Suit Seeks Accommodation for Christian Library Employee Who Objects To Using Co-Workers' Preferred Names and Pronouns

Suit was filed yesterday in a Louisiana federal district court by a Library Technician who was fired for refusing to comply with the library's Inclusivity Policy that requires employees to refer to fellow employees by their chosen name and pronoun.  Plaintiff Luke Ash is also a Christian pastor. The complaint (full text) in Ash v. City of Baton Rouge Louisiana, (MD LA, filed 7/9/2026) alleges in part:

Ash has sincerely held religious beliefs that God created mankind in his own image, and that each individual is created either male or female.... Ash also has sincerely held religious beliefs that biological sex is immutable....  Because of his sincerely held religious beliefs, Ash has sincere religious convictions and beliefs that referring to a person by pronouns inconsistent with their biological sex both dishonors God’s design for that person and constitutes a lie and a grave sin....  Ash believes that he is compelled to tell the truth, even to those who may disagree....

Ash had never, at any point, referred to any co-worker directly using pronouns inconsistent with their preference, and he had certainly never done so after being told by such individual that the pronoun he used was incorrect....

Ash contends that his firing violated his federal and state free speech, free exercise and equal protection rights and that under Title VII the Library was required to provide him a reasonable accommodation from the Inclusivity Policy. The complaint alleges in part:

Permitting Ash to maintain respectful communications to those with whom he interacts at the Library while maintaining compliance with his sincerely held religious beliefs would have been a reasonable accommodation that would impose no hardship whatsoever on the Defendants or the Library. 

The complaint also asks for an injunction barring enforcement of the Inclusivity Policy and asks for reinstatement of plaintiff. Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

8th Circuit Remands Case That Invalidated Conversion Therapy Bans

In Wyatt Bury, L.L.C. v. City of Kansas City, Missouri, (8th Cir., July 2, 2026), the U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals sent back to the district court a case in which the district court had upheld most of ordinances passed by Kansas City and Jackson County that prohibited mental health professionals from providing conversion therapy to minors. The court said that the remand was appropriate in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's intervening decision in Chiles v. Salizar. The court said in part:

Chiles addressed a free speech challenge to a Colorado statute similar to the Counseling Ordinances at issue here.  The Court rejected Colorado’s theory that its statute regulated professional conduct and not speech....  And it concluded that the Colorado statute triggered strict scrutiny because it regulated content and discriminated based on viewpoint.... Notably, Kansas City and Jackson County pressed the same speech-conduct distinction the Supreme Court rejected in Chiles before the district court and before us, and this distinction featured prominently in the district court’s order.

The Pathway reports on the decision.

1st Circuit Upholds Maine's Antidiscrimmination Rules For Religious Schools Except Its Religiouis Expression Nondiscrimination Requirement

Last week, the U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals issued opinions in two cases raising similar, but not identical, challenges to the antidiscrimination requirements of Maine's Human Rights Act. The schools particularly focused on provisions barring religious discrimination and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.  The Act applies to private schools that receive public funding, such as funding under Maine's tuition assistance program.

In St. Dominic Academy v. Makin, (1st Cir., July 2, 2026), the court in a 108-page opinion, held that the employment nondiscrimination rule "does not credibly threaten to injure St. Dominic".  The court said in part:

While the rule generally bars schools from employment discrimination based on religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity, the MHRA contains two specific carveouts for religious schools that apply regardless of whether a school participates in the tuition-assistance program.  First, section 4553(4) expressly protects a religious school's ability to discriminate "with respect to employment of its members of the same religion, sect or fraternity."... Second, section 4573-A(2) allows a religious school to "require that all applicants and employees conform to [its] religious tenets."

The court also held that neither the ban on religious discrimination in admissions nor the ban on sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination trigger strict scrutiny. The court said in part:

[T]he Religious Nondiscrimination Rule does not exclude any school solely because of its religious character.  Rather, the rule excludes a school because it discriminates against students on the basis of the students' religion, a practice that is neither uniquely religious nor uniquely tied to religious schools.... In short, the State is simply saying that a school in Maine, whether religious or not, cannot accept public funds while simultaneously putting up, for example, a "No Protestant Children Need Apply" sign....

