Texas Top Court Gives New Trial to Death Row Inmate Because of Trial Judge's Antisemitism

 In Ex Parte Halprin, (TX Ct. Crim. App., Nov. 6, 2024), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in a 6-3 decision granted a new trial to one of the so-called Texas Seven prison escapees who had been sentenced to death for murdering a police officer during the robbery of a sporting goods store shortly after their escape. The court concluded that the trial judge, Vickers Cunningham, was biased against Halprin because Halprin is Jewish.  The court said in part:

The evidence adduced in these habeas proceedings concerning Halprin’s judicial bias claim consists primarily of anti-Semitic statements attributed to Cunningham that, according to the witnesses, he made in generally private or semi-private settings rather than from the bench in open court or in chambers....

The uncontradicted evidence supports a finding that Cunningham formed an opinion about Halprin that derived from an extrajudicial factor—Cunningham’s poisonous anti-Semitism. Cunningham’s references to Halprin are not to “the fucking [murderer]” or “the filthy [criminal]” or “the [murderer] Halprin,” which might be fairly said to derive from the evidence presented at Halprin’s capital murder trial. Rather, Cunningham’s derogatory references to Halprin are expressly tied to Halprin’s Jewish identity.

Judge Richardson, joined by Judges Newell and Walker filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

This is not a case in which the action of a trial judge may just “look bad.” This is not a case in which there is merely the “appearance of impropriety.” This is a case where a person’s lifelong hatred and prejudice against Jews made him unfit to preside over this case. And that toxic viewpoint runs counter to our concept of the Rule of Law because “[o]ur law punishes people for what they do, not who they are.”

Thus, no precedent, rule, technicality, or excuse can justify allowing such a demonstrably biased person to constitutionally stand in judgment over a member of a class of people the judge espouses to hate. It violates our fundamental sense of fair play and the Supreme Court’s motto “Equal Justice Under Law” beneath which our precedent arises.

Judge Yeary filed a concurring opinion saying that the majority reached the correct result but used the wrong standard to reach it.  He said in part: 

... [T]he question is “not whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in [the challenged judge’s] position is ‘likely’ to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’”

Presiding Judge Keller, joined by Judges Keel and Slaughter filed a dissenting opinion saying in part:

The Court misunderstands the law regarding disqualification of a judge for bias.  It grants Applicant relief on the basis of the trial judge’s personal views and out-of-court comments about Applicant’s religion.  But under Supreme Court precedent, in order for a judge who holds derogatory views about a defendant’s religion to be disqualified, there must be a showing that the judge’s conduct in the criminal proceedings was influenced by his derogatory views.  What a judge does can violate the Constitution.  What he thinks cannot.  Nothing in the record on habeas or at trial shows, or even suggests, that the trial judge’s views influenced how he conducted the criminal proceedings in this case.

Texas Public Radio and AP report on the decision. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

9th Circuit Reinstates Claim of Christian-Israelite Inmate Who Was Refused Passover Diet

In Fuqua v. Raak, (9th Cir., Nov. 1, 2024), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals partially reversed an Arizona federal district court's dismissal of a suit by Michael Fuqua, a Christian-Israelite (Christian Identity) state prison inmate who was refused Passover dietary meals. The prison chaplain and other prison officials denied Fuqua's request for a Kosher for Passover diet on the ground that Fuqua's belief that Christian-Israelites were descended from the Tribes of Israel was wrong.  Officials said that supporting materials furnished by Fuqua suggested that he only needed to observe Passover with a memorial service using flatbread and grape juice. In reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on Fuqua's free exercise and equal protection claims, the court said in part:

... [W]e conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could find that Fuqua was denied his requested dietary accommodation, not based on his failure to follow a neutral and valid procedural rule for requesting accommodations, but rather based on [Chaplain] Lind’s own theological assessment of the correctness and internal doctrinal consistency of Fuqua’s belief system.

The court however affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for defendants on Fuqua's RLUIPA claim, saying in part:

that the Spending Clause does not allow Congress to impose individual damages liability on state or local officials who are not themselves the recipients of federal funds.

