Court Examines Sincerity and Religiosity of Vaccine Objections

Stynchula v. Inova Health Care Services, (ED VA, Nov. 19, 2024), is another of the dozens of cases working their way through the courts in which employees have asserted religious objections to Covid vaccine mandates, and their employers have refused to accommodate their objections on the ground that the employees' beliefs were either not religious or not sincerely held. Here the court examines objections asserted by two employees (Netko and Stynchula) and says in part:

Inova argues that Netko’s claim fails because his requests for religious exemptions from the COVID vaccine requirement did not assert beliefs that he sincerely held. The Court agrees....

... Netko’s practice with respect to medicines and vaccines developed using fetal cell lines “[was] inconsistent. He puts some medicines in his body, but not others” and thus he has severely contradicted his assertion that he could not receive a COVID-19 vaccine without compromising his religious beliefs.....  

Netko rejects this conclusion in several ways, none of which is compelling. He argues that Inova cannot show that he subjectively knew of the involvement of fetal cells in the medications and vaccinations that he received, when he received them, and because “sincerity is a subjective question pertaining to the party’s mental state,” if Netko received them ignorant of the fact of fetal cell involvement, “that is not behavior that is markedly inconsistent with his stated beliefs.” ... But there is no rule that a subjective mental state cannot be proven by objective circumstantial evidence....

Netko also contends that his failure to consistently raise fetal cell objections is of no consequence because “a finding of sincerity does not require perfect adherence to beliefs expressed by the [plaintiff], and even the most sincere practitioner may stray from time to time.”... But for a self-declared life-long adherent of a belief, like Netko, such a principle does not mean that sincerity is evident when he strays one hundred percent of the time until one day, he ostensibly decides to outwardly manifest his belief.

... Netko’s assertion that his religion prevented him from taking such vaccines “appears to have been newly adopted only in response to the demand that [he] take the COVID-19 vaccine,”... which is consistent with his general hostility to authority with respect to the COVID pandemic as a whole....

Inova asserts that Stynchula’s claim must fail because her vaccine exemption requests reflect beliefs that are secular, rather than religious, in nature....

Stynchula has not presented facts that show her vaccine-related beliefs are religious....   She states that her fetal cell line objections are grounded in her Catholic upbringing, whereas she joined the Church of Scientology in 2001.... And, the connection between her Scientological beliefs and her vaccination objections is undeveloped except to the extent that she objected to COVID vaccinations as “foreign substances” on the basis of the “axiom” of “Self Determinism” ...  and the idea that “the spirit alone may save or heal the body”... But these simply “seek[] a religious objection to any requirement with which [Stynchula] disagrees” and do not concern religious beliefs.... They are, rather, “isolated moral teaching[s]” in lieu of a “comprehensive system of beliefs about fundamental or ultimate matters.”...

Relatedly, Stynchula’s statements and conduct “only reinforce[] that her opposition stems from her medical beliefs.” ... She believes that her “body is a gift from God” and objects to vaccinations because “[she] do[es] not believe in injecting foreign substances unless there is a therapeutic reason”... and because they would “impact [her] relationship with God” and “would be a sin, as it goes against [her] deeply felt convictions and the answers [she] ha[s] received in prayer”....

... Stynchula does not review medication and vaccine information with an eye towards religious mandates or prohibitions. That is, her search is not to ensure that a specific substance is not present in her medications, or that certain religious procedures have been followed. She simply engages in a cost-benefit analysis of vaccines and medications rooted in her personal concerns over their safety and efficacy. Attaching a gloss of “general moral commandment[s],” such as beliefs in personal liberty or that the body is a temple, to these concerns cannot alone render them religious.

Jury Questions Remain in Suit by Casino Worker Fired for Refusing Covid Vaccine

In Brown v. MGM Grand Casino, ( ED MI, Nov. 18, 2024), a Michigan federal district court refused to grant summary judgment for either party in a suit by a former warehouse manager for MGM Grand Casino who was fired for refusing to comply with his employer's Covid vaccine mandate. Plaintiff, an Orthodox Apostolic Christian, had applied for a religious accommodation. It was refused. According to the court:

Defendant expressed doubt about the sincerity of Plaintiff’s religious belief.... It also expressed doubt about whether Plaintiff’s belief is religious in nature or purely secular.... Nevertheless, Defendant determined that accommodating Plaintiff would impose an undue burden on Defendant’s operations and denied his request on those grounds....

