Yeshiva Denied Preliminary Injunction Against Zoning Enforcement

In Anash, Inc., d/b/a Wyoming Valley Yeshiva v. Borough of Kingston, (MD PA, Dec. 19, 2024), a Pennsylvania federal district court refused to grant a preliminary injunction to an Orthodox Jewish Yeshiva whose property was condemned because it was being used for a school and dormitory in violation of zoning ordinances. The court concluded that plaintiff was not suffering irreparable harm, and that it was not likely that plaintiff would succeed on the merits of its challenge to the relevant zoning ordinance. The court said in part:

Plaintiffs also provide no support for their assertion that Rabbi Hellinger’s inability to access the Properties impairs his religious freedom, ability to act as a religious leader to others, or others’ freedoms. Defendants are not refusing to allow Rabbi Hellinger to practice his religion in any manner or gather with members of his congregation in any location other than the Properties.... Plaintiffs concede that they have been able to secure temporary alternative locations to gather to study Torah and engage in religious activities.... While Plaintiffs testified that the temporary or alternative locations do not allow for the same level of participation or consistency, the Court does not find that such imperfections show “irreparable harm.”...

Importantly, Plaintiffs have refused to engage in any sort of efforts to compromise or come to a resolution with the Borough....

The parties agree that the seminal issue for Plaintiffs’ religious discrimination claims, asserted under RLUIPA, the First Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause, all require this Court to determine if Plaintiffs can show evidence that the Zoning Ordinance restricts their freedom of religion in some way, that Defendants’ actions were somehow motivated by animus, or that Plaintiffs were treated differently than similarly situated individuals based upon their religion.... Plaintiffs have not established any of these scenarios....

Plaintiffs can and have practiced their religion in alternative locations and may, but have not, apply for a variance to use the Properties as a school, dormitory, or house of worship.... There is no convincing evidence that Plaintiffs’ freedom of religion is legitimately burdened. Further, even if they had shown such evidence, the Zoning Ordinance is the least restrictive manner of furthering a compelling government regulatory interest in health and safety,... 

Hospital Employee Who Refused Covid Nasal Swab Testing Is Entitled to Unemployment Benefits

 In St. Luke's University Hospital v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, (PA Commonw. Court, Nov. 1, 2024), a Pennsylvania state appellate court upheld a decision by the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Board of Review that a former employee of plaintiff hospital was entitled to unemployment benefits because her objections to Covid testing, which led to her firing, were religious. The hospital required all its employees to either obtain a Covid vaccination or, if they were granted a religious exemption, to undergo weekly nasal swab Covid testing. Employee Christine Puello objected to swab testing, contending in part:

Inserting a nasal swab with contaminants into my body violates my conscience and my sincerely held religious beliefs as I have previously described in my religious exemptions.  I am willing to submit my saliva under observation for weekly COVID[-19] testing which eliminates any invasiveness and preserves my dignity of one less object/contaminant entering my body.

The court concluded:

While Claimant did cite safety concerns as a secondary reason for refusing nasal swab testing, the record makes clear that her primary objection was religious and not secular in nature.  The Board credited Claimant’s testimony that this method of testing was prohibited by the tenets of her religion and determined she had good cause to refuse it.

Parents Must Be Given Right to Opt 1st Graders Out of Instruction on Transgender Issues

In a 94-page opinion in Tatel v. Mt. Lebanon School District, (WD PA, Sept. 30, 2024), a Pennsylvania federal district court held that a first-grade teacher violated parents' substantive due process and free exercise rights by introducing students to transgender issues without first giving parents the right to opt their children out of that instruction. The court said in part:

Concerns about undercutting parental authority are heightened when the children are in first grade and the person trying to influence them is their teacher.... The students’ confusion in this case illustrates how difficult it is for a first-grader when a teacher’s instruction conflicts with their Parents’ religious and moral beliefs. The heart of parental authority on matters of the greatest importance within their own family is undermined when a teacher tells first-graders their parents may be wrong about whether the student is a boy or a girl....

