Church Ceremony Without Marriage License Was Enough to Create a Civil Marriage In New York

In L.F. v. M.A., (NY Cnty. Sup. Ct., July 9, 2024), a New York state trial court, in a divorce action, held that a ceremony at a Coptic Orthodox Church in New York was sufficient to consider the parties civilly married even though they did not obtain a civil marriage license. Defendant had contended that the ceremony was merely a family blessing, and that the parties were never married.  According to the court:

At stake is not just the status of the parties' young child in common or spousal maintenance, but potentially millions of dollars in what would be marital assets versus separate property.

In a prior decision, the court ordered the Bishop who performed the ceremony to testify about it. In the current decision, the court said in part:

... [T]he parties participated in a religious solemnized ceremony, one that so looked like a wedding that the church's Father H.H. prepared the marriage certificate, and until one day before his testimony here, never thought anything other than that the parties were married that day in that ceremony. Plaintiff believed she was married — that is undisputed. Defendant now states that he did not think he was married, but his actions during the years immediately after the ceremony paint a clear and undisputed picture that he could have only thought that he was married and not otherwise.... In reaching its determination, the Court must, and does, apply neutral principles of law, and does not reach into religious details of a ceremony within the Coptic Orthodox Church. The court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Plaintiff has more than carried her burden that there was indeed a religious marriage ceremony that day, and further, that both parties so understood, as well, as did Father H.H. (and at least some of their wedding's witnesses).

India's Supreme Court Says Muslim Women Can Invoke Secular Law for Maintenance Award After a Religious Divorce

In Mohd v. State of Telangana, (India Sup. Ct., July 10, 2024), a 2-judge panel of India's Supreme Court held that a Muslim woman who has been divorced under Muslim law, has a choice of seeking maintenance under the secular provisions of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in addition to remedies available under the 1986 Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act. Each of the two justices wrote an opinion. Justices Nagarathna in his opinion said in part:

... [A] technical or pedantic interpretation of the 1986 Act would stultify not merely gender justice but also the constitutional right of access to justice for the aggrieved Muslim divorced women who are in dire need of maintenance. This Court would not countenance unjust or Faustian bargains being imposed on women. The emphasis is on sufficient maintenance, not minimal amount. After all, maintenance is a facet of gender parity and enabler of equality, not charity. It follows that a destitute Muslim woman has the right to seek maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC despite the enactment of the 1986 Act. Thus, an application for maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC would not prejudice another application under Section 3 of the 1986 Act insofar as the latter is additional in nature and does not pertain to the same requirements sought to be provided for by Section 125 of the CrPC. One cannot be a substitute for or supplant another; rather it is in addition to and not in derogation of the other.

The Independent reports on the decision.

First Amendment Precludes Court from Enforcing Mahr in Divorce Action

 In Omid v. Ahmadi, (CT Super., March 18, 2024), a Connecticut state trial court in a action for dissolution of a marriage refused to enforce a mahr (dowry) agreement because interpreting it would require the court to interpret religious principles.  The mahr was entered by the parties in connection with their marriage in Afghanistan. The husband who had apparently been a translator for the U.S. military during the Afghan war received a visa to the United States and then returned to Afghanistan for one month to enter an arranged marriage. Three years later he arranged for his wife to obtain a U.S. visa. One year after she came to the U.S., the parties separated. In denying the wife's request in the dissolution case for an order enforcing the mahr, the court said in part:

The parties disagree as to when the 100,000 Afghanis must be paid, and whether, as the defendant argues, the terms "prompt" and "deferred" as used in the agreement describe a general duty to pay at any time, or a specific duty to pay one amount before marriage and one amount upon divorce or death of the husband. The term "prompt" in the parties' agreement is ambiguous and would require the court to look outside the four corners of the contract....

On the basis of the foregoing, to the extent that construction of the contract language would require this court to reference Islamic religious principles to determine the meaning of the terms employed, such action would likely violate the religion clauses of the first amendment of the United States constitution. The present agreement is sparse, and its terms are ill-defined without extratextual evidence. Because this extratextual evidence involves considerations of what the terms mean under Islamic law, the agreement is unenforceable because it is likely impossible for the court to disentangle secular from religious considerations.