... [T]he record does not suggest that religious schools, by their nature, engage in sexual-orientation or gender-identity discrimination.... Simply put, barring sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination does not exclude religious schools from the tuition-assistance program solely based on their religious character....

Just as combatting religious discrimination qualifies as a legitimate governmental pursuit, so too combatting sexual-orientation and gender-identity discrimination rises to the level....  And the imposition of liability for sexual-orientation or gender-identity discrimination on those schools that accept public funding rationally relates to those antidiscrimination goals, as does the requirement that such schools respect students' expression of their gender identity....

The court, however, ordered the trial court to issue a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the rule that  provides "to the extent that an educational institution permits religious expression, it cannot discriminate between religions in doing so." The court said in part:

St. Dominic, as part of its religious mission, requires students to attend religion classes, Mass, and other religious activities.  These activities necessarily entail some degree of student participation.  Even under the Commissioner's reading of the Religious Expression Rule, then, if a preacher at a school-mandated Mass permits students to say "Amen" in order to signify agreement, St. Dominic would then be required to allow expressions of disagreement.  And in the classroom, inculcation often solicits -- indeed encourages -- affirmation, for example in the form of an iterative exchange of expression.  Few would teach the Lord's Prayer without having the students recite it; and under the Religious Expression Rule that recitation would, in turn, appear to require the school to allow the reciting of, for example, the Hare Krishna Mahā mantra.  And while such an example may seem fanciful, the point is that the Religious Expression Rule would inevitably interfere with a religious school's ability to foster an expressive environment consistent with its religious mission.....

Here, the Religious Expression Rule is facially nonneutral because it singles out "religious expression." ...

In Crosspoint Church v. Makin, (1st Cir., July 2, 2026), the court considered additional challenges to Maine's antidiscrimination rules as they apply to religious schools. Crosspoint Church contended that 2021 amendments to the state's anti-discrimination laws were a response to the Supreme Court's decision in Carson v. Makin that required Maine to include religious schools in its tuition assistance program.  The court said in part:

The State likely adopted the 2021 Amendments at least partially in response to the Carson litigation.  But we will not infer something as sinister as an "express[] design[]" to discriminate against a specific religious entity where Maine offers a quite logical and compelling rationale for the amendments' structure and timing: 

If [the State's] Legislature anticipated that the [Carson] litigation might result in [the State] being prohibited from excluding religious schools from [public funding], it would have been entirely appropriate to then make the same distinction in education as the Legislature did [years earlier] for employment and housing and require religious organizations that accept public funds to comply with [all antidiscrimination rules]. 

Thus, just as we concluded in St. Dominic that the plaintiffs there had not shown that general antireligious animus likely motivated the 2021 Amendments,... so too do we hold here that Crosspoint has not shown that specific anti-BCS animus motivated the same amendments....

The court also rejected Crosspoint's free expression claims, saying in part:

The Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Nondiscrimination Rule, Crosspoint contends, regulates speech because it would "require BCS to affirm a student's gender identity and sexual orientation," even though it would "violate[] BCS's statement of faith to admit a student or allow a student to remain enrolled who violates BCS's statement of faith by presenting as a gender not consistent with his or her biological sex."...

... [H]ere, Crosspoint seeks to refuse admission to (and expel) any student who is gay or transgender, irrespective of that student's speech.  Although such refusal may express Crosspoint's views regarding sexual orientation and gender identity, and the Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Nondiscrimination Rule would interfere with that expression, that does not transform the rule into a speech regulation....

Supreme Court Review Sought by Teacher Who Objects to School's Gender identity Policy

 A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed with the U.S. Supreme Court last week in Polk v. Montgomery County Public Schools, (Sup. Ct., cert. filed 6/26/2026). In the case, the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the denial of a preliminary injunction sought by a substitute teacher who objected on free speech and free exercise grounds to a Maryland school district's Guidelines for Student Gender Identity. (See prior posting.) The petition for review poses the Questions Presented as:

1. When public schools try to force teachers, over their religious objections, to use pronouns inconsistent with a student’s biological sex and to hide from parents information about their child’s gender expression at school, does Smith apply and foreclose heightened scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause?  

