Showing posts with label Prisoner cases. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Prisoner cases. Show all posts

Tuesday, February 20, 2024

9th Circuit: On Supervised Release, Must Have Secular Alternative To 12-Step Program Requirement

 In United States v. Rourke, (9th Cir., Feb. 15, 2024), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that it was "plain error" for a district court to impose as a condition of supervised release, without a non-religious alternative, that defendant live at and participate in a 12-step based halfway house if his probation officer requires it. The court said in part:

A twelve-step program is “a distinctive approach to overcoming addictive, compulsive, or behavioral problems,” which “asks each member to ... recognize a supreme spiritual power, which can give the member strength.” .... We have previously held that compelling a parolee to participate in an “Alcoholics Anonymous 12 step program” violated the Establishment Clause....

... [R]emand to the district court to modify the condition is required. So long as the revised condition explicitly notes Rourke’s right to object to the imposition of religious-based treatment and to be offered a secular alternative, no Establishment Clause violation will result.

Wednesday, February 07, 2024

5th Circuit, 11-6, Denies En Banc Rehearing on Availability of Damages Under RLUIPA

In Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety, (5th Cir., Feb. 5, 2024), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, by a vote of 11-6, denied an en banc rehearing in a RLUIPA suit seeking damages from officials in their individual capacities. Judge Clement, joined by 8 other judges, filed an opinion concurring in the denial, saying in part:

Officials at the Raymond Laborde Correctional Center knowingly violated Damon Landor’s rights in a stark and egregious manner, literally throwing in the trash our opinion holding that Louisiana’s policy of cutting Rastafarians’ hair violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act before pinning Landor down and shaving his head. Landor clearly suffered a grave legal wrong. The question is whether a damages remedy is available to him under RLUIPA. That is a question only the Supreme Court can answer.

Judge Ho, joined by Judge Elrod, filed a dissent to the denial. Judge Oldham, joined in whole or part by 5 other judges, also filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

The panel held RLUIPA does not allow prisoners to sue state prison officials in their individual capacities for money damages. With all due respect to my esteemed and learned colleagues, that result cannot be squared with Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592 U.S. 43 (2020). Tanzin held that individuals can sue for money damages under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”). The operative provisions of RFRA and RLUIPA are in haec verba, and both the Supreme Court and ours routinely interpret the statutes in parallel. Today, unfortunately for Landor, our court pits the statutes against one another. I respectfully dissent.

Tuesday, February 06, 2024

2nd Circuit: Delivering Inmate's Ramadan Meals Too Early Burdened His Free Exercise Rights

In Long v. Sugai(2d Cir., Feb. 5, 2024), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Hawaii prison sergeant may have violated plaintiff inmate's free exercise rights by delivering his Ramadan meals 4 hours before sundown.  The court said in part:

The question in the case before us is not whether serving cold, unappetizing, and possibly unsafe food is cruel and unusual punishment.  Rather, it is whether serving such food unconstitutionally burdened Long’s free exercise of his religion....

... [B]y the time Long could eat his evening meal at about 7:30 p.m., the food was often inedible and potentially unsafe, and, if eaten, exacerbated his stomach ulcers.  We take judicial notice of the fact that some food cannot safely sit at room temperature for four hours....

... [D]elivery of Long’s evening meal at 3:30 p.m. during Ramadan substantially burdened his free exercise of religion.  The district court should have evaluated the four Turner factors to determine whether the burden was justified.  Because the court did not conduct that analysis, we remand to allow it to do so.  The district court also did not conduct a qualified immunity analysis.  If the court concludes, after conducting the Turner analysis, that the burden was not justified, our remand allows the court to conduct a qualified immunity analysis. ...

The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of free exercise claims against another sergeant.

Friday, January 19, 2024

Michigan Prisons Implement Settlement Agreement on Religious Practices

In a press release yesterday, the Department of Justice announced that Michigan correctional authorities have now fully implemented prison reforms required by a 2021 settlement agreement. DOJ had alleged that various prison policies violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. The challenged policies required at least 5 people for group worship, barred group religious practices for Hindu, Yoruba, Hebrew Israelite and Thelema inmates and allowed access to the kosher Passover diet only to those who were on the year-round kosher diet.  According to DOJ's press release:

MDOC changed each of these policies to expand access to religious practice in compliance with the settlement. Under the revised policies, MDOC allows group religious practice for groups of two or more, permits previously banned religious groups to hold group services and allows people to participate in the Passover diet even if they do not participate in the kosher diet year-round. Department monitoring revealed that a significant number of people whose religious exercise was previously limited by policy can now worship together and can celebrate Passover consistent with their beliefs.

