The North Carolina Supreme Court last week decided four cases raising the constitutionality and reach of the SAFE Child Act. In McKinney v. Goins, (NC Sup. Ct., Jan. 31, 2025), the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld against attacks under the state constitution a provision that created a two-year window during which victims of child sexual abuse could bring tort claims that were previously barred by existing statutes of limitation. The Court held that neither the "Law of the Land" Clause not the Ex Post Facto Clause of the North Carolina Constitution bar the challenged provision. The Court also rejected a substantive due process claim. Justice Earls filed an opinion concurring in the result but strongly disagreeing with the majority's method of constitutional interpretation which he labels "extreme originalism".
In Cohane v. Home Missioners of America, (NC Sup. Ct., Jan 31, 2025), the Court held that the SAFE Child Act revived suits against those who enabled the abuse, as well as against the abusers. The Court said in part:
The issue here is whether the General Assembly meant to distinguish between abusers who personally harmed the plaintiff and those organizations, institutions, and parties that employed or supervised the abuser or otherwise condoned, ratified, or facilitated the abuse (enablers). Defendants would have us hold not only that the revival provision distinguished between the two types of potential defendants but also that it authorized suits against abusers and not against enablers, in contravention of background tort law principles. We conclude that such a distinction does not follow from the plain text of the provision, nor does it find support in the SAFE Child Act or related statutory provisions read as a whole.
However, in two cases consolidated for decision, John Doe 1K v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Charlotte and John Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Charlotte, (NC Sup. Ct., Jan. 31, 2025), the Court said in part:
Plaintiffs in this case are alleged victims of child sexual abuse in the 1970s and 1980s. The SAFE Child Act would have revived plaintiffs’ time-barred claims except for one glaring problem— plaintiffs already brought those claims over a decade ago and courts already entered final judgments dismissing those claims with prejudice because they were time barred.
... [T]he General Assembly does not have the power to set aside a final judgment of the judicial branch.
AP reports on the decisions. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]
