2nd Circuit: Lawyers Have Standing to Challenge Bar Rule That Limits Comments on Transgender and Religious Subject Matter

In Cerame v. Slack, (2d Cir., Dec. 9, 2024), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals held that two Connecticut lawyers have standing to bring a pre-enforcement challenge to a state Rule of Professional Conduct which prohibits lawyers from engaging in harassing or discriminatory conduct against members of various protected classes in the practice of law. It bars harassment or discrimination on the basis of  race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status or socioeconomic status. Commentary to the Rule defines discrimination as including harmful verbal conduct directed at an individual that manifests bias or prejudice. The attorneys allege that they often speak out on legal blogs, in articles and legal seminars in ways that could be construed as personally derogatory.  According to the court:

Moynahan and Cerame ... allege... that “[t]here are numerous examples of speech” fully protected by the First Amendment that members of the Connecticut bar will be reluctant to engage in, given the fear of a misconduct complaint...."  These include using “the pronoun associated with a transgender individual’s biological sex when addressing that individual”; using the term “‘gender preference’ rather than ‘gender orientation’”;  ... and publishing cartoons that “satiri[ze] or mock[]” “a religious deity”..... 

Appellees argue that the commentary to Rule 8.4, providing that an attorney “does not violate paragraph (7) when the conduct in question is protected under the first amendment to the United States constitution,”  ...“unambiguously shows that the Rule does not proscribe protected speech”....

Although the First Amendment carve-out may make it more likely that the SGC will conclude that some speech that would otherwise fall within the text of Rule 8.4(7) is not in fact proscribed, the carve-out is not enough, on its own, to render Appellants’ fear of a misconduct complaint and its professional repercussions “imaginary or wholly speculative” for Article III purposes...

At this stage in the proceedings, Appellants have alleged plausibly that they intend to engage in speech proscribed, at least arguably, by a recently enacted, focused regulation.  This gives rise to a credible threat of enforcement.

Reuters reports on the decision.

Knights of Columbus May Move Ahead with Suit for Denial of Permit for Christmas Program

 In Knights of Columbus Council 2616 v. Town of Fairfield, (D CT, Aug. 22, 2024), a Connecticut federal district court allowed the Knights of Columbus to move ahead with free speech, free exercise and equal protection claims when the town denied its Special Event Permit Application to host a Christmas Vigil in a prominent public park rather than a less centrally located one. The court said in part:

... [P]laintiffs have shown that the defendants’ stated reason for denying their 2020 application, i.e. COVID-19 concerns, was pretextual....

Therefore, the motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims to the extent they are based on the 2020 application, on the grounds that denial of the 2020 application was a valid discretionary action by the Town to mitigate a public health emergency, is being denied. ...

The Special Events Permitting Scheme does not satisfy the requirement that it contain adequate standards to guide the official’s decision. It contains no criteria, restraints, temporal limits, or guidelines to which the Commission must adhere when ruling on an application. Nor does it contain a method to appeal the Commission’s determination or require that the Commission furnish justifications for its decisions with respect to applications for Special Events Permits. Rather, the Special Events Permitting Scheme vests the Commission with unbridled discretion....

 Viewing the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the defendants’ actions were content-based. They have alleged facts showing that the Commission permitted other groups to use Sherman Green in a manner that was inconsistent with the reasons the Commission gave for denying the plaintiffs’ applications....

The Hartford Courant reports on the decision.

Court Dismisses Church's Suit Over Disaffiliation Request

In North United Methodist Church v. New York Annual Conference, (CT Super. Ct., Aug 14, 2024), a Connecticut trial court dismissed a local church's petition for a declaratory judgment. The local church sought a finding that it submitted its request to disaffiliate from the parent church in "sufficient time" to complete disaffiliation under the Book of Discipline. The court concluded that it would require the court to resolve a question of church policy and administration to resolve this issue. However, the court retained jurisdiction over the church's request for a declaratory judgment as to property rights, its quiet tile claim and its quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims.