Defendant cites many non-controlling cases from other Circuits for the proposition that Plaintiff’s objection to the vaccination policy based on his opposition to abortion fails to demonstrate a religious belief, because he does not tie it to a wider religious observance, practice, or outlook....However, the Court is not persuaded by the underlying logic of these cases. Of course, a plaintiff claiming a failure to accommodate is required to demonstrate a connection between their belief and some “religious principle” they follow.... But courts “may not question the veracity of one’s religious beliefs.” ... Thus, a plaintiff need not cite specific tenets of his religion that forbid the contested employment policy or explain how those tenets forbid it. ...

While Plaintiff has demonstrated that his beliefs are religious, it is another question whether his beliefs are sincere....  [T]he factfinder need not take a plaintiff at his word.” ... Defendant has raised several reasons to question Plaintiff’s sincerity, such as the fact that his religious reasoning was not consistent throughout his accommodation request process or in his deposition, or the fact that he described medical reasons for wanting to avoid the vaccine....

Therefore, the Court concludes that material questions of fact remain as to whether Plaintiff has a sincerely held religious belief.

The court also concluded that the employer's undue hardship defense posed a jury question since, among other things, large numbers of workers under collective bargaining agreements were not vaccinated.

2nd Circuit Hears Oral Arguments from Amish Seeking Vaccination Exemptions

The U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals yesterday heard oral arguments (audio of full oral arguments) in Miller v. McDonald. In the case, a New York federal district court upheld New York's removal of religious exemptions from its mandatory requirement for vaccination of school children. It rejected Free Exercise challenges by Amish individuals and schools, finding, in part that the law was both neutral and generally applicable, and thus did not trigger heightened scrutiny. (See prior posting.) Courthouse News Service reports on the oral arguments.

2nd Circuit Remands Two Plaintiffs' Claims for Improper Denial of Religious Exemptions from Vaccine Mandate

New Yorkers for Religious Liberty v. City of New York, (2d Cir., Nov. 13, 2024), is a decision on appeals of two cases challenging denials of religious exemptions from the Covid vaccine mandate imposed by the City of New York on public school teachers and staff.  While affirming the dismissal of many of the claims, the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals vacated dismissals of claims by two plaintiffs, Natasha Solon and Heather Clark, and remanded their cases to the district court. The court said in part:

If Solon’s initial, denied exemption application reflected her purely personal religious practices, then she has plausibly pleaded that she was improperly denied an accommodation because the old Arbitration Award Standards only allowed “exemption requests . . . for recognized and established religious organizations,” and did not honor exemptions for those whose “religious beliefs were merely personal.” ...  That could present a First Amendment problem.,,,

... [T]he documents Clark submitted ... describe a religious objection to the vaccine because it is a product of development using fetal cell lines and a “differing substance[]” that she may not ingest consistent with her faith....  Nevertheless, the district court dismissed Clark’s claim because “the [Citywide] panel found that her decision to not receive a vaccin[e] was not based on her religious belief, but rather, on nonreligious sources,” a conclusion the district court deemed “entirely proper . . . under Title VII.”... While such a conclusion could indeed be proper and constitutional if the Citywide Panel had a basis for reaching it, Clark’s allegations support the plausible inference that the Panel denied her request solely on the basis of its characterization of her religious objection as too idiosyncratic rather than as not sincerely held or non-religious in nature. 

Given this possibility, Clark has stated a cognizable as-applied claim at this stage.

Court Asks Parties for More Information on Whether Vaccine Mandate Was Generally Applicable

In Rodriguez v. Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority, (ND CA, Nov. 12, 2024), a California federal district court refused to dismiss a suit brought by employees of a public transportation provider who were denied religious exemptions from their employer's Covid vaccine mandate. The court ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs on whether or not the vaccine mandate exemption process was generally applicable in order to determine whether to apply strict scrutiny in evaluating plaintiffs' Free Exercise claim. The court said in part:

Although the VTA’s exemption review process did not involve the entirely unfettered discretion that the Supreme Court rejected in Fulton, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that this process contained enough individualized discretion to “permit discriminatory treatment of religion or religiously motivated conduct.” ...

