9th Circuit Reinstates Claim of Christian-Israelite Inmate Who Was Refused Passover Diet

In Fuqua v. Raak, (9th Cir., Nov. 1, 2024), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals partially reversed an Arizona federal district court's dismissal of a suit by Michael Fuqua, a Christian-Israelite (Christian Identity) state prison inmate who was refused Passover dietary meals. The prison chaplain and other prison officials denied Fuqua's request for a Kosher for Passover diet on the ground that Fuqua's belief that Christian-Israelites were descended from the Tribes of Israel was wrong.  Officials said that supporting materials furnished by Fuqua suggested that he only needed to observe Passover with a memorial service using flatbread and grape juice. In reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on Fuqua's free exercise and equal protection claims, the court said in part:

... [W]e conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could find that Fuqua was denied his requested dietary accommodation, not based on his failure to follow a neutral and valid procedural rule for requesting accommodations, but rather based on [Chaplain] Lind’s own theological assessment of the correctness and internal doctrinal consistency of Fuqua’s belief system.

The court however affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for defendants on Fuqua's RLUIPA claim, saying in part:

that the Spending Clause does not allow Congress to impose individual damages liability on state or local officials who are not themselves the recipients of federal funds.

In Fuqua v. Ryan, (9th Cir., Nov. 1, 2024) (unpublished), the 9th Circuit upheld the dismissal of Fuqua's free exercise claims against two correctional officers because there was no evidence that they were personally involved in the challenged actions. It upheld dismissal of claims against the kitchen manager on qualified immunity grounds. It also upheld the trial court's refusal to allow Fuqua to read from his Bible on the witness stand, saying in part:

The district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that, while Fuqua could explain the sincerity of his religious beliefs by reference to relevant scriptural passages, he did not need to have a physical Bible with him on the stand or to read the relevant passages verbatim.

Tennesse County Sued by Woman Who Was Required to Remove Hijab for Booking Photo

Suit was filed this week in a Tennessee federal district court by a Muslim woman who was required by Knox County, Tennessee Sheriff's Office employees to remove her hijab for a booking photo. Plaintiff was arrested along with others who were participating in a pro-Palestinian demonstration on the University of Tennessee campus. The photo was subsequently posted on the Sheriff Office's public website in violation of Sheriff's Office policy. The complaint (full text) in Solliz v. Knox County, Tennessee, (ED TN, filed 10/7/2024), alleges in part:

The Defendants’ mistreatment of Mrs. Soliz and their disrespect for her religious rights has scarred her.  The Defendants’ misbehavior was also illegal.  The federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ... and... Tennessee’s Preservation of Religious Freedom Act—flatly prohibited the Defendants from burdening Mrs. Soliz’s free exercise of her religion in the manner they did.

Longview News-Journal reports on the lawsuit.

Muslim Woman Can Move Ahead on Some Challenges to Sheriff's Booking Photo Policy

In Hague v. Kent County, (WD MI, Sept. 9, 2024), plaintiff, a Muslim woman, challenged the Kent County, Michigan, Sheriff Office's policy on booking photos for detainees wearing a religious head covering. Two photos were taken, one with the head covering and one without.  Only the one with the head covering is released to the public. The other was uploaded to the Michigan State Police data base. Multiple officers could be present when the photos were taken. The court held that the photo policy imposed a substantial burden on plaintiff's religious exercise in violation of RLUPA. but that money damages are not available for RLUIPA violations. Declaratory or injunctive relief is available. It also allowed plaintiff to move forward with her 1st Amendment free exercise claim, including for damages, against the county and the sheriff's office. The sheriff, though, has qualified immunity as to damage claims under the 1st Amendment.