2. Do public schools violate the Free Speech Clause when they compel objecting teachers to adhere to such a school policy?

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the petition.

Parents Sue California School District Over Opt-Out Rights

Suit was filed this week in a California federal district court challenging a California school district's refusal to allow parents to opt their children out of LGBTQ+ instruction that conflicts with the family's religious beliefs. Plaintiff parents contend that the Supreme Court's 2025 decision in Mahmoud v. Taylor gives them the right to opt their children out of this instruction. The complaint (full text) in Taylor v. Sunnyvale School District, (ND CA, filed 6/22/2026), alleges in part:

12.... As devout members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, they, like “[m]any Americans,” including the parents in Mahmoud, “believe that biological sex reflects divine creation, that sex and gender are inseparable, and that children should be encouraged to accept their sex and to live accordingly.”...  

13. The Taylors also believe that Sunnyvale’s curriculum is age-inappropriate and inconsistent with their religious beliefs, practices, and child-raising philosophies, and that forcing their children to participate in Sunnyvale’s LGBTQ+ instruction will undermine their efforts to raise their children in accordance with their religious beliefs....

18. ... [A]fter months of cordial conversation, Sunnyvale abruptly reversed course and denied the Taylors’ request for notice and opt-outs, stating in a letter that LGBTQ+ instruction “is not optional and is not subject to parent opt-out provisions.” ...  According to Sunnyvale, “the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Mahmoud v. Taylor … addressed a specific set of facts in another state,” did not create a “general or automatic right for parents to opt their children out of required curriculum,” and “does not override California’s statutory requirements governing instructional content.”... With that, the denial letter concluded that Sunnyvale is “not granting opt-outs from LGBTQ+-inclusive curriculum or storybooks that are part of our adopted educational program.”...

Plaintiffs contend that the school's refusal violates their parental right to control the education of their children as well as their free exercise and free speech rights. Becket Fund issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Nassau County Buffer and Bubble Zones Around Houses of Worship Violate Free-Speech Rights

In Borecky v. County of Nassau, (ED NY, June 18, 2026), a New York federal district court issued a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the Nassau County Religious Safety Act. The law prohibits picketing, literature distribution or oral advocacy within 35 feet of a place of religious worship (Buffer Provision). It also creates a bubble zone of 100 feet around a place of religious worship in which an advocate may not, without a person's consent, approach within 10 feet of a person to engage in oral advocacy, deliver literature or carry signs (Bubble Provision). Plaintiffs were advocates for immigrant rights. The court (in its 63-page opinion) said in part:

If the goal is to avoid harassment, intimidation, violence, or threatening speech, the County could have drafted a law that criminalized such conduct.  It need not have also banned peaceful conversation, polite exchange, and information distribution on public streets—what amounts to the “extreme step of closing a substantial portion of a traditional public forum to all speakers.”... There is no evidence in this record that Nassau County considered any alternative laws or seriously engaged in any exercise of limiting the First Amendment damage inflicted by the RSA on individuals like Plaintiffs....

There might have been a record that justified the impositions on protected speech from the Buffer Provision.  But it is not here....

Defendants have failed to articulate any rationale for having both a buffer and bubble provision to advance their interests in protecting religious liberty and public safety.  The combined effect of the two exacts a chilling of free expression that neither does alone....

The Buffer Provision makes no attempt to accommodate the diversity and types of institutions around which the restriction operates.  There are nearly 1000 such places, some are in storefronts, some which abut private business, others on detached pieces of property, others abutting sidewalks and public thoroughfares.... And as a result, the 35-foot radius around a driveway or entrance prohibits activity in all manner of places—including core public forums like sidewalks and streets—without regard to the particular site or location of any individual place of worship....