... Defendants failed to provide Tatel and Melton notice and the ability to opt their children out of Williams’ transgender agenda, even though Tatel’s and Melton’s objections to the instruction were based on their religious beliefs.  Defendants ratified the lack of parental notice and opt out rights, while providing parental notice and the ability to opt out for numerous other secular or religious reasons.... 

Defendants did not establish a compelling basis for refusing to provide notice and opt out rights for parents of first-graders affected by Williams’ transgender instruction.  ...

Refusing to allow notice and opt outs for religious and fundamental parental rights objections to transgender topics, i.e., forcing young children to be exposed to particular instruction over the objections of unwilling parents, while permitting notice and opt outs for other sensitive topics – is not neutral and constitutes an improper use of governmental authority....

PA Supreme Court: Yard Signs Responding to Neighbors' Antisemitism Protected by Pennsylvania Constitution

In a 4-2 decision in Oberholzer v. Galapo, (PA Sup. Ct., Aug. 20, 2024), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, relying on the broad free speech protections in Art. I, Sec. 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, dissolved an injunction issued by a trial court in an unusual dispute between neighbors. As described by Justice Dougherty's majority opinion:

In November 2014, a brewing feud between the neighbors over landscaping issues reached a boiling point after Dr. Galapo confronted Mr. Oberholzer about a resurveyed property line and Mrs. Oberholzer responded by calling him a “fucking Jew.”  This prompted the Galapos in June 2015 to erect the first of many signs primarily displaying anti-hate and anti-racist messages “along the back tree-line directly abutting [the Oberholzers’] property line, pointed directly at [the Oberholzers’] house, and in direct sight of [other] neighbors’ houses.” ...  All told, the Galapos posted twenty-three signs over a years-long span, during which the neighbors continued to quarrel over other minor nuisances.

Among other things, the Oberholzers sued claiming the signs placed them in a false light. The majority concluded:

We hold the Galapos engaged in protected speech when they posted in their own yard stationary signs decrying hatred and racism.  We further hold the Oberholzers failed to prove that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner by the Galapos’ pure residential speech.  As such, Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and this Court’s precedents precluded the trial court from enjoining the signs, regardless of the nature of the torts alleged.  The injunction imposed an improper prior restraint on speech in violation of Article I, Section 7.

Justice Wecht filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

The Galapos argue that the present injunction violates the no-injunction rule, that it is an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech, and that it fails strict scrutiny.  These arguments are unpersuasive.  The no-injunction rule does not exist in Pennsylvania.  Moreover, even if it did exist, it would not apply here because the equity court did not purport to enjoin defamatory speech.... The argument that the injunction constitutes a prior restraint is also mistaken because the injunction does not restrict speech in advance of its publication.  Finally, the injunction withstands application of strict scrutiny because it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.

Justice Brobson also filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

I would conclude that the trial courts of this Commonwealth have the authority to enjoin residential speech protected by Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution that rises to the level of a private nuisance and disrupts the quiet enjoyment of a neighbor’s home.  I would further find that the Injunction is content neutral, furthers the Commonwealth’s significant interest in protecting the privacy and quiet enjoyment of the Oberholzers’ home, and burdens no more of the Galapos’ speech than necessary to protect the Oberholzers’ right to residential privacy.

AP reports on the decision.

3rd Circuit: Jury Issues Remain in Suit Over Religious Exemption from Covid Vaccine Mandate

In Spivack v. City of Philadelphia, (3d Cir., July 29, 2024), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the dismissal of a suit brought by Rachel Spivack, an Orthodox Jewish employee of the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office, and remanded the case for trial.  Spivack was dismissed from her position for refusing, on religious grounds, to comply with the Office's Covid vaccine mandate. Spivack contended:

 “[a]ll three available brands of COVID-19 vaccines constitute a profound violation of the scriptural prohibitions against forbidden mixtures,” and that “[i]njecting such forbidden substances directly into our bloodstream completely challenges scriptural teaching that regards one’s body as the repository of the soul made in God’s image.” ...

