LA Sued Over Its handling of Permit Application for Christian Revival Event

Suit was filed last week in a California federal district court by leaders of May Day USA, a nationwide Christian revival event, contending that the manner in which Los Angeles officials handed their application for a permit to hold a revival on Hollywood Boulevard violated their 1st and 14th Amendment rights. The 54-page complaint (full text) in Donnelly v. City of Los Angeles, California, (CD CA, filed 8/21/2025), alleges in part:

15. LAPD wielded the unconstitutionally unbridled discretion afforded it under the City’s permitting scheme to subject MayDay to lengthy and pretextual administrative hurdles....

16. Among the LAPD’s many demands was a requirement that MayDay conduct a petition of Hollywood Boulevard’s business owners and vendors to ensure at least 51% approved of MayDay’s expressive activity and speech....

19. The City’s permitting scheme thus enshrined an unconstitutional heckler’s veto upon MayDay and its expressive activities....

21. The City refused to provide MayDay with any concrete answer on its permit application until the last minute, prohibiting MayDay from finalizing their planned event, advertising it, or otherwise adequately preparing to engage in the event....

23. Three days prior to its requested event, the City denied the permit actually requested by MayDay ...and “granted” the application to host the event at a location ... it never requested and out of the site of the hecklers who Defendants believed would veto MayDay’s speech. In essence, the City tried to put MayDay unconstitutionally out of sight, and out of mind....

25. Simply put, the City said MayDay could speak, but only if it did it quietly, quickly, and where no one who might object would be forced to hear it. Defendants denied MayDay’s permit application on the basis of the views it planned to espouse and out of concern that Hollywood Boulevard was not an appropriate place for their religious speech, exercise, and expression.

Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Court Again Upholds Idaho Law on School Restroom Use by Transgender Students

In Sexuality and Gender Alliance v. Critchfield, (D ID, Aug. 7, 2025), an Idaho federal district court refused to issue a preliminary injunction to bar enforcement of an Idaho statute that requires transgender students in Idaho public schools to use restrooms, changing rooms, and showers that correspond to their biological sex. The 9th Circuit had previously upheld the denial of a broad preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the statute. In this suit, plaintiffs ask for a narrow injunction applicable only to restrooms at Boise High School. Plaintiffs argue that Boise High School has allowed transgender students to use bathrooms consistent with their gender identity for years, and allowing enforcement now would upset the status quo. The court said in part:

Separating restrooms by biological sex has been common for centuries.... And for good reason—there are biological differences between men and women.... Those biological differences are deserving of privacy and S.B. 1100’s segregation of restrooms based on sex is related to that interest. It is not the Court’s role to determine whether S.B. 1100 is a perfect policy; the Court must only address whether it is “substantially related” to the State of Idaho’s interest in protecting student’s privacy. Because S.B. 1100 is substantially related to the State’s legitimate interest in privacy, the Court finds SAGA is unlikely to succeed on its Equal Protection claim....

The Ninth Circuit... concluded: “SAGA failed to meet its burden to show that the State had clear notice at the time it accepted federal funding that Title IX prohibits segregated access to the facilities covered by S.B. 1100 on the basis of transgender status.”... This conclusion applies with equal force to SAGA’s as-applied challenge. Accordingly, the Court finds SAGA is unlikely to succeed on its Title IX claim.

ADF issued a press release announcing the decision.

10th Circuit Upholds Oklahoma's Ban on Gender-Affirming Care for Minors

In Poe v. Drummond, (10th Cir., Aug. 6, 2025), the U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's refusal to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of an Oklahoma law that prohibits furnishing of surgical procedures, puberty blocking drugs or cross-sex hormones to treat gender dysphoria in minors.  Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Skrmetti, the court rejected equal protection and parental rights challenges. The court said in part:

We conclude that Oklahoma’s enactment of SB 613 rationally relates to Oklahoma’s interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of minors in light of the debate among medical experts about the risks and benefits associated with treating a minor’s gender dysphoria with gender transitioning procedures.  We thus affirm the district court’s ruling as to Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim....

In sum, SB 613 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it discriminates based on age and medical purpose and satisfies rational basis review.  We also need not subject SB 613 to heightened scrutiny based on impermissible legislative purpose because no evidence exists that Oklahoma legislature enacted it as a pretext to invidiously discriminate against transgender minors....

