LA Sued Over Its handling of Permit Application for Christian Revival Event

Suit was filed last week in a California federal district court by leaders of May Day USA, a nationwide Christian revival event, contending that the manner in which Los Angeles officials handed their application for a permit to hold a revival on Hollywood Boulevard violated their 1st and 14th Amendment rights. The 54-page complaint (full text) in Donnelly v. City of Los Angeles, California, (CD CA, filed 8/21/2025), alleges in part:

15. LAPD wielded the unconstitutionally unbridled discretion afforded it under the City’s permitting scheme to subject MayDay to lengthy and pretextual administrative hurdles....

16. Among the LAPD’s many demands was a requirement that MayDay conduct a petition of Hollywood Boulevard’s business owners and vendors to ensure at least 51% approved of MayDay’s expressive activity and speech....

19. The City’s permitting scheme thus enshrined an unconstitutional heckler’s veto upon MayDay and its expressive activities....

21. The City refused to provide MayDay with any concrete answer on its permit application until the last minute, prohibiting MayDay from finalizing their planned event, advertising it, or otherwise adequately preparing to engage in the event....

23. Three days prior to its requested event, the City denied the permit actually requested by MayDay ...and “granted” the application to host the event at a location ... it never requested and out of the site of the hecklers who Defendants believed would veto MayDay’s speech. In essence, the City tried to put MayDay unconstitutionally out of sight, and out of mind....

25. Simply put, the City said MayDay could speak, but only if it did it quietly, quickly, and where no one who might object would be forced to hear it. Defendants denied MayDay’s permit application on the basis of the views it planned to espouse and out of concern that Hollywood Boulevard was not an appropriate place for their religious speech, exercise, and expression.

Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

School Counselor's Office Display of Anti-Trans Books Is Permissible Only When No Students Are in His Office

In Theis v. Intermountain Education Service Board of Directors, (D ORA, Aug. 20, 2025), a social worker employed by the district to administer standardized tests individually to students sued claiming his constitutional rights were violated when the district found that his display of two particular books in his office violated the district's bias policy. The district found that the display of the books-- titled He is He and She is She--constituted a hostile expression toward a person because of their gender identity. Plaintiff was ordered to stop displaying the books. 

The court concluded that the district's policy did not violate plaintiff's free exercise rights, saying in part:

... Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant’s Speech Policy is not neutral. There is no indication that the ESB Policy restricts any religious practices because of their religious motivations. Indeed, the policy explicitly seeks to prevent discrimination or harassment based on religion. And even if the ESB Policy adversely impacted religious practices, it is addressing the legitimate concern of ensuring an open and welcoming school environment for all students and employees.

Plaintiff also has not shown that Defendants were “hostile” towards his religious beliefs....

The court however agreed in part with plaintiff's free speech claim, saying that "only his display when no students are present is protected under the First Amendment." It explained: 

When no students were present in Plaintiff’s office, the message of the books would not be reasonably attributable to IMESD, and the display could not press Plaintiff’s views on impressionable or captive students.

Good News Clubs Must Have Equal Access to School Facilities

In Child Evangelism Fellowship NorCal, Inc. v. Oakland Unified School District Board of Education, (ND CA, Aug. 15, 2025), a California federal district court issued a preliminary injunction barring the Oakland School District from denying Christian Evangelism Fellowship and its Good News Clubs access to school facilities after school on an equal basis with the access provided similarly situated nonprofit organizations. Plaintiff had been denied use of school facilities, in part because all space was being used by two broad afterschool programs that choose subcontractors to provide content. The court said in part:

Even assuming that afterschool space is now controlled by the lead agencies, as OUSD seems to urge, Plaintiff has provided an example of a lead agency similarly denying CEF access as a subcontractor because of its religious affiliation....

In short, the Court finds that the law and facts clearly favor Plaintiff’s position that OUSD violated CEF’s free speech rights.

Catholic News Agency reports on the decision.

9th Circuit: Oregon Religious Non-Discrimination Rule for Grantees Is Mostly Valid

 In Youth 71Five Ministries v. Willliams, (9th Cir., Aug. 18, 2025), a Christian youth program sued after the Oregon Department of Education's Youth Development Division withdrew the conditional award of a grant. Plaintiff requires that its board members, employees, and volunteers agree to a Christian Statement of Faith and be involved in a local church. The Division contended that this violates its religious non-discrimination policy.  Plaintiff contended that the withdrawal violated its free exercise, religious-autonomy, and expressive-association rights. 