The appeals court said in part:

There is ... a dispute of material fact as to whether anti-religious hostility tainted the DAO’s treatment of religious exemptions.  That is because a reasonable jury could conclude, based on some evidence in the record, that the DAO’s treatment of religious exemptions reflected “intoleran[ce] of religious beliefs.”...

But Krasner claims that Spivack was disciplined under a later policy—the January 2022 policy, which eliminated the religious exemption altogether and kept only the medical exemption.... 

That Krasner continued to evaluate medical exemption requests under the January 2022 policy does not undermine that policy’s general applicability.  Medical exemptions were a separate and objectively defined category of exemption requests....

The critical question is whether the medical exemptions in these policies are comparable to a religious exemption—in other words, whether the “preferential treatment of secular behavior” in the form of a medical exemption “affect[s] the regulation’s purpose in the same way as the prohibited religious behavior.” ...

Unlike a religious exemption, a medical exemption furthers the DAO’s interest in keeping its employees safe and healthy by allowing employees for whom the COVID-19 vaccine would cause death or illness to abstain from vaccination....

[T]he DAO must show that its policy was narrowly tailored, which “requires the government to demonstrate that a policy is the least restrictive means of achieving its objective.”...

Unanswered factual questions pervade this inquiry.  How many similar exemption requests would the DAO need to grant?  Would other, less restrictive mitigation measures for employees with religious exemptions ... have achieved the office’s objectives?  If strict scrutiny applies, a jury must consider these questions....

First Liberty Institute issued a press release announcing the decision.

Medicaid Limit on Reimbursing for Family Care Did Not Violate Muslim Family's Free Exercise Rights

In Alsyrawan v. Department of Human Services, (PA Commonwealth Ct., May 20, 2024), a Pennsylvania state appellate court held that Medicaid rules limiting reimbursement of family members providing in-home and companion services to a total of 60 hours per week did not violate a Muslim family's rights under Pennsylvania's Religious Freedom Protection Act. The Medicaid recipient was a non-verbal adult male with Down syndrome and several other disabilities who was being cared for by his mother and sister. According to the court:

... [The] family, including Petitioner, follows Islamic law set forth in the Quran, which forbids ... unrelated males and females from being alone together, and unrelated males from providing personal care involving nudity or exposed private areas....  Therefore, to protect Petitioner from sin, only Mother, Sister, or other closely related female relatives may be alone with Petitioner, and only a father, brother, uncle, or grandfather could provide his more intimate bathroom and shower care....  Mother added that the prohibition of unrelated males and females being alone together likewise prohibits her from being alone with an unrelated male caretaker while he is tending to Petitioner....

... Petitioner also asserts that the Department’s refusal to grant him an exception to the 40/60 Rule violates the RFPA, where he has shown by clear and convincing evidence that placement of an unrelated caregiver in his home would burden his and his family’s religious exercise, and the Department cannot show that its denial of an exception is the least burdensome way to serve a compelling interest....

... [S]substantial record evidence supports that Islamic law allows an unrelated, non-Islamic male aide to assist Petitioner outside Mother’s presence (i.e., either outside the home or when Mother leaves the home to attend to personal business), before and after which Mother could provide Petitioner’s necessary intimate personal care.... 

... Because Petitioner has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the 40/60 Rule “[s]ignificantly constrains or inhibits conduct or expression mandated by [his] sincerely held religious beliefs[,]” “[s]ignificantly curtails [his] ability to express adherence to [his] faith[,]” “[d]en[ies] [him] reasonable opportunity to engage in activities . . . fundamental to [his] religion[,]” nor “[c]ompels conduct or expression which violates a specific tenet of [his] religious faith[,]” 71 P.S. § 2403, he has failed to meet his initial burden of proving that the application of the 40/60 Rule substantially burdens his free exercise of religion under the Free Exercise Clause or the RFPA.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Casts Doubt on Abortion Exclusion From State Medicaid Coverage