Conversely, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the exemption process was “tied directly to limited, particularized, business-related, objective criteria” such that it was generally applicable.....  Unlike Fulton, no individual here exercised “sole discretion.”....  Instead, the committee rendered decisions as a group based on set criteria.... A reasonable jury could find that the VTA committee exercised a degree of discretion that preserved the policy’s general applicability.

IT Specialist Awarded $12.69M For Denied Religious Exemption from Vaccine Mandate

 A Michigan federal district court jury last week awarded damages of $12,690,000 to an IT specialist who was fired from her position after she refused for religious reasons to comply with her employer's Covid vaccine mandate. In Domski v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, (ED MI, Nov. 8, 2024) (Jury Form), plaintiff contended that her Catholic religious beliefs precluded her from complying because of the use of fetal cells in the development of the Covid vaccines. Plaintiff had been employed by Blue Cross Blue Shield for 38 years. Law Enforcement Today and WWJ Radio report on the jury verdict.

Firefighters Can Move Ahead With Title VII Claims Over Forced Leave to Accommodate Religious Objections to Covid Vaccine

In Bingham v. City of San Jose, (CA App., Oct. 30, 2024), a California state appeals court held that five San Jose firefighters who were placed on unpaid leave when they asserted religious objections to the Covid vaccine may move ahead with their claims under Title VII and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act.  Reversing the trial court's dismissal of the suit, the appeals court held in part:

Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded that the extended and involuntary unpaid leave allegedly imposed on them was not a reasonable accommodation.  By not requiring plaintiffs to take the COVID-19 vaccines mandated by the County vaccination order, the City eliminated the conflict between the order and plaintiffs’ religious beliefs concerning the COVID-19 vaccines.  However, the alleged unpaid leave did not reasonably preserve plaintiffs’ employment status....

... [T]he amended complaint alleges that the City Fire Department was facing a severe staffing shortage and that a County public health order allowed employers facing such shortages to seek a waiver of the vaccination requirement.  Additionally, plaintiffs alleged that they could have been transferred to positions answering 911 calls, which presumably is not a Higher-Risk Setting and therefore would not have required vaccination under the County vaccination order.  If these allegations are accepted as true, as they must be at the demurrer stage... that would have allowed plaintiffs to work without a vaccination.  Thus, far from establishing the City’s undue hardship defense, the face of the complaint shows that the City could have reasonably accommodated plaintiffs’ beliefs without undue hardship. 

CBN reports on the decision.

6th Circuit Finds That Employee's Objections to Covid Testing Were Not Religious

 In DeVore v. University of Kentucky Board of Trustees, (6th Cir., Oct. 11, 2024), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a lawsuit by a former department manager at the University of Kentucky who was denied a religious accommodation that would exempt her from the University's policy that required weekly testing of employees who were not vaccinated against Covid. Plaintiff filed a suit claiming religious discrimination in violation of Title VII. She alleged in part that the University's policy was designed to coerce her to get tested. the court said:

Such coercion, she explained, was “wrong” because “[t]rying to manipulate somebody into doing something to attain a result that you want by holding something over them” is “not right behavior.”...

DeVore drew no connection between her fairness conclusion and any “religious principle” she follows, leaving it simply to reflect her “personal moral code.”... DeVore’s “subjective evaluation” of the Policy against this rubric of “secular values” does not establish a religious conflict with the Policy.