Connecticut Supreme Court: Constitutional (But Not Statutory) Challenges to Removal of School Vaccination Religious Exemptions Barred by Sovereign Immunity

In Spillane v. Lamont, (CT Sup. Ct., July 30, 2024), the Connecticut Supreme Court in a complicated opinion held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars constitutional claims asserted in a class action suit by school parents against the governor, the commissioners of education and of public health, and two boards of education. Plaintiffs were challenging the legislature's removal of previously available religious exemptions from school vaccination requirements. Under Connecticut law, sovereign immunity for constitutional claims is waived only when actions for declaratory relief or an injunction allege a substantial claim that the state or a state official has violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Here plaintiffs did not have a substantial claim that their free exercise or equal protection rights under the federal constitution were violated, nor that their right to education under the Connecticut constitution was violated.

However, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that plaintiffs' statutory claim under the Connecticut Religious Freedom Restoration Act was not barred by sovereign immunity. Connecticut's RFRA waived sovereign immunity for violations and applying the Act here does not violate the principles that one legislature may not bind the authority of a later one or that enactments are presumed to repeal inconsistent portions of prior legislation.

(See prior related posting.) WTNH News reports on the decision.

Certiorari Denied in Connecticut Repeal of Religious Exemptions from Vaccination Requirements

The U.S. Supreme Court yesterday denied review in We the Patriots USA, Inc. v. Connecticut Office of Early Childhood Development, (Docket No. 23-643, certiorari denied 6/24/2024). (Order List.) In the case, the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, upheld the constitutionality of Connecticut's repeal of religious exemptions from its mandatory vaccination laws, while retaining medical exemptions. (See prior posting.) AP reports on the Supreme Court's action.

First Amendment Precludes Court from Enforcing Mahr in Divorce Action

 In Omid v. Ahmadi, (CT Super., March 18, 2024), a Connecticut state trial court in a action for dissolution of a marriage refused to enforce a mahr (dowry) agreement because interpreting it would require the court to interpret religious principles.  The mahr was entered by the parties in connection with their marriage in Afghanistan. The husband who had apparently been a translator for the U.S. military during the Afghan war received a visa to the United States and then returned to Afghanistan for one month to enter an arranged marriage. Three years later he arranged for his wife to obtain a U.S. visa. One year after she came to the U.S., the parties separated. In denying the wife's request in the dissolution case for an order enforcing the mahr, the court said in part:

The parties disagree as to when the 100,000 Afghanis must be paid, and whether, as the defendant argues, the terms "prompt" and "deferred" as used in the agreement describe a general duty to pay at any time, or a specific duty to pay one amount before marriage and one amount upon divorce or death of the husband. The term "prompt" in the parties' agreement is ambiguous and would require the court to look outside the four corners of the contract....

On the basis of the foregoing, to the extent that construction of the contract language would require this court to reference Islamic religious principles to determine the meaning of the terms employed, such action would likely violate the religion clauses of the first amendment of the United States constitution. The present agreement is sparse, and its terms are ill-defined without extratextual evidence. Because this extratextual evidence involves considerations of what the terms mean under Islamic law, the agreement is unenforceable because it is likely impossible for the court to disentangle secular from religious considerations.

2nd Circuit En Banc: Athletes Have Standing To Sue Under Title IX Over Transgender Girls on Girls' Teams

In Soule v. Connecticut Association of Schools, Inc., (2d Cir., Dec. 15, 2023), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc held that four cisgender female track and field athletes (plus two intervenors) have standing to sue a Connecticut high school athletic conference under Title IX for allowing transgender girls to compete in girls' track and field meets. Plaintiffs claimed that this deprived them of equal athletic opportunity. the court summarized its holding as follows:

We do not consider whether Plaintiffs’ Title IX claims have any merit or whether they would be entitled to the relief that they seek as a matter of equity, but rather whether the district court has jurisdiction to hear their claims in the first instance. We conclude that it does.... Plaintiffs have established Article III standing at this stage in the litigation. They have pled a concrete, particularized, and actual injury in fact that is plausibly redressable by monetary damages and an injunction ordering Defendants to alter certain athletic records. Second, the district court was not required to determine whether Defendants had adequate notice of a Title IX violation to be liable for monetary damages before reaching the merits of Plaintiffs’ Title IX claims.

This majority arose from splintered views expressed in 8 separate opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part from each other and spanning 142 pages. NBC News reports on the decision.