In Allegheny Reproductive Health Center v. Pennsylvania Department of Human Services, (PA Sup. Ct., Jan. 29, 2024) [Majority Opinion], the Pennsylvania Supreme Court remanded to the trial court for strict scrutiny review a challenge to the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's ban on the use of state Medicaid funds for abortion services (except in the case of rape, incest or threat to the life of the mother). Six of the Court's 7 Justices participated in the case.  Justice Donohue's opinion (joined by Justice Wecht) sets out the conclusions of a majority of the Justices in a 219-page opinion. The majority overruled its 1985 decision in Fischer v. Department of Public Welfare that had upheld the ban.  The majority concluded that that pregnancy-related distinctions may violate the state Constitution's Equal Rights Amendment (Art. I, Sec. 28), saying in part:

... [T]he Fischer Court ignored that reproductive functions, by definition, have historically been the primary basis for the distinction between men and women, i.e., physical characteristics that make one a member of the sex. The text of Section 28 does not support the exception created by Fischer that equality of rights can be denied or abridged based on a physical characteristic that makes a person a member of the male or female sex....

 ... [W]e overrule Fischer’s interpretation of the Equal Rights Amendment. We further conclude that when a statute is challenged as violative of Section 28, a sex-based distinction is presumptively unconstitutional, and it is the government’s burden to rebut the presumption with evidence of a compelling state interest in creating the classification and that no less intrusive methods are available to support the expressed policy.

The majority also overruled Fischer's holding that the state Constitution's equal protection provision (Art. I, Sec. 26) does not prevent the state from conferring a benefit unequally.  The majority said in part:

... [A] court, presented with a challenge to a legislative classification that touches on the exercise of a civil right on the basis that it violates Article I, Section 26, must determine whether the classification operates neutrally with regard to the exercise of that right. If it does not, the court shall then conduct a commensurate means-end review.

Writing only for himself and Justice Wecht, Justice Donohue also contended that that the state Constitution substantively protects a woman's right to make reproductive decisions, including abortion.

Justice Wecht also filed a 71-page concurring opinion discussing additional issues. Chief Justice Todd filed a 17-page opinion dissenting in part, concluding that the Fischer decision is binding precedent. Justice Dougherty filed a brief opinion concurring in part, agreeing with the majority's overruling of Fischer. Justice Mundy filed a 24-page opinion dissenting in part, concluding that the funding ban should be upheld on the basis of the Fischer case and strongly criticizing the majority's holding that Art. I, Section 26 requires funding neutrality.

Philadelphia Inquirer reports on the decision.

State Regulation of Catholic Childcare Program Upheld

In South Hills Catholic Academy v. Department of Human Services, (PA Commonwealth Ct., Jan. 11, 2024), a Pennsylvania appellate court rejected a Catholic school's challenges to regulatory requirements imposed on it.  The state asserted that the school's program allowing parents to drop students off 45 minutes early and pick them up 90 minutes late constitutes an uncertified child care center. The school contended that the Department's regulations violate the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the 1st Amendment and the freedom of conscience and religious practices clause of the Pennsylvania constitution. The court said in part:

Private School believes the Department’s regulations impermissibly infringe upon a religious school’s ability to hire staff “based upon their religious beliefs and their ability to transmit those beliefs to the individuals they instruct.”...

The Department’s regulations continue to require only “compliance” with existing civil rights statutes and regulation, from which religious schools are exempt. Therefore, we reject Private School’s contention that reference in the regulations to various civil rights laws infringes upon a religious school’s employment decisions.

With regard to Private School’s other asserted concerns, ..., Private School “has not explained how the regulations at issue interfere with the facility’s ability to communicate Church teachings,” and has “failed to identify any actual or imminent infringement upon [its] right.”... Accordingly, Private School’s “constitutional claims necessarily fail.”