We next determine whether the liberty interest—parents’ right to access gender transition procedures for their children—is so deeply rooted in our Nation’s history to establish a fundamental right.  After conducting “a careful analysis of the history of the right at issue,”... we conclude there is no deeply rooted tradition in parents’ right to access gender transition procedures for their children.

News On 6 reports on the decision.

Cutoff of Funding to All Planned Parenthood Clinics Enjoined

In Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Kennedy, (D MA, July 28, 2025), a Massachusetts federal district court in a 58-page opinion extended a preliminary injunction it had issued a week earlier barring Congress' defunding of Planned Parenthood clinics that do not offer abortions to preliminarily enjoin Congress's cutoff of funds for non-abortion services even to Planned Parenthood clinics that do offer abortions. the court said in part:

To the extent that Section 71113 may be applied to Planned Parenthood Members who do not provide abortion, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in establishing that the law impermissibly conditions the receipt of Medicaid reimbursements on these Members foregoing their right to associate with Planned Parenthood Federation and other Members...

... Instead of merely prohibiting Planned Parenthood Members that receive Medicaid funds from providing abortions, the statute prohibits them from affiliating with entities that do.... [R]estricting funds based on affiliation with an abortion provider operates only to restrict the associational right of Members that do not provide abortion. ...

... [I]n light of the disconnect between the law and its purported ends on the one hand, and the severe burdens it imposes on Planned Parenthood Federation and its Members on the other, Plaintiffs are likely to establish that Congress singled them out with punitive intent. The legislative context bolsters that conclusion. Plaintiffs have thus demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on their claim that Section 71113 is an unconstitutional bill of attainder. ...

... Where Defendants have not shown the law is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest, Plaintiffs have demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on their equal protection claim.  

Moreover, Plaintiffs are likely to show that there is no rational relationship between the class burdened by Section 71113—comprised of 47 Planned Parenthood Members and two additional entities—and the goal of reducing abortion. As explained above, Section 71113 affects only a small number of abortion providers and leaves every other conceivable category unaffected.

ABC News reports on the decision.

Cutoff of Medicaid Funds to Planned Parenthood Clinics That Do Not Offer Abortions Is Unconstitutional

In Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Kennedy, (D MA, July 21, 2025), a Massachusetts federal district court granted a preliminary injunction barring the federal government from cutting off Medicaid funding to Planned Parenthood members that do not offer abortion services, but whose Medicaid funding was cut off by recent Congressional legislation.  The court concluded that this cutoff likely violated the expressive association and equal protection rights of these Planned Parenthood clinics. The court said in part:

To the extent that Section 71113 may be applied to Planned Parenthood Members who do not provide abortion, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in establishing that the law impermissibly conditions the receipt of Medicaid funding on these Members foregoing their right to associate with Planned Parenthood Federation and other Members. Members who do not provide abortions cannot escape the law’s burden except by disassociating from Members that do. And because Section 71113 may be applied to Members who are affiliates of each other via the structure, governance, and membership requirements of Planned Parenthood Federation, disassociating with other Members requires disassociating from Planned Parenthood Federation itself.  

While Defendants contend that Section 71113 does not regulate speech, the record demonstrates that Members’ affiliation via their membership in Planned Parenthood Federation is expressive. Planned Parenthood Federation advocates before Congress, provides education and information about sexual and reproductive health, and through Planned Parenthood Action Fund, communicates with the public regarding lawmakers’ voting records, supports campaigns for ballot initiatives, and supports candidates for federal, state, and local officials who will support reproductive freedom in furtherance of its mission....

Congress may set conditions “that define the limits” of a spending program by “specify[ing] the activities Congress wants to subsidize,” but Congress may not set “conditions that seek to leverage funding to regulate speech outside the contours of the program itself.”...

... Instead of merely prohibiting Planned Parenthood Members that receive Medicaid funds from providing abortions, the statute prohibits them from affiliating with entities that do.... Therefore, restricting funds based on affiliation with an abortion provider operates only to restrict the associational right of Members that do not provide abortion....

... Section 71113 ... declines Medicaid funding on the basis of affiliation, and thus draws a classification that burdens a fundamental First Amendment right. Where Defendants have not shown the law is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest, Plaintiffs have demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on their equal protection claim....

Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts posted an update explaining the court's holding. Fox News reports on the decision.