Religious Marriage Without Marriage License and Later Annulled by Religious Court Is Still Recognized By New York

 In T.I. v. R.I., (NY Sup Ct Kings Cty, March 20, 2024), a New York state trial court held that the state would recognize a couple's marriage that was performed in a Jewish religious ceremony even though the couple did not obtain a civil marriage license and the marriage was annulled eight years later by a religious tribunal.  In a long-running dispute between the parties, there had been a prior divorce action which the parties discontinued and there had been protection orders in favor of the wife against the husband issued by the Family Court and Criminal Court. Now the husband, claiming that no marriage between them existed any longer, sought to have the wife's divorce action dismissed so that the court could not issue orders for him to pay child support, spousal maintenance or equitable distribution of property. According to the court:

The husband contends that the rabbinical court invalidated the parties' religious marriage on two Jewish religious concepts: 1) based upon "concealment" because the wife did not disclose her alleged mental health history to him prior to the religious solemnization ceremony; and 2) because the person who conducted the solemnization ceremony was not, although unknown to the parties, authorized to do so by at least some portion of the religious community....

Nothing related to the wife's request for a civil divorce requires this Court to address or assess the religious issues that the husband brought before the rabbinical court or that may have been part of the rabbinical court's determination and, as such, the husband's theory that the issue of whether the wife can seek a divorce of any marriage recognized by the State of New York is not prohibited by the First Amendment. Here, the determination of whether a marriage recognized by the State of New York exists between the parties separate and apart from any religious marriage rests not upon religious doctrine but upon neutral principles of law.

Any religious determinations and any ramification of religious doctrine made by the rabbinical court as to the parties' religious marriage are separate and apart from the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over whether, based on neutral principles of law, there exists here a marriage recognized by the State between the parties....

CT Supreme Court Upholds Refusal to Enforce Ketubah in Divorce Action

In Tilsen v. Benson, (CT Sup. Ct., Sept. 5, 2023), the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld a trial court's refusal to enforce the provisions of the parties' ketubah (Jewish marriage document) in setting alimony in a marital dissolution action. The husband, a rabbi, sought enforcement of the ketubah as a prenuptial agreement.  The ketubah provided that any divorce would be "according to Torah law."  Husband contended that meant a 50/50 division of property and no obligation to pay alimony, but conflicting interpretations of Jewish law were presented to the trial court.  The Supreme Court said in part:

... [W]e conclude that the plaintiff’s desired relief violates the establishment clause under the neutral principles of law doctrine. Most significant, the parties’ ketubah is facially silent as to each spouse’s support obligations in the event of dissolution of the marriage, thus leaving the court to determine those obligations from external sources as to Jewish law, namely, the parties’ expert witnesses, whose proffered opinions differed in this case, instantly alerting the court as to the establishment clause dilemma....

The court also rejected husband's argument that refusal to enforce the ketubah violated his free exercise rights by preventing him from divorcing according to Jewish law and denying him the generally available benefit of enforcing a prenuptial agreement only because of the agreement's religious nature.  The court said in part:

... [E]nforcement of this vaguely worded ketubah in the guise of protecting the plaintiff’s free exercise rights would have put the trial court on the horns of an establishment clause dilemma.

Second, the trial court did not deny the plaintiff access to the court or otherwise exact some kind of penalty in connection with his religious beliefs or practices; its decision simply meant that this dissolution action would be governed by generally applicable principles of Connecticut law as expressed in our alimony and equitable distribution statutes. Parties who desire specific tenets of their religious beliefs to govern the resolution of marital dissolution actions remain free to contract for that relief via a properly executed antenuptial, postnuptial, or separation agreement that is specifically worded to express those beliefs in a way that avoids establishment clause concerns under the neutral principles of law doctrine.

Enforcing Agreement To Cooperate With Jewish Religious Court Does Not Violate Establishment Clause

In Satz v. Satz, (NJ Super., Aug. 18, 2023), a New Jersey state appellate court upheld a trial court's order enforcing a marital settlement agreement (MSA) that the parties had entered in connection with their divorce proceedings. One provision in the agreement obligated the parties to comply with recommendations of a Jewish religious court (beis din) regarding the husband giving a get (Jewish bill of divorce) to the wife. According to the court:

On July 6, 2022, the beis din issued a fifteen-page ruling finding that defendant had not properly responded to summonses from rabbinical courts, that defendant is "obligated to divorce [plaintiff] forthright and immediately," and that his refusal to provide plaintiff a get "is a form of abuse." 