Elimination of Religious Exemption from School Vaccination Requirements Is Upheld

 In Milford Christian Church v. Russell-Tucker, (D CT, Dec. 1, 2023), a Connecticut federal district court dismissed 1st and 14th Amendment challenges to Connecticut's removal of its religious exemption from school vaccination requirements. The court said in part:

To be clear, Plaintiffs do argue that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-204a is not a neutral law and that it “specifically targeted religious practices that it disagreed with – refusing to take a vaccine because of its ingredients – and it eliminated any tolerance for those religious beliefs by completely foreclosing all avenues for parents who hold religious beliefs against taking vaccines to education their children at al.”... But this argument ... is based on Plaintiffs contention that Defendants’ failure to eliminate medical exemptions and legacy exemptions undermines their stated goal of protecting children’s and community health. ...

Here, the conduct regulated by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-204a—requiring vaccination before attending school—is applied to everyone regardless of religious or secular objections. 

The secular conduct permitted—exemptions for medical reasons—does not “undermine[] the government’s asserted interests in a similar way,”... These medical exemptions—because they are limited in number—are not “at least as harmful to the legitimate government interest purportedly justifying it,”....

In We the Patriots...., the Second Circuit held that that “protecting public health is a compelling government interest,”... and that “Act’s repeal of the religious exemption is rationally related to that interest because it seeks to maximize the number of students in Connecticut who are vaccinated against vaccine-preventable diseases.”...

To the extent that mandating the vaccination of students affects the Plaintiffs’ speech rights, it is “an incidental burden” related to a “neutral regulation” for “substantial” public health reasons, an interest not achievable by not requiring vaccinations, despite any “incidental” message it sends Plaintiffs’ about their religion....

CT Supreme Court Upholds Refusal to Enforce Ketubah in Divorce Action

In Tilsen v. Benson, (CT Sup. Ct., Sept. 5, 2023), the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld a trial court's refusal to enforce the provisions of the parties' ketubah (Jewish marriage document) in setting alimony in a marital dissolution action. The husband, a rabbi, sought enforcement of the ketubah as a prenuptial agreement.  The ketubah provided that any divorce would be "according to Torah law."  Husband contended that meant a 50/50 division of property and no obligation to pay alimony, but conflicting interpretations of Jewish law were presented to the trial court.  The Supreme Court said in part:

... [W]e conclude that the plaintiff’s desired relief violates the establishment clause under the neutral principles of law doctrine. Most significant, the parties’ ketubah is facially silent as to each spouse’s support obligations in the event of dissolution of the marriage, thus leaving the court to determine those obligations from external sources as to Jewish law, namely, the parties’ expert witnesses, whose proffered opinions differed in this case, instantly alerting the court as to the establishment clause dilemma....

The court also rejected husband's argument that refusal to enforce the ketubah violated his free exercise rights by preventing him from divorcing according to Jewish law and denying him the generally available benefit of enforcing a prenuptial agreement only because of the agreement's religious nature.  The court said in part:

... [E]nforcement of this vaguely worded ketubah in the guise of protecting the plaintiff’s free exercise rights would have put the trial court on the horns of an establishment clause dilemma.

Second, the trial court did not deny the plaintiff access to the court or otherwise exact some kind of penalty in connection with his religious beliefs or practices; its decision simply meant that this dissolution action would be governed by generally applicable principles of Connecticut law as expressed in our alimony and equitable distribution statutes. Parties who desire specific tenets of their religious beliefs to govern the resolution of marital dissolution actions remain free to contract for that relief via a properly executed antenuptial, postnuptial, or separation agreement that is specifically worded to express those beliefs in a way that avoids establishment clause concerns under the neutral principles of law doctrine.

2nd Circuit Upholds Connecticut's Repeal of Religious Exemptions from Vaccination Requirements

In We the Patriots USA, Inc. v. Connecticut Office of Early Childhood Development, (2d Cir., Aug. 4, 2013), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, upheld the constitutionality of Connecticut's repeal of religious exemptions from its mandatory vaccination laws, while retaining medical exemptions. The majority said in part:

 At bottom, plaintiffs' argument that the Act is not neutral under Smith boils down to the proposition that repealing any existing religious exemption is hostile to religion per se.... We find this argument unpersuasive, for four reasons....