6th Circuit: Permit Requirement Did Not Substantially Burden Church

 In Dad's Place of Bryan, Ohio v. City of Bryan, Ohio, (6th Cir., Sept. 5, 2024), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals refused to enter a preliminary injunction pending appeal to prevent the city from enforcing requirements that the church obtain a permit or variance before people may sleep on the first floor of the church building. Rejecting plaintiff's RLUIPA argument, the court said in part:

Dad's Place fails to show that it will likely succeed on establishing that the City's zoning laws substantially burden its religious exercise.... [T]he burdens alleged by Dad's Place are self-imposed.... The City provides a process by which entities in the commercial district can seek a variance or conditional use permit ("CUP") allowing them to operate as residential facilities.... Yet, despite being opened in 2018, Dad's Place has never applied to the City for a CUP or variance.... RLUIPA does not entitle Dad's Place to engage in unauthorized uses without ever seeking a permit or variance to do so....

Additionally, Dad's Place has not shown that it lacks adequate alternatives. For example, it can use a second floor as a residential facility or open a second facility. It asserts that such alternatives "transform the nature of the Church's ministry," but it gives no explanation as to why its ministry requires people to sleep on the ground floor of the building as opposed to the second floor, or why its ministry would be less effective if people slept in a different building that was properly zoned for residential use....

The court also rejected plaintiff's free exercise claim.

RLUIPA Success Unlikely on Challenge to Denial of Special Use Permit for Jewish Retreat Center

In Fresh Start Center v. Township of Grosse Ile, (ED MI, Sept. 5, 2024), a Michigan federal district court refused to grant a preliminary injunction in a RLUIPA lawsuit challenging the denial of a variance and a special land use permit to the Fresh Start Center to operate a religious retreat center in an area zoned residential. The Center holds retreats twice a month for Orthodox Jews who have experienced a loss of faith because of trauma. Each retreat involves 4 to 5 participants from all over the world and up to 4 other staff. The court said in part:

Because Plaintiff has not demonstrated a strong likelihood of establishing a substantial burden on the Center’s religious exercise, the Court need not determine whether that substantial burden was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest....  Here, the Center has not shown there are no feasible alternate locations within the Township and outside the Township where the Center can conduct its retreats.  The only burden the Center has demonstrated is disappointment that it cannot conduct its retreats at the Property.  The present record reveals that being unable to conduct its retreats at a desired location does not rise to the level of a substantial burden.  While the Center may ultimately succeed on the merits once the record is more fully developed, at this juncture it has not shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits of its substantial burden RLUIPA claim....

The court also concluded that plaintiff is unlikely to prevail on a claim that the denial violated the equal terms provision of RLUIPA.

6th Circuit Reverses Dismissal of Muslim Inmate's Religious Accommodation Complaints

 In Mustin v. Wainwright, (6th Cir., Aug. 27, 2024), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of free exercise, RLUIPA, equal protection and certain retaliation claims brought by a Muslim inmate who objected to the manner in which space was made for religious services and objected to inadequate Ramadan meals.  The court said in part:

Mustin contends that defendants ... substantially burdened his ability to attend Jummah and Taleem by (1) “constantly” moving Jummah and Taleem to small rooms that could safely accommodate only half of the attendees, and (2) inconsistently allowing inmates to attend Taleem services and sending inmates back to their cells to accommodate other religious events.... Mustin properly alleged that defendants ... substantially burdened Mustin’s ability to safely attend Jummah and Taleem by forcing him to put his personal safety at risk in order to fulfill his religious obligations by attending services in a room packed with roughly twice the number of people it can safely house....

At this early stage, Mustin has alleged facts sufficient to support an inference that defendants’ provision of expired, offending, and otherwise nutritionally insufficient meals during Ramadan pressured him to violate his religious beliefs or face potential malnutrition.  Mustin alleges that he was served raw food and expired drinks in his breakfast bags, and that his dinner bags often contained pork-based main courses, which Muslims are forbidden from eating.... Mustin plausibly alleged that the non-expired and non-pork-based foods he received during Ramadan were insufficient in quantity and nutrition quality to meet his nutritional needs.

