Alaska Supreme Court Rejects Facial Challenge To Law Allowing State Reimbursement to Home Schoolers For Materials

In State of Alaska, Department of Education & Early Development v. Alexander, (AK Sup. Ct., June 28, 2024), the Alaska Supreme Court refused to hold unconstitutional on its face a state statute that permits school districts to approve an allotment of funds to families to purchase educational materials and services for correspondence study programs from public, private or religious organizations. Plaintiffs contended that the law violates a provision in the Alaska Constitution barring the use of public funds for the direct benefit of any religious or other private educational institution. The Supreme Court said that there are some clearly constitutional applications of the statute, so a facial challenge does not succeed. It added:

Under AS 14.13.300-.310 it is school districts, not the State, that design students’ individual learning plans and authorize particular uses of allotment funds to purchase services and materials in connection with those plans. For this reason, Alexander’s claim that certain uses of allotment funds are unconstitutional cannot proceed without joining a school district that has authorized those uses of allotment funds.

The superior court rejected this argument, which was error. We therefore vacate the court’s denial of the State’s motion to dismiss Alexander’s as-applied challenge and remand for further proceedings. To proceed with an as-applied challenge on remand, Alexander must decide which particular uses of allotments he believes are unconstitutional and then identify and join the school district or districts that authorized that spending.

Alaska Watchman reports on the decision.

Iowa Supreme Court Allows 6-Week Abortion Ban to Go into Effect

In Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Reynolds, (IA Sup.Ct., June 28, 2024), the Iowa Supreme Court in a 4-3 decision reversed the grant of a temporary injunction against Iowa's 6-week fetal heartbeat abortion ban. The Court said in part:

We have previously held that abortion is not a fundamental right under the Iowa Constitution....  Applying our established tiers of scrutiny, we hold that abortion restrictions alleged to violate the due process clause are subject to the rational basis test. Employing that test here, we conclude that the fetal heartbeat statute is rationally related to the state’s legitimate interest in protecting unborn life. We thus reverse the district court order entering the temporary injunction blocking enforcement of the fetal heartbeat statute....

Chief Justice Christensen, joined by Justices Waterman and Mansfield, filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Today, our court’s majority strips Iowa women of their bodily autonomy by holding that there is no fundamental right to terminate a pregnancy under our state constitution. I cannot stand by this decision. The majority’s rigid approach relies heavily on the male-dominated history and traditions of the 1800s, all the while ignoring how far women’s rights have come since the Civil War era. It is a bold assumption to think that the drafters of our state constitution intended for their interpretation to stand still while we move forward as a society. Instead, we should interpret our constitution through a modern lens that recognizes how our lives have changed with the passage of time.

Justice Mansfield, joined by Chief Justice Christensen and Justice Waterman, filed a dissenting opinion saying in part:

I believe that subjecting a near-total ban on abortion to a rational basis test—the same test we apply to traffic cameras, and a more forgiving test than the one we apply to a law not allowing county auditors to correct defective absentee ballot applications—disserves the people of Iowa and their constitution. The liberty protected by article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution includes a woman’s ability to make decisions regarding her own body, just as it includes rights of procreation, parenting, and to use contraception.

Suit Challenges Michigan Medicaid Ban on Abortion Funding

Suit was filed yesterday in the Michigan Court of Claims challenging the exclusion of abortion coverage from the state's Medicaid program. Plaintiff is a local YWCA which operates a Reproductive Health Fund that provides financial support for county residents for reproductive health care, including abortion services. The complaint (full text) Young Women's Christian Association of Kalamazoo, Michigan v. State of Michigan, (MI Ct. Cl., filed 6/27/2024), alleges that the exclusion violates the state Constitutional Amendment protecting reproductive freedom, the Michigan Reproductive Health Act which implemented the Amendment and the ban on sex discrimination. ACLU issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Michigan Court Enjoins Abortion Restrictions Including 24-Hour Waiting Period and Consent Form