Church Buses Used in Released-Time Programs Not Subject to School Bus Regulations

In CBM Ministries of South Central Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, (PA Commonwlth.. Ct., Dec. 18, 2023), the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court in a 5-2 decision held that privately owned vehicles used by a Bible ministry to transport children from public schools to off-site locations for religious instruction during the school day in released-time programs are not subject to state standards for school buses. CBM operates 87 released-time programs in 8 Pennsylvania counties. It contended that requiring it to comply with the heightened standards for school buses would burden its religious exercise in violation of the Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection Act (RFPA). The majority concluded:

While CBM does transport children to and from public schools for the released time program, DOT’s regulations, by their plain language, do not apply to vehicles that are neither owned by nor contracted with a school. In other words, the text of the enabling statute expressly limits the reach of DOT’s regulatory power in this area.

President Judge Jubelirer, joined by Judge Wojcik dissented, saying in part:

I fear the Majority’s overly narrow reading of the enabling statute thwarts the legislature’s intent, pursuant to its police power, to empower PennDOT to keep children safe when they are being transported to and from public school during the school day.

The dissenters rejected plaintiff's religious freedom argument saying that Vehicle Code provisions that protect the public from unsafe operation of motor vehicles are explicitly excluded from coverage under the RFPA, and that "for a given regulation to violate RFPA, it must 'substantially den[y an organization] a reasonable opportunity to engage in activities . . . fundamental to its religion.'"

U Penn Sued Over Hostile Antisemitic Campus Environment

Suit was filed earlier this week in a Pennsylvania federal district court by two Jewish students alleging that the hostile environment for Jewish students on the University of Pennsylvania's campus violates Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law and constitutes a breach of contract. The 84-page complaint (full text) in Yakoby v. University of Pennsylvania, (ED PA, filed 12/5/2023), alleges in part:

1. Penn, the historic 300-year-old Ivy League university, has transformed itself into an incubation lab for virulent anti-Jewish hatred, harassment, and discrimination. Once welcoming to Jewish students, Penn now subjects them to a pervasively hostile educational environment. Among other things, Penn enforces its own rules of conduct selectively to avoid protecting Jewish students from hatred and harassment, hires rabidly antisemitic professors who call for anti-Jewish violence and spread terrorist propaganda, and ignores Jewish students’ pleas for protection. In doing so, Penn has placed plaintiffs and other Jewish and Israeli students at severe emotional and physical risk. 

2. This lawsuit seeks to hold Penn accountable under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for the damages it has caused plaintiffs and for its failure to remedy the hostile environment on its campus. The harassment and discrimination on campus and in the classroom are relentless and intolerable. Plaintiffs and their Jewish peers are routinely subjected to vile and threatening antisemitic slurs and chants such as “Intifada Revolution,” “from the River to the Sea,” “Fuck the Jews,” “the Jews deserve everything that is happening to them,” “you are a dirty Jew, don’t look at us,” “keep walking you dirty little Jew,” “get out of here kikes!” and “go back to where you came from.” Plaintiffs and other Jewish students must traverse classrooms, dormitories, and buildings vandalized with antisemitic graffiti. Subjected to intense anti-Jewish vitriol, these students have been deprived of the ability and opportunity to fully and meaningfully participate in Penn’s educational and other programs.

The Daily Pennsylvanian reports on the lawsuit.

Exclusion of Parochial School Students from District's Extracurricular Activities Violates Free Exercise

In Religious Rights Foundation of PA v. State College Area School District, (MD PA, Dec. 1, 2023), a Pennsylvania federal district court refused to dismiss a free exercise challenge to a school district's policy that allowed district students enrolled in a home school program or in a charter school to participate in the district's extracurricular activities, but did not allow parochial school students to participate.  The court said in part:

SCASD presents its policy as one prohibiting private students’ involvement in extracurricular programming and argues that by this definition its policy would be generally applicable. But by carving exemptions out of the definition of a policy, a defendant can make any policy appear generally applicable. This approach is clearly circular for the obvious reason that “every law applies to everything it applies to.” ...