Anti-Injunction Act Precludes RLUIPA Claim, But Church's Constitutional Claims Move Ahead

 In Resurrection House Ministries, Inc. v. City of Brunswick, (SD GA, Aug. 23, 2024), a Georgia federal district court held that the federal Anti-Injunction Act required dismissal of a RLUIPA lawsuit brought by a Ministry against which the city had filed a nuisance action.  The ministry had attempted to open a shelter for the homeless, to which the city objected. However, the court permitted the Ministry to move ahead with its 1st, 4th, 5th and 14th Amendment claims against the city, concluding that the Younger abstention doctrine did not apply. It concluded that plaintiff had adequately alleged that the nuisance action had been brought against it in bad faith, saying in part:

RHM alleges providing a shelter to needy individuals is a tenet of its Christian religion and, therefore, institution of the temporary emergency shelter is a practice of such religion. And practice of RHM’s religion is constitutionally protected by the Free Exercise Clause.... Therefore, RHM has satisfied its burden under the first prong of the Court’s analysis because it has sufficiently alleged that “the conduct allegedly retaliated against or sought to be deterred was constitutionally protected.”...  

The Court also finds that RHM’s allegations are sufficient to set forth that Defendants’ institution of the Nuisance Proceedings “was motivated at least in part by a purpose to retaliate for or to deter that conduct.”

Requiring Conditional Use Permit Is Not Substantial Burden Under RLUIPA

In Athey Creek Christian Fellowship v. Clackamas County, (D OR, July 30, 2024), an Oregon federal district court dismissed a RLUIPA challenge to the denial of a Conditional Use Permit for construction of the second phase of a church building. The court said in part: 

... [P]laintiff filed this suit in November of 2022, alleging that the zoning ordinance that required churches to apply for a conditional use permit and did not allow churches as a primary use is facially invalid under the RLUIPA, and that the County violated plaintiff’s rights under the RLUIPA, the First Amendment, and the Oregon Constitution by not allowing plaintiff to build phase 2 of the project and forcing plaintiff to re-apply for a new or modified conditional use permit. 

The purported burden here then includes the County’s conclusion that the 2006 CUP has expired, and the County’s resulting insistence that plaintiff must now apply to build phase 2 under the new “primary use” .... Neither one of these carries the traditional hallmarks of a substantial burden under the RLUIPA....

Notably, the record in case is missing a common, even pervasive, attribute in those cases where the plaintiffs succeeded on a substantial burden claim, namely that the relevant zoning authority displayed some outward hostility toward or pretextual decision-making about the plaintiffs’ proposed religious use....

... [P]laintiff has not shown why seeking an extension of the 2006 CUP or timely obtaining the relevant building permits for phase 2 were a substantial burden to its religious exercise....

The same reasoning applies to the alleged burden that resulted from the County’s insistence now that plaintiff must now re-apply as a primary use. It is not a substantial burden to file an application for a proposed land use.

Church Obtains Preliminary Injunction Under RLUIPA Allowing Its On-Site Shelter Program to Continue

In Church of the Rock, Inc. v. Town of Castle Rock, Colorado, (D CO, July 19, 2024), a Colorado federal district court granted a church a preliminary injunction preventing the Town of Castle Rock from interfering with the church's use of an RV and a trailer on church property in its On-Site Temporary Shelter Ministry. The court said in part:

The Town argues that the Church’s RLUIPA claim is not likely to succeed because the applicable zoning regulations do not substantially burden the Church’s exercise of its religious beliefs.... The Town instead characterizes the nature of the burden as a “mere inconvenience” and suggests that the Church could find other ways to satisfy its religious compulsion to provide for the needy, such as by providing hotel rooms or housing in other areas that are zoned for residential use.... It also suggests that finding a substantial burden in this case “effectively would be granting an automatic exemption to religious organizations from generally applicable land use regulations.”

The Church responds that its religious beliefs don’t just obligate it to provide for the needy in some general way; they obligate it to provide for the needy on Church property....

The Church has carried its burden on this question.... Although the Town alludes to a bit of a disconnect between the Church’s assertion that it is compelled to allow the poor to “live among you” and its desire to have people live in RVs on Church grounds rather than in homes and residential areas where Church members live, it does not ultimately dispute the sincerity of the Church’s assertions on this point, which are supported by sworn affidavits....