 In Northland Family Planning Center v. Nessel, (MI Ct. Cl., June 25, 2024), the Michigan Court of Claims issued a preliminary injunction against enforcement of three restrictions on abortion procedures found in Michigan law.  The enjoined provisions impose a 24-hour mandatory waiting period, require a uniform informed consent for women seeking an abortion, and bar advanced practice clinicians from performing abortions. The court held that the provisions are unconstitutional under a state constitutional amendment adopted by referendum in 2022 which grants every individual a fundamental right to reproductive freedom and provides that an "individual’s right to reproductive freedom shall not be denied, burdened, nor infringed upon unless justified by a compelling state interest achieved by the least restrictive means." The court said in part:

... [T]he Court is convinced that the [24-hour] mandatory delay exacerbates the burdens that patients experience seeking abortion care, including by increasing costs, prolonging wait times, increasing the risk that a patient will have to disclose their decision to others, and potentially preventing a patient from having the type of abortion that they prefer....

The informed-consent provisions, read as whole, are designed to force a patient to consider the alternative of not having an abortion. The manner in which the information is presented is not neutral; it is designed to eschew abortion in favor of completing a pregnancy. This forced deliberation, through the mandatory informed-consent process, burdens and infringes upon a patient’s right to make and effectuate decisions about abortion care. The State is metaphorically putting its finger on the scale, thereby infringing upon a patient’s deliberative process.

The court however refused to enjoin provisions calling for oral counseling against coercion and providing resources to victims of domestic violence. Bridge Michigan reports on the decision.

Oklahoma Supreme Court Says Creation of Religious Charter School Is Unconstitutional

In Drummond v. Oklahoma Statewide Virtual Charter School Board, (OK Sup, Ct., June 25, 2024), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the state Charter School Board's authorization of a Catholic sponsored publicly-funded charter school violates Oklahoma statutes, the Oklahoma Constitution and the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. The court said in part:

Although a public charter school, St. Isidore is an instrument of the Catholic church, operated by the Catholic church, and will further the evangelizing mission of the Catholic church in its educational programs. The expenditure of state funds for St. Isidore's operations constitutes the use of state funds for the benefit and support of the Catholic church. It also constitutes the use of state funds for "the use, benefit, or support of . . . a sectarian institution." The St. Isidore Contract violates the plain terms of Article 2, Section 5 of the Oklahoma Constitution....

Because it is a governmental entity and a state actor, St. Isidore cannot ignore the mandates of the Establishment Clause, yet a central component of St. Isidore's educational philosophy is to establish and operate the school as a Catholic school. St. Isidore will fully incorporate Catholic teachings into every aspect of the school, including its curriculum and co-curricular activities. It will require students to spend time in religious instruction and activities, as well as permit state spending in direct support of the religious curriculum and activities within St. Isidore--all in violation of the Establishment Clause....

... [W]hat St. Isidore requests from this Court is beyond the fair treatment of a private religious institution in receiving a generally available benefit, implicating the Free Exercise Clause. It is about the State's creation and funding of a new religious institution violating the Establishment Clause.12 Even if St. Isidore could assert free exercise rights, those rights would not override the legal prohibition under the Establishment Clause. Compliance with the Establishment Clause in this case is a compelling governmental interest that satisfies strict scrutiny under other provisions of the First Amendment.

Vice Chief Justice Rowe concurred in part and dissented in part, saying that he concurred only in the conclusion "that Article 1, Section 5 of the Oklahoma Constitution mandates that public charter schools are nonsectarian."

Justice Kuehn dissented, saying in part:

St. Isidore would not become a "state actor" merely by contracting with the State to provide a choice in educational opportunities. By allowing St. Isidore to operate a virtual charter school, the State would not be establishing, aiding, or favoring any particular religious organization. To the contrary: Excluding private entities from contracting for functions, based solely on religious affiliation, would violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

AP reports on the decision.