Affirming the trial court, the appellate court rejected the husband's Establishment Clause challenge, saying in part:

In this case ... the trial court was asked to enforce a civil contract, not a religious one. Nor did the trial court substantively review or affirm the beis din ruling. For purposes of this appeal, the beis din ruling is essentially a report confirming plaintiff's assertion that defendant failed to participate in the beis din proceeding in violation of his obligations under the MSA....

Defendant agreed in the MSA to abide by the beis din ruling, whatever that might be. In enforcing that agreement, the trial court in no way interpreted religious doctrine. The orders entered in this case scrupulously avoid entanglement with religion because the trial court applied well-established principles of civil contract law, not rabbinical law. The latter body of law remained solely within the province of the beis din and was not interpreted or applied by the Family Part judge, nor by us.

Bishop Must Testify in Divorce Case with Millions of Dollars at Stake

L.M. v. M.A., (NY County Sup. Ct., Feb. 6, 2023), is a decision by a New York state trial court refusing to quash a subpoena that orders a Coptic Orthodox Church Bishop to testify in a divorce action.  At issue is whether the parties to the divorce action were ever married. If they were, the wife may share in millions of dollars of assets in her claims for equitable distribution of marital property and spousal support. The court explains:

The parties here disagree about whether they were married in 2017, with plaintiff stating that they were married, and defendant stating that the Bishop "blessed" their relationship, but did not marry them. The parties agree that their infant son was baptized, as planned.... The parties also agree that Plaintiff mother L.M., who had previously been baptized by another church ... was then baptized in front of many witnesses in the church in an unplanned ceremony immediately following the child's baptism. What occurred next is the crux of the parties' dispute. Defendant father M.A. asserts that the Bishop, the subject of the instant subpoena, who had conducted the two baptisms, then proceeded to perform a family blessing. Plaintiff mother, on the other hand, claims that the Bishop offered to marry the parties ... and that he then performed the parties' previously unplanned wedding ceremony....  The Bishop performed the ceremonies in a combination of the English, Arabic and Coptic languages and most of the guests, all of whom had only been invited to the child's baptism, were not sure whether or not the final ceremony was a marriage ceremony....

As the Bishop has refused to testify as to which ceremony he performed, allegedly because his religious conviction prevents him from testifying in a civil action involving church members, and the parties and their witnesses have testified to diametrically conflicting views as to which ceremony took place, the Court and the parties have all asked the Bishop to testify. Defendant served a valid subpoena upon the Bishop and the Bishop ... has moved to quash the subpoena, stating through counsel and an affidavit from a Coptic theologian, that it is contrary to the tenets of the religion for the Bishop to testify in civilian court "brother against brother."

The court however refused to quash the subpoena, saying in part:

[T]he Court does not have a sufficient factual basis to find that either (i) Bishop A.B. personally has a religious belief that he cannot come into a civilian court to testify "brother against brother," or that (ii) even if he had such a belief, that it is applicable here, where he is not being asked to testify against a co-religionist but instead to describe a public factual event, and both parties (the only people who could plausibly be considered to be a person "against" whom he is testifying) are instead asking him to testify about those facts.....

In a lengthy discussion, the court went on to say that even if this did pose a 1st Amendment issue, there was no violation here.

Utah Supreme Court Says Order in Divorce Proceeding on Children's Religious Teaching Is Too Broad

Kingston v. Kingston, (UT Sup. Ct., Dec. 22, 2022), is a challenge by Ryan Kingston to a trial court's order in a divorce proceeding that barred him from encouraging his children to adopt the teachings of any religion without the consent of his former wife, Jessica. According to the Court:

At the time of their marriage, Ryan and Jessica were both members of the Order, also known as the Kingston Group, a polygamous religious community. Ryan remains a member of the Order today, but Jessica left the Order before the divorce.

During the divorce proceedings, the teachings and practices of the Order became a key issue as both Ryan and Jessica sought custody of their four children.

In a 3-2 decision, the Court remanded the case to the trial court for it to "craft a more narrowly tailored remedy." The majority said in part:

 [W]e agree with Jessica that the State has a compelling interest in shielding the children from psychological harm. The district court found that "[t]he Order's religious teachings jeopardize the health or safety of the children, and will cause harm to the children's welfare." Specifically, the court identified two potentially substantial harms to the children associated with Ryan's religious beliefs: (1) grooming of the children for early marriage; and (2) exposure to Order teachings that ostracize outsiders and demonize those who have left the group, including Jessica. Protecting the children from these harms is a compelling state interest....