Instead, the policy is more accurately stated at a broader level of generality—only students enrolled in SCASD may participate in its extracurricular activities. That general policy is subject to two categorical exemptions for charter-schooled and homeschooled students....

Where a regime refuses to exempt religious conduct but imposes a categorical exemption for secular conduct which threatens an analogous harm to the stated interest, it is a foregone conclusion that the regime is underinclusive. For if SCASD had a policy narrowly tailored to prevent overcrowding of its extracurricular programming, it would not have had the homeschool and charter school exemptions in the first place.....

Plaintiffs attend parochial schools as a form of religious exercise. Other students attend homeschool and charter school for their own reasons. Under the Free Exercise Clause, religious reasons for not attending public school must be considered at least as important as any secular reason. Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that SCASD’s failure to extend its exemption to students who do not attend its school for religious reasons offends the Free Exercise Clause, as it denies a government benefit on the basis of religious exercise through a law which is not generally applicable....

At one point in its opinion, the court added:

If SCASD proffers different justifications for its scheme of exemptions later in this litigation, such that strict scrutiny does not apply, it might succeed in defending the status quo. But such a justification must actually be grounded in some fact distinguishing homeschooled and charter-schooled students from parochially schooled students, in relation to the risks posed by allowing their participation.

[Thanks to Eugene Volokh via Religionlaw for the lead.] 

Pennsylvania Legislature Repeals Ban on Public School Teachers Wearing Religious Garb or Insignia

Yesterday, the Pennsylvania legislature gave final passage to Senate Bill 84 (full text) which repeals Pennsylvania's ban on public school teachers wearing any religious garb or insignia in the classroom. According to Penn Live, Governor Josh Shapiro is expected to sign the bill when it reaches his desk. Pennsylvania is the only state that still has such a ban on its books. In Nichol v. Arin Intermediate Unit 28, (WD PA, June 25, 2003), a Pennsylvania federal district court, in a preliminary injunction action, held that the law likely violates the Free Speech and Free Exercise clauses of the 1st Amendment. After the decision, plaintiff was rehired and given back pay. (See Senate Memo on SB 84.)

Cert. Filed In Abortion Sidewalk Counseling Dispute

 A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed yesterday with the U.S. Supreme Court in Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, (Sup. Ct., filed 10/10/2023).  In the case, the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by anti-abortion sidewalk counselors challenging Harrisburg's ordinance creating a 20-foot buffer zone designed to exclude protesters around health-care facilities, including abortion clinics. In its opinion, the 3rd Circuit agreed that the city did not have a policy or custom prohibiting one-on-one sidewalk counseling. Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the filing of the petition for review.

3 Courts Rule on Claims for Religious Exemptions from Covid Vaccine Mandates

Last week, federal district courts in three states handed down decisions in cases in which a former employee was suing his or her employer for refusing to provide them with a religious exemption from the employer's Covid vaccine mandate.

In Crocker v. Austin, (WD LA, June 22, 2023) a Louisiana federal district court dismissed as moot a suit for injunctive relief brought by seven military service members who faced involuntary separation from the Air Force when they filed suit. However, in January 2023 the military rescinded the vaccine mandate and updated personnel records to remove any adverse actions associated with the denial of requested exemptions. Any remaining suit for damages falls under the Tucker Act and must be brought in the Court of Federal Claims.

In Leek v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, (ED PA, June 23, 2023), a Pennsylvania federal district court refused to dismiss a Title VII religious discrimination claim filed by a nurse who was denied religious exemptions from a hospital's requirement to receive Covid and influenza vaccines. The hospital claimed that the nurse's objections were not religious in nature. The court held that the nurse's belief that chemical injections may make her body impure in the eyes of the Lord, and her objections to some vaccines because they were developed using aborted fetal cells, are both religious objections.  The fact that some of her other objections were more medical or political did not negate the presence of religious objections.