The differences between the Buffer and Bubble Provisions do not save the latter from facial invalidity....

Given the breadth of the expressive conduct and speech implicated by the law, an officer is left with the discretion to determine whether the individual standing in silence wearing a t-shirt with a political message is violating the statute or not engaging in expressive conduct at all.  “Because of its overbreadth, the statute vests local law enforcement officers with too much arbitrary discretion in determining whether or not a certain emblem is grounds for prosecution.  It permits only that expression which local officials will tolerate[.]” ...

amNY reports on the decision.

Cert. Petition Filed Challenging Grant of Qualified Immunity In 1st Amendment Case

A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed with the U.S Supreme Court last week seeking review of the 5th Circuit's decision in Hershey v. City of Bossier City. In the case, a 3-judge panel in a splintered decision reversed a Louisiana federal district court's dismissal of a suit against the city by plaintiff who was passing out booklets for the Christian Vegetarian Association outside an arena in which a Christian rock concert was taking place. However, the court affirmed the trial court's qualified immunity dismissal of the claims against police and security guards. (See prior posting.) It is this aspect of the 5th Circuit's decision that is being appealed in the certiorari petition. At issue is whether in free speech and free exercise claims, officers can claim qualified immunity where a reasonable officer should have understood their action to be unconstitutional, but their particular action has not been previously held unconstitutional by a court.

First Liberty Institute issued a press release announcing the filing of the cert. petition.

Cert. Denied In School's Discipline of Pro-Life Student Group

The Supreme Court yesterday denied review in E.D. v. Noblesville School District, (Docket No. 25-906, certiorari denied 6/15/2026). At issue in the case is a high school's refusal to permit a student pro-life group to post flyers in the school because of the political content of the flyers. The dispute eventually led to the suspension of the pro-life group for several months. The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the school's action. 

Justice Alito filed an opinion dissenting from the denial of certiorari, saying in part:

Hazelwood ... concerned the regulation of “school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”  ...  When regulating the content of such activities, the Court held, a school need only meet the low bar of showing that the censorship is “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” 

... “[C]ourts must be very careful when a government claims that speech by one or more private speakers is actually government speech,” because “it can be difficult to tell whether the government is using the doctrine ‘as a subterfuge for favoring certain private speakers over others based on viewpoint.’”...

I would grant the petition to clarify the relationship between Hazelwood and our subsequent government-speech decisions.

Muslim High Schoolers Sue After Being Disciplined for Instagram Video

Suit was filed yesterday in a Virginia federal district court against Fairfax County schools by four Muslim students who were disciplined because of a skit they posted on the Muslim Students Association Instagram site.  The complaint (full text) in Doe v. School Board for Fairfax County Public Schools, (ED VA, filed 6/4/2026), alleges in part:

2. Plaintiffs, students at Thomas Jefferson High School for Science and Technology (“TJHSST”), created a lighthearted promotional video for their chapter of the Muslim Student Association. The video contained no threats, no weapons, and no reference to any real-world event. It was a skit, modeled on a viral online trend, intended to invite students to their events.  

3. After bad-faith actors outside of TJHSST made Islamophobic, racist, and anti-Palestinian characterizations about the video, FCPS and TJHSST adopted those characterizations as their own. 

4. Defendants suspended Plaintiffs, labeled their conduct “antisemitic,” barred one Plaintiff from wearing a sweatshirt displaying the map of Palestine, and placed disciplinary marks on the students’ records.  

5. These actions were entirely without justification, damaging the reputations of the students before their peers and teachers and significantly affecting their educational performance and future opportunities. 

6. Because Defendants punished Plaintiffs’ protected speech, and treated Plaintiffs differently because they were Muslim, Arab, and Palestinian, Plaintiffs are entitled to relief under the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and Title VI.