(See prior related posting.)  CBS News reports on the decision.

2nd Circuit: Former Hindu Inmate's Challenges to Mandated Treatment Program Dismissed

 In Tripathy v. McKoy, (2d Cir., May 29, 2024), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought against prison officials by a former inmate who contended that his rights were violated when he was forced to enroll in a specific sex offender treatment program in order to get lighter parole and registration requirements. According to the court: 

A devout Hindu, Tripathy objected to this requirement on religious grounds, arguing that he was innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted and that accepting responsibility for his crimes would require him to make a false statement, in violation of the “core” Hindu “tenet[]” against lying.

The court summarized its holdings:

We agree with the district court that Tripathy’s claim for damages under RLUIPA is barred by our precedent holding that the statute does not permit individual capacity damages; we likewise agree that his demands for injunctive and declaratory relief became moot when his state convictions were vacated and he was released from prison.  With respect to his constitutional claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the district court properly concluded that Tripathy’s free exercise claim under the First Amendment is barred by qualified immunity, that he lacks standing to seek damages for his due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that he fails to state a claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment.

Church Sues Town Over Zoning Objections to Temporary Shelter Ministry

Suit was filed last week in a Colorado federal district court by a non-denominational Christian church challenging a town's claim that the church's Temporary Shelter Ministry violates the town's zoning ordinance. The complaint (full text) in Church of the Rock, Inc. v. Town of Castle Rock, Colorado, (D CO, filed 5/13/2024) alleges that the church's rights under the First Amendment as well as the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act are violated by the town's objections to the church's use of an RV and a trailer in the church's parking lot as temporary or emergency shelter for homeless families. The church also claimed unlawful retaliation by the town. Plaintiff additionally filed a Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Preliminary Injunction (full text). First Liberty issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Civil Rights Commission Holds Briefing on Prisoners' Religious Freedom

Last Friday, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights held a lengthy hearing on The Federal Role in Enforcing Religious Freedom in Prisons. A video of the full hearing is available on YouTube. In announcing the hearing, the Commission said:

The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights will hold a briefing on, Friday, May 17, 2024, on whether prisoners’ religious freedom rights are being protected and enforced in accordance with constitutional and statutory provisions. This is an update to the Commission’s 2008 statutory enforcement report, Enforcing Religious Freedom in Prison.

Specifically, the Commission will review the constitutional and federal statutory provisions of the First Amendment, the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980 (CRIPA), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990 (RFRA), the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), and the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).

At this public briefing, the Commission will hear from subject matter experts such as government officials, religious leaders, academics, prisoners’ rights advocates, religious liberty organizations, and legal experts. The Commission will accept written materials from the public for consideration as we prepare our report....

5th Circuit Remands Muslim Inmate's RLUIPA and Establishment Clause Claims

 In Lozano v. Collier, (5th Cir., April 11, 2024), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a portion of the district court's decision and vacated another portion of it in a challenge by a Muslim inmate to practices that allegedly burdened plaintiff's ability to exercise his religion. The court said in part:

In his first RLUIPA claim, Lozano alleges that the [Texas Department of Criminal Justice] Defendants burdened his religious exercise by denying him the opportunity to shower privately with other Muslim inmates for Jumah.  He alleges that the shower conditions—which include inmates who are “naked, cussing, speaking idol talk” and inmates who are “homosexuals and predators”—make it impossible for him to meet his “holy obligation for cleanliness in prayer for Jumah”...   

Lozano’s second RLUIPA claim, alleges that the TDCJ defendants burdened his religious liberty by denying him a private cell to pray..... Lozano alleges... that other inmates in his cell intruded into his prayer space and tried to provoke him to fight them during his attempts to pray....

Lozano’s third RLUIPA claim involves an alleged lack of access to religious programming and instruction, namely, Taleem and Quranic studies. ...

In his § 1983 claim, Lozano contends that the existence of Jewish- and Native-American-designated units, and the absence of a Muslim-designated unit, constitutes a neutrality problem and violates the Establishment Clause.  