Plaintiffs and the dissent suggest that further development of the factual record might reveal that medical exemptions and religious exemptions are comparable for Free Exercise Clause purposes. But because the Act's medical exemptions further the State's interest in a way a religious exemption would not, permitting plaintiffs to proceed to discovery would require more of the State than what the Supreme Court has prescribed.

Judge Bianco dissented in part, saying in part:

Notwithstanding these many fact-intensive questions regarding whether this law satisfies the general applicability requirement under Smith, the majority opinion closes the courthouse doors to plaintiffs on their free exercise claim on a motion to dismiss before any discovery and before plaintiffs had an opportunity to present evidence bearing on the general applicability requirement in this particular context. The majority opinion does so by concluding, inter alia, that medical and religious exemptions are not comparable for free exercise purposes as a matter of law. Neither Supreme Court precedent nor this Court’s jurisprudence allows a court to so summarily cast aside the fundamental constitutional right of individuals to the free exercise of religion. In reaching this conclusion ... the majority opinion ignores two recent decisions by this Court addressing similar COVID-19 vaccination requirements.

AP reports on the decision. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Ministerial Exception Applies to Slander, But Not Contract Claims

In Gackenheimer v. Southern New England Conference of the United Church of Christ, Inc., (CT Super., June 29, 2023), a minister who was fired from his position as executive director of a church's conference center sued the church and its senior leaders for defamation, infliction of emotional distress and breaches of express and implied contract.  Plaintiff alleged that the leaders misrepresented the reasons for his firing in communications to community religious leaders and church volunteers. A Connecticut trial court applied the ministerial exception doctrine to dismiss defamation related claims, but permitted plaintiff to move ahead with his contract claims. The court said in part:

The ministerial exception ... does not categorically preclude all claims brought against a religious institution. ..."...[E]ven if it is established that the plaintiff's primary duties render him a ministerial employee ... Connecticut courts must consider whether adjudicating the particular claims and defenses in the case would require the court to intrude into a religious institution's exclusive right to decide matters pertaining to doctrine or its internal governance or organization."... Therefore, the court will separately examine each of the plaintiff's causes of action in order to determine whether they are barred by the ministerial exception.

In counts one and two, the plaintiff alleges slander and slander per se causes of action based on two statements allegedly made by SNE's senior leaders to members of the community.... Therefore, to adjudicate the plaintiff's slander claims, the court would necessarily have to delve into the veracity of comments made by SNE's leaders regarding its decision to terminate the plaintiff's employment.... Such an examination into the decision-making process of church leadership is exactly what the ministerial exception prohibits. Accordingly, the court strikes counts one and two.

Counts three and four state claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress... based on SNE's decision to terminate his employment and the immediate aftermath of the process... . "[T]hese claims arise directly from, and in furtherance of, the defendants' decision to terminate the employment of the plaintiff...." On that basis, the court grants the motion to strike counts three and four....

Unlike the claims brought by the plaintiff in counts one through four, counts five through eight do not involve the plaintiff's termination process and the reasons behind it. Rather, in these counts, the plaintiff asks the court to determine if SNE breached its employment contract with him or, alternatively, ... the plaintiff is entitled to relief under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Importantly, the plaintiff alleges that he earned this claimed compensation years before he was fired. Therefore, when deciding this dispute, the court will not be excessively entangled in SNE's decision about whether to retain the plaintiff as its minister.... The court ... therefore denies the motion to strike counts five, six, seven and eight.

Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine Bars Court From Interpreting Foundation's Bylaws

In Foundation for the Advancement of Catholic Schools, Inc. v. The Most Reverend Leonard P. Blair, (CT Super, June 15, 2023), a Connecticut trial court held that "the constitutional bar on court jurisdiction over religious matters" required it to dismiss a suit over interpretation of the bylaws of an organization that provides scholarships for students attending Catholic schools in the Archdiocese of Hartford. At issue was whether the Archbishop could appoint Board of Trustee members other than those recommended by the Governance Committee. The court said in part:

Notwithstanding its formal status as a nonstock corporation, the court finds that FACS is a religious organization with ecclesiastical doctrine and practices. While FACS may be akin to a mutual fund in how it accepts contributions, diversifies assets, and distributes money, the mission and character of the organization is wholly marked by "clear and obvious religious characteristics."...