Christian Bookstore Challenges Colorado Anti-Discrimination Law

Suit was filed this week in a Colorado federal district court by a Christian bookstore challenging on free speech, free exercise, equal protection and due process grounds recent amendments to Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Act. The complaint (full text) in Doxa Enterprise, Ltd. v. Sullivan, (D CO, filed 7/16/2025), alleges in part:

2. Colorado recently passed HB25-1312 (the “Act”) and amended the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (“CADA”) to define “gender expression” to include “chosen name” and “how an individual chooses to be addressed.” The Act then declares that Coloradans have a right to access “public accommodations[] and advertising” free of discrimination on that basis— except if the requested language is “offensive” or made for “frivolous purposes.”  Under this revised CADA language, it is now illegal for public accommodations like independent bookstores to refer to transgender-identifying individuals with biologically accurate language in their publications and customer interactions. 

3. This puts CADA on a collision course with the First Amendment rights of Plaintiff Doxa Enterprise, Ltd (“Born Again Used Books” or the “Bookstore”), a Christian bookstore in Colorado Springs that sells Christian literature, homeschool curricula, and classics. The Bookstore also publishes a website and social media accounts to promote its Christian faith and products.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Planned Parenthood Fights New Medicaid Funding Cutoff

Planned Parenthood filed suit this week in a Massachusetts federal district court challenging Section 71113 of H.R. 1, One Big Beautiful Bill Act which denies federal Medicaid funds for non-abortion services for one year to any non-profit that provides abortions, and which received in 2023 Medicaid funds exceeding $800,000. (Use of Medicaid funds for abortions is already prohibited under other laws.) The complaint (full text) in Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Kennedy, (D MA, filed 7/7/2025), alleges that the provision was drafted to target and retaliate against Planned Parenthood. The complaint reads in part:

10. There is no legitimate justification for the statute; rather, the true design of the Defund Provision is simply to express disapproval of, attack, and punish Planned Parenthood, which plays a particularly prominent role in the public debate over abortion and (if Planned Parenthood’s Members are treated collectively) is the only nationwide abortion provider. Supporters of the Defund Provision, including President Trump and members of Congress, have made this point unmistakably clear. 

11. For these reasons, the Defund Provision’s exclusion of Planned Parenthood Members from a program designed to provide high-quality medical care to the Nation’s neediest patients—care that Planned Parenthood Members have delivered for decades—is unconstitutional as to all Planned Parenthood Members as a Bill of Attainder and it also violates Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection and First Amendment rights.

On the day the complaint was filed, the court issued a 14-day Temporary Restraining Order (full text) requiring that Medicaid funding continue to be furnished to plaintiffs. After the government responds, the court will decide whether to issue a temporary injunction in the case. Jurist and The Hill report on these developments.

UPDATE: On July 11, the court extended the Temporary Restraining Order through July 21 in a 9-page opinion and Order.  Daily Caller reports on this development.

Cert. Granted in Challenge to Ban of Transgender Women on Women's Sports Teams

Yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court granted review in two cases raising the issue of whether laws that bar transgender women from participating on women's sports teams in public schools and colleges violate Title IX or the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. (Order List). The cases are Little v. Hecox, (Docket No. 24-38, certiorari granted 7/3/2025) involving a challenge to Idaho's Fairness in Women's Sports Act, and West Virginia v. B.P.J., (Docket No. 24-43, certiorari granted 7/3/2025) involving West Virginia's Save Women's Sports Act. Links to all the briefs and pleadings in the Hecox case are available here. Links to all the briefs and pleadings in the West Virginia case are available here. SCOTUSblog reports on the Court's action.

Supreme Court Upholds Tennessee's Ban on Gender Affirming Care for Minors

In United States v. Skrmetti,(Sup.Ct., June 18, 2025), the U.S. Supreme Court today by a vote of 6-3 upheld Tennessee's law that bars both hormonal and surgical gender transition procedures for minors. The case generated 5 separate opinions spanning 118 pages. Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion held that the Tennessee law does not trigger heightened scrutiny. He said in part:

This Court has not previously held that transgender individuals are a suspect or quasi-suspect class. And this case, in any event, does not raise that question because SB1 does not classify on the basis of transgender status. As we have explained, SB1 includes only two classifications: healthcare providers may not administer puberty blockers or hormones to minors (a classification based on age) to treat gender dysphoria, gender identity disorder, or gender incongruence (a classification based on medical use). The plaintiffs do not argue that the first classification turns on transgender status, and our case law forecloses any such argument as to the second....

