In a 4-2 decision in Oberholzer v. Galapo, (PA Sup. Ct., Aug. 20, 2024), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, relying on the broad free speech protections in Art. I, Sec. 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, dissolved an injunction issued by a trial court in an unusual dispute between neighbors. As described by Justice Dougherty's majority opinion:
In November 2014, a brewing feud between the neighbors over landscaping issues reached a boiling point after Dr. Galapo confronted Mr. Oberholzer about a resurveyed property line and Mrs. Oberholzer responded by calling him a “fucking Jew.” This prompted the Galapos in June 2015 to erect the first of many signs primarily displaying anti-hate and anti-racist messages “along the back tree-line directly abutting [the Oberholzers’] property line, pointed directly at [the Oberholzers’] house, and in direct sight of [other] neighbors’ houses.” ... All told, the Galapos posted twenty-three signs over a years-long span, during which the neighbors continued to quarrel over other minor nuisances.
Among other things, the Oberholzers sued claiming the signs placed them in a false light. The majority concluded:
We hold the Galapos engaged in protected speech when they posted in their own yard stationary signs decrying hatred and racism. We further hold the Oberholzers failed to prove that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner by the Galapos’ pure residential speech. As such, Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and this Court’s precedents precluded the trial court from enjoining the signs, regardless of the nature of the torts alleged. The injunction imposed an improper prior restraint on speech in violation of Article I, Section 7.
Justice Wecht filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:
The Galapos argue that the present injunction violates the no-injunction rule, that it is an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech, and that it fails strict scrutiny. These arguments are unpersuasive. The no-injunction rule does not exist in Pennsylvania. Moreover, even if it did exist, it would not apply here because the equity court did not purport to enjoin defamatory speech.... The argument that the injunction constitutes a prior restraint is also mistaken because the injunction does not restrict speech in advance of its publication. Finally, the injunction withstands application of strict scrutiny because it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
Justice Brobson also filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:
I would conclude that the trial courts of this Commonwealth have the authority to enjoin residential speech protected by Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution that rises to the level of a private nuisance and disrupts the quiet enjoyment of a neighbor’s home. I would further find that the Injunction is content neutral, furthers the Commonwealth’s significant interest in protecting the privacy and quiet enjoyment of the Oberholzers’ home, and burdens no more of the Galapos’ speech than necessary to protect the Oberholzers’ right to residential privacy.
AP reports on the decision.