Missouri Abortion Bans Do Not Violate State Constitution's Establishment Clauses

In Blackmon v. State of Missouri, (MO Cir. Ct., June 1, 2024), a Missouri trial court held that Missouri's various statutory provisions banning abortion do not violate the Establishment Clauses of the Missouri Constitution. Plaintiffs focused particularly on the mention of God in one of the statutory provisions and the legislative determination that life begins at conception in other provisions. The court concluded that the language mentioning God was similar to that in the Preamble to the Missouri Constitution, and that finding that language problematic would call into question whether the state Constitution's Preamble itself violates the Constitution.  In rejecting plaintiffs' other challenges, the court said in part:

Large portions of the parties' arguments centered around comments made by legislators concerning their religious motivations for supporting the Challenged Provisions. However, the court finds that individual comments by legislators should be given little to no consideration when determining the constitutionality of the Challenged Provisions....

The court does not accept Petitioners' argument that the determination that life begins at conception is strictly a religious one. The plain language of the Challenged Provisions stating that life begins at conception do not do so in religious terms.... While the determination that life begins at conception may run counter to some religious beliefs, it is not itself necessarily a religious belief. As such, it does not prevent all men and women form worshiping Almighty God or not worshipping according to the dictates of their own consciences....

Americans United issued a press release responding to the decision.

Texas Supreme Court Rejects Expansion of Medical Exceptions to Abortion Ban

 In State of Texas v. Zurawski, (TX Sup. Ct., May 31, 2024), the Texas Supreme Court vacated a temporary injunction entered by a state trial court which had broadened the medical exception to Texas' abortion ban. The trial court had relied on the Due Course of Law and Equal Protection clauses of the Texas Constitution. The Supreme Court said in part:

Under the Human Life Protection Act, a woman with a life-threatening physical condition and her physician have the legal authority to proceed with an abortion to save the woman’s life or major bodily function, in the exercise of reasonable medical judgment and with the woman’s informed consent. As our Court recently held, the law does not require that a woman’s death be imminent or that she first suffer physical impairment. Rather, Texas law permits a physician to address the risk that a life-threatening condition poses before a woman suffers the consequences of that risk. A physician who tells a patient, “Your life is threatened by a complication that has arisen during your pregnancy, and you may die, or there is a serious risk you will suffer substantial physical impairment unless an abortion is performed,” and in the same breath states “but the law won’t allow me to provide an abortion in these circumstances” is simply wrong in that legal assessment. 

Given this construction, we conclude that Dr. Karsan has not demonstrated that the part of the Human Life Protection Act that permits life-saving abortion is narrower than the Texas Constitution allows.

Justice Lehrmann filed a concurring opinion. Justice Busby also filed a concurring opinion which Justice Lehrmann joined.

CBS News reported on the decision.

Court Says NY Proposed Amendment on Abortion, Sexual Orientation and Gender May Not Go on Ballot

In Byrnes v. Senate of the State of New York, (Livingston County NY Sup. Ct., May 7, 2024), a New York state trial court held that the proposed state Equal Protection constitutional amendment must be removed from the November 2024 ballot because the state legislature did not follow the proper procedures in approving the amendment for placement on the ballot.  The proposed amendment (full text) would expand the state constitution's Equal Protection clause by adding ethnicity, national origin, age, disability, sex (including sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, pregnancy, pregnancy outcomes and reproductive healthcare and autonomy) to race, color, creed and religion that are already protected against discrimination by the clause. The clause covers discrimination by private individuals and firms as well as by the state and the proposed amendment provides that no characteristic listed in the section shall be interpreted to interfere with the civil rights of any other person based on any of the other characteristics listed. The court held that the state legislature's failure to wait 20 days for an Attorney General's opinion on the proposed amendment before taking the initial vote on it invalidated the Resolution proposing the amendment. The City reports on the decision.

Ohio Court Issues TRO Against Bill Barring Gender-Affirming Care for Minors and Transgender Women on Sports Teams

 In Moe v. Yost, (OH Com. Pl., April 16, 2024), an Ohio state trial court issued a 14-day temporary restraining order preventing the state from enforcing House Bill 68 which enacted the Saving Ohio Adolescents from Experimentation (SAFE) Act barring gender transition services for minors and the Save Women's Sports Act that barred transgender women from competing on women's sports teams. (See prior posting.) The bill was set to take effect on April 24. The court concluded that the bill likely violates the provision in the Ohio Constitution that states: "No bill shall contain more than one subject..." The ACLU says that it "will continue the litigation to ultimately obtain a permanent injunction on behalf of Ohio families whose children are at risk of losing critical life-saving medical care." National Review reports on the decision.