... [T]here is a rational basis for SB1’s classifications. Tennessee concluded that there is an ongoing debate among medical experts regarding the risks and benefits associated with administering puberty blockers and hormones to treat gender dysphoria, gender identity disorder, and gender incongruence. SB1’s ban on such treatments responds directly to that uncertainty....

Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, saying in part: 

This case carries a simple lesson: In politically contentious debates over matters shrouded in scientific uncertainty, courts should not assume that self-described experts are correct.

Deference to legislatures, not experts, is particularly critical here. Many prominent medical professionals have declared a consensus around the efficacy of treating children’s gender dysphoria with puberty blockers, cross-sex hormones, and surgical interventions, despite mounting evidence to the contrary. They have dismissed grave problems undercutting the assumption that young children can consent to irreversible treatments that may deprive them of their ability to eventually produce children of their own. They have built their medical determinations on concededly weak evidence. And, they have surreptitiously compromised their medical recommendations to achieve political ends.

Justice Barrett, joined by Justice Thomas, filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

Because the Court concludes that Tennessee’s Senate Bill 1 does not classify on the basis of transgender status, it does not resolve whether transgender status constitutes a suspect class.... I write separately to explain why, in myview, it does not....

Beyond the treatment of gender dysphoria, transgender status implicates several other areas of legitimate regulatory policy—ranging from access to restrooms to eligibility for boys’ and girls’ sports teams. If laws that classify based on transgender status necessarily trigger heightened scrutiny, then the courts will inevitably be in the business of “closely scrutiniz[ing] legislative choices” in all these domains....

Justice Alito filed an opi nion concurring in part, saying in part:

I do notjoin Part II–A–2 of the opinion of the Court, which concludes that SB1 does not classify on the basis of “transgender status.” There is a strong argument that SB1does classify on that ground, but I find it unnecessary to decide that question. I would assume for the sake of argument that the law classifies based on transgender status, but I would nevertheless sustain the law because such a classification does not warrant heightened scrutiny. I also do not join Part II–A–3 of the Court’s opinion because I do not believe that the reasoning employed in Bostock v. Clayton County ... is applicable when determining whether a law classifies based on sex for Equal Protection Clause purposes.

Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Jackson and joined in part by Justice Kagan, saying in part:

Tennessee’s law expressly classifies on the basis of sex and transgender status, so the Constitution and settled precedent require the Court to subject it to intermediate scrutiny. The majority contorts logic and precedent to say otherwise, inexplicably declaring it must uphold Tennessee’s categorical ban on lifesaving medical treatment so long as “‘any reasonably conceivable state of facts’” might justify it... Thus, the majority subjects a law that plainly discriminates on the basis of sex to mere rational-basis review. By retreating from meaningful judicial review exactly where it matters most, the Court abandons transgender children and their families to political whims....

Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

I take no view on how SB1 would fare under heightened scrutiny.... So I would both start and stop at the question of what test SB1 must satisfy. As JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR shows, it is heightened scrutiny...

SCOTUSblog reports on the decision.

Washington Bishops Sue Challenging Expanded Child Abuse Reporting Law

Last week, the Catholic bishops in Washington state filed suit challenging the constitutionality of a recently adopted amendment to the state's mandatory child abuse reporting law. The amendment requires clergy to report child abuse or neglect when they have reasonable cause to believe that it has occurred, even when a priest learns of the abuse or neglect in a confessional. The complaint (full text) in Etienne v. Ferguson, (WD WA, filed 5/29/2025) alleges in part:

1. Consistent with the Roman Catholic Church’s efforts to eradicate the societal scourge of child abuse, the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Seattle and the Dioceses of Yakima and Spokane have each adopted and implemented within their respective dioceses policies that go further in the protection of children than the current requirements of Washington law on reporting child abuse and neglect....

3. Yet despite these self-imposed reporting policies—policies that go beyond what Washington law requires—Washington is targeting the Roman Catholic Church in a brazen act of religious discrimination.  Without any basis in law or fact, Washington now puts Roman Catholic priests to an impossible choice: violate 2,000 years of Church teaching and incur automatic excommunication or refuse to comply with Washington law and be subject to imprisonment, fine, and civil liability....  Washington has done so at the same time that it expanded exemptions from mandatory reporting requirements for certain non-clergy.  The object of this law is clear: subject Roman Catholic clergy to dictates of the state. 

4. Putting clergy to the choice between temporal criminal punishment and eternal damnation, interfering with the internal governance and discipline of the Catholic Church, and targeting religion for the abrogation of all privileges, is a patent violation of both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and a violation of Article I, Section 11 of the Washington Constitution.