Lozano also alleges that the TDCJ’s faith-based dormitories have a curriculum that requires inmates to attend Christian-based classes, despite the faith-based dorms being nominally open to inmates of all religions. ...

... [W]e reverse the district court’s order granting summary judgment on Lozano’s RLUIPA claims... and vacate and remand for further consideration....

The district court held that Lozano failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact on whether the absence of a Muslim-designated unit or dorm violates the Establishment Clause.... We vacate and remand this claim to the district court to reconsider, in a manner consistent with applicable precedent and this opinion....

Class Action By Muslim Women Against NYPD Settled for $17.5M

 AP reports that New York City has agreed to settle the class action damage claim in Clark v. City of New York for $17.5 million. The suit brought in a New York federal district court under RLUIPA challenged the NYPD's former policy of requiring Muslim women to remove their hijabs when sitting for arrest photos. (See prior posting.) Under the settlement, which still must obtain judicial approval, the $17.5 million will be shared equally by all class members who file a claim, with each getting a minimum of $7,824.  Previously, settling the claims for an injunction and declaratory judgment, the police department agreed to change its arrest photo policy. (See prior posting).

Inmates Sue Claiming Religious Need to Watch Solar Eclipse

Suit was filed last week in a New York federal district court by six inmates at the Woodbourne Correctional Facility in Sullivan County, New York seeking to enjoin a 3-hour statewide prison lock down scheduled for April 8 that will prevent inmates from viewing the solar eclipse.  Plaintiffs are Christian, Muslim, Santerian and Atheist. The complaint (full text) in Zielinski v. New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, (ND NY, filed 3/29/2024), alleges that plaintiffs "have each expressed a sincerely held religious belief that April’s solar eclipse is a religious event that they must witness and reflect on to observe their faiths." The complaint sets out the nature of each plaintiff's religious belief. It alleges that the lock down violates plaintiffs' rights under RLUIPA, the Free Exercise and the Equal Protection Clauses. CBS News reports on the lawsuit.

UPDATE: AP, April 5, reports:

Thomas Mailey, a spokesperson for the corrections department, said the department has agreed to permit the six individuals to view the eclipse, while plaintiffs have agreed to drop their suit with prejudice.

Restricting Frequency of Church Free Meal Services Violates RLUIPA

 In St. Timothy's Episcopal Church v. City of Brookings, (D OR, March 27, 2024), an Oregon federal district court held that a zoning ordinance that limits the number of days that a church can serve free meals to people in need violates the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. St. Timothy's has been offering free lunchtime meals since 2009 and sees this as fundamental to their Episcopalian faith. Most recently meals have been served three to four times per week. In 2021, the city amended its zoning code to require a conditional use permit for "benevolent meal services" in residential districts and limited such services to two times per week. Finding that the city has burdened the church's religious exercise without a compelling interest in violation of RLUIPA, the court said in part:

[P]rotecting the public welfare, maintaining peace and order, and preventing crime are all certainly compelling government interests in a broad, general sense. However, the City has not articulated how the specific provisions of the Ordinance that limit meal service to two days per week ... serve to protect public welfare, maintain peace and order, or prevent crime in practical application. The Court can find no logical, causal relationship between the limitation and these interests....

Here, the City has long permitted, and arguably even supported benevolent meal services at St. Timothy's, without limitation as to the number of days such meals could be provided. This undisputed fact is fatal to their argument that the Ordinance's restrictions are intended to promote public welfare, peace, and order, and to deter crime....

... [T]he City has not shown that it considered and rejected the efficacy of less restrictive measures.

Denial of Church's Property Tax Exemption Did Not Violate RLUIPA

In Sandstrom v. Wendell, (WD NY, March 22, 2024), a New York federal district court rejected RLUIPA challenges to local tax officials' denial of a tax exemptions for two properties owned and converted to religious use by the Church of the Holy Redemption. Plaintiff, pastor of the church, argued that his religious exercise was substantially burdened by the denial. Tax officials contended that the Church did not qualify for a tax exemption. The court held in part:

[D]espite Plaintiff’s attempts to recharacterize his claims as amounting to a zoning challenge, ... Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged any burden on his religious beliefs apart from having to apply for tax-exempt status or being required to pay taxes.  At its core, Plaintiff is seeking a federal court ruling on a local tax matter, which is specifically circumscribed by the Tax Injunction Act and principles of comity....