 The U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals said in part:

... [T]he Rule does not deny funding based on a practice exclusive to religious organizations. Government agencies, secular corporations, and religious ministries alike might engage in religion-based employment discrimination....

Based on the evidence properly before the district court, it was not an abuse of discretion to conclude that the Division likely treats comparable secular and religious activity the same....

... 71Five argues that merely tailoring services to a target demographic is comparable to 71Five’s categorical exclusion of non-Christians. We disagree....

The Division adopted the Rule to, among other reasons, better reflect its “commitment to equitable access, equal opportunity, and inclusion.” That is a legitimate interest.... The Rule rationally furthers that interest by ensuring that Division-funded initiatives are equally open to employees, volunteers, and participants regardless of race, sex, religion, or any other protected characteristic. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in determining that 71Five is not likely to succeed on the merits of its free-exercise claim....

71Five claims that the Rule abridges its expressive association by requiring it to accept employees and volunteers “who disagree” with its message “or would express a contrary view.” ... We hold that 71Five has established that it is likely to succeed, at least in part. As to Division-funded initiatives, the Rule is likely permissible as a reasonable and viewpoint-neutral regulation of expressive association in a limited public forum—the Grant Program. But to the extent that it restricts 71Five’s selection of speakers to spread its Christian message through initiatives that receive no Division funding, the Rule likely imposes an unconstitutional condition....

71Five’s complaint does not allege a violation of any clearly established right under the First Amendment, so the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and the district court did not err in dismissing 71Five’s damages claims with prejudice.

Judge Rawlinson concurred only in the judgment and did not join the majority's opinion, saying in part:

I concur in the judgment because, and only because, of our truncated review of a district court's decision granting or denying injunctive relief, and our obligatory deference to a district court's discretionary decision to decline consideration of arguments and evidence presented in a Reply Brief. ...

I decline to join the majority opinion's analysis because it relies heavily on the premise (mistaken, in my view), that Youth Five's website evidenced discrimination, while websites from the secular organizations applying for grants did not evidence discrimination....

[Thanks to Steven Sholk for the lead.]

9th Circuit Rejects Christian Day Care's Challenge to Licensing Requirement

In Foothills Christian Ministries v. Johnson, (9th Cir., Aug. 14, 2025), Foothills, a Christian day care center, challenged a California licensing provision requiring that day care centers ensure that children are free to attend religious services or activities of their parents' choice. The U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the regulation on free exercise grounds because the state has repeatedly taken the position that the regulation does not prohibit operating a day care center with a mandatory religious curriculum, where parents are made aware of this in advance of enrollment. 

However, the court held that Foothills does have standing to challenge the general licensing requirement on the ground that some secular child day care centers are exempt from licensing. But the court rejected that claim on the merits, saying in part:

Foothills contends that the Act’s exemption of “recreation programs conducted for children by” the YMCA “or similar organizations,”...  But this provision only exempts recreation programs from the licensure requirement; it explicitly does not exempt “child day care programs conducted by” the same organizations and so creates no mechanism for granting individualized exemptions for such facilities....

Foothills points to the exception for any “child daycare program that operates only one day per week for no more than four hours on that one day.”... This exemption applies to, among other things, Sunday schools. But a program that oversees children for only four hours a week does not present a threat to children’s health and safety comparable to that of a facility that can operate up to 24 hours a day....

Foothills alleges that the Act’s exemption of certain sectarian organizations—such as the YMCA and Boy Scouts of America—from licensing gives preferential treatment to certain religions in violation of the Establishment Clause.... 

If Foothills sought to operate a recreation program, it would not be subject to the Act. And if the YMCA or the Boy Scouts sought to operate a child day care facility, they would. This exemption draws no lines based on religion....

The court also held that the required disclosure to parents of the right for their child to attend religious activities of their choice does not infringe Foothills' free speech rights, distinguishing the Supreme Court case of Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra , saying in part:

 Because the Act merely requires Foothills to inform parents of their children’s rights and does not “convey a message fundamentally at odds with its mission,” the required disclosure is not controversial....