Friday, January 12, 2024

Inmate's Speech and Religion Challenges to His Execution Method Are Not Dismissed, But Execution Not Enjoined

In Smith v. Hamm, (MD AL, Jan. 10, 2024), plaintiff, who is scheduled for execution by nitrogen hypoxia on January 25, challenges the legality of his execution on several grounds.  Among these are his claims that his free speech rights as well as his free exercise rights are violated because masking him will interfere with his making an audible statement and praying audibly during his execution.  The court concluded that plaintiff had made plausible claims that the execution protocol violates his First Amendment free speech rights and his religious free exercise rights under RLUIPA, the First Amendment and the Alabama Religious Freedom Act (as well as his 8th Amendment rights).  Therefore, it denied defendants' motion to dismiss those claims.  The court went on, however, to conclude that plaintiff had not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of those claims. Therefore, the court refused to issue a preliminary injunction to bar execution of plaintiff. At issue in the case is the state's second attempt to execute plaintiff. A previous attempt to execute him by lethal injection failed when after 90 minutes of trying, authorities were unable to access his veins.

Thursday, December 14, 2023

4th Circuit: Nation of Gods and Earths May Qualify as a Religion

In Greene v. Lassiter, (4th Cir., Dec.13, 2023), the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals in a pro se suit by a prisoner held that the district court should not have dismissed plaintiff's RLUIPA and the 1st Amendment claims.  At issue is whether Nation of Gods and Earths ("NGE") qualifies as a "religion" for purposes of those provision. The court held that even though plaintiff's complaint said that NGE is a God-centered culture that should not be misconstrued as a religion, this should not be treated as a binding admission.  The court said in part:
Greene’s statement wasn’t an “intentional and unambiguous waiver[] that release[d] the opposing party from its burden to prove the facts necessary to establish the waived conclusion of law.”... To the contrary, Greene has consistently maintained that he asserts rights under RLUIPA and the First Amendment for being denied the ability to practice his faith or belief system, even if NGE eschews the label of “religion.” And in RLUIPA, Congress “defined ‘religious exercise’ capaciously” and “mandated that this concept ‘shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise....
Our review of the record shows that there may be at least an open factual question about whether NGE qualifies as a religion for RLUIPA and First Amendment purposes, making summary judgment inappropriate.

Tuesday, November 28, 2023

2nd Circuit: 1st Amendment Free Exercise Claim Requires Only "Burden", Not "Substantial Burden" On Religion

In Kravitz v. Purcell, (2d Cir., Nov. 27, 2023), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals held that unlike suits under RFRA, an inmate alleging a 1st Amendment violation of his religious freedom need not show a "substantial burden" on his sincere religious beliefs, but only a "burden." The suit was brought by an inmate whose observance of the Jewish holiday of Shavuot was impaired by harassment of prison correctional officers. As described by the court:

The admissible evidence shows that Kravitz was unable to observe his religious holiday due to the abusive conduct of corrections officers. On the first night, corrections officers obstructed all communal prayer and threw paper bags at the inmates, “laughing and say[ing], here is your kosher meal. You Jew, blah, blah, and F-U.” ... On the second night, an officer interrupted Kravitz’s prayer after approximately thirty seconds, stating, “I don’t want to hear that. You need to stop and get eating that food. I got things to do.” ... 

In vacating the district court's grant of summary judgment, the court said in part:

When we are considering government policies that are not neutral and generally applicable—that is, policies that discriminate against religion rather than burden it incidentally—there is no justification for requiring a plaintiff to make a threshold showing of substantial burden. “The indignity of being singled out for special burdens on the basis of one’s religious calling is so profound that the concrete harm produced can never be dismissed as insubstantial...." 

... The district court erred in deciding that the burden on Kravitz’s observance was insufficient to establish an infringement of his right to free exercise under the First Amendment. The district court could reach that conclusion only by deciding that thirty seconds of prayer or a blessing over bread suffices for Shavuot observance. But what the observance of Shavuot entails is beyond the competence of a federal court.

