Denial of Historic Preservation Grants to Churches Violates 1st Amendment

In The Mendham Methodist Church v. Morris County, New Jersey, (D NJ, Nov. 27, 2024), a New Jersey federal district court held that Rule 5.6.4 of New Jersey's Historic Preservation Grant program violates the 1st Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. Rule 5.6.4 bars grants for "property currently used for religious purposes or functions."  The Rule was based on the state constitution's Religious Aid Clause which says in part: "[n]o person shall . . . be obliged to pay . . . taxes ... for building or repairing any church or ... place ... of worship....." In granting a preliminary injunction against denial of grants to plaintiff churches, the court said in part:

The Religious Aid Clause does not "zero in on any particular 'essentially religious' aspect of funding.... Therefore, Rule 5.6.4 is not narrowly tailored. It states that "[a]ny property that is currently used for religious purposes or functions is ineligible for Historic Preservation grant funding."... Plaintiff Mendham was informed in 2022 that it was ineligible for grant funding from the Fund because the application involved "the principle [sic] church building that is currently used for religious purposes."... Rule 5.6.4 does not limit funding to religious institutions to secular aspects of repair. Instead, it excludes the institutions from eligibility wholesale because they are religious institutions. Rule 5.6.4, as currently written and construed, therefore, likely violates the Free Exercise Clause.

The current construction of Rule 5.6.4 does not mean, however, that Locke [v. Davey] is not still good law, nor that any restriction on taxpayer funding of religious institutions is unconstitutional. Without deciding the issue, the Court notes that a different version of Rule 5.6.4 restricting mandated taxpayer funding of purely religious iconography or purposes may still survive under Locke. However, such a hypothetical, narrower provision is not before the Court.

Equally Divided New Jersey Supreme Court Dismisses Defamation Suit Against Jewish School

 In Hyman v. Rosenbaum Yeshiva of North Jersey, (NJ Sup. Ct., July 24, 2024), an equally divided New Jersey Supreme Court decision resulted in affirmance through a short per curiam opinion of the dismissal of defamation claims brought against an Orthodox Jewish school by a Judaic Studies teacher whose employment by the school was terminated. The Justices were equally divided on whether discovery should be permitted in the case.

The 6 justices participating in the decision unanimously agreed on the standard for applying the ministerial exception, saying that the court must analyze each element of plaintiff's claim and determine whether adjudicating it would require the court to choose between competing religious visions or would interfere with a church's administrative prerogatives including its right to select and control the duties of its ministers, whether or not the alleged misconduct is rooted in religious belief. Here plaintiff's employment was terminated for inappropriate touching of female students. Information about his termination was emailed to the school's Board of Directors, parents of current students and faculty members. The letter was subsequently disseminated on social media.

Justice Patterson's concurring opinion for 3 justices said in part:

Here, the religious employer’s allegedly defamatory statement was not a description of claimed misconduct by Hyman; no such description appears in Price’s letter to the school community.  Instead, Hyman’s defamation claims are premised on Price’s statement that “it was determined that Rabbi Hyman’s conduct had been neither acceptable nor consistent with how a rebbe in our Yeshiva should interact with students.”  In short, the statement at the heart of this case was not an assertion of fact about the former students’ allegations, but an explanation of the Yeshiva’s decision to terminate Hyman -- a determination made in consultation with halachic authorities as well as legal counsel.  With or without discovery regarding the details of the allegations, the court’s inquiry as to the merits would be the same:  the court would be required to assess the reasons for a religious institution’s decision to terminate the employment of a minister, an inquiry that would violate the First Amendment.

Justice Pierre-Louis' dissenting opinion for 3 justices said in part: 

In order for a court to make [a determination that the ministerial exception applies] ... plaintiffs must be allowed discovery.... [U]nder the concurring opinion’s analysis, a religious entity can seemingly fire an employee based solely on a personal vendetta, publish a knowingly false and defamatory statement about the plaintiff, and shield itself from liability -- and even discovery -- by invoking the ministerial exception.  Such a holding slams the courthouse door shut on potentially wronged plaintiffs before they can even obtain discovery that would allow a court to determine whether adjudicating their claims actually interferes with religious autonomy....