8th Circuit: Rejection of Prison Course on Manhood From Christian Biblical Lens Violated Volunteer's 1st Amendment Rights

In Schmitt v. Robertus, (8th Cir., Aug. 14, 2025), the U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision held that Minnesota prison officials likely violated the 1st Amendment in  refusing to allow plaintiff, a volunteer, to teach a program titled The Quest for Authentic Manhood at the Minnesota Correctional Facility.  The program defines manhood through a Christian biblical lens. Officials rejected the program as violating the prison's diversity, equity and inclusivity values, saying in part:

Throughout all sessions reviewed, men were only identified as heterosexual, seeking ideal relationships and marriage with women. It is evident that throughout this curriculum, manhood can only be achieved through heterosexual relationships.

Additionally, throughout many of the sessions, women are also identified as the problem for creating “soft males[,”] described as indecisive and weak....

The 8th Circuit focused on the test in prison cases announced by the Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley. Under that test prison regulations must have a valid rational connection to a legitimate governmental interest. The 8th Circuit said in part:

The first Turner factor, however, requires more than a legitimate penological interest. “[T]he governmental objective must be a legitimate and neutral one.”... “This means that the proffered mechanism by which the regulation promotes the legitimate government interest must be ‘unrelated to the suppression of expression.’” ...

Here, although the MDOC set forth a legitimate government interest, its termination of Quest was not “in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression.”...

Judge Kelly dissented, saying in part:

As I see it, it is common sense that a prison, like a school, can curate the programming it provides. ...

It thus seems natural to me to conclude that MDOC’s rehabilitative programming constitutes government speech, casting doubt on Schmitt’s free-speech and free-exercise claims....

8th Circuit: Jury Should Decide If Anti-Abortion Facebook Posting Impacted Delivery of Public Services

In Melton v. City of Forrest City, Arkansas, (8th Cir., Aug. 13, 2025), the U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals held that a district court should have sent factual questions to a jury instead of granting summary judgment in a retaliation suit by a fireman who was dismissed because of the firestorm caused by a controversial posting on his personal Facebook page. The fire chief had received complaints about the posting from city council members and members of the public. The court said in part:

Steven Melton is a pro-life, evangelical Christian.  In June 2020, he reposted a black-and-white image on Facebook that depicted a silhouette of a baby in the womb with a rope around its neck.  His intent was to convey that he was “anti-abortion.”...

Others did not view the image the same way.  Two weeks after he posted it, a retired fire-department supervisor complained to Melton that he thought it looked like a noose around the neck of a black child.  It upset him because the caption of the image, “I can’t breathe!,” was associated with the protests surrounding George Floyd’s death.  Melton agreed to delete it immediately....

The problem is that there was no showing that Melton’s post had an impact on the fire department itself.  No current firefighter complained or confronted him about it.  Nor did any co-worker or supervisor refuse to work with him.  Granting summary judgment based on such “vague and conclusory” concerns, without more, runs the risk of constitutionalizing a heckler’s veto.

ADF issued a press release announcing the decision.

Denial of State Reimbursement for Religious Home School Material Does Not Violate 1st Amendment

In Trakel v. Critchfield, (D ID, Aug. 6, 202), an Idaho federal district court rejected parents' claim that they are entitled to reimbursement for religiously influenced supplemental materials that they purchased for their children who are enrolled in the state's home learning program, the Idaho Home Learning Academy. The court said in part:

IHLA is an accredited public charter school that provides Idaho students with a customizable online education. The school offers its own online curriculum options but also reimburses families for the costs of certain self-selected supplemental and enrichment materials. Some of these items are “preapproved,” while others require IHLA to first determine that the items are educationally appropriate, reasonable, and an efficient use of tax dollars....

The school denied the reimbursement request, citing State Department of Education policies and Article IX, Section 5 of the Idaho Constitution, known as the Blaine Amendment,  which prohibits the use of public money for religious purposes....

The Trakels argue this denial violates the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment. Specifically, they view IHLA’s reimbursement policy as a public benefit, which is unconstitutionally limited to secular curriculums....

... [T]he Trakels seek to compel IHLA to provide a religious education. IHLA’s reimbursement policy is not a public benefit that allows parents to make fully independent decisions regarding their children’s education. Although families have an unusual degree of input and flexibility, IHLA is ultimately a public school that sets its own curriculum. To qualify for reimbursement, supplemental materials must receive approval and meet a variety of standards set by the school.... To put it simply, reimbursed materials become part of the IHLA curriculum. The question, then, is whether the Trakels have a free exercise or free speech right for their children to receive a public religious education. The answer is clearly no.