5th Circuit Denies Further Relief to Native American Church Objecting to Park Modifications

As previously reported, last year a Texas federal district court held that members of the Lipam-Apache Native American Church should be given access for religious services to a point on the San Antonio River which is a Sacred Site for them.  The court refused to grant plaintiffs' request that the proposed improvements to the park in which the Sacred Site is located be limited so that the spiritual ecology of the Sacred Area would be preserved by minimizing tree removal and allowing cormorants to nest. Plaintiffs appealed the injunction denials.  In Perez v. City of San Antonio, (5th Cir., April 11, 2024), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. Rejecting appellants' claim under the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the court said in part:

In analyzing Appellants’ contention that the destruction of the tree canopies, where cormorants nest, and the driving away of the cormorants themselves will burden their religions, we consider whether the presupposed burden is real and significant....

Appellants continue to have virtually unlimited access to the Park for religious and cultural purposes. Appellants’ reverence of the cormorants as sacred genesis creatures from the Sacred Area is not implicated here because the City’s rookery management program does not directly dictate or regulate the cormorants’ nesting habits, migration, or Park visitation. For example, the record shows that, regardless of the rookery management program, no cormorants, due to their migration patterns, inhabit the area for extended periods of time each year. Moreover, the City’s rookery management program does not substantially burden Appellants’ religious beliefs because cormorants can still nest elsewhere in the 343-acre Park or nearby. The deterrent activities are deployed only within the two-acre Project Area and only to persuade the birds to nest elsewhere....

The record indicates that various areas of the Park “become nearly unusable for 10 months of the year due to the bird density/habitat.”...

 [T]he City’s tree removal plan is narrowly tailored to achieve the City’s compelling governmental interest of making the Project Area safe for visitors to the Park....

Appellants assert that the City’s plan violates the religious-service protections provision of the Texas Constitution....

Even accepting that the “relatively new provision bars any government action that prohibits or limits religious services,” Appellants do not sufficiently brief the question of whether a compelled “preservation of spiritual ecology” was envisioned in the statute’s definition of a “religious service” protected from state sanctioned prohibitions or limitations.

Judge Higginson dissented in part, contending that the city should have done more to accommodate plaintiffs as to tree removal and anti-nesting matters.

Louisiana Supreme Court: Revival of Barred Sex Abuse Claims Violates Priest's Rights Under State Constitution

 In Bienvenu v. Defendant 1, (LA Sup. Ct., March 22, 2024), the Louisiana Supreme Court in a 4-3 decision held that a 2021 Louisiana statute that revived child sex abuse claims that had previously been time barred violates the Louisiana Constitution. The statute gave victims a 3-year window to file claims. The court said in part:

Essentially, plaintiffs alleged they were sexually molested by a Roman Catholic priest at various times between 1971 and 1979.   At the time of the alleged abuse, plaintiffs ranged in ages from eight to fourteen.  

Defendants responded by filing several exceptions, including a peremptory exception of prescription, arguing that plaintiffs’ claims were subject to the general one-year liberative prescriptive period for delictual actions under former La. Civ. Code art. 3536(1)....

The definite nature of accrued prescription has been repeatedly recognized in our jurisprudence, which makes it clear that, unlike statutes of limitations at common law, under civilian principles, prescriptive periods that have accrued act to extinguish the civil obligation to which they apply....

Guided by Louisiana’s civil law tradition, we decline to upend nearly a half of a century’s jurisprudence that recognizes the unique nature of vested rights associated with liberative prescription, which inure to the benefit of both plaintiffs (protecting an accrued cause of action) and defendants (protecting a defense of accrued liberative prescription).  Therefore, despite the sickening  and despicable factual allegations in this case, we must conclude that La. R.S. 9:2800.9, as amended by the revival provisions, cannot be retroactively applied to revive plaintiffs’ prescribed causes of action.  To find otherwise would divest defendants of their vested right to plead prescription in violation of Art. I, Section 2 of the Louisiana Constitution.