Defendants have conflated the issues in this case, making it appear as though this defamation case is the same as an employment discrimination case.  But assessing the legality of what a religious institution says about an adverse employment action is not the same thing as determining the lawfulness of the adverse action itself.  The latter necessarily requires a court to interfere with a religious institution’s internal management, its doctrinal specificities, and its decisions regarding who preaches the faith, but the former does not.

Becket Fund issued a press release announcing the decision.

Fraud and Negligence Claims Move Ahead Against Church Over Mistreatment of Members

In Ramirez v. World Mission Society, Church of God, (D NJ, April 1, 2024), plaintiff brought suit in a New Jersey federal district court against various defendants, including a church and its Pastor, for fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence. Plaintiff claims that she was pressured into joining defendant Church, in part through concealment of the identity of the Church's leader. She was further coerced into donating 10% of her income to the church based on misrepresentations that the donations would be used for charitable purposes rather than salaries. The Church indoctrinated its members so that they would work long hours at low pay. It alienated plaintiff from her family and friends, and told members they could not have children which led plaintiff to get an abortion and subsequently attempt suicide. The court dismissed many of the claims because elements were not adequately pleaded. Only a claim against the Church and its Pastor for intentional fraud based on false representations and a claim for negligence against the Church survived defendants' motion to dismiss.

Court Enforces Arbitration Award Requiring Husband to Furnish Jewish Bill of Divorce

In S.I. v. M.I., (NJ App., March 22, 2024), a New Jersey state appellate court held that a husband was required to comply with an arbitration agreement he had signed that required him to accept Rabbi David Twersky's decision on his obligation to give his wife a get (Jewish bill of divorce). The rabbi ordered giving of a get, but the husband refused to comply. The trial court declined to confirm the arbitration award because it concluded that it could not order a party to carry out a religious act.  The court of appeals reversed, saying in part:

Here, confirmation of the award can be granted under neutral principles of law and without interpretation of religious doctrine.  We therefore conclude the Establishment Clause is not violated because the parties' arbitration agreement regarding a get serves the "purpose of enforcing the parties' contractual obligations" and "encouraging divorce litigants to resolve disputes by negotiating and entering" into marital agreements....

Additionally, enforcement does not infringe on the Free Exercise Clause as the parties voluntarily entered into the MOU arbitration provision and agreement....

Confirmation of the award strictly required a determination of defendant's contractual obligation.

RLUIPA Safe harbor Does Not Extend to Claims for Monetary Damages

 In Bair Brucha Inc. v. Township of Toms River, New Jersey, (D NJ, Feb. 29, 2024), a New Jersey federal district court granted plaintiffs judgment on the pleadings on their RLUIPA and Free Exercise challenges to discriminatory land use regulations that prevented their construction of a synagogue.  Plaintiffs claimed that Toms River had engaged in an orchestrated effort to prevent the growth of the Orthodox Jewish population in the town. Subsequent to the filing of this lawsuit, the township amended its zoning regulations in a settlement of a RLUIPA suit brought by the Justice Department. Plaintiffs did not deny that their original regulations violated the Equal Terms and the Exclusion and Limits provisions of RLUIPA. However, they contended that since the zoning ordinances have subsequently been amended, the township is covered by the safe harbor provision in RLUIPA that shields a local government from the preemptive force of RLUIPA if it subsequently amends its land use regulations to remove the burdensome or discriminatory provisions. The court held that the safe harbor provision does not extend to claims for monetary damages incurred before the township took corrective action.

Also finding a violation of the Free Exercise clause, the court concluded that the land use regulations were neither neutral nor generally applicable and that antisemitic animus was a motivating factor behind the land use regulations.