In Fuqua v. Ryan, (9th Cir., Nov. 1, 2024) (unpublished), the 9th Circuit upheld the dismissal of Fuqua's free exercise claims against two correctional officers because there was no evidence that they were personally involved in the challenged actions. It upheld dismissal of claims against the kitchen manager on qualified immunity grounds. It also upheld the trial court's refusal to allow Fuqua to read from his Bible on the witness stand, saying in part:

The district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that, while Fuqua could explain the sincerity of his religious beliefs by reference to relevant scriptural passages, he did not need to have a physical Bible with him on the stand or to read the relevant passages verbatim.

6th Circuit Reverses Dismissal of Muslim Inmate's Religious Accommodation Complaints

 In Mustin v. Wainwright, (6th Cir., Aug. 27, 2024), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of free exercise, RLUIPA, equal protection and certain retaliation claims brought by a Muslim inmate who objected to the manner in which space was made for religious services and objected to inadequate Ramadan meals.  The court said in part:

Mustin contends that defendants ... substantially burdened his ability to attend Jummah and Taleem by (1) “constantly” moving Jummah and Taleem to small rooms that could safely accommodate only half of the attendees, and (2) inconsistently allowing inmates to attend Taleem services and sending inmates back to their cells to accommodate other religious events.... Mustin properly alleged that defendants ... substantially burdened Mustin’s ability to safely attend Jummah and Taleem by forcing him to put his personal safety at risk in order to fulfill his religious obligations by attending services in a room packed with roughly twice the number of people it can safely house....

At this early stage, Mustin has alleged facts sufficient to support an inference that defendants’ provision of expired, offending, and otherwise nutritionally insufficient meals during Ramadan pressured him to violate his religious beliefs or face potential malnutrition.  Mustin alleges that he was served raw food and expired drinks in his breakfast bags, and that his dinner bags often contained pork-based main courses, which Muslims are forbidden from eating.... Mustin plausibly alleged that the non-expired and non-pork-based foods he received during Ramadan were insufficient in quantity and nutrition quality to meet his nutritional needs.

3rd Circuit: District Court Did Not Show Compelling Interest in Denying Muslim Inmate Religious Accommodations

In Nunez v. Wolf, (3d Cir., Aug. 27, 2024), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals, in a suit under RLUIPA, held that the district court had not established that the Department of Corrections had a compelling interest in denying a Muslim inmate religious accommodations so that he could consummate his marriage, have ongoing conjugal visits with his wife, engage in congregate prayer with visitors and be circumcised. The court said in part:

To be clear, we are not holding that the DOC’s denials of Nunez’s requests cannot satisfy strict scrutiny if properly supported on remand.  What we do hold is that this determination cannot be made on the current record and that, as we have now clarified the nature of its burden, the DOC should have the opportunity to supplement the record before renewing its motion for summary judgment.

2nd Circuit: Former Hindu Inmate's Challenges to Mandated Treatment Program Dismissed

 In Tripathy v. McKoy, (2d Cir., May 29, 2024), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought against prison officials by a former inmate who contended that his rights were violated when he was forced to enroll in a specific sex offender treatment program in order to get lighter parole and registration requirements. According to the court: 

A devout Hindu, Tripathy objected to this requirement on religious grounds, arguing that he was innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted and that accepting responsibility for his crimes would require him to make a false statement, in violation of the “core” Hindu “tenet[]” against lying.

The court summarized its holdings:

We agree with the district court that Tripathy’s claim for damages under RLUIPA is barred by our precedent holding that the statute does not permit individual capacity damages; we likewise agree that his demands for injunctive and declaratory relief became moot when his state convictions were vacated and he was released from prison.  With respect to his constitutional claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the district court properly concluded that Tripathy’s free exercise claim under the First Amendment is barred by qualified immunity, that he lacks standing to seek damages for his due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that he fails to state a claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment.