The Pillar reports on the lawsuit.

Suit Challenges Exclusion of Religious Training from Virginia Tuition Grant Programs

Suit was filed last week in a Viginia federal district court challenging the exclusion from Virginia's Tuition Assistance Grant Program and its National Guard Grants of educational programs that provide religious training or theological education. The complaint (full text) in Johnson v. Fleming, (ED VA, filed 5/28/2025), alleges that the exclusions violate the Free Exercise, Establishment and Equal Protection clauses.  The complaint reads in part:

297. Defendants’ religious exclusions violate the Free Exercise Clause several ways....

298. The government violates the Free Exercise Clause when it disqualifies otherwise eligible persons or organizations from receiving otherwise available government benefits “solely because of their religious character,”....

327. Because the VTAG and National Guard religious exclusions are not neutral or generally applicable, they trigger strict scrutiny....

335. So the State Council [of Higher Education] considers CIP Code 39 programs as too religious and excludes them from participation in the Tuition Assistance Grant Program. This requires the State Council to entangle itself in religious matters. 

336. The [Virginnia] Department [of Military Affairs] likewise does not deem religious majors at secular private schools and public schools to be for “religious training or theological education” and students who pursue those programs at those schools can receive a National Guard Grant. 

337. The Department favors students who pursue religious programs at secular private schools and public schools to the detriment of students who pursue religious programs at religious schools....

347. Defendants’ religious exclusions create arbitrary and irrational distinctions based on nothing more than government officials’ discretion about whether a certain program is too religious.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit. 

Suit Challenges Refusal to Recognize Ministers Ordained Online

Suit was filed last week in a Virginia federal district court challenging Augusta County and the City of Staunton's refusal to recognize ministers of the Universal Life Church who obtained ordination online as ministers authorized to perform marriage ceremonies under Virginia Code §20-23. Instead, they are required to register under §20-25 as a civil officiant which includes posting a $500 bond. The complaint (full text) in Universal Life Church Monastery Storehouse v. Landes, (WD VA, filed 5/22/2025) alleges that this violates the 1st and 14th Amendment, saying in part:

69. The Clerk defendants violate the Establishment Clause by interpreting and applying Va. Code Ann. §§20-23 and 20-26 to categorically deny ULC Monastery ministers the authority to solemnized marriages as religious officiants, solely because they were ordained by and are in regular communion with the ULC Monastery and not another approved religious society. This conduct impermissibly prefers certain denominations over others.....

77. Many of plaintiff ULC ministers ... choose to exercise their religion by officiating marriage ceremonies.... The Clerk Defendants' interpretation an application of Va. Code Ann. §§20-23 and 20-26 ... accordingly places an impermissible burden on Plaintiffs' religious practice in violation of the Free Exercise Clause....

84. ... The Equal Protection Clause prohibits intentional discrimination against similarly situated individuals and prohibits state action that burdens fundamental rights, including religious freedom.  Discrimination based on religious affiliation must survive strict scrutiny....

91. Defendants' actual and threatened enforcement of Va. Code Ann. §§20-23, 20-26 and 20-28 against ULC Monastery and its ministers burdens speech based on its content and viewpoint, and is accordingly subject to strict scrutiny....

Augusta Free Press reports on the lawsuit. 

[Thanks to Dusty Hoesly for the lead.] 

Sports Apparel Company Challenges Colorado's Public Accommodation Law Protection of Transgender Athletes

Suit was filed this week in a Colorado federal district court by an online athletic apparel company, "XX-YY Athletics," that promotes banning of transgender women from women's sports through logos on its apparel and through advertisements.  The company claims that Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Act violates the 1st and 14th Amendments when its public accommodation provisions declare that Coloradans have a right to access advertising that is free from discrimination on the basis of gender expression and chosen name. The complaint (full text) in Committee of Five, Inc. v. Sullivan, (D CO, filed 5/27/2025), alleges in part:

191. The most common way that XX-XY Athletics demonstrates why male competition in women’s sports is unfair or unsafe is by reference to specific transgender-identifying male athletes....

206. Although CADA prohibits XX-XY Athletics from speaking consistently with its view that sex is immutable, the law allows other businesses that also qualify as public accommodations to speak according to their view that sex can be changed.  

207. This distinction in treatment is based on a particular view that the business holds about human sexuality and gender identity....