New Jersey Man Pleads Guilty to Hate Crimes Against 5 Orthodox Jews

In a Feb. 1 press release, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the district of New Jersey announced that 29-year old Dion Marsh has pleaded guilty to violations of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act and to a count of carjacking for his assault on 5 men on April 8, 2022.  According to a statement by the U.S. Attorney:

This defendant violently attacked five men, driving a car into four of them, stabbing one of them in the chest, and attempting to kill them, simply because they were visibly identifiable as Orthodox Jews....

Sentencing is set for June 11.

Defamation Claim Not Subject to Ministerial Exception Doctrine; Discrimination and Contract Claims Are

In Uzomechina v. Episcopal Diocese of New Jersey, (D NJ, Jan. 18, 2024), a New Jersey federal district court held that the ministerial exception doctrine requires the court to dismiss racial discrimination and wrongful discharge claims brought by an African-American Episcopal priest who was dismissed from his position after allegedly false charges of financial and sexual misconduct. The court dismissed the claims saying that they "directly implicate the employment relationship between the religious institution and its ministerial employee." It dismissed breach of contract claims for similar reasons.

Plaintiff also brought a defamation claim against the Diocese for passing on false information about him to his subsequent employer-- a drug abuse rehabilitation center. The court concluded that this claim was not barred by the ministerial exception doctrine, saying in part:

... [B]y sharing its internal disciplinary procedures and beliefs with a secular third-party, ... the Diocese Defendants subjected itself to the laws that govern the public realm. In other words, exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim will not second-guess or threaten the Diocese Defendants' decisions to investigate its clergy, find misconduct by a clergy member, or impose internal disciplinary measures against a member of the church. What it will threaten is a religious organization's ability to make false and defamatory statements about its clergy or members to the general public, outside of the organization's internal operations. The ministerial exception, therefore, is not applicable to Plaintiff's defamation claims.

The court, nevertheless, dismissed this claim without prejudice for failing to adequately set out facts supporting the claim.

New Jersey Will Allow Candidates To File With Secular Alternative To Oath of Allegiance

As previously reported, in early October a suit was filed in a New Jersey federal district court challenging the New Jersey requirement that candidates filing to run for public office sign an Oath of Allegiance that ends with the phrase "so help me God." In response to this lawsuit, on Oct. 24 the Acting Director of the New Jersey Division of Elections circulated a Memo (full text) to County Clerks stating that now candidates have the option of filing a solemn affirmation or declaration in lieu of an oath, and when that option is chosen, the words "so help me God" are to be omitted. This led the Freedom from Religion Foundation which is counsel for plaintiffs in the October lawsuit to file for voluntary dismissal of the suit.  New Jersey Monitor reports on these developments.

School Material on Islam Did Not Violate Current Establishment Clause Test

As previously reported, in November 2020 in Hilsenrath v. School District of the Chathams, a New Jersey federal district court held that the 7th grade World Cultures and Geography course presentation of material about Islam did not violate the Establishment Clause. Subsequently the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals (2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 20588 (July 20, 2022)) remanded the case to the district court for further consideration in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District. Now in Hilsenrath v. School District of the Chathams, (D NJ, Oct. 16, 2023), the district court reaffirmed its former conclusion, saying in part:

In sum, the curriculum and materials here were not coercive and do not otherwise bear or resemble the “hallmarks of religious establishments the framers sought to prohibit when they adopted the First Amendment.” Accordingly, the Board did not violate the Establishment Clause. I will enter summary judgment in the Board’s favor on Hilsenrath’s remaining nominal-damages claim.

Potential Candidate Challenges Religious Oath On New Jersey Candidate Petition Forms

Suit was filed this week in a New Jersey federal district court challenging the New Jersey requirement that candidates filing to run for public office sign an oath that ends with the phrase "so help me God." The complaint (full text) in Tosone v. Way, (D NJ, filed 10/3/2023), alleges that plaintiff, who wishes to run for public office, is unable as a matter of conscience to sign an oath which is religious. Alleging that the current version of the oath violates Article VI of the Constitution, as well as the free speech, free exercise and Establishment Clauses, plaintiff seeks a court order requiring the Secretary of State to provide a form that allows him to run for public office without his swearing "so help me God." New Jersey Monitor reports on the case.