However the court remanded the case for the trial court to determine whether the one-year prescriptive period had tolled.

Justice Crichton filed a concurring opinion, as did Justice Griffin.

Chief Justice Weimer dissented, saying in part:

Given Louisiana’s legitimate interest in protecting its citizens who were sexually abused as minors and in providing them with the ability to seek redress in the courts, and the narrowly tailored nature of the relief provided–the legislation revives, for a short period of time, for a narrow category of tort victims, actions otherwise prescribed–I would find that the revival provision is consistent with the due process guarantee.  Under the due process clause, no rights–not even fundamental ones–are absolute.  The due process clause simply offers protection from arbitrary and unreasonable action by the government.  The revival provision at issue is not arbitrary (in fact, in this case it is arguable that the “arbitrary and unreasonable” conduct was the alleged sexual abuse perpetrated upon children by those in society who were placed in positions of authority).  And, the provision has been demonstrated to have a substantial relationship to public safety, morals and welfare.

Justice Crain also filed a dissenting opinion. Justice McCallum dissented without opinion.

Balls and Strikes reported on the decision. [Thanks to Scott Mange for the lead.]

Florida Supreme Court Clears Abortion Rights Proposal for November Ballot

 In Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re: Limiting Government Interference with Abortion, (FL Sup. Ct., April 1, 2024), the Florida Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, rejected challenges to placing a proposed abortion rights constitutional amendment on the November ballot. The proposed amendment provides:

Limiting government interference with abortion.—Except as provided in Article X, Section 22, no law shall prohibit, penalize, delay, or restrict abortion before viability or when necessary to protect the patient’s health, as determined by the patient’s healthcare provider.

The court said in part:

We decline to adopt a standard that would effectively vest us with the power to bar an amendment from the ballot because of a supposed ambiguity in the text of the amendment.  We decline to encroach on the prerogative to amend their constitution that the people have reserved to themselves.

Chief Justice Muniz filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Canaday and Couriel concur, saying in part:

... [Q]uestions of justice are appropriately at the heart of the voters’ assessment of a proposed amendment like the one under review.  With its reference to the existence of “inalienable rights” in all persons, our constitution’s Declaration of Rights assumes a pre-constitutional, objective moral reality that demands our respect—indeed, a moral order that government exists to protect.  The proposed amendment would constitutionalize restrictions on the people’s authority to use law to protect an entire class of human beings from private harm.  It would cast into doubt the people’s authority even to enact protections that are prudent, compassionate, and mindful of the complexities involved.  Under our system of government, it is up to the voters—not this Court—to decide whether such a rule is consistent with the deepest commitments of our political community.

Justice Grosshans filed a dissenting opinion in which Justic Sasso concurs. Justice Francis filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Sasso filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Grosshans and Francis concur, saying in part:

I agree with the majority that, at a very high level, the voters will understand that this amendment creates a broad right to abortion in Florida.  However, our precedent has consistently required that the summary explain more than the amendment’s general aim.  Indeed, we have said that ballot summaries must explain the “material legal effect,” so that the electorate is advised of the “true meaning, and ramifications, of an amendment” and is thereby “adequately informed.” 

The summary here does none of this.

In a separate decision yesterday, the Florida Supreme Court held that the state Constitution's Privacy Clause does not protect abortion rights. (See prior posting.) Orlando Sentinel reports on the two decisions.

Montana Supreme Court Says AG Wrongly Rejected Language of Reproductive Rights Initiative

In Montanans Securing Reproductive Rights v. Knudson,(MT Sup. Ct., March 18, 2024), the Montana Supreme Court held that the state Attorney General was incorrect in in concluding that a proposed reproductive rights ballot initiative violates the separate vote requirement of the Montana Constitution. It also held that the Attorney General lacked authority to append a fiscal statement to the initiative. The court ordered the Attorney General to prepare a ballot statement for the initiative and forward it to the Secretary of State. 