2nd Circuit Reverses Dismissal of Muslim Inmate's Complaint About Eid Meal

In Brandon v. Royce, (2d Cir., May 15, 2024), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment dismissing a Muslim inmate's free exercise of religion claim against three Sing Sing prison officials. At issue was plaintiff's participation in a special meal for Muslim inmates and their guests around Eid al-Adha. Because the event was overbooked, prison officials offered inmates the special meal in their cells if they withdrew from attending the group event. Plaintiff withdrew but did not receive a meal.  On appeal, defendants argued, among other things, that they had a legitimate penological interest in not delivering the meal to plaintiff's cell-- a concern that civilian and inmate cooks who prepared meals for the event might place contraband in the meal trays. The court concluded:

In granting summary judgment to the defendants, the district court did not resolve the parties’ dispute as to whether the September 26 event was a religious event related to Eid al-Adha or an unrelated “family event.”  Rather, the district court relied on the defendants’ asserted penological interests and their view that there was an alternative means of Brandon exercising his First Amendment right: by attending the September 26 event and receiving the special meal there.  Neither ground supports granting judgment as a matter of law to the defendants at the summary judgment stage....

To be sure, we do not dispute that an increased possibility that a visitor would introduce contraband into a prison is a legitimate penological concern ....  We simply conclude that there is no unambiguous record support for the defendants’ claim that they denied Brandon a meal tray on September 26 because “the presence of outside guests increased the risk that contraband could be hidden in the food.”...  And we further conclude, based on the evidence before the district court, that the penological concerns relied on by the district court and raised on appeal cannot at this juncture support summary judgment in favor of the defendants....

5th Circuit Remands Muslim Inmate's RLUIPA and Establishment Clause Claims

 In Lozano v. Collier, (5th Cir., April 11, 2024), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a portion of the district court's decision and vacated another portion of it in a challenge by a Muslim inmate to practices that allegedly burdened plaintiff's ability to exercise his religion. The court said in part:

In his first RLUIPA claim, Lozano alleges that the [Texas Department of Criminal Justice] Defendants burdened his religious exercise by denying him the opportunity to shower privately with other Muslim inmates for Jumah.  He alleges that the shower conditions—which include inmates who are “naked, cussing, speaking idol talk” and inmates who are “homosexuals and predators”—make it impossible for him to meet his “holy obligation for cleanliness in prayer for Jumah”...   

Lozano’s second RLUIPA claim, alleges that the TDCJ defendants burdened his religious liberty by denying him a private cell to pray..... Lozano alleges... that other inmates in his cell intruded into his prayer space and tried to provoke him to fight them during his attempts to pray....

Lozano’s third RLUIPA claim involves an alleged lack of access to religious programming and instruction, namely, Taleem and Quranic studies. ...

In his § 1983 claim, Lozano contends that the existence of Jewish- and Native-American-designated units, and the absence of a Muslim-designated unit, constitutes a neutrality problem and violates the Establishment Clause.  

Lozano also alleges that the TDCJ’s faith-based dormitories have a curriculum that requires inmates to attend Christian-based classes, despite the faith-based dorms being nominally open to inmates of all religions. ...

... [W]e reverse the district court’s order granting summary judgment on Lozano’s RLUIPA claims... and vacate and remand for further consideration....

The district court held that Lozano failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact on whether the absence of a Muslim-designated unit or dorm violates the Establishment Clause.... We vacate and remand this claim to the district court to reconsider, in a manner consistent with applicable precedent and this opinion....

Inmates Sue Claiming Religious Need to Watch Solar Eclipse

Suit was filed last week in a New York federal district court by six inmates at the Woodbourne Correctional Facility in Sullivan County, New York seeking to enjoin a 3-hour statewide prison lock down scheduled for April 8 that will prevent inmates from viewing the solar eclipse.  Plaintiffs are Christian, Muslim, Santerian and Atheist. The complaint (full text) in Zielinski v. New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, (ND NY, filed 3/29/2024), alleges that plaintiffs "have each expressed a sincerely held religious belief that April’s solar eclipse is a religious event that they must witness and reflect on to observe their faiths." The complaint sets out the nature of each plaintiff's religious belief. It alleges that the lock down violates plaintiffs' rights under RLUIPA, the Free Exercise and the Equal Protection Clauses. CBS News reports on the lawsuit.