Air Force Officers' Suit Over Vaccine Mandate Is Now Moot

Still working their way through the courts are dozens of cases brought by employees or former employees who were denied religious exemptions from Covid vaccine mandates. One of the more interesting is Air Force Officer v. Austin, (MD GA, Oct. 11, 2024), a class action suit on behalf of Air Force officers who were denied religious exemptions from the military's Covid vaccine mandate. The mandate has been rescinded by the military after Congress ordered it to do so. At issue in the case is whether the lawsuit is now moot. Plaintiffs made two basic arguments against mootness. One is that the government has not shown that the mandate will not be reimposed at some later time. The second is that plaintiffs are seeking an injunction that applies to exemptions from all military vaccine mandates, not just Covid vaccine requirements.  The court rejected both claims. The court said in part:

Understandably so, Plaintiffs and Defendants just disagree whether there is no reasonable expectation that “the same kind of COVID-19 vaccination requirement will be reinstated,” but it can’t be overlooked that “for almost two years now” there hasn’t been any indication that the COVID-19 vaccination mandates will be reinstated. In this Court’s opinion, that’s quite persuasive....

Claim That Deprioritizing Religious Vaccine Exemption Requests Violates Title VII Moves Ahead

 In Desmarais v. Granholm, (D DC, Aug. 16, 2024), a D.C. federal district court refused to dismiss a Title VII complaint by a Department of Energy employee that his request for a religious exemption from the Department's Covid vaccine mandate was given lower priority than requests for medical exemptions. The court said in part:

 Of course, there could well be a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for such a policy—but that is an inquiry for summary judgment, not for a motion to dismiss.  The court therefore concludes that Mr. Desmarais has plausibly alleged a causal connection between his protected characteristic and DOE’s decision to put his accommodation request “on hold.” 

Connecticut Supreme Court: Constitutional (But Not Statutory) Challenges to Removal of School Vaccination Religious Exemptions Barred by Sovereign Immunity

In Spillane v. Lamont, (CT Sup. Ct., July 30, 2024), the Connecticut Supreme Court in a complicated opinion held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars constitutional claims asserted in a class action suit by school parents against the governor, the commissioners of education and of public health, and two boards of education. Plaintiffs were challenging the legislature's removal of previously available religious exemptions from school vaccination requirements. Under Connecticut law, sovereign immunity for constitutional claims is waived only when actions for declaratory relief or an injunction allege a substantial claim that the state or a state official has violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Here plaintiffs did not have a substantial claim that their free exercise or equal protection rights under the federal constitution were violated, nor that their right to education under the Connecticut constitution was violated.

However, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that plaintiffs' statutory claim under the Connecticut Religious Freedom Restoration Act was not barred by sovereign immunity. Connecticut's RFRA waived sovereign immunity for violations and applying the Act here does not violate the principles that one legislature may not bind the authority of a later one or that enactments are presumed to repeal inconsistent portions of prior legislation.

(See prior related posting.) WTNH News reports on the decision.

7th Circuit Gives Broad Interpretation of "Religious" Claims Under Title VII

In Passarella v. Aspirus, Inc., (7th Cir., July 29, 2024), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals in an opinion by Judge Scudder held that a request for a religious accommodation under Title VII may include secular elements. At issue were employees' requests for an exemption from the employer's Covid vaccine mandate. The court said in part:

At the pleading stage, an employee seeking an accommodation in the form of an exemption from an employer’s vaccine mandate must allege facts plausibly permitting an inference that some “aspect[]” of the request is based on the employee’s “religious observance and practice” or “belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). 

Applying the statutory language necessarily requires an exercise of judgment: the standard is not amenable to formulaic resolution like solving a math equation. To the contrary, its application requires a holistic assessment of the terms of the employee’s exemption request, with the controlling inquiry at the pleading stage being whether the employee plausibly based her vaccination exemption request at least in part on an aspect of her religious belief or practice.  

... An employee may object to an employer’s vaccine mandate on both religious and non-religious grounds—for example, on the view that receiving the vaccine would violate a religious belief and implicate health and safety concerns. Congress permitted this, as we see no other way to give effect to the breadth of its definition of “religion”—as covering “all aspects” of an employee’s religious observance, practice, and belief.... And, for its part, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in implementing this same definition, has likewise emphasized that a religious objection to a workplace requirement may incorporate both religious and secular reasons.... 