CAIR issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Title VI Does Not Bar Religious Discrimination

In Storms v. Carcieri, (D NJ, May 26, 2026), a New Jersey federal district court dismissed a suit which challenged a requirement by the Somerset County YMCA that in order to serve as a Board member, a board nominee must complete a 30-minute training course titled "Advancing Equity, Understanding Biases." Plaintiff Michael Storms refused to take the course because it violated his "deeply held religious belief that only Jesus Christ can forgive my sins." Storms, proceeding pro se, sued alleging that imposing the requirement on him violated his 1st and 14th Amendment rights, as well as Title VI and Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act. A number of his claims were dismissed because he had not plausibly alleged that the YMCA's conduct involved state action. The court dismissed plaintiff's Title VI claim because Title VI only bars discrimination on the basis of race, color or national origin. It does not cover religious discrimination. He also failed to show that the federal funding received by the national YMCA organization was the source of any of operations of the local entity.

Interestingly, in his complaint, Plaintiff also listed "Jesus Christ" as a plaintiff. In a footnote the court said: "The Court finds that Jesus Christ is not a proper plaintiff and proceeds in its analysis with Storms as the sole plaintiff in this matter."

Kars4Kids Violated False Advertising and Unfair Competition Laws by Not Disclosing Its Religious Ties

In Puterbaugh v. Kars4Kids, LLC, (CA Super. Ct., May 8, 2026), a California state trial court held that Kars4Kids violated California's Unfair Competition Law and its False Advertising Law through "inherently deceptive" omissions in its ads. The organization runs short repetitive television and radio ads featuring young children playing musical instruments and asking for donations of used cars. The ads make no mention of the actual recipients of funds from the organization or of the organization's religious affiliation. The organization's website says: "Because kids are our future. Learn how you can make a difference in the life of a child." The broadcast ads do not make this statement.

The primary function of Kars4Kids is to fund Oorah, an organization that operates Jewish heritage and summer camps in New York and New Jersey. Oorah also funds matchmaking programs for young adults and gap- year trips to Israel for 17- and 18-year-olds. The court said in part:

2. The Court finds that the First Amendment does not shield the Defendant. While charities have free speech rights, the government may regulate misleading commercial speech. Fraudulent omissions in an inducement to donate property are not protected by “free expression.”...

6. The name “Kars4Kids,” the 8-10-year-old actors in the advertisement, and the repetitive jingle all serve to reinforce the belief that donations are used exclusively for the benefit of children. 

7. Under cross-examination, the COO, Esti Landau, admitted that the organization’s primary purpose is to help “Jewish kids and families throughout their lives.”...

The Court finds that the Defendant disseminated public statements concerning... vehicle donations that were misleading by omission. Under the statutory “knew or should have known” standard, the Defendant is charged with the knowledge that California donors would reasonably assume their contributions benefit a general class of children, including those within their own state. The Court finds that the Defendant’s stated intent to make the advertisement “memorable” through extreme repetition, while simultaneously stripping it of all substantive facts, constitutes an actionable strategy of deception....

The Court finds the Kars4Kids “jingle” creates a false sense of a universal, secular, and local charity. The “Kars4Kids” name, when coupled with an advertisement that “does not mention anything” about its specific mission ... is likely to deceive the public. It improperly narrows the perceived beneficiary class to “kids” to elicit emotional and financial responses, while diverting funds to a much broader religious and familial social-service network....

The court ordered Kars4Kids to end all non-compliant broadcasting in California within 30 days. Inside Radio reports on the decision.

Certiorari Denied In Christian Day Care's Challenge to California's Licensing Requirements

The U.S. Supreme Court today denied review in Foothills Ministries v. Johnson, (Docket No. 25-802, certiorari denied 5/18/2026) (Order List). In the case, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Christian day care center lacks standing to bring a free exercise challenge a California requirement that day care centers ensure that children are free to attend religious activities of their parents' choice. The 9th Circuit held, however, that the day care center does have standing to challenge the state's general licensing requirement and to challenge on free speech grounds required disclosures to parents of the right for their child to attend religious activities of their choice. On the merits, though, the 9th Circuit held that neither of these requirements infringe the day care's 1st Amendment rights. (See prior posting.)