Video Pressing Estranged Husband to Give Wife a Get Is Protected Speech

In S.B.B. v. L.B.B., (NJ App., Sept. 6, 2023), a New Jersey appellate court vacated a Final Restraining Order (FRO) issued by a trial court under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act. The court said in part:

The FRO was based on the predicate act of harassment. The communication underlying the trial judge's finding of harassment was defendant's creation and dissemination of a video accusing her estranged husband of improperly withholding a get, a Jewish bill of divorce, and asking community members to "press" her husband to deliver the get. Because defendant's communication constituted constitutionally protected free speech, we reverse.

In reaching that conclusion, the appellate court said in part:

[The trial court] judge's finding that the Jewish community was prone to violence against get refusers—and the implicit holding that defendant was aware of and intentionally availed herself of such violent tendencies—is not supported by the record. The video was intended to get a get. The video did not threaten or menace plaintiff, and nothing in the record suggests that plaintiff's safety or security was put at risk by the video.... Without credible evidence that the video incited or produced imminent lawless action or was likely to do so, defendant's speech does not fall within the narrow category of incitement exempted from First Amendment protection.

Volokh Conspiracy has more on the decision.

New Jersey Settles With Township Accused of Discriminating Against Orthodox Jewish Residents

 A Consent Order (full text) was entered yesterday by a New Jersey trial court in Platkin v. Jackson Township, (NJ Super., Aug. 28, 2023).  In the suit, the state alleged that the Township had violated the Law Against Discrimination by taking zoning and enforcement actions against the growing Orthodox Jewish population in the Township. (See prior posting.) Under the Order, the Township must pay $275,000 in penalties and place another $150,000 in a Restitution Fund. It must end its discriminatory use of land use and zoning regulations and create a Multicultural Committee. It must create procedures for erecting Sukkahs and eruvim, and must comply with a previously issued order in federal enforcement case to zone to allow religious schools, including schools with dormitories, in various parts of the Township. The New Jersey Attorney General issued a press release with further information on the settlement agreement.

Enforcing Agreement To Cooperate With Jewish Religious Court Does Not Violate Establishment Clause

In Satz v. Satz, (NJ Super., Aug. 18, 2023), a New Jersey state appellate court upheld a trial court's order enforcing a marital settlement agreement (MSA) that the parties had entered in connection with their divorce proceedings. One provision in the agreement obligated the parties to comply with recommendations of a Jewish religious court (beis din) regarding the husband giving a get (Jewish bill of divorce) to the wife. According to the court:

On July 6, 2022, the beis din issued a fifteen-page ruling finding that defendant had not properly responded to summonses from rabbinical courts, that defendant is "obligated to divorce [plaintiff] forthright and immediately," and that his refusal to provide plaintiff a get "is a form of abuse." 

Affirming the trial court, the appellate court rejected the husband's Establishment Clause challenge, saying in part:

In this case ... the trial court was asked to enforce a civil contract, not a religious one. Nor did the trial court substantively review or affirm the beis din ruling. For purposes of this appeal, the beis din ruling is essentially a report confirming plaintiff's assertion that defendant failed to participate in the beis din proceeding in violation of his obligations under the MSA....

Defendant agreed in the MSA to abide by the beis din ruling, whatever that might be. In enforcing that agreement, the trial court in no way interpreted religious doctrine. The orders entered in this case scrupulously avoid entanglement with religion because the trial court applied well-established principles of civil contract law, not rabbinical law. The latter body of law remained solely within the province of the beis din and was not interpreted or applied by the Family Part judge, nor by us.