In Algarin v. NYC Health + Hospitals Corp., (SD NY, June 23, 2023), a New York federal district court dismissed claims by an Internet technology professional at a health care facility that denial of his request for a religious exemption from the state's Covid vaccine mandate violated Title VII and the New York State and City Human Rights Laws. The court disagreed, holding that requiring the employer to violate a state rule would place an undue burden on the employer. The court also rejected plaintiff's 1st Amendment free exercise claim, finding that the vaccine mandate was a neutral law of general applicability.

3rd Circuit Hears Oral Arguments In Abortion Clinic Buffer Zone Challenge

The U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals yesterday heard oral arguments in Reilly v. City of Harrisburg (audio of full oral arguments). In the case below (MD PA, March 28, 2022) (full text), the court dismissed a suit by anti-abortion sidewalk counselors to Harrisburg's ordinance creating a 20-foot buffer zone designed to exclude protesters around health-care facilities, including abortion clinics. Liberty Counsel issued a press release previewing its arguments for appellants in the case.

Court Reaffirms Refusal to Dismiss Case Challenging 1st-Grade Teacher's Gender Identity Instruction

In Tatel v. Mt. Lebanon School District (II), (WD PA, May 31, 2023), a Pennsylvania federal district court reaffirmed its prior decision and concluded that parents of first-grade students have asserted plausible claims that their due process and free exercise rights, as well as their rights to familial privacy and equal protection, were violated by a teacher who pursued her own agenda in discussing gender identity with young students.  The court said in part:

This case ... involves not merely instruction to influence tolerance of other children or families, but efforts to inculcate a teacher’s beliefs about transgender topics in Plaintiffs’ own children. ... [T]he allegations in this case go beyond mere reading of a few books. Here, the teacher allegedly pursued her agenda throughout the school year, including teaching first-graders that their parents may be wrong about their gender, telling one boy could dress like his mother, and telling the children to keep the teacher’s discussions about gender topics secret from their parents.... [I]t was the children’s own family and their own gender identity that Williams targeted. Plaintiffs allege that Williams targeted one child for repeated approaches about gender dysphoria despite, or because of, the parents’ beliefs.... It is reasonable to infer that Williams intended to influence the children’s own gender identity and to have at least one child become like the teacher’s transgender child.

In assessing plaintiffs' free exercise claim, the court said in part: 

Plaintiffs allege that Williams’ agenda about gender dysphoria and transgender transitioning conflicts with their sincerely held religious and moral beliefs that “human beings are created male or female and that the natural created order regarding human sexuality cannot be changed regardless of individual feelings, beliefs, or discomfort with one’s identity, and biological reality, as either male or female.”... Plaintiffs contend that Defendants deliberately supplanted the parents’ role to control the instruction of their young children about their gender identity in accordance with their religious values ... and adopted a de facto policy that Williams could continue to advocate her agenda to first-graders in the future without notice or opt out rights for the parents.... As noted, this case is not about teaching kindness or tolerance, but about a teacher’s agenda to instruct first-graders that their parents’ religious beliefs about their own children’s gender are or may be wrong.....

Volokh Conspiracy has additional discussion of the case.

Bankruptcy Reorganization Plan for Harrisburg Diocese Approved By Court

On Feb. 15, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania gave final approval to the Plan of Reorganization for the Catholic Diocese of Harrisburg. (Full text of Reorganization Plan.) (Announcement by Diocese.) A Questions and Answers document explaining the Plan says in part:

The Plan outlines how the RCDH and related entities will (a) establish a Survivor Compensation Trust, (b) provide funding to the Trust in an amount equal to $7,500,000 to provide financial restitution for survivors of clergy sexual abuse, and (c) adopt enhanced child protection protocols. In addition to the financial restitution from the RCDH and related entities, current and historical insurance providers will also contribute $10,750,000 to the Trust....

Prior to filing for reorganization, the RCDH authorized an independent Survivor Compensation Program be established, in order to provide financial restitution to abuse survivors. Through this program, $12,784,450 was provided to assist 111 survivors.... 

More than 60 proofs of claim were submitted during the reorganization process and may be eligible for financial distributions from the Survivor Compensation Trust....