Noise Ordinance Arrest Did Not Violate First Amendment or State RFRA

In Acevedo v. Zatora,(ND IL, May 11, 2026), an Illinois federal district court dismissed plaintiff's claims that police officers violated his free speech and free exercise rights when they arrested him for violating Chicago's noise ordinance. The ordinance prohibits amplified sound on public property that is louder than average conversational level at 100 feet distance. Acevedo and six others set up a microphone on a public sidewalk across from a Planned Parenthood clinic. Acevedo contends that his amplified speech was no louder than permitted under the Ordinance. The court said in part:

Acevedo’s First Amendment grievance ... is not with the noise ordinance’s constitutionality, either facially or as applied to his circumstances. He instead challenges defendants’ decision to arrest him for violating the noise ordinance despite his compliance with it and purportedly owing to his protected speech. This claim is indistinguishable from Acevedo’s First Amendment retaliation claim ... where he alleges that he was unjustly arrested in retaliation for his protected speech, despite his compliance with the noise ordinance....

In dismissing Acevedo's retaliation claim, the court concluded that Acevedo was arrested for disobeying an officer's order to stop using the microphone, not because of the religious or political content of his speech.

The court also dismissed Acevedo's claim against the city of Chicago. Acevedo contended that the city has a policy of  "preventing Christian street preachers (and presumably others) from using voice amplification on the public way by misapplying the noise ordinance to prohibit all amplified religious speech (and possibly other speech) regardless of volume or compliance with the ordinance’s actual requirements." The court said that the complaint did not give the city fair notice of the action Acevedo was challenging. The court said in part:

Do officers involved in the allegedly problematic practice exclusively target Christian street preachers engaged in religious speech, or do the officers also target street preachers of “all” faiths and other individuals not engaged in religious speech at all? Do officers consistently invoke the noise ordinance when they encounter Christian street preachers, or do they arrest Christian street preachers for other alleged infractions and without invoking the noise ordinance at all.

Dismissing Acevedo's claim under the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the court said in part:

Acevedo has not alleged that he faced a “coercive choice” between abandoning his religious convictions or complying with a City regulation. Rather, Acevedo alleges that he did comply with the City’s ordinance while exercising his religious convictions.

The court allowed Acevedo to move ahead on his 4th Amendment false arrest claim.

Released-Time Provider Sues School District After Termination For Facebook Posting

Suit was filed last week in a Georgia federal district court by a Christian ministry-- Sweet Onion Christian Learning Center-- that has offered released time off-campus religious instruction for students attending Vidalia, Georgia High School.  School officials canceled the released time program because of Facebook posts by Sweet Onion's executive director which criticized a proposed property tax increase for the city's schools. The complaint (full text) in Sweet Onion Christian Learning Center, Inc. v. Youmans, (SD GA, filed 5/8/2026), alleges that the cancellation violates the 1st and 14th Amendments as well as the Georgia Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The complaint reads in part:

2.... After learning about the posts, Superintendent Reid secretly investigated the Center and learned an unremarkable fact—the Center, a Christian ministry, provides Christian education. This led her to report to the Board that, in addition to the problems with the Facebook posts, Rev. Youmans’ instruction “reflected a particular interpretation of the Bible” that wasn’t presented in a “neutral or well-balanced manner.” Either way, Defendants punished Rev. Youman, his ministry, and the students at Vidalia High simply because Defendants disagreed with Rev. Youman’s constitutionally protected expression.  

3. Under the First Amendment, Rev. Youmans had a clearly established right both to criticize a proposed tax increase and to teach the Bible from his religious perspective. By punishing him and his ministry for his criticism and religious instruction, the Board and Superintendent Reid violated that right....