Justice McKinnon filed a concurring opinion. Justice Rice filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

I believe it is clear that the provisions of CI-14 are not readily understood, have effects that are concealed, and would result in voter confusion this review is designed to prevent.

(See prior related posting.) Montana Free Press reports on the decision. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

State Constitutional Challenge to Abortion Restrictions Filed in Wisconsin Supreme Court

Last year in Kaul v. Urmanski, (WI Cir. Ct., Dec. 5, 2023), a Wisconsin state trial court held that Wisconsin Statute §940.04 which prohibits destroying the life of an unborn child applies only to feticide, and not to consensual abortions. That case is now on appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Yesterday, Planned Parenthood filed a petition with the Wisconsin Supreme Court asking it to take original jurisdiction over a state constitutional challenge to §940.04. It contends that the Court should decide the constitutional question before it engages in the statutory interpretation issue presented in the Kaul case. The petition (full text) in Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin v. Linton, (WI Sup.Ct., filed 2/22/2024), contends that Wisconsin Statute §940.04, if interpreted to ban abortions in all cases except to save the life of the mother, violates Art. I, Sec. 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution. The Petition asserts that the abortion ban (enacted in the mid 19th century) violates the right to bodily integrity, autonomy and self-determination; the physician's and the patient's right to equal protection, and the physician's right to practice his or her profession. Courthouse News Service reports on Planned Parenthood's petition.

Arkansas AG Certifies Abortion Amendment Proposal; Signature Collection May Begin

After rejecting two prior proposals as being unclear or misleading (1 , 2 ) on Tuesday, Arkansas Attorney General Tim Griffin certified the popular name and ballot title for a proposed constitutional amendment that, if adopted by voters, will liberalize abortion rules in Arkansas.  The ballot proposal describes the changes as follows in part:

... [T]his amendment changes Arkansas law by amending the Arkansas Constitution to provide that the government of the State of Arkansas, its officers, or its political subdivisions shall not prohibit, penalize, delay, or restrict abortion services (1) in cases of rape, (2) in cases of incest, (3) in the event of a fatal fetal anomaly, or (4) when, in a physician’s good-faith medical judgment, abortion services are needed to protect a pregnant female’s life or to protect a pregnant female from a physical disorder, physical illness, or physical injury; to provide that the government of the State of Arkansas, its officers, or its political subdivisions shall not prohibit, penalize, delay, or restrict abortion services within 18 weeks of fertilization....

As reported by the Arkansas Democrat Gazette, the Attorney General's approval allows proponents to begin to collect 90,704 signatures needed to get the proposal on the November 2024 ballot.

Montana AG Says Abortion Rights Initiative Cannot Go on Ballot

In a Memorandum dated January 16, Montana's Attorney General has ruled that proponents of an abortion rights amendment to the Montana Constitution may not begin to collect signatures to get the proposal on the ballot because the proposal is legally insufficient. (Full text of AG's ruling.) Montana's Supreme Court in Armstrong v. State (1999) has previously held that the state Constitution's privacy provisions protect the right to pre-viability abortion. The proposed Amendment as summarized by the Secretary of State would explicitly protect that right, would assure the right to abortion even post-viability when necessary to protect the pregnant person's life or health, and would prohibit the state from taking adverse action against patients, healthcare providers or anyone assisting someone in obtaining reproductive care. The Attorney General's Memorandum concludes that the proposed Amendment "logrolls multiple distinct political choices into a single initiative," in violation of the separate-vote provision of the state Constitution. Montana Free Press reporting on the Attorney General's action, says that Amendment proponents plan to challenge the Attorney General's action in court. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Virginia Supreme Court Rules For Teacher Who Refused To Use Student's Preferred Pronouns

In Vlaming v. West Point School Board, (VA Sup. Ct., Dec. 14, 2023), the Virginia Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, held that a teacher who was fired after refusing for religious reasons to use masculine pronouns in referring to a biologically female student has a claim for violation of the free exercise provisions of the Virginia state Constitution. The majority, in a 73-page opinion, held that the Virginia Constitution requires greater accommodation than does the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution when a neutral law of generally applicability conflicts with a religious belief.  The majority said in part:

[W]e hold that in the Commonwealth of Virginia, the constitutional right to free exercise of religion is among the “natural and unalienable rights of mankind,” ... and that “overt acts against peace and good order,”  correctly defines the limiting principle for this right and establishes the duty of government to accommodate religious liberties that do not transgress these limits.