Tuesday, November 21, 2023

2nd Circuit Remands Free Exercise Claim of Inmate Who Could Not Attend Religious Services

In Wiggins v. Griffin, (2d Cir., Nov. 20, 2023), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded a New York federal district court's dismissal of a suit against prison officials by a Baptist inmate who contends that his exercise of religion was burdened when there was a delay of over five months in updating the call-out list for Protestant religious services after plaintiff was moved to a new cellblock. Plaintiff was unable to attend religious services until the list was updated. Because one of the 3 judges on the appeals panel died after argument, the case was decided by a 2-judge panel. The court held that it did not need to decide whether plaintiff needed to show a "substantial burden" or just a "burden" on his free exercise rights since there was evidence from which a jury could find a substantial burden and defendants conceded that a substantial burden was present.  In a concurring opinion, Judge Menashi said in part:

In an appropriate case, we should hold that a prisoner alleging a violation of the Free Exercise Clause under § 1983 need only show a burden on sincerely held religious beliefs—not a “substantial” burden that involves showing that the beliefs are “central.” Three decades is too long for federal judges to be telling litigants which of their religious beliefs are “unimportant.”

The court remanded the case for a jury determination of whether defendants had qualified immunity, saying in part:

[A] jury may find that one or more Defendants purposefully ignored or delayed processing Wiggins’s requests, seeking to deny his participation in communal worship, or may have been deliberately indifferent to Wiggins’s requests. In such a scenario, they would have violated Wiggins’s clearly established right....  But, on the other hand, a Defendant may have simply missed Wiggins’s requests or failed to take extra steps to ensure they were processed. If so, qualified immunity may be appropriate.

The court went on to decide the state of mind necessary to show a violation of the 1st Amendment's free exercise clause: 

The First Amendment‘s command that government not “prohibit” the free exercise of religion... “connotes a conscious act, rather than a merely negligent one,”.... Given this understanding of the First Amendment, isolated acts of negligence cannot violate an individual’s free exercise of religion in this context....

Although mere negligence cannot support a First Amendment free exercise claim, we have previously held that deliberate indifference “clearly suffices.”...

With these principles to guide us, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the claim against [prison Superintendent] Griffin. Wiggins sent Griffin two letters. Although Griffin left one letter unanswered, he quickly acted upon the second. ... [T]his evidence ... establishes (at most) that Griffin acted negligently in response to the first letter. Such a showing is insufficient. Whether the record suffices to permit a finding that any of the remaining [three] defendants were deliberately indifferent poses a closer question. Instead of single acts of negligence, the record contains sufficient evidence to allow a jury to conclude that one or more of the remaining defendants repeatedly failed to redress Wiggins’s exclusion from the call-out list....

Wednesday, November 15, 2023

11th Circuit: No Bivens Remedy for Free Exercise Infringement by Government Contractor or Its Employees

 In Walker v. Dismas Charities, Inc., (11th Cir., Nov. 14,2023), the U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Free Exercise and 8th Amendment claims by an inmate serving part of his sentence for conspiracy to commit arson in home confinement. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Egbert v. Boule, the court concluded that there is no Bivens implied damages remedy under the Constitution in a suit against a corporate entity that has contracted with the government to supervise federal prisoners serving their federal criminal sentences in home detention....  The court also rejected the claim that a Bivens remedy lies against employees of the government contractor, saying in part:

Walker’s complaint seeks to extend the implied remedy against federal officials first recognized in Bivens to a new class of defendants: individual employees of government contractors. On top of that, he asks us to recognize an implied cause of action under the Constitution to claims brought by a person in home confinement as part of a federal criminal sentence alleging violations of his right to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment, his right to procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment, and his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Because “a court is not undoubtedly better positioned than Congress to create” such a damages remedy, we conclude that Walker does not have an implied cause of action under the Constitution for his constitutional claims....

Thursday, October 19, 2023

5th Circuit: Religious Objection to Medications Must Be Considered In Forcible Medication Determination

United States v. Harris, (5th Cir., Oct. 17, 2023), involved a defendant who was charged with threatening to assault a federal judge. Defendant was found incompetent to stand trial and was involuntarily hospitalized to determine whether it was likely that he will attain competency in the foreseeable future. The government sought to involuntarily medicate defendant who, as a Jehovah's Witness, had refused for religious reasons to take medications.  Under Supreme Court precedent (Sell v. United States), one of the factors to be considered in deciding whether involuntary medication is permissible is whether important governmental interests are at stake, taking into account that special circumstances may lessen the importance of that interest.  In the case the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals held that said in part:

If ... secular circumstances are important enough to lessen the Government’s interest in prosecution, ... we believe religious liberty must be at least as important....