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Supreme Court: Pregnancy Resource Center Has Standing to Challenge Subpoena for Donor Records

The Supreme Court today in First Choice Women's Resource Centers, Inc. v. Davenport, (Sup. Ct., April 29, 2026), held that First Choice, a religious anti-abortion pregnancy counseling center, has Article III standing to challenge a subpoena from the New Jersey Attorney General. The subpoena sought the names, addresses, phone numbers and places of employment of individuals who made donations to the center so that the state could contact a sample of donors to determine if they had been misled into thinking that the center provided abortions. New Jersey contended that the subpoena did not chill First Choice's associational rights. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Gorsuch, the Supreme Court disagreed, saying in part:

Since the 1950s, this Court has confronted one official demand after another like the Attorney General’s.  Over and again, we have held those demands burden the exercise of First Amendment rights.  Disputing none of these precedents but seeking ways around them, the Attorney General has offered a variety of arguments.  Some are old, some are new, but none succeeds....

Christian Post reported on the decision.

British Court Reverses Conviction of Christian for Sending Offensive Anti- Abortion Emails

In The King v. Skinner, (Crown Ct., April 24, 2026), a British Crown Court set aside a Magistrate Court's conviction under the Communications Act. Defendant was convicted of violating a provision of the Communications Act that prohibits sending "grossly offensive" messages by means of a public electronic communications network. Defendant, a Christian anti-abortion advocate, sent e-mails captioned "Reporting Mass Murder..." to two police officials. The emails contained pictures of aborted fetuses and made comments about "brutal killings". The emails also contained pictures of Nazi concentration camp victims. The court said in part:

First, the views expressed in the Letters (as supported by the Images) are political speech entitled to the highest form of protection. The abortion debate raises important matters of public interest where strong views are legitimately held and expressed, often in forceful terms, by persons on each side of the argument. ...

Second, an individual has the right to use images as a form of speech in a way which will shock and offend and indeed it is of often the power of an image which carries the message in its strongest terms....

Third, the intended recipients of the Letters were public officials....

In summary, the Crown has not satisfied us under the demanding standard applied to restrictions on political speech, that the conviction is a justifiable interference with Mr. Skinner’s Article 10(1) rights. On the facts, that restriction has not been demonstrated to be necessary in our modern democratic society

Law & Religion UK reports on the decision.

Released-Time Provider Must Get Equal Treatment with Secular Organizations

 In LifeWise, Inc. v. Everett Public School District, (WD WA, April 24, 2026), LifeWise, an organization that provides off-premise released-time religious instruction to public school students, was granted a preliminary injunction requiring the Everett, Washington School District to grant it treatment equal to that given to secular organizations. The injunction issued by a Washington federal district court requires the district to allow LifeWise to participate in district community resource fairs and display printed flyers in schools to the same extent as permitted for secular organizations. The court also ordered the school to simplify the permission slip procedure for students attending the released time program. Finally, because some parents complained that those attending the released time program were pressuring other students to attend by providing them with materials received during their released time, the school had required students to keep sealed in their backpacks material received during their released-time instruction. A parent who was one of the plaintiffs contended that this prevented her child from being able to read the Bible during free time. The court agreed and ordered that this plaintiff's children be permitted to read LifeWise reading materials during times of the school day when students are allowed to read other non-scholastic materials.

1st Amendment Challenges to State's Foster Care Licensing Policy Move Ahead

In DeGross v. Hunter, (WD WA, April 22, 2026), a Washington federal district court refused to dismiss free speech and free exercise claims against the Washington Department of Children, Youth and Families brought by a Christian couple who object to the Department's policy on sexual orientation and gender identity. The state requires prospective foster parents to agree to support a foster child's sexual orientation, gender identity and expression (SOGIE), including using their preferred pronouns and chosen name. The DeGrosses were granted only a limited foster care license because they would not agree to fully implement the state's policy. The court said in part:

The DeGrosses have plausible alleged that Policy § 1520 draws distinctions based on the message the speaker conveys....  Policy § 1520 restricts certain speech by prospective parents on the topic of SOGIE, while requiring speech that aligns with the state’s perspective.... 

In essence, the Department has forced the DeGrosses to choose between forfeiting their freedom of speech to obtain an unrestricted license, or upholding their beliefs surrounding SOGIE, and receiving a less-favorable license subject to certain restrictions.   