NJ Anti-Discrimination Law Creates Defense for Catholic School That Requires Teachers to Follow Catholic Teachings

 In Cristello v. St. Theresa School, (NJ Sup. Ct., Aug. 14, 2023), the New Jersey Supreme Court dismissed a suit against a Catholic school which had fired an art teacher/ toddler room caregiver who was unmarried and become pregnant.  The teacher's employment agreement required her to abide by the teachings of the Catholic Church and prohibited employees from engaging in premarital sex. The teacher sued under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) alleging pregnancy and marital status discrimination.  The court's majority opinion held that the LAD provision creating an exception for religious organizations following the tenets of its religion in establishing employment criteria gives the school an affirmative defense. The majority said in part:

Determining whether a religious employer’s employment action was based exclusively on the tenets of its religion requires application of only neutral principles of law and does not impermissibly entangle the courts in ecclesiastical matters.

Justice Pierre-Louis filed a concurring opinion taking the position that the religious tenet provision does not create an affirmative defense, but instead shifts to plaintiff the requirement to show that the purported reason for the firing was a pretext for prohibited discrimination. However here plaintiff did not show that this was a pretext.

Washington Examiner reports on the decision.

New Jersey Issues Guidance On Public Accommodation Law Coverage After 303 Creative Decision

Earlier this week (July 31), the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights issued a Guidance on the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis (full text) (press release). The Release says in part:

The Supreme Court’s ruling exempts from anti-discrimination laws like the LAD only a narrow set of services offered by some places of public accommodation. In order to assert an exemption, at a minimum, a public accommodation must establish that (1) its creative services are “original” and “customized and tailored” for each customer; (2) the creation is “expressive” and expresses the creator’s own First Amendment-protected speech; and (3) the public accommodation’s refusal to provide the creative service to a customer is based on the message it conveys, not the customer’s identity or protected characteristic standing alone. As a practical matter, many of the products or services that meet that narrow definition—for example, a documentary film created by a movie director—are created by artists or businesses that fall outside the LAD’s definition of a public accommodation already. Moreover, because the overwhelming majority of places of public accommodation do not provide “customized,” “original,” and “expressive” products or services to the public that express the creator’s own speech, the Court’s decision does not exempt most places of public accommodation—or most goods and services—from the LAD. That is why, as the Court itself acknowledged, state civil rights law still applies to “a vast array of businesses” selling “innumerable goods and services.”

[Thanks to Jeff Pasek for the lead.] 

Suit Seeks Historic Preservation Funds for Churches

Two historic churches have filed suit in a New Jersey federal district court challenging Morris County's exclusion of properties currently used for religious purposes from receiving Historic Preservation funds from the county. Plaintiffs contend that recent U.S. Supreme Court cases invalidate an earlier state Supreme Court decision barring churches from participation in such funding programs. The complaint (full text) in Mendham Methodist Church v. Morris County, New Jersey, (D NJ, filed 4/28/2023), alleges in part:

In 2018 ... the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the Religious Aid Clause of the New Jersey Constitution bars state and local governments from providing grants to preserve the architecture of historic churches. Freedom From Religion Found. v. Morris Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders ...

This is unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of religion: States and local governments that choose to provide a generally available public benefit—such as historic preservation grants—cannot exclude an otherwise-qualified applicant solely because the applicant happens to be a house of worship. See Carson v. Makin, 142 S. Ct. 1987, 1996 (2022).... ;Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue...., 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2262 (2020)....

First Liberty Institute issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Parties Cannot Be Forced to Arbitration Over Issues Surrounding Jewish Religious Divorce

In Bierig-Kiejdan v. Kiejdan, (NJ App., Feb. 16, 2023), a New Jersey state appeals court held that a family court judge could not order parties to a divorce to return to arbitration over issues surrounding which religious tribunal should oversee the issuance of a get-- Jewish divorce document-- when the parties' original agreement to arbitrate terms of the divorce had expired and they had not entered a new arbitration agreement covering issues that would arise later. JD Supra reports on the decision.