Harris’s religious beliefs, combined with his lengthy detention and his potential civil confinement, thus lessen the Government’s interests under the first Sell factor.

We hasten to emphasize the limits in today’s holding. We do not hold that religious faith constitutes a get-out-of-jail-free card. We also do not hold that all religious objections eliminate the Government’s interests under the first Sell factor. We hold only that religious liberty can constitute a “special circumstance” under Sell,,,,

Wednesday, September 20, 2023

Denying Inmate Permission to Marry Was RFRA Violation

In Davis v. Wigen, (3d Cir., Sept. 19, 2023), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court's dismissal of a RFRA claim brought by a former federal inmate and his fiancée.  The suit was brought against a private prison that primarily houses alien inmates claiming that the prison denied all inmate marriage requests, even when the inmate met the criteria set out in Bureau of Prison policies for approval of the request.  The court, finding that plaintiffs adequately alleged that the denials imposed a substantial burden on religious exercise, said in part:

The District Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ RFRA claim because they failed to allege that Defendants pressured Plaintiffs to either refrain from conduct that their faith prescribed or participate in conduct that their faith prohibited....  Because neither Christian tradition nor doctrine requires adherents to marry, Defendants argue that the denial of Plaintiffs’ marriage request did not cause them to violate any religious precept or belief....

Here, Plaintiffs desired to marry because marriage “had profound religious significance for them” and because they “viewed their marriage as an expression of” their Christian faith.... Although marriage may not be required of every Christian, Plaintiffs allege that their desire to marry has significant religious meaning for them. They contend that marriage is an expression of their faith. By denying Plaintiffs’ marriage request, Defendants caused them to refrain from such religious expression and thereby “violate their beliefs.”...

... While not every government-imposed hurdle to the practice of sincere faith-based conduct will be a substantial burden, the more proximate the government action is to an outright bar, the more likely it is a substantial burden. We conclude, therefore, that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged a substantial burden on their religious beliefs. 

Thursday, August 10, 2023

11th Circuit: PLRA Exhaustion Requirement Does Not Include Filing of Rule Change Petition

In Sims v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections,(11th Cir., July 31, 2023), the U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act's requirement that prisoners exhaust available administrative remedies before filing suit only requires exhaustion of the prison system's grievance process.  A prisoner does not also have to file a petition with the Department of Corrections seeking a change in its rules.  At issue was the Florida prison system's denial of a request by a Muslim inmate for an exemption from grooming rules that require beards be no longer than one-half inch.

Thursday, July 13, 2023

9th Circuit: Prison Official's Referencing Bible Verse Did Not Violate Establishment Clause

In Forter v. Young, (9th Cir., July 12, 2023), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected former prisoner Jeffrey Forter's complaints about the procedure used to deny his religious meal accommodation request.  In seeking access to kosher meals, Forter cited a Bible verse. A response from a prison official disagreed with Forster's interpretation of the verse and cited an additional verse. Forster claimed that response violated the Establishment Clause.  The court disagreed, saying in part:

[T]he Establishment Clause does not prevent religious references by state actors... and the prison official’s actions do not constitute an unconstitutional “official policy that ‘establishes a religion or religious faith, or tends to do so,’”

Wednesday, March 22, 2023

3rd Circuit: Qualified Immunity Can Be Asserted in RFRA Case, But Not in This One

In Mack v. Yost, (3rd Cir., March 21, 2023), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision held that qualified immunity can be asserted as a defense by prison officers in a suit against them under RFRA, but also concluded that at the summary judgment stage here defendants had not shown facts demonstrating that they are entitled to the defense. The majority summarized its 48-page opinion in part as follows:

When Mack was incarcerated, he worked at the prison commissary, where two supervising prison guards singled him out for harassment because of his Muslim faith. Most significantly, the evidence as it now stands shows that, when Mack would go to the back of the commissary to pray during shift breaks, the guards would follow him and deliberately interfere with his prayers by making noises, talking loudly, and kicking boxes. Fearing retaliation if he continued to pray at work, Mack eventually stopped doing so, but the guards nevertheless engineered his termination from his commissary job. He then sued.

... The guards ... moved for summary judgment ... on the theory that they are entitled to qualified immunity.... [T]he District Court sided with them. It held that ... no clearly established caselaw would have put a reasonable person on notice of the illegality of the guards’ actions. Mack has again appealed.