Office of Personnel Management Says Federal Employee Religious Speech In Workplace Is Protected

Yesterday, the federal Office of Personnel Management issued a Memo (full text) to heads of federal departments and agencies on Protecting Religious Expression in the Federal Workplace. The cover letter transmitting the Memo says in part:

The memo provides clear guidance to ensure federal employees may express their religious beliefs through prayer, personal items, group gatherings, and conversations without fear of discrimination or retaliation....

The memo builds on OPMʼs July 16 guidance on reasonable accommodations for religious purposes....

The Memo itself defines kind of religious speech that should be protected in the federal workplace, saying in part:

... Employees should be permitted to display and use items used for religious purposes or icons of a religiously significant nature ... on their desks, on their person, and in their assigned workspaces. 

... Agencies should allow ... employees to engage in individual or communal religious expressions in both formal and informal settings alone or with fellow employees, so long as such expressions do not occur during on-duty time...

... Employees may engage in conversations regarding religious topics with fellow employees, including attempting to persuade others of the correctness of their own religious views, provided that such efforts are not harassing in nature. Employees may also encourage their coworkers to participate in religious expressions of faith, such as prayer, to the same extent that they would be permitted to encourage coworkers participate in other personal activities. The constitutional rights of supervisors ...should not be distinguished from non-supervisory employees.... However, unwillingness to engage in such conversations may not be the basis of workplace discipline.   

...  [W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, they are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.....

Among the specific examples of protected employee speech set out in an Appendix to the Memo are:

• An employee may invite another to worship at her church despite being belonging to a different faith. 
• On a bulletin board meant for personal announcements, a supervisor may post a handwritten note inviting each of his employees to attend an Easter service at his church....
• A park ranger leading a tour through a national park may join her tour group in prayer.
• A doctor at a Veterans Affairs (VA) hospital may pray over his patient for her recovery.....

The Hill reports on the Memo. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Adoptive Parent Rule on Transgender Children Violates Plaintiff's Free Speech and Free Exercise Rights

 In Bates v. Pakseresht, (9th Cir., July 24, 2025), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff Oregon's requirement that to be certified as an adoptive parent, a person must agree to respect and support an adopted child's gender identity and gender expression and use the child's preferred pronouns. Plaintiff contended that it violated her Seventh Day Adventist religious beliefs to use a child's preferred pronouns or take the child for gender transition medical appointments. In a 2-1 decision, the court agreed that the requirement violated plaintiff's free speech and free exercise rights. The majority, in a 50-page opinion, said in part:

We deal here with two vital such rights: the First Amendment’s protections for free speech and the free exercise of religion.  These rights work together, with “the Free Exercise Clause protect[ing] religious exercises, whether communicative or not,” and “the Free Speech Clause provid[ing] overlapping protection for expressive religious activities.”...  Fundamental as basic freedoms, these rights spring from a common constitutional principle: that the government may not insist upon our adherence to state favored orthodoxies, whether of a religious or political variety....

We hold that Oregon’s application of § 413-200-0308(2)(k) to Bates, in denying her certification to be an adoptive parent, triggers strict scrutiny for both her free speech and free exercise claims.  In Part A below, we explain why strict scrutiny applies to Bates’s free speech claim.  In Part B, we do the same for Bates’s Free Exercise Clause claim.  And in Part C, we explain why applying Oregon’s policy to Bates does not survive strict scrutiny.  Bates has therefore shown a likelihood of success on the merits of her claim that denying her certification under § 413-200-0308(2)(k) violates the First Amendment.

Judge Clifton dissented, saying in part in a 40-page opinion:

The only limitation imposed by the state in declining to approve her application to foster a child concerns her treatment of the child, not what she personally believes, how she speaks to the world, or how she practices her faith. Oregon should be permitted to put the best interests of the child for which it is responsible paramount in making the decision to place one of its children in the custody of a foster applicant. Parents would not be expected to entrust their children to caregivers who volunteer that they will not respect the child’s self-determined gender identity, if that is something the parents have decided is important. Oregon should not be powerless to protect children for whom it has parental responsibility and for whom it has decided respect should be given. 