UPDATE: AP, April 5, reports:

Thomas Mailey, a spokesperson for the corrections department, said the department has agreed to permit the six individuals to view the eclipse, while plaintiffs have agreed to drop their suit with prejudice.

4th Circuit: Inmate's Claim for Religious Diet Should Move Forward

In Pendleton v. Jividen, (4th Cir., March 20, 2024), the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals held that a West Virginia federal district court should not have dismissed a RLUIPA religious diet claim brought by an inmate who follows the Sufi Original Traditions of Islam. Those Traditions allow him to only eat fruit, vegetables and certain fish. The court said in part:

In 2014 ... prison officials introduced a new diet program for those with religious dietary restrictions. Under that program, a single “religious special diet” is served—one designed to meet the needs of all faiths by following the rules of the most diet-restrictive ones. With all forms of meat off the table, the diet uses soy as its primary protein source....

Although Pendleton’s religious beliefs do not forbid consumption of soy as such, the complaint alleges that Pendleton experiences vomiting, abdominal pain, constipation, and other digestive issues when he does so. And this, the complaint asserts, is of “religious significance” to Pendleton because his inability to properly digest soy renders such foods "Haram" for him....

Defendants insist that Pendleton could obtain a meat-free and soy-free diet by obtaining test results showing he has a medically significant allergy to soy. And, the defendants continue, because Pendleton has refused to submit to allergy testing ... he has not plausibly alleged a substantial burden on his religious practice. That argument fails too. Pendleton need not produce documentation of his alleged soy allergy to survive a motion to dismiss.... Even if Pendleton took an allergy test and that test was negative, it would not eliminate his religiously based objections to eating soy.  For that reason, Pendleton has plausibly alleged a substantial burden on his religious practices, and the district court erred in concluding otherwise.

9th Circuit: On Supervised Release, Must Have Secular Alternative To 12-Step Program Requirement

 In United States v. Rourke, (9th Cir., Feb. 15, 2024), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that it was "plain error" for a district court to impose as a condition of supervised release, without a non-religious alternative, that defendant live at and participate in a 12-step based halfway house if his probation officer requires it. The court said in part:

A twelve-step program is “a distinctive approach to overcoming addictive, compulsive, or behavioral problems,” which “asks each member to ... recognize a supreme spiritual power, which can give the member strength.” .... We have previously held that compelling a parolee to participate in an “Alcoholics Anonymous 12 step program” violated the Establishment Clause....

... [R]emand to the district court to modify the condition is required. So long as the revised condition explicitly notes Rourke’s right to object to the imposition of religious-based treatment and to be offered a secular alternative, no Establishment Clause violation will result.

5th Circuit, 11-6, Denies En Banc Rehearing on Availability of Damages Under RLUIPA

In Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety, (5th Cir., Feb. 5, 2024), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, by a vote of 11-6, denied an en banc rehearing in a RLUIPA suit seeking damages from officials in their individual capacities. Judge Clement, joined by 8 other judges, filed an opinion concurring in the denial, saying in part:

Officials at the Raymond Laborde Correctional Center knowingly violated Damon Landor’s rights in a stark and egregious manner, literally throwing in the trash our opinion holding that Louisiana’s policy of cutting Rastafarians’ hair violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act before pinning Landor down and shaving his head. Landor clearly suffered a grave legal wrong. The question is whether a damages remedy is available to him under RLUIPA. That is a question only the Supreme Court can answer.

Judge Ho, joined by Judge Elrod, filed a dissent to the denial. Judge Oldham, joined in whole or part by 5 other judges, also filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

The panel held RLUIPA does not allow prisoners to sue state prison officials in their individual capacities for money damages. With all due respect to my esteemed and learned colleagues, that result cannot be squared with Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592 U.S. 43 (2020). Tanzin held that individuals can sue for money damages under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”). The operative provisions of RFRA and RLUIPA are in haec verba, and both the Supreme Court and ours routinely interpret the statutes in parallel. Today, unfortunately for Landor, our court pits the statutes against one another. I respectfully dissent.