We agree with Mack that granting summary judgment was wrong. While ... qualified immunity can be asserted as a defense under RFRA, the officers have not – at least on this record – met their burden of establishing that defense.... [E]vidence of the RFRA violation here involved significant, deliberate, repeated, and unjustified interference by prison officials with Mack’s ability to pray as required by his faith. Based on those facts ..., the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity. But if different facts come out at trial, the officers may again raise qualified immunity....

Judge Hardiman dissented, saying in part:

Even accepting the majority’s articulation of the right at issue, I would not find it clearly established here.

The cases Mack cites, as the majority notes, are not factually analogous. And the majority identifies no other precedent—from our Court or elsewhere, before or after RFRA was enacted—sufficiently similar to deny Defendants qualified immunity.

Friday, March 03, 2023

7th Circuit: Protestant Inmate's Prayer Oil Claim Dismissed In Part

In Greene v. Teslik,(7th Cir., March 2, 2023), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that a Protestant inmate's complaint under the Free Exercise clause about the denial of prayer oil should be dismissed, but remanded his Establishment Clause claim.  The court said in part:

Greene ... contends that, by denying his request ... for the same prayer oil allowed to Muslims and Pagans, the defendants violated his rights under the Free Exercise Clause.... [W]e need not answer whether Greene was substantially or unjustifiably burdened when the defendants denied him prayer oil because we agree with the district court that the doctrine of qualified immunity prevents liability on the Free Exercise Clause claim....

Greene cites no case (nor can we find one) clearly establishing that denying access to a prayer accessory akin to a scented oil makes the practice of religion effectively impracticable. Qualified immunity was therefore appropriate....

Greene also claims that the defendants violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment....

[D]efendants contend that in 2013 it was not clearly established that, by denying Greene prayer oil, they would substantially burden his religion.... But that is not the right inquiry under the Establishment Clause. It has long been clearly established that “the Establishment Clause may be violated even without a substantial burden on religious practice.”... It thus “could not reasonably be thought constitutional,”...for prison staff to treat prisoners differently based on their religion—unless they present evidence that Greene was insincere or a security threat....The defendants did not do so....

[A]ny potential recovery is limited to nominal damages only. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), Greene may not recover compensatory damages for emotional or mental injuries from a constitutional violation unless a physical injury also occurred....

Tuesday, February 28, 2023

11th Circuit: Plaintiff Can Move Ahead with Claims Stemming from Denial of Kosher Meals in Jail

In Ravan v. Talton, (11th Cir., Feb. 27, 2023), the U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals held that plaintiff who is Jewish should have been able to move ahead with RLUIPA claims against a food service and 1st Amendment free exercise claims against two food service workers for denial of kosher meals on seven different occasions while he was in a county detention center. The court said in part:

[I]ndividual defendants argue that depriving Ravan of a handful of meals over a period of months doesn’t constitute an impermissible burden on his religion. But the number of missed meals is not necessarily determinative because being denied three Kosher meals in a row might be more substantial of a burden on religion being denied three meals in three months, and for a diabetic, the denial of one meal may be a substantial burden. And the record is (at best) muddled about the number and timing of Kosher meals that Ravan was denied....

But we reach a different conclusion as to Summit Food Service. To state a claim against Summit Food Service, Ravan had to plead that the company had a custom or policy of not providing Kosher meals, or acquiesced in or ratified its employees’ doing so..... Ravan has not done so...

[I]nstitutions that receive federal funding are liable for monetary damages for violating RLUIPA.... But individual defendants aren’t.... We therefore reverse the dismissal of Ravan’s claim against Summit Food Service and affirm the dismissal of Ravan’s claims against the individual defendants.

Thursday, February 23, 2023

Alaska Supreme Court Reverses Dismissal of Muslim Inmate's RLUIPA Claims

In Din v. State of Alaska, Department of Corrections, (AK Sup. Ct., Feb. 22, 2023) the Alaska Supreme Court vacated a trial court's dismissal of a suit brought under RLUIPA and the Alaska constitution by a Muslim inmate and remanded the case for further factual development.  At issue was the inmate's requests to pray five time per day using scented prayer oils and to eat halal meat as part of his diet. Prison rules only allowed use of scented oils for weekly outdoor congregate religious activities and only provided vegetarian or vegan meals for those requesting a halal diet. The court concluded that both restrictions imposed a substantial burden on the inmate's religious exercise. It went on:

Prison security is a compelling government interest. But DOC’s position that possessing prayer oils is prohibitively dangerous is difficult to reconcile with the fact that it allows inmates to possess “skin cream/oil.” Inmate and staff health are also important government interests, and DOC asserts that “even a seemingly mild scent may cause an adverse respiratory reaction.” But DOC’s position is difficult to reconcile with its policies allowing prisoners to possess other fragranced items, like deodorant, hair spray, and air fresheners....