Judge Rovner dissented, saying in part:

I recognize that Dottenwhy, in the statements she submitted to Aspirus, invoked her rights as a Christian, said she had prayed about the matter and sought guidance from G-d, and expressed her conviction that “HE is with me on this decision.” ... Without more, such statements are not enough, in my view, to transform an otherwise secular objection to the vaccine into a religiously-based one.... I am not convinced that Congress meant to compel an employer to grant any requested accommodation that an employee has prayed about and has concluded that his or her G-d supports. If that were so, there would be almost no limit to the accommodations that an employer would have to entertain under Title VII’s ban on religious discrimination....

Passarella’s statement came somewhat closer to describing a religious basis for a vaccine exemption, but in the end, I believe that Aspirus correctly understood her objection to the COVID-19 vaccine to be secular rather than religious....

It cannot be enough to state a claim for a religious accommodation to assert that because one’s conscience is G-d given, any decision one reaches in their good conscience is necessarily inspired and endorsed by G-d, and therefore is religious in nature.

In Bube v. Aspirius Hospital, Inc., (7th Cir., July 29, 2024), a different panel of the 7th Circuit, with only Judge Scudder being on both, reversed the dismissal of claims by two employees for religious exemptions from a hospital's Covid vaccine mandate. The court, in a unanimous opinion written by Judge Scudder, said in part:

We have no trouble concluding that both of these requests are based at least in part on an aspect of the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs. God “gave” Bube a “mind, body and soul” so that she feels obligated to avoid what she considers unsafe substances in order to remain healthy. And Hedrington was “created … perfectly” by God so that accepting a “risk[y]” vaccine would be a “sin.” ...

Scrutinizing the composition of these requests—especially at the pleading stage—runs counter to not only the broad language of Title VII but also the Supreme Court’s repeated warnings that the law requires a hands-off approach when it comes to defining and discerning the core limits of religious exercise.

3rd Circuit: Jury Issues Remain in Suit Over Religious Exemption from Covid Vaccine Mandate

In Spivack v. City of Philadelphia, (3d Cir., July 29, 2024), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the dismissal of a suit brought by Rachel Spivack, an Orthodox Jewish employee of the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office, and remanded the case for trial.  Spivack was dismissed from her position for refusing, on religious grounds, to comply with the Office's Covid vaccine mandate. Spivack contended:

 “[a]ll three available brands of COVID-19 vaccines constitute a profound violation of the scriptural prohibitions against forbidden mixtures,” and that “[i]njecting such forbidden substances directly into our bloodstream completely challenges scriptural teaching that regards one’s body as the repository of the soul made in God’s image.” ...

The appeals court said in part:

There is ... a dispute of material fact as to whether anti-religious hostility tainted the DAO’s treatment of religious exemptions.  That is because a reasonable jury could conclude, based on some evidence in the record, that the DAO’s treatment of religious exemptions reflected “intoleran[ce] of religious beliefs.”...

But Krasner claims that Spivack was disciplined under a later policy—the January 2022 policy, which eliminated the religious exemption altogether and kept only the medical exemption.... 

That Krasner continued to evaluate medical exemption requests under the January 2022 policy does not undermine that policy’s general applicability.  Medical exemptions were a separate and objectively defined category of exemption requests....

The critical question is whether the medical exemptions in these policies are comparable to a religious exemption—in other words, whether the “preferential treatment of secular behavior” in the form of a medical exemption “affect[s] the regulation’s purpose in the same way as the prohibited religious behavior.” ...

Unlike a religious exemption, a medical exemption furthers the DAO’s interest in keeping its employees safe and healthy by allowing employees for whom the COVID-19 vaccine would cause death or illness to abstain from vaccination....

[T]he DAO must show that its policy was narrowly tailored, which “requires the government to demonstrate that a policy is the least restrictive means of achieving its objective.”...

Unanswered factual questions pervade this inquiry.  How many similar exemption requests would the DAO need to grant?  Would other, less restrictive mitigation measures for employees with religious exemptions ... have achieved the office’s objectives?  If strict scrutiny applies, a jury must consider these questions....

First Liberty Institute issued a press release announcing the decision.