[T]he court cannot neutrally apply principles of corporate bylaw interpretation without intruding upon the archbishop's religious decision-making authority. Instead, the court is being asked to entangle the Superior Court of the State of Connecticut into matters of religious doctrine, religious practices and church polity.

Connecticut Legislature Absolves Those Tried For Witchcraft In 17th Century

On Thursday, the Connecticut legislature gave final passage to House Joint Resolution 34 (full text), formally absolving by name some 34 individuals who were indicted or convicted of witchcraft and familiarities with the devil in the 17th century by courts in the early British colonies of Connecticut and New Haven. The Resolution concludes:

[T]he State of Connecticut apologizes to the descendants of all those who were indicted for the crimes of witchcraft and familiarities with the devil, convicted and executed and for the harm done to the accused persons' posterity to the present day, and acknowledges the trauma and shame that wrongfully continued to affect the families of the accused.

CtMirror reports on the passage of the Resolution. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Former Cantor's Claims Against Synagogue Are Dismissed

In Sklar v. Temple Israel, Westport Inc., (CT Super., April 21, 2023), a Connecticut state trial court dismissed breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims asserted by the former Cantor of defendant synagogue, Temple Israel.  Plaintiff contended that the Temple failed to provide him the procedural protections to which he was entitled under his contract before it fired him for three incidents of unsatisfactory performance of duties. The court held that the ministerial exception doctrine precludes plaintiff's contract claims, saying in part:

[T]he manner in which the defendant Temple Israel discharged or disciplined the plaintiff would constitute government interference with an internal decision that affects the faith and mission of the synagogue, thereby violating the Free Exercise Clause. The Court also finds that it would also violate the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement in ecclesiastical decisions because it concerns internal management decisions of the synagogue as to its employment relationship with its clergy.

The court concluded that plaintiff's other allegations, while serious, are legally insufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff had complained of lapses in COVID protocols and lack of enhanced security which exacerbated his post-traumatic stress disorder.

COVID Order Violated Priest's Free Exercise Rights

 In Urso v. Mohammad, (D CT, March 10, 2023), a Catholic priest sued a town's health director over COVID orders that cancelled religious gatherings and congregational prayers. The court concluded that the health Directive violated plaintiff's free exercise rights, but left for trial the question of whether plaintiff suffered an injury, saying in part:

[N]ot all secular businesses in the Town of Orange were closed, and the Directive itself is unquestionably stricter than the Governor’s Executive Orders, which imposed capacity limits on religious institutions in line with those imposed on other secular businesses, and never cancelled all religious services completely.... In Agudath Israel, the Second Circuit applied strict scrutiny when businesses such as retail stores, news media, financial services, and construction were not as restricted as houses of religious worship.... Thus, the Second Circuit has already made the determination there is no meaningful difference between a retail store and a house of worship in terms of COVID-19 risk.... Regardless of how well intentioned it might have been and the difficult circumstances under which it was issued, the Directive “expressly singles out religion for less favored treatment” by subjecting religious services to complete cancellation while not imposing such strict measures on other businesses regardless of their size or the length of time people were gathering there ... and is thus subject to strict scrutiny....

The Court determines therefore as a matter of law both that the Directive is subject to strict scrutiny, and that it fails that scrutiny, thus violating the First Amendment....

The court concluded that plaintiff's equal protection claim is tied to the free exercise claim.  The court found that claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were now moot. It rejected plaintiff's Establishment Clause claim saying that the health directive did not "establish religion or espouse a religious message." It rejected plaintiff's free speech and freedom of assembly claims, relying on the Supreme Court's 1905 decision in Jacobson v. Massachusetts.