DOC also asserts that the estimated additional cost of providing “halal/kosher meals . . . to accommodate all Alaska inmates who claim to need a special halal/kosher diet . . . would exceed $1,000,000 annually.” Din contends that this is not a compelling reason because providing him pre-packaged halal food would cost DOC approximately $7,700 more than the cost of regular meals, a small sum compared to its massive budget. 

Cost management obviously is an important government interest. But Congress contemplated that RLUIPA may “require a government to incur expenses in its own operations to avoid imposing a substantial burden on religious exercise”....

The court also concluded that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether present policies are the least restrictive means to achieve the state's interests. 

Friday, January 20, 2023

4th Circuit: Muslim Inmate's Free Exercise Claim Rejected; Establishment Clause Claim Remanded

In Firewalker-Fields v. Lee, (4th Cir., Jan. 17, 2023), the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a Muslim inmate's 1st Amendment Free Exercise claim. Plaintiff alleged that he did not have access in jail to Friday Islamic prayers. The court said in part:

Middle River had three rules in place that kept Firewalker-Fields from attending in-person Friday Prayer: no inmate led groups; no maximum-security prisoners allowed in any in-person groups; and prisoner services and classes by volunteer or donation only. Those rules are reasonably related to justifiable prison goals and therefore do not offend the Free Exercise Clause....

... [E]ach of Middle River’s policies is reasonably related to the legitimate penological purposes of security and resource-allocation; despite the jail’s policies, Firewalker-Fields still had other ways to practice his religion, even if they were not perfect; Firewalker-Fields’s preferred solutions would have impaired the jail’s safety and its efficient operation; and Firewalker-Fields failed to propose easy and obvious alternative policies that would have solved those issues while allowing more room for his religious practice. Taken together, this shows that each challenged policy is reasonably related to legitimate penological goals and are justifiable under Turner.

The court also vacated and remanded plaintiff's Establishment Clause challenge to the jail's broadcast of Christian services every Sunday on televisions throughout the facility.  Noting the Supreme Court's recent repudiation of the Lemon test and adoption of a test based on historical practice and understanding, the court said in part:

The district court should have the initial responsibility of working through Firewalker-Fields’s Establishment Clause challenge under Kennedy.

Thursday, December 29, 2022

6th Circuit: Temporary Shortening of Prison Worship Time Upheld

In Dykes-Bey v. Schroeder, (6th Cir., Dec. 27, 2022), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought under the 1st Amendment and RLUIPA by a Michigan inmate, concluding that the Michigan prison system had not imposed a "substantial burden" on the inmate's free exercise of religion. According to the court:

[D]efendants reduced the worship time for all religious groups from one hour to 30 minutes. As a result of this reduction in worship time, Dykes-Bey, a Moorish American Moslem, was unable to read the proclamation or conduct the closing prayer at four weekly meetings of the Moorish Science Temple of America....

Finding no 1st Amendment violation, the court said in part: 

Dykes-Bey sufficiently alleged a sincerely held religious belief or practice—reading the proclamation and conducting the closing prayer at meetings of the Moorish Science Temple of America. But the defendants' conduct did not rise to the level of a substantial burden on his religious exercise....

Focusing on plaintiff's RLUIPA claim, the court said in part:

Dykes-Bey sought only monetary relief from the defendants, which is not authorized by RLUIPA.

Friday, December 16, 2022

9th Circuit Reverses Dismissal of Inmate's Complaint Over Exclusion of NOI Texts

In Jones v. Shinn, (9th Cir., Dec.14, 2022), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court should not have dismissed an inmate's claim that his rights under RLUIPA were violated when prison authorities denied him access to four texts by Elijah Muhammad. The court said in part:

[T]he district court erred in characterizing the religious exercise at issue as whether Jones was denied all Nation of Islam texts rather than whether the exclusion of the specific texts constitutes a substantial burden on his exercise of religion.... 

And because Jones provided evidence that all texts by Elijah Muhammad are “essential religious texts needed to practice the Islamic faith in accordance with the Nation of Islam,” he raised a triable dispute as to whether the exclusion of the texts constitutes a substantial burden on his exercise of religion.

However, the court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's 1st Amendment free exercise claims, because defendants showed the exclusion was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.