’s compensation, much less the minimum compensation that a minister should receive to subsist, was a concern of the founders....