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that he submitted a meaningful application to challenge the controversy or gave Defendants an opportunity to commit to a position intended to be “final.”  Plaintiff does not allege that he completed the necessary requirements to challenge the properties’ status, commenced any appeal of the determination, or that such efforts would be futile, weighing against a finding that the claims are ripe....

Christian Food Ministry Sues to End City's Attempts to Close It Down

 Last week, a Yuma County, Arizona Baptist church filed suit in an Arizona federal district court challenging actions the city of San Luis has taken to close down the church's food distribution ministry which it has operated for 23 years. The complaint (full text) in Gethsemani Baptist Church v. City of San Luis, (D AZ, filed 3/13/2024), says that with the election of a new mayor in 2022, the city ended its prior support for the food ministry and used zoning rules to attempt to end its operations. The city contends that the growth of the church's Food Ministry has changed it sufficiently that it may no longer rely on its prior treatment as a legal non-conforming use. The church alleges that the city's actions violate RLUIPA, the Free Exercise Clause, and Arizona's Free Exercise of Religion Act. First Liberty issued a press release announcing the filling of the lawsuit.

7th Circuit: Zoning Denial for Catholic School Athletic Field Lights Did Not Violate RLUIPA

In Edgewood High School of the Sacred Heart v. City of Madison, Wisconsin, (7th Cir., March 15, 2024), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit upheld the denial of zoning approval for a Catholic high school to install lights in its athletic field for nighttime games. The court rejected the school's claims that the denial violated the "equal terms" and "substantial burden" provisions of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, saying in part:

... [W]e remain doubtful that the hosting of nighttime athletic competitions constitutes “religious” activity.... We can put our doubts to the side, though, because the City effectively conceded on appeal that the hosting of games at Edgewood’s athletic field constitutes religious activity. We accept that concession for purposes of this appeal. 

It would be a bridge too far, however, to conclude that Edgewood’s inability to host nighttime competitions at its field imposes a “substantial burden” on its Catholic mission.... [W]e have examined the term in the land-use context and concluded that the availability of other adequate properties to host religious activities may defeat a substantial burden claim....

The alternative venues in this case are in the same general community within the City of Madison as Edgewood and, according to the evidence developed during discovery, remain available to host nighttime events. Given these alternative sites, we cannot see how the City’s zoning decisions imposed a substantial burden on Edgewood’s religious mission. Indeed, the high school has never hosted nighttime competitions on its athletic field but has carried out its religious mission all the same for over 100 years.

RLUIPA Safe harbor Does Not Extend to Claims for Monetary Damages

 In Bair Brucha Inc. v. Township of Toms River, New Jersey, (D NJ, Feb. 29, 2024), a New Jersey federal district court granted plaintiffs judgment on the pleadings on their RLUIPA and Free Exercise challenges to discriminatory land use regulations that prevented their construction of a synagogue.  Plaintiffs claimed that Toms River had engaged in an orchestrated effort to prevent the growth of the Orthodox Jewish population in the town. Subsequent to the filing of this lawsuit, the township amended its zoning regulations in a settlement of a RLUIPA suit brought by the Justice Department. Plaintiffs did not deny that their original regulations violated the Equal Terms and the Exclusion and Limits provisions of RLUIPA. However, they contended that since the zoning ordinances have subsequently been amended, the township is covered by the safe harbor provision in RLUIPA that shields a local government from the preemptive force of RLUIPA if it subsequently amends its land use regulations to remove the burdensome or discriminatory provisions. The court held that the safe harbor provision does not extend to claims for monetary damages incurred before the township took corrective action.

Also finding a violation of the Free Exercise clause, the court concluded that the land use regulations were neither neutral nor generally applicable and that antisemitic animus was a motivating factor behind the land use regulations.