2nd Circuit: Delivering Inmate's Ramadan Meals Too Early Burdened His Free Exercise Rights

In Long v. Sugai, (2d Cir., Feb. 5, 2024), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Hawaii prison sergeant may have violated plaintiff inmate's free exercise rights by delivering his Ramadan meals 4 hours before sundown.  The court said in part:

The question in the case before us is not whether serving cold, unappetizing, and possibly unsafe food is cruel and unusual punishment.  Rather, it is whether serving such food unconstitutionally burdened Long’s free exercise of his religion....

... [B]y the time Long could eat his evening meal at about 7:30 p.m., the food was often inedible and potentially unsafe, and, if eaten, exacerbated his stomach ulcers.  We take judicial notice of the fact that some food cannot safely sit at room temperature for four hours....

... [D]elivery of Long’s evening meal at 3:30 p.m. during Ramadan substantially burdened his free exercise of religion.  The district court should have evaluated the four Turner factors to determine whether the burden was justified.  Because the court did not conduct that analysis, we remand to allow it to do so.  The district court also did not conduct a qualified immunity analysis.  If the court concludes, after conducting the Turner analysis, that the burden was not justified, our remand allows the court to conduct a qualified immunity analysis. ...

The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of free exercise claims against another sergeant.

Michigan Prisons Implement Settlement Agreement on Religious Practices

In a press release yesterday, the Department of Justice announced that Michigan correctional authorities have now fully implemented prison reforms required by a 2021 settlement agreement. DOJ had alleged that various prison policies violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. The challenged policies required at least 5 people for group worship, barred group religious practices for Hindu, Yoruba, Hebrew Israelite and Thelema inmates and allowed access to the kosher Passover diet only to those who were on the year-round kosher diet.  According to DOJ's press release:

MDOC changed each of these policies to expand access to religious practice in compliance with the settlement. Under the revised policies, MDOC allows group religious practice for groups of two or more, permits previously banned religious groups to hold group services and allows people to participate in the Passover diet even if they do not participate in the kosher diet year-round. Department monitoring revealed that a significant number of people whose religious exercise was previously limited by policy can now worship together and can celebrate Passover consistent with their beliefs.

Inmate's Speech and Religion Challenges to His Execution Method Are Not Dismissed, But Execution Not Enjoined

In Smith v. Hamm, (MD AL, Jan. 10, 2024), plaintiff, who is scheduled for execution by nitrogen hypoxia on January 25, challenges the legality of his execution on several grounds.  Among these are his claims that his free speech rights as well as his free exercise rights are violated because masking him will interfere with his making an audible statement and praying audibly during his execution.  The court concluded that plaintiff had made plausible claims that the execution protocol violates his First Amendment free speech rights and his religious free exercise rights under RLUIPA, the First Amendment and the Alabama Religious Freedom Act (as well as his 8th Amendment rights).  Therefore, it denied defendants' motion to dismiss those claims.  The court went on, however, to conclude that plaintiff had not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of those claims. Therefore, the court refused to issue a preliminary injunction to bar execution of plaintiff. At issue in the case is the state's second attempt to execute plaintiff. A previous attempt to execute him by lethal injection failed when after 90 minutes of trying, authorities were unable to access his veins.

4th Circuit: Nation of Gods and Earths May Qualify as a Religion

In Greene v. Lassiter, (4th Cir., Dec.13, 2023), the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals in a pro se suit by a prisoner held that the district court should not have dismissed plaintiff's RLUIPA and the 1st Amendment claims.  At issue is whether Nation of Gods and Earths ("NGE") qualifies as a "religion" for purposes of those provision. The court held that even though plaintiff's complaint said that NGE is a God-centered culture that should not be misconstrued as a religion, this should not be treated as a binding admission.  The court said in part:

Greene’s statement wasn’t an “intentional and unambiguous waiver[] that release[d] the opposing party from its burden to prove the facts necessary to establish the waived conclusion of law.”... To the contrary, Greene has consistently maintained that he asserts rights under RLUIPA and the First Amendment for being denied the ability to practice his faith or belief system, even if NGE eschews the label of “religion.” And in RLUIPA, Congress “defined ‘religious exercise’ capaciously” and “mandated that this concept ‘shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise....

Our review of the record shows that there may be at least an open factual question about whether NGE qualifies as a religion for RLUIPA and First Amendment purposes, making summary judgment inappropriate.