The majority also held that plaintiff had adequately stated a claim under the Virginia Religious Freedom Restoration Act as well as a claim for violation of the free speech and due process provisions of the Virginia Constitution. The majority said in part:

Because the gravamen of Vlaming’s free-speech claims involves an allegation of compelled speech on an ideological subject, we hold that the circuit court erred when it dismissed Vlaming’s free-speech claims....

At the time that the School Board fired Vlaming, no clearly established law — whether constitutional, statutory, or regulatory — put a teacher on notice that not using third-person pronouns in addition to preferred names constituted an unlawful act of discrimination against transgender students. If the government truly means to compel speech, the compulsion must be clear and direct.

Finally the majority concluded that plaintiff adequately alleged that the School Board had breached his contract.

Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Goodwyn concurred in part, saying in part:

I write separately to clarify that, in my opinion, the proper test to evaluate a free exercise claim under Article I, Section 16 of the Virginia Constitution is traditional strict scrutiny as expressed in Sherbert v. Verner.... I disagree with the majority’s conclusion “that ‘overt acts against peace and good order,’ ... correctly defines the limiting principle for this right [in Article I, Section 16] and establishes the duty of the government to accommodate religious liberties that do not transgress these limits.”

Justice Mann filed a 64-page opinion dissenting in part. He said in part:

I dissent from the majority’s analysis and interpretation of Article I, Section 16.... The majority’s proposed limiting principle for the free exercise provision ... is not supported by the plain words of our Constitution, its history, our legal precedent, or legislative action of the General Assembly. I also dissent with respect to the majority’s rulings on Vlaming’s free speech and due process claims. Regarding Vlaming’s free-exercise claim, the majority establishes a sweeping super scrutiny standard with the potential to shield any person’s objection to practically any policy or law by claiming a religious justification for their failure to follow either.,,, 

Where a claimant alleges that the government was hostile towards his religious free exercise or that the government did not neutrally apply the law, the reviewing court should apply strict scrutiny to determine whether the government’s enforcement was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest....

As for Vlaming’s free speech and due process claims, the facts speak for themselves. Under well-established federal precedent, Vlaming’s allegations as pleaded establish that Vlaming was (1) a public employee engaged in curricular speech pursuant to his official job duties, (2) not speaking as a private citizen on a matter of public concern; and (3) had ample notice that his refusal to use Doe’s preferred pronouns was a violation of the School Board’s policies, and the School Board provided him an opportunity to be heard on his discipline.... 

Justice Powell and Chief Justice Goodwyn joined the portions of Justice Mann's opinion that relate to the Virginia Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the free speech and due process provisions of the Virginia Constitution.

Court Disqualifies Proposed Nevada Reproductive Freedom Amendment From 2024 Ballot

In Washington v. Aguilar, (NV Dist. Ct., Nov. 21, 2023), a Nevada state trial court held that an Initiative Petition proposing a Reproductive Freedom Constitutional Amendment could not be placed on the 2024 ballot. The court held that the initiative proposal violates the single subject rule, contains a misleading description of the Amendment's effect and contains an unfunded mandate.  The court said in part:

This Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the Petition embraces a multitude of subjects that amount to logrolling. Subsection 1, alone, embraces the following subjects: prenatal care, childbirth, postpartum care, birth control, vasectomy, tubal ligation, abortion, abortion care, management of a miscarriage, and infertility care. Subsection 1 purportedly creates a “fundamental right to reproductive freedom,” but there is no limiting language in that section to circumscribe that right such that the section embraces a single and articulable subject....

The court found the description of the Amendment misleading because "it fails to mention that the law will bar the State from prosecuting, fining, or regulating any miscarriage or stillbirth"; it fails to mention that a medical provider can order a late term abortion to protect the pregnant person's health.; and it fails to explain that it affects equality and equal protection.