Company Settles EEOC Suit for $110,000, Compensating Employee Whose Religious Objections to Vaccine Were Ignored

 A national furniture retailer, Hank's Furniture, has settled a Title VII religious discrimination lawsuit brought against it by the EEOC. Under a consent decree, Hank's will pay $110,000 in damages and will implement a written policy assuring broad accommodation of religious beliefs that do not impose an undue burden. According to the EEOC's press release:

... [A] former assistant manager at HFI’s Pensacola, Florida, location notified the company that her religious beliefs prevented her from receiving a COVID-19 vaccine. Rather than discuss the employee’s religious beliefs to determine the feasibility of an accommodation, management ignored accommodation requests then summarily denied the employee’s requests and attempted to dispute the validity of her sincerely-held religious beliefs.

NY Sanitation Worker Can Move Ahead on Failure To Accommodate Anti-Vax Beliefs

Decisions on suits by individuals who were denied religious exemptions from now-rescinded Covid vaccine mandates are still being issued by the courts.  In Rizzo v. New York City Department of Sanitation, (SD NY, July 2, 2024), a New York federal district court refused to dismiss a Title VII failure to accommodate claim (as well as similar state-law and local-law claims) brought by a New York City sanitation worker. The court rejected the city's arguments that the worker's objections were based on conscience, not religion. It also rejected, at least at this stage of the litigation, the city's argument that accommodation would impose an undue burden on the city.  The court also allowed plaintiff to move forward on his claim that the city failed to engage in cooperative dialogue as required by the New York City Human Rights Law.  However, the court dismissed plaintiff's Title VII disparate impact claim and his 1st Amendment Free Exercise claim.

Certiorari Denied in Connecticut Repeal of Religious Exemptions from Vaccination Requirements

The U.S. Supreme Court yesterday denied review in We the Patriots USA, Inc. v. Connecticut Office of Early Childhood Development, (Docket No. 23-643, certiorari denied 6/24/2024). (Order List.) In the case, the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, upheld the constitutionality of Connecticut's repeal of religious exemptions from its mandatory vaccination laws, while retaining medical exemptions. (See prior posting.) AP reports on the Supreme Court's action.

9th Circuit Reverses Dismissal of Suit Challenging Refusal to Grant Religious Exemptions to Vaccine Mandate

 In Bacon v. Woodward, (9th Cir., June 18, 2024), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision reversed a Washington federal district court's dismissal of a suit by firefighters who claim that their free exercise rights were infringed by the city of Spokane refusing to accommodate their religious objections to the Covid vaccine. The majority said in part:

The Complaint alleges that, once unvaccinated firefighters were terminated, Spokane would turn to firefighters from neighboring fire departments to fill the gaps left by the firefighters’ departure even though those fire departments granted religious accommodations to their employees.  In other words, Spokane implemented a vaccine policy from which it exempted certain firefighters based on a secular criterion—being a member of a neighboring department—while holding firefighters who objected to vaccination on purely religious grounds to a higher standard.  The Free Exercise Clause prohibits governments from “treat[ing] comparable secular groups more favorably.”...

 ... [T]he Complaint alleges at least three less restrictive ways that “[t]he Mayor, the Fire Chief, and the City could accomplish its same compelling purpose.”...

Judge Hawkins dissented, saying that rational basis review should apply:

The complaint alleges that the City Defendants applied the Proclamation to their employees uniformly and treated medical and religious objectors the same.  The complaint also alleges that other cities and entities adopted different policies and the City Defendants had pre-existing mutual aid agreements with some neighboring fire departments.  The complaint then predicts that, as a result of those pre-existing mutual aid agreements, some unvaccinated firefighters from neighboring departments may operate within the City of Spokane.  In my view, these allegations are insufficient to plausibly show that the Proclamation, as implemented by the City Defendants, is not neutral or generally applicable.

Court Upholds Firing of Nurse with Religious Objections to Flu Vaccine

In French v. Albany Medical Center, (ND NY, June 12, 2024), a New York federal district court upheld a hospital's firing of a nurse who refused for religious reasons to receive the flu vaccine. Plaintiff based her religious exemption claim on teachings of the "Israelite" religion which she adopted in 2018. Rejecting plaintiff's claim that the hospital violated Title VII by refusing to accommodate her religious beliefs, the court said in part:

[T]he Court concludes that Plaintiff's requested accommodation was not reasonable as it was a blanket exemption request which would have allowed her to continue interacting with staff and vulnerable patients while unvaccinated. This exemption would have caused an undue hardship on Defendant.