2nd Circuit: 1st Amendment Free Exercise Claim Requires Only "Burden", Not "Substantial Burden" On Religion

In Kravitz v. Purcell, (2d Cir., Nov. 27, 2023), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals held that unlike suits under RFRA, an inmate alleging a 1st Amendment violation of his religious freedom need not show a "substantial burden" on his sincere religious beliefs, but only a "burden." The suit was brought by an inmate whose observance of the Jewish holiday of Shavuot was impaired by harassment of prison correctional officers. As described by the court:

The admissible evidence shows that Kravitz was unable to observe his religious holiday due to the abusive conduct of corrections officers. On the first night, corrections officers obstructed all communal prayer and threw paper bags at the inmates, “laughing and say[ing], here is your kosher meal. You Jew, blah, blah, and F-U.” ... On the second night, an officer interrupted Kravitz’s prayer after approximately thirty seconds, stating, “I don’t want to hear that. You need to stop and get eating that food. I got things to do.” ... 

In vacating the district court's grant of summary judgment, the court said in part:

When we are considering government policies that are not neutral and generally applicable—that is, policies that discriminate against religion rather than burden it incidentally—there is no justification for requiring a plaintiff to make a threshold showing of substantial burden. “The indignity of being singled out for special burdens on the basis of one’s religious calling is so profound that the concrete harm produced can never be dismissed as insubstantial...." 

... The district court erred in deciding that the burden on Kravitz’s observance was insufficient to establish an infringement of his right to free exercise under the First Amendment. The district court could reach that conclusion only by deciding that thirty seconds of prayer or a blessing over bread suffices for Shavuot observance. But what the observance of Shavuot entails is beyond the competence of a federal court.

2nd Circuit Remands Free Exercise Claim of Inmate Who Could Not Attend Religious Services

In Wiggins v. Griffin, (2d Cir., Nov. 20, 2023), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded a New York federal district court's dismissal of a suit against prison officials by a Baptist inmate who contends that his exercise of religion was burdened when there was a delay of over five months in updating the call-out list for Protestant religious services after plaintiff was moved to a new cellblock. Plaintiff was unable to attend religious services until the list was updated. Because one of the 3 judges on the appeals panel died after argument, the case was decided by a 2-judge panel. The court held that it did not need to decide whether plaintiff needed to show a "substantial burden" or just a "burden" on his free exercise rights since there was evidence from which a jury could find a substantial burden and defendants conceded that a substantial burden was present.  In a concurring opinion, Judge Menashi said in part:

In an appropriate case, we should hold that a prisoner alleging a violation of the Free Exercise Clause under § 1983 need only show a burden on sincerely held religious beliefs—not a “substantial” burden that involves showing that the beliefs are “central.” Three decades is too long for federal judges to be telling litigants which of their religious beliefs are “unimportant.”

The court remanded the case for a jury determination of whether defendants had qualified immunity, saying in part:

[A] jury may find that one or more Defendants purposefully ignored or delayed processing Wiggins’s requests, seeking to deny his participation in communal worship, or may have been deliberately indifferent to Wiggins’s requests. In such a scenario, they would have violated Wiggins’s clearly established right....  But, on the other hand, a Defendant may have simply missed Wiggins’s requests or failed to take extra steps to ensure they were processed. If so, qualified immunity may be appropriate.

The court went on to decide the state of mind necessary to show a violation of the 1st Amendment's free exercise clause: 

The First Amendment‘s command that government not “prohibit” the free exercise of religion... “connotes a conscious act, rather than a merely negligent one,”.... Given this understanding of the First Amendment, isolated acts of negligence cannot violate an individual’s free exercise of religion in this context....

Although mere negligence cannot support a First Amendment free exercise claim, we have previously held that deliberate indifference “clearly suffices.”...