222. The First Amendment’s Free Speech, Press, and Assembly Clauses protect XX-XY Athletics’ ability to speak, create, publish, sell, and distribute speech; to associate with others and with their messages for expressive purposes; to adopt and act on certain speech-related policies; to decline to associate with others and their message for expressive purposes; to decline to create, publish, sell, and distribute speech; to be free from content-based and viewpoint-based discrimination; and to be free from overbroad and vague restrictions on speech that give enforcement officials unbridled discretion....

225. As applied to XX-XY Athletics, CADA impermissibly discriminates against the company’s speech based on content and viewpoint by prohibiting it from referring to individuals by their given name and with pronouns and terminology consistent with their biological sex.  

226.  As applied to XX-XY Athletics, CADA impermissibly inhibits the company’s ability to form expressive associations it desires to form and to avoid expressive associations it desires to avoid by requiring the company to refer to individuals by their preferred name, pronouns, and other terminology and prohibiting the company from referring to individuals by their given name and with pronouns and terminology consistent with their biological sex....

The complaint also alleges that the Colorado law is void for vagueness and violates the Equal Protection clause. ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

California Agrees to Consent Decree Allowing Sectarian Schools to Participate In IDEA

 As previously reported, last October the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a California federal district court's dismissal of a suit by the parents of special needs children and by two Orthodox Jewish schools. The suit challenges as a violation of the Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses California's rules that preclude sectarian schools from receiving payments for special needs children under the federal Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). This week, in the district court the parties filed a Joint Motion for Entry of Consent Judgment and Permanent Injunction in Loffman v, California Department of Education, (CD CA, May 19, 2025). The injunction bars California from enforcing requirements that schools be nonsectarian in order to participate in the IDEA program. Fox News reports on these developments.

Montana Court Strikes Down Ban on Gender-Affirming Care for Minors

In Cross v. State of Montana, (MT Dist. Ct., May 13, 2025), a Montana state trial court in a 59-page opinion held that Montana Senate Bill 99 that bars hormonal or surgical treatment of minors for gender dysphoria is unconstitutional. The court said in part:

First, concerning the right to privacy, Plaintiffs have met their burden ... by providing evidence that the major medical organizations in the United States endorse gender-affirming medical care as a safe, effective way to treat gender dysphoria. Defendants ... fail to demonstrate a medically acknowledged, bona fide health risk with respect to the care banned by SB 99....

Second, Plaintiffs have met their burden ... on their equal protection claim by demonstrating that SB 99 classifies based on similarly situated classes, infringes on several fundamental rights, and denies minors equal protection of the laws on the basis of sex and transgender status because it prohibits health care providers from administering certain care when sought to treat adolescents with gender dysphoria, but it allows the same providers to administer the same care to all other adolescent patients for all other purposes....

Finally ... Plaintiffs successfully demonstrate that SB 99 unconstitutionally regulates medical providers' speech based on content and viewpoint discrimination, and that it is presumptively invalid.... Moreover, Plaintiffs successfully demonstrate that SB 99 prohibits minors with gender dysphoria and their parents from hearing from health care providers....

The Hill reports on the decision. [Thanks to Scott Mange for the lead.]

Employees' Suit Against School Board for Denying Religious Exemption from Covid Vaccine Moves Ahead

Decisions in suits by former employees who were denied religious exemptions from employer Covid vaccine mandates continue to be handed down by the courts.  Here is a recent example:

In Brandon v. Board of Education of the City of St. Louis, (ED MO, May 8, 2025), a Missouri federal district court in a 76-page opinion refused to dismiss 16 employees' free exercise, equal protection, Title VII and state human rights act claims against the St. Louis school board. However, damage claims against the superintendent and the chief human resource officer were dismissed on qualified immunity grounds. Plaintiffs all had requested religious exemptions from the Board's Covid vaccine mandate. The Board received 189 requests for religious exemptions from its 3500 employees. None of the requests were granted. The board granted between 40 and 50 disability and medical exemptions. The court said in part:

Defendants have failed to meet their initial summary-judgment burden of showing that no genuine dispute of material fact exists as to Plaintiffs’ sincere religious beliefs....

... [T]he very providing of exemptions rendered the contract not generally applicable because it “‘invite[d]’ the government to decide which reasons for not complying with the policy [were] worthy of solicitude.”...  For these reasons, the Court holds that the strict-scrutiny standard governs here....

Defendants point to three interests that Policy 4624 purportedly served: (1) education, (2) stemming the spread of COVID-19, and (3) promoting “the health, safety, and general welfare of students.”...