The court also rejected plaintiff's claims of disparate treatment and retaliation, saying in part:

Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that her religion was a motivating factor in Defendant's decision to suspend and terminate her.

8th Circuit Reverses Dismissal of Suit for Failure to Accommodate Religious Objections to Vaccine Mandate

In Ringhofer v. Mayo Clinic, Ambulance, (8th Cir., May 24, 2024), the U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a Minnesota federal district court's dismissal of suits by Mayo Clinic employees who sought accommodations because their employer's Covid vaccine mandate violated their religious beliefs. The court concluded that two of the employees did properly exhaust their administrative remedies under Title VII. It also found that all the employees had adequately pleaded a conflict between their Christian religious beliefs and the vaccine mandate. Finally, it concluded that the Minnesota Human Rights Act provides a cause of action for failure to accommodate religious beliefs.

10th Circuit: Vaccine Exemption for Only Some Religions Violates 1st Amendment

In Jane Does 1-11 v. Board of Regents of the University of Colorado, (10th Cir., May 7, 2024), the U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the policies for granting or denying a religious exemption from the Covid vaccine mandate on one of the campuses of the University of Colorado violated the 1st Amendment's Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. As explained by the court:

The September 1 Policy declared that “[a] religious exemption may be submitted based on a person’s religious belief whose teachings are opposed to all immunizations.” ...  The Administration made clear that it would “only accept requests for religious exemption that cite to the official doctrine of an organized religion . . . as announced by the leaders of that religion.”  ....

...  Therefore, as the Administration explained to Anschutz students and employees, Christian Scientists and Jehovah’s Witnesses would qualify for an exemption under the Administration’s criteria.  However, the Administration would reject an application for an exemption if it deemed the applicant’s beliefs “personal,” not “religious,” or “not part of a comprehensive system of beliefs.”...  For example, the Administration decided that “it is ‘morally acceptable’ for Roman Catholics to take vaccines against COVID-19,” and that any Roman Catholic objections to the COVID-19 vaccine are “personal beliefs,” not “religious beliefs.” ... For similar reasons, the Administration refused to approve exemptions for Buddhist applicants.  Nor would the Administration approve exemptions for applicants who were members of the Eastern Orthodox Church.  The Administration also rejected exemption applications from Evangelical Christians, non-denominational Protestants, and applicants who did not specify whether they were affiliated with a particular religious organization....

The University adopted a modified policy on September 24 in the face of litigation, but, according to the majority, it was a mere pretext to continue its September 1 policy. The majority found that both policies were unconstitutional, summarizing its holding in part as follows:

We hold that a government policy may not grant exemptions for some religions, but not others, because of differences in their religious doctrines, which the Administration’s first policy did.  We further hold that the government may not use its views about the legitimacy of a religious belief as a proxy for whether such belief is sincerely-held, which the Administration did in implementing the first policy.  Nor may the government grant secular exemptions on more favorable terms than religious exemptions, which the Administration’s second policy does.  Finally, we hold that the policies at issue in this appeal were motivated by religious animus, and are therefore subject to strict scrutiny—which neither policy survives.  The district court concluded otherwise and, in so doing, abused its discretion.....

Judge Ebel filed a partial dissent, saying in part:

I agree the September 1 mandate should be enjoined preliminarily, although for reasons different from those relied upon by the majority.  However, I would not enjoin the September 24 mandate....  

... I see no evidence indicating that the University adopted either mandate out of an animus—that is, a hostility—toward religion generally or toward some religions in particular.  Second, Plaintiffs have not shown that the two inquiries the University posed to those applying for a religious exemption under the September 1 mandate infringed any First Amendment protection.  The University was entitled to ask applicants why they opposed being vaccinated in order to determine whether that opposition was based on religious beliefs and, if so, whether those religious beliefs were sincerely held and, if so, how those beliefs could be accommodated.

Thomas More Society issued a press release announcing the decision.