With these principles to guide us, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the claim against [prison Superintendent] Griffin. Wiggins sent Griffin two letters. Although Griffin left one letter unanswered, he quickly acted upon the second. ... [T]his evidence ... establishes (at most) that Griffin acted negligently in response to the first letter. Such a showing is insufficient. Whether the record suffices to permit a finding that any of the remaining [three] defendants were deliberately indifferent poses a closer question. Instead of single acts of negligence, the record contains sufficient evidence to allow a jury to conclude that one or more of the remaining defendants repeatedly failed to redress Wiggins’s exclusion from the call-out list....

11th Circuit: No Bivens Remedy for Free Exercise Infringement by Government Contractor or Its Employees

 In Walker v. Dismas Charities, Inc., (11th Cir., Nov. 14,2023), the U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Free Exercise and 8th Amendment claims by an inmate serving part of his sentence for conspiracy to commit arson in home confinement. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Egbert v. Boule, the court concluded that there is no Bivens implied damages remedy under the Constitution in a suit against a corporate entity that has contracted with the government to supervise federal prisoners serving their federal criminal sentences in home detention....  The court also rejected the claim that a Bivens remedy lies against employees of the government contractor, saying in part:

Walker’s complaint seeks to extend the implied remedy against federal officials first recognized in Bivens to a new class of defendants: individual employees of government contractors. On top of that, he asks us to recognize an implied cause of action under the Constitution to claims brought by a person in home confinement as part of a federal criminal sentence alleging violations of his right to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment, his right to procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment, and his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Because “a court is not undoubtedly better positioned than Congress to create” such a damages remedy, we conclude that Walker does not have an implied cause of action under the Constitution for his constitutional claims....

5th Circuit: Religious Objection to Medications Must Be Considered In Forcible Medication Determination

United States v. Harris, (5th Cir., Oct. 17, 2023), involved a defendant who was charged with threatening to assault a federal judge. Defendant was found incompetent to stand trial and was involuntarily hospitalized to determine whether it was likely that he will attain competency in the foreseeable future. The government sought to involuntarily medicate defendant who, as a Jehovah's Witness, had refused for religious reasons to take medications.  Under Supreme Court precedent (Sell v. United States), one of the factors to be considered in deciding whether involuntary medication is permissible is whether important governmental interests are at stake, taking into account that special circumstances may lessen the importance of that interest.  In the case the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals held that said in part:

If ... secular circumstances are important enough to lessen the Government’s interest in prosecution, ... we believe religious liberty must be at least as important....

Harris’s religious beliefs, combined with his lengthy detention and his potential civil confinement, thus lessen the Government’s interests under the first Sell factor.

We hasten to emphasize the limits in today’s holding. We do not hold that religious faith constitutes a get-out-of-jail-free card. We also do not hold that all religious objections eliminate the Government’s interests under the first Sell factor. We hold only that religious liberty can constitute a “special circumstance” under Sell,,,,

Denying Inmate Permission to Marry Was RFRA Violation

In Davis v. Wigen, (3d Cir., Sept. 19, 2023), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court's dismissal of a RFRA claim brought by a former federal inmate and his fiancée.  The suit was brought against a private prison that primarily houses alien inmates claiming that the prison denied all inmate marriage requests, even when the inmate met the criteria set out in Bureau of Prison policies for approval of the request.  The court, finding that plaintiffs adequately alleged that the denials imposed a substantial burden on religious exercise, said in part:

The District Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ RFRA claim because they failed to allege that Defendants pressured Plaintiffs to either refrain from conduct that their faith prescribed or participate in conduct that their faith prohibited....  Because neither Christian tradition nor doctrine requires adherents to marry, Defendants argue that the denial of Plaintiffs’ marriage request did not cause them to violate any religious precept or belief....

Here, Plaintiffs desired to marry because marriage “had profound religious significance for them” and because they “viewed their marriage as an expression of” their Christian faith.... Although marriage may not be required of every Christian, Plaintiffs allege that their desire to marry has significant religious meaning for them. They contend that marriage is an expression of their faith. By denying Plaintiffs’ marriage request, Defendants caused them to refrain from such religious expression and thereby “violate their beliefs.”...

... While not every government-imposed hurdle to the practice of sincere faith-based conduct will be a substantial burden, the more proximate the government action is to an outright bar, the more likely it is a substantial burden. We conclude, therefore, that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged a substantial burden on their religious beliefs.