Defendants argue that Policy 4624 was necessary to providing “children of any and all backgrounds safe access to education, social mobility, and athletic, cultural[,] and social development.”...  The Court agrees that these interests are compelling. ...

But the Court disagrees that  Defendants have satisfied their summary-judgment burden and proven that Policy 4624 was narrowly tailored to serve those interests....

... [T]he Board could have granted every request for religious exemption, while still granting all the disability and medical exemptions that it granted, and achieved a total employee vaccination rate of between 93.1%  ... and 93.4%.....

In sum, the record at a minimum strongly indicates that the Board denied all religious-exemption requests wholesale, and Plaintiffs thus received vastly different treatment than their comparators did....

Plaintiffs marshal evidence that the Board denied Plaintiffs’ religious-exemption requests because the Board thought that the religious-exemption requests were less important than other exemption requests. With this evidence, Plaintiffs more than show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether Defendants unlawfully intended to discriminate against Plaintiffs based on Plaintiffs’ protected religious beliefs....

Antisemitism Claims Against UC Berkeley Move Ahead in Part

In Louis D. Brandeis Center, Inc. v. Regents of the University of California, (ND CA, March 31, 2025), plaintiffs allege that UC Berkeley has discriminated against Jewish faculty and students. The California federal district court allowed plaintiffs' free exercise, equal protection and Title VI claims to move forward. However, it dismissed plaintiffs' Sec. 1981 claim for discriminatory refusal to enter contracts. The court said in part:

The FAC [First Amended Complaint] alleges a series of events unfolding over the course of several months on campus, which are said to have been precipitated by a campus culture hostile to Jewish students and professors....  The FAC says that these events were perpetrated by students who professed to oppose Zionism, but actually intended to discriminate against Jewish students and professors because they are Jewish....  The FAC also alleges that Berkeley failed or refused to enforce its anti-discrimination policies as to its Jewish students and faculty in response to these events.... The FAC also plausibly alleges that Berkeley was deliberately indifferent to the on-campus harassment and hostile environment.... Consequently, Brandeis’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Equal Protection and Free Exercise Clauses of the U.S. Constitution will go forward, as will the Title VI claim.  

It bears mention that the FAC repeatedly alleges that “Zionism is a central tenet of the Jewish faith.”...  This raises concerns about whether Brandeis intends to call upon the Court to determine the articles of faith of Judaism.  If so, a serious constitutional problem would arise....

The 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim is dismissed.  The gist of this claim is that members of the plaintiff organizations who are legal academics cannot contract with certain Berkeley student organizations that adopted a bylaw barring invitations to individuals espousing Zionist beliefs....  Brandeis does not dispute it must show standing.... The complaint does not allege that any academic member has sought to contract with the organizations since adoption of the bylaw, been turned away on account of the bylaw, or has otherwise been put at a contractual disadvantage by the bylaw.

Diocese and Pregnancy Center Challenge Illinois Ban on Employment Discrimination Because of Reproductive Health Care Choices

Suit was filed last week in an Illinois federal district court by a Christian Pregnancy Care Center and a Catholic diocese challenging the requirement that they comply with recent amendments to the Illinois Human Rights Act that prohibit discrimination against employees based on their reproductive health care decisions. The complaint (full text) in Pregnancy Care Center of Rockford v. Bennett, (ND IL, filed 3/20/2025), alleges in part:

198. Because they wish to carry out their respective missions and spread their pro-life messages successfully, Plaintiffs hire and retain employees who avoid reproductive decisions that undermine their identity, mission, and message. For Plaintiffs, the credibility of their messengers is as important as the message. 

199. The Act’s Employment, Offensive Speech, and Notice Clauses severely burden Plaintiffs’ freedom of expressive association by forcing them to form associations and assemblies with employees whose reproductive decisions undermine their mission and message....

209. The Act substantially burdens Plaintiffs’ right to the free exercise of religion by prohibiting faith-based speech and conduct related to reproduction, interfering with their faith-based employment decisions, and forcing Plaintiffs to revise their statements of faith, positional statements, codes of conduct, employee handbooks, and other policy documents....

235. [The] right to religious (or “church”) autonomy safeguards a religious organization’s decision about which officers, board members, employees, and volunteers are best suited to advance its religious mission and purpose. 

236. This freedom extends to Plaintiffs’ ability to hire and employ only those who believe—and live out—the beliefs of their organizations about reproductive health decisions such as abortion, sterilization, and contraception....