Tennessee Law Barring Recruitment of Minor to Obtain an Abortion Is Unconstitutional

In Welty v. Dunaway, (MD TN, July 18, 2025), a Tennessee federal district court enjoined enforcement of a Tennessee statute that prohibits "recruiting" an unemancipated minor to obtain an out-of-state abortion that is legal where performed. The court said in part:

... [P]laintiffs have established that §39-15-201(a) unconstitutionally regulates speech based on content and is facially overbroad.

Axios reports on the decision. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Ban On Pride Flag on City Poles Does Not Violate Establishment Clause

 In Gordon v. City of Hamtramck, (ED MI, July 14, 2025), a Michigan federal district court held that a ban on religious, ethnic, racial, political, or sexual orientation group flags on city flag poles does not violate the plaintiffs' free speech rights or the Establishment Clause, saying in part:

The plaintiffs also bring a claim under another part of the First Amendment, positing that the enactment of Resolution 2023-82 that effectively banned display of the Pride flag violated the Establishment Clause because it was promulgated “to accommodate a segment of the Hamtramck community which was hostile to the rights of the gay community based on their personal religious views.”  The plaintiffs cite several statements in this record by city councilpersons condemning homosexuality and expressing hostility to the sentiments that the Gay Pride flag may symbolize.   

However, the plaintiffs’ “evidence” of subjective motivation to advance a religious viewpoint is irrelevant to the analysis of alleged Establishment Clause violations....

The justifications advanced here — foreclosing public controversy and avoiding contentious litigation over displays of competing viewpoints — have been found to be constitutionally valid by courts that upheld regulations with indistinguishable limitations on flagpole displays.

Christian Bookstore Challenges Colorado Anti-Discrimination Law

Suit was filed this week in a Colorado federal district court by a Christian bookstore challenging on free speech, free exercise, equal protection and due process grounds recent amendments to Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Act. The complaint (full text) in Doxa Enterprise, Ltd. v. Sullivan, (D CO, filed 7/16/2025), alleges in part:

2. Colorado recently passed HB25-1312 (the “Act”) and amended the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (“CADA”) to define “gender expression” to include “chosen name” and “how an individual chooses to be addressed.” The Act then declares that Coloradans have a right to access “public accommodations[] and advertising” free of discrimination on that basis— except if the requested language is “offensive” or made for “frivolous purposes.”  Under this revised CADA language, it is now illegal for public accommodations like independent bookstores to refer to transgender-identifying individuals with biologically accurate language in their publications and customer interactions. 

3. This puts CADA on a collision course with the First Amendment rights of Plaintiff Doxa Enterprise, Ltd (“Born Again Used Books” or the “Bookstore”), a Christian bookstore in Colorado Springs that sells Christian literature, homeschool curricula, and classics. The Bookstore also publishes a website and social media accounts to promote its Christian faith and products.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Christian Evangelist Challenges Town's Permit Requirement for Carrying Sign

Suit was filed this week in a South Carolina federal district court challenging the application of Chapin, South Carolina's "Parades, Demonstrating, Picketing" Ordinance to plaintiff's carrying of a religious sign on public rights of way. The complaint (full text) in Giardino v. Town of Chapin, South Carolina, (D SC, filed 7/15/2025), alleges in part:

2. Chapin interprets and applies the Ordinance regulating “demonstrations” to engulf Giardino’s use of religious signs while standing on public rights-of-way in town limits, requiring him to (i) apply for a permit to hold a sign on a public way, (ii) supply fourteen-day advance notice of his use of a sign, (iii) divulge identity and content of his sign, (iv) conditioned on standardless approval of the Mayor, and, if approved, (v) limit his time holding a sign to thirty minutes, and (vi) to move to a different spot after fifteen minutes...

12. Giardino is an evangelical Christian driven by his faith to share the good news of Jesus Christ (gospel) with others. 

13. He wants to inform others of the salvation they can find by believing in Jesus Christ and accepting Him as their savior.   

14. To convey this evangelistic message, Giardino holds a 20-inch by 24-inch sign attached to a short handle containing a short, pithy statement about the gospel while standing on a public sidewalk or public right-of-way in the town limits of Chapin, South Carolina.