Ministerial Exception Doctrine Requires Dismissal of Jewish Teacher's Defamation Suit

In Hyman v. Rosenbaum Yeshiva of North Jersey, (NJ Super., Feb. 8, 2023), a New Jersey state appellate court held that the ministerial exception doctrine required dismissal of a defamation suit brought by a rabbi who was an elementary school Judaic studies teacher at an Orthodox Jewish school. An investigation by an outside law firm employed by the school concluded that the rabbi had inappropriately touched 5th and 6th grade female students in his classes. The school terminated the rabbi's employment and, after consulting halachic authorities, e-mailed a letter to school parents informing them that the rabbi was terminated because his conduct violated the Orthodox Jewish standards of conduct set out in the school's Staff Handbook. According to the court:

The letter was spread throughout the entire school community and similar Jewish communities. Additionally, plaintiff's picture appeared on Jewish websites such as "Frums Follies" and "Lost Messiah," and the allegations were disseminated by bloggers. As a result, plaintiff was allegedly branded as a pedophile among the Jewish community, which affected any possibility of him obtaining future employment in education.

In affirming the dismissal of the rabbi's defamation suit, the court concluded that the ministerial exception doctrine applies to more than just employment discrimination lawsuits.  It said in part:

We ... conclude that the ministerial exception applies to bar tort claims, provided (1) the injured party is a minister formerly employed by a religious institution and (2) the claims are related to the religious institution's employment decision.

Court Remands Question of Accommodating Religious Objection to COVID Testing

In In re Whitehead, (NJ App,, Dec. 22, 2022), a New Jersey state appellate court remanded to the state Civil Service Commission for further findings an appeal by a city zoning officer whose employment was terminated after she refused to be tested for COVID in order to return to work.  Plaintiff's refusal of testing was based on her religious beliefs which the court described:

She explained her refusal to undergo the test is founded on her belief the testing is required because of a fear she may be infected with COVID-19, and that fear is inconsistent with her religious belief that "God has not given us the spirit of fear." Thus, according to Whitehead, she could not, based on her religious beliefs, succumb to the fear she had COVID-19 upon which the City based its testing requirement.

The court explained its remand decision:

The ALJ determined the termination of Whitehead's employment did not violate the City's obligation under Title VII to reasonably accommodate Whitehead's religious belief because returning Whitehead to work without COVID-19 testing created an undue hardship — the risk of infecting the City's other on-site employees with COVID-19. That determination, which Whitehead does not challenge on appeal, applies solely to an accommodation — returning Whitehead to on-site work without testing — she no longer claims is reasonable, required, or appropriate...  

Whitehead, however, correctly argues the ALJ did not decide her claim the City should have allowed her to work from home as a reasonable accommodation based on her asserted religious belief.

3rd Circuit: Challenge to COVID Limits on Worship Services Is Moot

In Clark v. Governor of the State of New Jersey, (3d Cir., Nov. 28, 2022), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of appeals in a 2-1 decision held that a challenge by two Christian congregations and their pastors to former COVID limits on in-person worship services is moot. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the suit.  In the case, plaintiffs challenged orders by the Governor of New Jersey that limited religious gatherings while permitting certain essential secular activities to continue. The majority said in part:

Appellants offer nothing more than speculation to suggest that we have a live controversy here. They invite us to hypothesize about future scenarios in which (a) not only does the COVID-19 pandemic reach crisis levels comparable to early-2020, but (b) New Jersey’s executive officials will choose to ignore everything—both legal and factual—we have learned since those early months and bluntly reintroduce legally-suspect gathering restrictions on religious worship. This will not do, and we will therefore affirm.

Judge Matey dissented, saying in part:

[N]o lively imagination is needed to conjure up future competitions between public health and religious liberty given the volatility of respiratory viruses, the increased probability of future pandemics, and the routine declaration of “emergencies” by Governor Murphy. I would take the opportunity to provide an answer now, giving the people of New Jersey, and its representatives, the guidance they are entitled to under the Constitution.