Finally, the court found that the proposed Amendment creates an unfunded mandate because a Panel or Board would need to be created to determine whether a healthcare provider acted within the standard of care.

Nevada Independent reports on the decision.

Oklahoma Supreme Court Temporarily Enjoins 3 Laws Restricting Abortions

In Oklahoma Call for Reproductive Justice v. Drummond, (OK Sup. Ct, Nov. 14, 2023), the Oklahoma Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision directed the trial court to issue a temporary injunction preventing enforcement of three statutes that impose regulatory requirements on abortions while challenges to the laws proceed. The court's majority opinion says in part:

[In Oklahoma Call for Reproductive Justice v. Drummond I] we held that the Oklahoma Constitution protects a limited right to an abortion, i.e., one that creates an inherent right of the mother to terminate a pregnancy when necessary to preserve her life.... This ... was defined to mean: a woman has an inherent right to choose to terminate her pregnancy if, at any point in the pregnancy, the woman's physician has determined to a reasonable degree of medical certainty or probability that the continuation of the pregnancy will endanger the woman's life due to the pregnancy itself or due to a medical condition that the woman is either currently suffering from or likely to suffer from during the pregnancy.... We made no ruling on whether the Oklahoma Constitution provides a right to an elective termination of a pregnancy....

H.B. 1904 provides a new requirement that a physician who performs an abortion must be board-certified in obstetrics and gynecology. S.B. 779 requires a physician who is certified to provide an abortion-inducing drug either to have admitting privileges at a hospital in the county or contiguous to the county where the abortion-inducing drug was administered or to have a written agreement with an associated physician in such location. S.B. 778 requires an Ultrasound be performed at least 72 hours prior to providing an abortion-inducing drug, but it does make an exception if such requirement would pose a greater risk of death or impairment.....

The clear weight of the evidence presented showed the apparent effect of the three Acts would place unnecessary burdens on the lawful termination of a pregnancy....

Maintaining the status quo would further the public interest of protecting a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy in order to preserve her life....

A concurring opinion and four dissenting opinions were filed. A dissent by Chief Justice Kane, joined by Justice Kuehn, says in part:

The constitutional analysis undertaken by the majority continues to omit the weighing of the rights and interests of the unborn. Any analysis of an abortion statute that proceeds under the proposition that the life of the unborn is unworthy of consideration is defective. In a separate concurring writing, my colleague makes the identical point as to the life of the mother. I completely agree with my colleague on this. However, the interests of the mother were the only interests considered by the majority- the rights of the unborn remain unheard.

AP reports on the decision.

Anti-Abortion Legislators in Ohio Will Seek to Remove Jurisdiction of Courts to Interpret New Constitutional Amendment

 As previously reported, abortion opponents in Ohio have taken several approaches in their unsuccessful attempt to prevent the adoption of a reproductive rights amendment to the Ohio Constitution. First they unsuccessfully attempted to amend the state constitution to increase the percentage of voters needed to adopt a constitutional amendment.  Then the state Ballot board adopted a description of the proposed amendment that was seen as painting the amendment in a less favorable light.  Nevertheless, earlier this week voters adopted the amendment by a vote of 56.6% to 43.4%.  Several legislators now say they will attempt to remove jurisdiction from Ohio courts to interpret the new amendment.  In a November 9 press release from the state legislature's Republican Newsroom, Republican legislators said in part:

“Foreign billionaires don't get to make Ohio laws,” said Jennifer Gross (R-West Chester), pointing to millions from billionaires outside America that helped fund Issue 1. Gross added, “This is foreign election interference, and it will not stand.”...

Representative Beth Lear (R-Galena) stated, “No amendment can overturn the God given rights with which we were born.”

To prevent mischief by pro-abortion courts with Issue 1, Ohio legislators will consider removing jurisdiction from the judiciary over this ambiguous ballot initiative. The Ohio legislature alone will consider what, if any, modifications to make to existing laws based on public hearings and input from legal experts on both sides.