The complaint alleges that enforcement of the Ordinance violates plaintiff's free speech, free exercise and due process rights, as well as South Carolina's Religious Freedom Act. Plaintiff also filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

First Liberty issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Section 1981 Suit Can Move Ahead Against Defendants Who Disrupted Jewish Religious Celebration

Congregation Hazon Ovadya, Inc. v. Rabbinical Council of California, (CD CA, July 1, 2025), is a suit by a Sephardic Jewish synagogue against several individuals of Ashkenazi Jewish origin as well as a group of Ashkenazi rabbis. The court describes the dispute:

On or about July 13, 2022, CHO organized a procession and solemn, religious ceremony centered around the dedication of a Torah.... In preparation for the Ceremony, CHO contracted with various rabbis and vendors, including musicians, a disc jockey, and equipment providers....

Plaintiffs allege that the Rabbinical Defendants contacted hundreds of people, including the Individuals Defendants, to organize a riot and frustrate the Ceremony.... Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants were motivated by their bias and animosity towards people of Sephardic origin.... In addition to playing sirens and other noises, some of the Individual Defendants shouted racial slurs at Plaintiff Vanounou, including but not limited to calling him "Arab."....

Due to the riot, the musicians and other vendors were unable to perform their contractual duties during the Ceremony....

Plaintiffs sued under 42 USC §1981 which prohibits discrimination on account of race in the making and enforcement of contracts. The court denied defendants' motion to dismiss the case under California's anti-SLAPP law, saying that the suit does not seek to hold defendants liable for their speech. The court refused to dismiss the suit against three individual defendants, saying in part:

The Court acknowledges that § 1981 is not "meant to provide an omnibus remedy for all racial injustice."... And the facts at issue in this action certainly do not fall within the typical kinds of claims raised under § 1981. However, having been presented with no authority expressly precluding claims of this nature, the Court does not view dismissal on this ground appropriate at this stage. At bottom, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled that their contractual rights were impaired...

However the court dismissed charges against the Rabbinical organization, saying in part:

Even if the Rabbinical Defendants organized the riot and some of the participants engaged in racial chants, Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts supporting the idea that the Rabbinical Defendants engaged in this conduct themselves or otherwise ordered or condoned it....

Cert. Granted in Street Preacher's Suit Challenging Protest Zone

Yesterday the U.S. Supreme Court granted review in Olivier v. City of Brandon, Mississippi, (Docket No. 24-993, certiorari granted 7/3/2025). (Order List.) In the case, a Christian street preacher challenges a city ordinance that limits demonstrations to a designated area within three hours of an event at the city's amphitheater. The certiorari petition frames the question in part as follows:

Gabriel Olivier is a Christian who feels called to share the gospel with his fellow citizens.  After being arrested and fined for violating an ordinance targeting “protests” outside a public amphitheater, Olivier brought a § 1983 suit under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to declare the ordinance unconstitutional and enjoin its enforcement against him in the future.   

The Fifth Circuit, applying its precedent construing this Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), held that Olivier’s prior conviction barred his § 1983 suit because even the prospective relief it seeks would necessarily undermine his prior conviction....

Links to briefs and pleadings in the case are available here.

11th Circuit: Florida Can Bar Transgender Teacher's Use of Preferred Pronouns to Refer to Herself in Classroom

In Wood v. Florida Department of Education, (11th Cir., July 2, 2025), the U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, held that a transgender woman teacher's right to free speech was not violated by a Florida statute that  prohibits her from using the title “Ms.” and the pronouns “she,” “her,” and “hers” in exchanges with her high school students during class time. The majority concluded that the teacher "cannot show, with respect to the expression at issue here, that she was speaking as a private citizen rather than a government employee." The majority said in part:

... [W]e needn’t—and don’t—consider whether Wood has a First Amendment right to use gendered identifiers or don a “she/her” pin when conversing with colleagues in the faculty lounge, or, for that matter, even whether she has a right to do those things in her classroom after the students have departed for the day....

When a public-school teacher addresses her students within the four walls of a classroom—whether orally or in writing—she is unquestionably acting “pursuant to [her] official duties.”  Interacting with students during class time, quite literally, is a teacher’s “official dut[y].”  We reiterate that our decision is a narrow one.  We hold only that when Wood identified herself to students in the classroom using the honorific “Ms.” and the pronouns “she,” “her,” and “hers,” she did so in her capacity as a government employee, and not as a private citizen....

Judge Jordan dissented, saying in part:

The preferred personal title and pronouns of a teacher are, like her name, significant markers of individual identity.  They exist outside of, and do not depend on, the school or the government for their existence.... 