Rastafarian Police Officer's Free Exercise Claim May Move Ahead

In Taylor v. City of New Haven, (D CT, March 10, 2023), a Rastafarian police officer sued claiming religious and disability discrimination after being denied an exemption from the police department's grooming policy. While dismissing a half dozen of plaintiff's claims largely on procedural and jurisdictional grounds, the court permitted him to move ahead with his First Amendment free exercise claim for damages, saying in part:

The plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to show that the general order at issue burdened his religious conduct..., and that the order lacked general applicability, both because it invited individualized exemptions... and because the City of New Haven permitted secular conduct contrary to the general order.... Thus, the plaintiff has alleged facts which, if true, demonstrate that the general order is subject to strict scrutiny and that the government can achieve its interests in a manner that does not burden religion. Consequently, for purposes of this stage of the case, the plaintiff has shown that he had a right protected by the First Amendment.

Suit Challenges Law Limiting Employer Right to Force Employees to Listen to Religious Presentations

 A number of business organizations filed suit yesterday in a Connecticut federal district court challenging on free speech grounds a Connecticut statute that protects employees from being made into captive audiences. The statute imposes liability on employers that discipline employees who refuse to attend employer-sponsored meetings or listen to employer communications whose primary purpose is to express the employer's views on religious or political matters. The complaint (full text) in Chamber of Commerce of the USA v. Bartolemo, (D CT, filed 11/1/2022), also contends that the state law is pre-empted by the National Labor Relations Act. Ct  Mirror reports on the lawsuit.

Special Permit Requirement Only For Houses Of Worship Violates 1st Amendment

In Omar Islamic Center Inc. v. City of Meriden, (D CT, Sept. 30, 2022), a Connecticut federal district court held that a zoning regulation that required places of worship to obtain a special permit to operate in areas zoned M-4 (Planned Industrial District) violates plaintiffs' 1st Amendment free exercise rights. Plaintiff sought to use a vacant commercial building as a mosque. The court said in part:

Regulations allowed hotels, motels, and convention centers, as well as numerous shops and stores including bakeries, restaurants, and theaters, to operate as of right in the M-4 district, without needing to apply for a special permit.... Places of worship, however, were required to obtain a special permit before opening their doors. It is clear to the Court that, under the test set forth by the Supreme Court in Tandon, at least some comparable secular activities were therefore treated more favorably than religious activities under the Regulations. Thus, the law is not neutral and generally applicable under free exercise principles, and it must be examined with strict scrutiny.

Defendants have not defended the law under either a rational basis or strict scrutiny standard. In fact, they have proffered no rationale underlying the law whatsoever.

The court also found that the regulation violated plaintiff's equal protection rights. The court refused to pass on plaintiff's RLUIPA claims because it was unclear whether or not plaintiff had an actual property interest in the building.

Suit In Connecticut State Court Challenges Elimination Of Religious Exemptions To School Vaccine Requirements

Suit was filed earlier this month in a Connecticut state trial court challenging the Connecticut's elimination of religious exemptions to the requirement that school children receive vaccination against several diseases. In January, a Connecticut federal district court dismissed a similar challenge (We The Patriots USA, Inc. v. Connecticut Office of Early Childhood Development, (D CT, Jan. 11, 2022).  The new state court complaint (full text) in We The Patriots USA, Inc. v. Connecticut Office of Early Childhood Development, (CT Super., Feb. 8, 2022), contends that requiring students who have religious objections to receive vaccines developed with fetal cells, or containing porcine gelatin, violates various provisions of the Connecticut state constitution and of state law protecting free exercise of religion, as well as equal protection, bodily self-determination, child-rearing, and public education rights.  CT Insider reports on the lawsuit.

Connecticut Elimination Of Religious Exemption From School Vaccination Requirement Is Upheld

 In We the Patriots USA, Inc. v. Connecticut Office of Early Childhood Development, (D CT, Jan. 11, 2022), a Connecticut federal district court upheld a Connecticut statute that eliminates the religious exemption from the state requirement for vaccinations for school children. Medical exemptions remain in the statute, and students with previous religious exemptions are allowed to retain them. The court summarized its conclusions in part as follows:

Count One, alleging a violation of the Free Exercise Clause, is dismissed because mandatory vaccination as a condition to school enrollment does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. However, even if P.A. 21-6 was not foreclosed by Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedent, it is constitutional because it is a neutral law of general applicability which is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.

CT Insider reports on the decision.