The DeGrosses have carried their burden to show that the Department’s enforcement of Policy § 1520 plausibly constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination.  Thus, the DeGrosses alleged sufficient facts to show a First Amendment violation unless the government can satisfy strict scrutiny....

... [T]he DeGrosses plausibly allege the Department’s policy at issue here puts the DeGrosses in an unfair predicament: they may obtain an unrestricted foster care license but only if they disavow their religious beliefs.... "[S]uch a policy imposes a penalty on the free exercise of religion that triggers the most exacting scrutiny." ...

... “A law is not generally applicable if it ‘invites’ the government to consider the particular reasons for a person’s conduct by providing ‘a mechanism for individualized exemptions.’”... 

... [T]he DeGrosses have carried their burden, at the motion to dismiss stage, to show that § 1520 is neither neutral nor generally applicable.  Thus, the DeGrosses alleged sufficient facts to show a First Amendment violation of freedom of religion unless Defendants can satisfy strict scrutiny.  Based on the limited record before it, the Court is unable to determine at this time whether Defendants can satisfy strict scrutiny.  Thus, the DeGrosses’ freedom of religion claim survives the motion to dismiss.

The court however dismissed plaintiffs' equal protection claim.

Supreme Court Grants Review on When Religious Schools Can Be Excluded from General State Programs

The U.S. Supreme Court this morning granted certiorari in St. Mary Catholic Parish in Littleton v. Roy, (Docket No. 25-581, cert. granted 4/20/2026). (Order List). In the case, the U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the nondiscrimination requirements of Colorado's Universal Preschool Program do not violate the free exercise or expressive association rights of Catholic schools that are excluded from the program because they insist on considering the sexual orientation and gender identity of a student and their parents in making decisions on who will be admitted. (See prior posting.) In granting review, the Court limited it grant to Questions 1 and 2 in the petition for certiorari:

1. Whether proving a lack of general applicability under Employment Division v. Smith requires showing unfettered discretion or categorical exemptions for identical secular conduct.

2. Whether Carson v. Makin displaces the rule of Employment Division v. Smith only when the government explicitly excludes religious people and institutions.

It excluded from the grant petitioner's third question:

3. Whether Employment Division v. Smith should be overruled.

Catholic Hospice Sues Over NY Standards for Care of Transgender Patients

Last week, Dominican Sisters who operate a home that provides palliative care for indigent, terminally ill cancer patients filed suit in a New York federal district court challenging New York's requirements for care of transgender patients. The complaint (full text) in Dominican Sisters of Hawthorne v. Hochul, filed 4/6/2026) alleges in part:

New York’s LGBTQ Long-Term Care Facility Residents’ Bill of Rights ...  require long-term care facilities to assign patients to rooms based on stated “gender identity” rather than biological sex even over the opposition of the roommate, to permit residents and their visitors of one sex to access bathrooms set aside for those of the opposite sex, to use patients’ “preferred pronouns” even when the patient is not present, to use language and to “create communities” affirming patients’ sexual preferences, to accommodate patients’ desire for extramarital relations, and to post notices affirming compliance with these requirements....

... The Dominican Sisters of Hawthorne and Rosary Hill Home operate in accordance with the Ethical and Religious Directives and the teachings of the Catholic Church. They cannot comply with the Mandate without violating these sincerely held religious beliefs.....

Requiring a person to identify another by a sex other than his or her God-gifted sex would therefore require such a person to act against central, unchangeable and architectural teachings of the Catholic faith. It would contradict the teachings of the Bible concerning God’s creative sovereignty, contradict reason and truth, and betray our sacred obligation not to knowingly harm other persons, particularly the most vulnerable. The implications are so much greater than whether to utter the words “he” or “she.” Indeed, to demand that a Catholic deny another’s sex is to require him or her to affirm another religious worldview....

The complaint alleges 7 counts: Free Exercise; Religious Autonomy Doctrine; Ministerial Exception; Establishment Clause; Equal Protection; Free Speech; and Expressive Association.

NewsNation reports on the lawsuit.