The majority’s expansive application of the government speech doctrine essentially leaves the First Amendment on the wrong side of the schoolhouse gate.  As this case demonstrates, “the government speech doctrine [is being] used as a subterfuge for favoring certain private speakers over others based on viewpoint.” ...

The statute at issue here, § 1000.071(3), has nothing to do with curriculum and everything to do with Florida attempting to silence those with whom it disagrees on the matter of transgender identity and status.

California May Proceed With False Advertising Charges Against Abortion Pill Reversal Promoters

In Culture of Life Family Services, Inc. v. Bonta, (SD CA, June 13, 2025), a California federal district court refused to enter a preliminary injunction to prevent California's attorney general from moving ahead with an enforcement action against a Catholic community health clinic that promoted "abortion pill reversal". California claimed that the clinic violated Unfair Commpetition and False Advertising laws. The clinic contended its promotion of abortion pill reversal is speech protected by the First Amendment. The court said in part:

The Court has already found that the challenged laws are not content-based and do not warrant application of a strict scrutiny standard.... But as content-neutral regulations, they are generally subject to heightened scrutiny: the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions “are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open....

The court concluded that the clinic was engaged in commercial speech and that, "it would be at the very least potentially misleading to state that supplemental progesterone can “reverse” an abortion." It went on to conclude that a number of other staements that the clinic made regarding abortion pill reversal are, or are potentially, false and misleading. The court went on to say in part:

Although this regulation involves reproductive rights, AG Bonta is not aiming to limit the actual practice of APR. And reproductive choices are not apart from consumer choices: women, in exercising their reproductive rights, are also consumers who must be given the correct information to make knowledgeable decisions for themselves....

In sum, Plaintiff cannot carry its burden of showing likelihood of success. Commercial speech that is inherently false or misleading does not receive First Amendment protection. For potentially misleading speech, the AG has more than carried his burden under Central Hudson.

Cert. Granted In Litigation Over Investigatory Demands

The U.S Supreme Court today granted review in First Choice Women's Resource v. Platkin, (Docket No. 24-781, certiorari granted 6/16/2025). (Order List). The petition for certiorari describes the complex fact situation involved:

New Jersey’s Attorney General served an investigatory subpoena on First Choice Women’s Resource Centers, Inc., a faith-based pregnancy center, demanding that it turn over most of its donors’ names. First Choice challenged the Subpoena under 42 U.S.C. 1983 in federal court, and the Attorney General filed a subsequent suit to enforce it in state court. The state court granted the Attorney General’s motion to enforce the Subpoena but expressly did not decide First Choice’s federal constitutional challenges. The Attorney General then moved in state court to sanction First Choice. Meanwhile, the district court held that First Choice’s constitutional claims were not ripe in federal court.

The Third Circuit affirmed in a divided percuriam decision.. [T]he majority concluded First Choice’s claims were not yet ripe because First Choice could litigate its constitutional claims in state court.... It did not address the likely loss of a federal forum once the state court rules on the federal constitutional issues.

The question presented is: Where the subject of a state investigatory demand has established a reasonably objective chill of its First Amendment rights, is a federal court in a first-filed action deprived of jurisdiction because those rights must be adjudicated in state court?

Court Denies TRO In Challenge To Trump's Executive Orders on Antisemitism

In McClanahan v. Trump, (WD MO, June 9, 2025), a Missouri federal district court refused to grant a temporary restraining order in a challenge to President Trump's Executive Orders directing federal agencies to use the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (“IHRA”) definition of antisemitism in enforcing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and which direct federal agencies to withhold funding from universities that do not bar criticism of Israel.  According to the court:

Plaintiff brings his action challenging the constitutionality of Executive Orders 13899 and 14188 based on alleged violations of his First Amendment Right of free speech, Violation of his Fifth Amendment Right under the Due Process Clause; and violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment....

Plaintiff identifies five constitutional arguments he believes have a likelihood of succeeding on the merits. Those arguments are First Amendment – Viewpoint Discrimination; First Amendment – Chilling Effect; First Amendment – Right to Petition; Establishment Clause; and Fifth Amendment – Due Process and Vagueness. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has alleged not facts indicating a reasonable belief that he will lose his federal benefits and no link betweean y prospective loss of his federal benefits and the challenged executive orders. 

The court concluded that plaintiff's likelihood of success on any of these claims was low.