The district court's prohibition is broader than necessary to prevent the identified potential harms to the children. The court prohibited Ryan from "encourag[ing] [the children] to adopt the teachings of any religion" without Jessica's consent. This prohibition applies broadly to "the teachings of any religion," but the court only identified specific harms associated with the Order. As written, the prohibition would prevent Ryan from teaching the children the Lord's Prayer or encouraging them to adopt the teachings of Islam. Based on a plain language reading of the prohibition, Ryan would have to seek Jessica's consent before engaging in either of these activities. The prohibition cannot be described as "narrowly tailored" when it reaches far beyond the compelling interest it is meant to address....

 Associate Chief Justice Pearce filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Peterson.  They said in part:

[S]trict scrutiny is the wrong test to apply.... I would follow the Utah Code and analyze whether the district court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, real or substantiated potential harm to the child if the parent is allowed to participate in the child's religious upbringing.....

There is absolutely no evidence in the record that Ryan's objection to the district court's order is fueled by a desire to read the Quran to his children or to lead them in the Lord's Prayer....

... I respectfully dissent and would affirm the district court's order.

Jewish Congregation Sues for Return of Deeds To 5000 Burial Plots

 An unusual suit was filed this week in a New York state trial court by a Bukharian Jewish religious organization which is seeking to recover nearly 5,000 burial plot deeds that the organization says belong to it. The complaint (full text) in Bukharian Jewish Community Center v. Nektalova, (NY County Sup. Ct., filed 12/6/2022) alleges that United Bukharian Congregation holds cemetery documents in trust for members of the Bukharian Jewish community in New York. One of its members, 92-year old Roman Nektalov, was in charge of providing the relevant deeds to cemeteries and families when funerals of members were being arranged.  During COVID, Nektalov took the deeds to his home so he could distribute them from there. A domestic dispute arose between Nektalov and his wife. His wife obtained a protective order which prevents Nektalov from accessing the deeds in his home. She later filed for divorce and refuses to turn the deeds over to the religious organizations, claiming that they are marital property. The Jewish organizations ask the court to hold that they are the rightful owners of the deeds, and to order them turned over to them or to a receiver. AMNY reports on the lawsuit. [Names in post corrected]

In Dispute Over Frozen Pre-Embryos, Wife's Religious Concerns Do Not Prevail

In In re Marriage of Olsen,(CO App., June 23, 2022), a Colorado state appellate court was called on to settle a dispute between a husband and wife over the disposition of their cryogenically frozen pre-embryos after their divorce. The wife wanted to donate the pre-embryos, now held by a fertility clinic, for implantation to another couple because of her religious belief that they are human lives. The husband wanted to destroy the pre-embryos to avoid procreation. A 2018 Colorado Supreme Court (In re Marriage of Rooks) in a somewhat similar case called for the balancing of various factors. Applying this precedent, the Court of Appeals awarded the pre-embryos to the husband, saying in part:

The district court erred by considering wife’s religious belief that the pre-embryos are human lives when weighting the first Rooks factor — the intended use of the party seeking to preserve the disputed pre-embryos.... 

The first Rooks factor simply asks what the party seeking to preserve the pre-embryos intends to do with them.... Does that party seek to implant the pre-embryos to achieve genetic parenthood or does that party seek to donate them? The first factor is not concerned with why the party prefers to preserve the pre-embryos over discarding them....

Although we are sensitive to wife’s concern that awarding the pre-embryos to husband will force her to participate in their destruction against her religious beliefs, the district court can enter orders to mitigate this concern. The district court can award husband the pre-embryos and authorize him to direct their disposal. Wife need not be involved in the process.... Because the decision will belong to husband, wife will not be compelled to do anything in violation of her religious beliefs, and therefore there is no Free Exercise violation. 

Plaintiff Lacks Standing To Challenge No-Fault Divorce Law Under 1st Amendment

 In King v. State of New York, (2d Cir., May 9, 2022), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals held that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge New York's no-fault divorce law on free exercise or Establishment Clause grounds. The court said in part:

Ms. King alleges that this law and the resulting divorce violated her Free Exercise and Establishment Clause rights by requiring her to become divorced despite her religious belief in marriage until death..... Because Ms. King alleges only the termination of a civil contract, she has not plausibly alleged that the civil judgment of divorce entered against her “sever[ed] the holy marriage covenant made before God,” ... or “chang[ed] her status under . . . the laws of God”....