259. The Act also restricts Plaintiffs’ right to free speech because it compels them to speak a message contrary to their beliefs not only to their current employees but also to prospective employees and the public in general....

281. Defendants’ application of the Act’s provisions about reproductive decisions to Plaintiffs’ religious speech and conduct violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Catholic Vote reports on the lawsuit. 

Court Enjoins Implementation of Ban on Transgender Individuals Serving in the Military

In Talbott v. United States, (D DC, March 18, 2025), the United States federal district court for the District of Columbia issued a preliminary injunction barring the military from implementing Executive Orders and military memoranda that exclude transgender persons from serving in the military. The injunction requires the military to maintain the pre-Trump status quo on military service by transgender individuals. Explaining its decision, the court's 79-page opinion said in part:

The Court agrees that “courts [are] ill-equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority might have” and that “the military authorities [not courts] have been charged by the Executive and Legislative Branches with carrying out our Nation’s military policy.”... Often, courts accept “the reasoned, professional analysis of Congress and the Executive on matters strictly within the realm of military expertise.”...   

Defendants carry deference too far, however.  By “defer” they basically mean the Court must side with the military’s position, end-stop.  And they contend the Court must defer even if the judgment, as here, does not make sense....

The Court ... applies Bostock’s reasoning to analyze the Military Ban.  In doing so, it does not “import[] the Title VII test for liability,” ... into the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment.  Rather, it borrows Justice Gorsuch’s reasoning to conclude that transgender discrimination is a form of sex discrimination for purposes of the equal protection inquiry....

... [B]ecause the Military Ban targets transgender persons for disparate treatment, it creates an explicit sex-based classification that requires application of intermediate scrutiny. ...

The court also concluded that the Military Ban is subject to intermediate scrutiny because transgender persons should be considered a quasi-suspect class. The court went on:

Defendants have articulated important government objectives in military readiness, unit cohesion, and saving costs.  But the Fifth Amendment requires more than pointing to such “broadly formulated interests.”...  Defendants must show that the discriminatory Military Ban is in some way substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.  And they must do so without relying on “overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.” ... They do not come close.  Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that the Military Ban fails intermediate scrutiny review.....

The Military Ban is soaked in animus and dripping with pretext.  Its language is unabashedly demeaning, its policy stigmatizes transgender persons as inherently unfit, and its conclusions bear no relation to fact.  Thus, even if the Court analyzed the Military Ban under rational basis review, it would fail....

The Court could stop here in its analysis and comfortably conclude that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that the Military Ban is motivated by animus and is not tailored to meet its stated goals.  But, as they say, there is more, for the Military Ban does not stand alone.  President Trump has signed an executive order recognizing the existence of only two sexes; blocked schools from using federal funds to promote the idea that gender can be fluid; directed the State Department to stop issuing documents that allow a third “X” gender marker; changed references to “LGBTQI+” on government websites to “LGB,” erasing not just transgender persons, but intersex people as well; revoked the ability of transgender federal employees to receive gender-affirming care; and directed that all incarcerated transgender persons be denied medical treatments and be housed by birth sex, where they are nine times more susceptible to violence....

NPR reports on the decision.

Refusal To Amend Birth Certificate Did Not Violate Plaintiff's 1st or 14th Amendment Rights

In Malone-Bey v. Mississippi State Board of Health, (MS App, March 4, 2025), a Mississippi state appellate court held that plaintiff's religious free exercise, equal protection and due process rights were not violated when the State Board of Health refused to amend his birth certificate to designate his race as “white: Asiatic/Moor.” The court said in part:

[Plaintiff] asserts that “[t]he inability to recognize this information on [his] birth certificate impedes his full expression of his identity.”  He further asserts that the Board is “discriminating against [him] or placing undue burdens on him due to his religious beliefs or status” and has “denied [him] the ability to fulfill religious obligations and affirm his identity.”

These arguments are without merit.  The Board is in no way “discriminating against” Malone-Bey.  To the contrary, the Board’s approved Certificate of Live Birth does not identify the race, nationality, or religion of any child.  The Board has not treated Malone-Bey different from anyone else.  The Board has treated him just like everyone else....

“Just as the [State] may not insist that [Malone-Bey] engage in any set form of religious observance, so [Malone-Bey] may not demand that the [State] join in [his] chosen religious practices by” adding new categories of information to the State’s records....