The majority of the claims involve accusations against Diocesan priests. As part of the confirmation process, the Diocese issued a list of persons involved in the claims. That list is available www.hbgdiocese.org/reorganization-information. All claims of abuse received during the bankruptcy process were reported to law enforcement.

Links to all the major legal documents filed in the reorganization are available on the Diocese's website. WHP CBS21 reports on the Plan's approval. The Survivor's Network SNAP issued a press release reacting to the Plan approval.

Dismissal of Title VII Suit By Teacher Fired By Catholic School Is Denied

In Ference v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Greensburg, (WD PA, Jan. 18, 2022), a Pennsylvania federal magistrate judge recommended denying a motion to dismiss filed by the Catholic Diocese in a Title VII sex-discrimination lawsuit by a Lutheran 6th-grade teacher in a Catholic school who was fired shortly after being hired when the school discovered that he was in a same-sex marriage. The Diocese had raised defenses based on Title VII's exemption for religious discrimination, the church autonomy doctrine, the ministerial exception and RFRA.

Vaccine Mandate Without Religious Exemption Is Upheld

In Spivack v. City of Philadelphia, (ED PA, Jan. 4, 2023), a Pennsylvania federal district court held that Philadelphia's District Attorney Lawrence Krasner did not violate the religious rights of an Orthodox Jewish Assistant District Attorney when he refused to grant her an exemption from the Office's COVID vaccine mandate. The mandate, in its final form, offered no religious exemptions and only limited medical exemptions. According to the court, in seeking a religious exemption plaintiff submitted a letter from her rabbi that explained:

congregation members are forbidden from (1) benefitting from the live dissection of animals; (2) using hybridization technologies; (3) "self-flagellating"; (4) exposing themselves to unnecessary risk (Spivack's "natural immunity" to the virus made vaccination unnecessary); and (5) injecting a product whose precise ingredients are undisclosed.... Neither Krasner nor the City disputes that Spivack's sincerely holds her religious beliefs.

Rejecting plaintiff's First Amendment challenge, the court said in part:

Spivack offers no evidence that Krasner's exemption changes "stemmed from religious intolerance, rather than an intent to more fully ensure that employees [at the DAO] receive the vaccine in furtherance of the State's public health goal."...

[T]he medical exemption Krasner finally approved was for an objectively and narrowly defined category of persons: non-union DAO employees for whom a vaccination could be life-threatening. This is not the kind of exemption that undermines the Policy's general applicability....

The DAO ... "seriously considered substantially less restrictive alternatives" in the hope that they could achieve the Office's compelling interest-- "trying to keep people as safe as we can."... Concluding that these alternatives were inadequate, the Office required vaccinations for all non-union employees save one.

In these circumstances, the DAO Vaccine Policy survives strict scrutiny review.

Suit Over Teaching 1st Graders About Transgender Topics Moves Forward

In Tatel v. Mt. Lebanon School District, (WD PA, Oct. 27, 2022), a Pennsylvania federal district court allowed parents of first graders to move ahead with their due process, equal protection and free exercise claims against a teacher who has a transgender child for teaching their students about transgender topics over parental objections. It also permitted plaintiffs to move ahead against school administrators, the school board and the school district   The court summarized its decision, saying in part:

[T]he factual allegations in the complaint present plausible claims that Parents have fundamental constitutional rights (pursuant to Substantive and Procedural Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment and the First Amendment Free Exercise clause) that were violated by a public school teacher, over the Parents’ objections and without notice and opt out rights, when the teacher promoted her own agenda to their first grade children about gender dysphoria and transgender transitioning, including showing videos or reading books about those topics, telling the children that the Parents may be wrong about the child’s gender, telling a child she would never lie (implying the parents may be lying about the child’s identity), telling the children to keep the discussions about transgender topics secret, and grooming a student to become a transgender child. The Equal Protection and familial privacy claims asserted by the Plaintiffs are plausible, but will benefit from further factual development. 

A claim based on the children's privacy rights was dismissed without prejudice.