Mahr Did Not Set Upper Limit Of Amounts Awardable To Wife In Divorce

In Parbeen v. Bari, (FL App., March 16, 2022), a Florida state appellate court held that a traditional Islamic prenuptial agreement-- a Mahr-- in setting an amount payable upon divorce did not eliminate the wife's right to temporary support, alimony, equitable distribution of property and attorneys' fees under Florida law. While the Mahr's secular terms are enforceable under Florida contract law, the Mahr did not set the maximum amount payable to the wife. [Thanks to Volokh Conspiracy via Steven H. Sholk for the lead.]

Protective Order Did Not Violate Ex-Husband's Free Exercise Rights

 In Kaur v. Singh, (PA Super., Aug. 2, 2021), a Pennsylvania appellate court upheld a Protection From Abuse Order that excludes plaintiff's former husband from attending the Nazareth Temple on Sundays when his former wife is present. The court said in part:

[T]he Final PFA Order did not substantially burden Appellant’s right to practice his religion....The Order did not ban Appellant from practicing his religion, nor compel him to perform actions against his religion. Appellant can attend services at several other temples in the area on Sunday, attend services at Nazareth Temple every day but Sunday, and attend services at Nazareth Temple on Sunday if Ms. Kaur is not present. As the trial court explained, “[t]he record established that all of the Sikh temples in the area have essentially the same services”....

Additionally ... [s]ince Appellant’s purpose of attending the services at Nazareth Temple is to harass Ms. Kaur as opposed to practicing his religion, the Order arguably does not impact Appellant’s ability to practice his religion at all.

New York's No-Fault Divorce Law Did Not Infringe Wife's Religious Freedom

In King v. New York, (ND NY, Feb. 26, 2021), a New York federal district court rejected a wife's contention that New York's no-fault divorce law violates the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses by infringing her Christian religious belief that marriage is permanent and cannot be dissolved by the state. The court said in part:

... [A] finding that H. King must remain married against his will because of L. King’s religious convictions would defy all logic and reason, and create a much larger Establishment Clause issue than the one L. King argues exists today....

Moreover, ... there is no constitutional injury here for the independent reason that the divorce that gave rise to this litigation only dissolved L. King’s and H. King’s legal marriage recognized by the State of New York; the divorce did not affect the status of their “religious marriage.”

No Free Exercise Infringement When Court Allocates Vaccination Decision-Making Between Parents

 In In re Marriage of Crouch, (CO App., Jan. 14, 2021), a Colorado state appellate court remanded a trial court's refusal to modify the allocation of medical decision-making by divorced parents for their children. Originally both parents had agreed, largely for religious reasons, that their children should not be vaccinated. Subsequently the father changed his mind and sought to have them vaccinated.  The appeals court held that the trial court improperly imposed on the father an added burden in order to overcome the mother's right to free exercise of religion.  The court said in part:

A parent’s free exercise rights are not implicated by a court’s allocation of decision-making responsibility between parents.

Grand Junction Daily Sentinel reports on the decision.

UAE Liberalizes Personal Status and Penal Laws

The United Arab Emirates today announced liberalizing changes in its Sharia-based personal laws. The Hill, The National, and Emirates News Agency all report on the changes made by Presidential Decree to the Personal Status, Civil Transactions, Penal Code and Criminal Procedural laws.  The changes, many involving protections for foreigners living in the UAE, take effect immediately. They include:

• Repeal of the provisions allowing more lenient sentences for so-called "honor crimes".
• Divorces of foreigners who were married abroad will be governed by the laws of their home country instead of Sharia law.
• The law of a person's home country, rather than Sharia law, will govern division of assets on death where no will is left.
• Attempted suicide is decriminalized.
• "Good Samaritans" who intervene to help another person will not be held accountable for the person's injury or death.
• More severe punishments are set for harassment of women.
• Death penalty is prescribed for rape of a minor or of someone of limited mental capacity.
• Alcohol consumption in authorized areas by adults who do not have a license to consume liquor is decriminalized. Typically Muslims have been denied a license.
• Cohabitation by unmarried couples is decriminalized.
• Translators will be provided in courts for defendants and witnesses, and evidence involving indecent acts will not be made public.

No Fault Divorce Does Not Infringe Husband's Free Exercise Rights

 In Melki v. Melki,(MD App., Sept. 29, 2020), the Maryland Court of Special Appeals rejected a husband's claim that granting his wife a no-fault divorce violates his free exercise rights. In addition to rejecting jurisdictional and contract clause challenges, the court said in part:

Because the Orthodox faith does not permit divorces absent fault, Husband claims that the dissolution of the marriage on the grounds of a twelve-month separation would unconstitutionally force him to commit a mortal sin according to his religion.... Because a trial court granting a divorce merely dissolves a civil contract between the spouses, courts universally hold that no-fault divorce statutes do not infringe on the right to the free exercise of religion, even if a spouse’s religious beliefs prohibit no-fault divorces....

 Husband "still has [his] constitutional prerogative to believe that in the eyes of God, [he] and [his] estranged [wife] are ecclesiastically wedded as one...." ... In fact, it might well violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to compel Wife to remain married to Husband because of Husband’s religious beliefs, for the court would then be preferring one spouse’s beliefs over the other spouse’s.

British Court Refuses Financial Support Orders For Non-Complying Religious Marriage Ceremonies

Under Britain's Matrimonial Causes Act, a party to a "void marriage" may obtain a decree of nullity from a family court which entitles the party, among other things, to seek an order for financial support.  In Attorney General v. Akhter, (EWCA, Feb. 14, 2020), Britain's Court of Appeal held that a party to an Islamic marriage ceremony held in a restaurant rather than a building registered as a marriage site and without other required formalities may not obtain a decree of nullity because the original ceremony not was not sufficient to even create a "void marriage."  The husband and wife had planned to follow the religious ceremony with a civil ceremony,  but never followed through on those plans. They remained together for 18 years and had four children before the wife sued for divorce. The court also posted a Media Summary of the decision.

Reporting on the lawsuit, International News quotes a critic of the decision

Today’s judgment will force Muslim and other women to turn to Sharia ‘courts’ that already cause significant harm to women and children for remedies because they are now locked out of the civil justice system.

Court In India Reduces Power of Ecclesiastical Courts In Goa

Hindustan Times of Oct. 19 reports:

After hearing two separate petitions filed by persons whose marriages were annulled by a so-called church court, the Bombay high court at Goa has struck down Article 19 of a Portuguese edict that gave legal sanctity to rulings of ecclesiastical tribunals in the former Portuguese colony

The high court said the article was “unconstitutional, illegal, null and void and ultra vires Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.”

The decree in question, Portuguese Decree 35461, has its origin in a 1940 agreement between the government of Portugal and the Holy See.... The decree went into effect in Goa in 1946 and governs marriages and divorces of Catholic couples. But in doing so, it virtually reduced the role of civil courts to administrative bodies, merely tasked with ensuring the execution of orders passed under the decree....

Interpreting the judgement, [a former law commissioner] said that now, couples who seek annulment of a church marriage can approach the ecclesiastical tribunals, but will also have the option of approaching the civil courts to dissolve the civil aspect of marriage....

Court Refuses To Enforce Jewish Marriage Contract Provision

In Tilsen v. Benson, 2019 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2475 (CT Super. Ct., Sept. 11, 2019), a Connecticut trial court opinion that has just become available on LEXIS, the court rejected plaintiff's argument that it could constitutionally apply neutral principles of law to enforce a provision in a ketubah (Jewish marriage contract) as if it were a pre-nuptial agreement. According to the court, the ketubah provided that any divorce would be "according to Torah law."  The husband argued that this means there should be a 50/50 division of property with no obligation for continuing alimony payments. In denying plaintiff's motion to enforce the ketubah, the court said in part:

To educate the court about the parties' chosen law, the plaintiff submitted the affidavit of a rabbi ... describing his understanding of Torah law as it pertains to alimony and property division. The defendant also submitted the affidavit of a rabbi. However, the defendant's rabbinical expert disagrees with the plaintiff's rabbinical expert.

It is clear, then, that enforcement of the "Torah law" provision in the Ketubah would require the court to choose between competing interpretations of Jewish law. But resolving such a dispute is precisely what the neutral principles approach forbids a court to do. The first amendment does not permit courts to resolve disputes over the meaning and interpretation of the Torah-or the Koran, the New Testament or any other religious text....