Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today in Appeal from Faith-Based Pregnancy Center Over Subpoena for Identity of Donors

The Supreme Court today hears oral arguments in First Choice Women's Resource Centers v. Platkin. At issue in the case is an investigatory subpoena issued by the New Jersey Attorney General seeking the names of donors to First Choice, a faith-based pregnancy center. First Choice contends that the subpoena violates its First Amendment rights and the associational rights of its donors who are concerned about disclosure of their identities. The issue before the Supreme Court is one of whether the First Amendment question should be initially fought out in state or federal court. First Choice challenged the subpoena in federal district court. The Attorney General then filed a subsequent suit to enforce the subpoena in state court. The district court held that First Choice’s constitutional claims are not ripe in federal court because they can be litigated in the subsequently filed state court action. That holding was affirmed by the Third Circuit and is now before the Supreme Court.

Oral arguments, beginning at 10:00 Am, can be heard live at this link. Later today, a transcript and a recording of the oral arguments will be available from the Supreme Court's website here. The SCOTUSblog case page has links to all the filings in the case as well as to commentary.

UPDATE: Here are links to the transcript and audio of the full oral arguments. SCOTUSblog reports on the oral arguments.

2nd Circuit: Information About Abortion Pill Reversal Is Protected Speech

In National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. James, (2d Cir., Dec. 1, 2025), the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a district court's preliminary injunction barring New York's attorney general from taking enforcement action to prevent the plaintiff religious organizations from disseminating information regarding abortion pill reversal. Finding, on the record before it, that plaintiffs' speech is fully protected by the 1st Amendment, the court said in part:

... [W]e conclude that the speech at issue is noncommercial based on the uncontroverted evidence in the current record demonstrating that the speech is religiously and morally motivated, the NIFLA plaintiffs receive no remuneration or financial benefit for engaging in it, and the NIFLA plaintiffs do not provide APR themselves, but rather provide the public with information about APR and access to third-party providers who can offer APR.  Put simply, in this context, these combined elements of the speech at issue here do not transform it into commercial speech for First Amendment purposes. 

To hold otherwise could potentially subject a sweeping range of non-profits to regulation of their speech for providing the public with information and resources concerning critical services.  This could include, depending, of course, on the particular facts and context of each situation, a reproductive rights group in a state with abortion restrictions that provides information about out-of-state organizations that will help women obtain the procedure for free; an LGBT rights group in a state with gender-affirming care restrictions that provides free information about out-of-state organizations that will help individuals seeking hormone therapy to obtain it; or a group that matches immigrants with organizations providing access to employment, English language classes, or immigration legal services.

Reuters reports on the decision.

1st Amendment Protects Law Student's Antisemitic Posts

In Damsky v. Summerlin, (ND FL, Nov. 24, 2025), a Florida federal district court issued a preliminary injunction requiring the University of Florida law school to reinstate a student it had expelled after complaints about racist language in his term papers and then a social media post on X that read:

My position on Jews is simple: whatever Harvard professor Noel Ignatiev meant by his call to “abolish the White race by any means necessary” is what I think must be done with Jews. Jews must be abolished by any means necessary.

He also engaged in a discussion with a professor online about his post. Students and faculty felt threatened, and the law school suspended him for creating a material and substantial disruption to the school's academic operation. After a disciplinary hearing he was expelled. In finding the student's statements protected by the First Amendment, the court said in part:

To be sure, those reading Damsky’s words may be justifiably fearful. Some may assume that anyone uttering such commentary is more likely to act violently than someone who does not.... But that is not the test. The test is whether Damsky’s posts constituted a “serious expression” that he meant “to commit an act of unlawful violence.”...

The bottom line is that the University has not shown that any of Damsky’s speech constituted a “true threat.”...

... Here, I cannot agree that an observer would reasonably interpret Damsky’s posts as threats of violence—much less school-directed threats. Damsky’s March 21 X post bears no connection with the school at all. He does not mention the University, its administrators, students, or professors....

Damsky expressly conditioned his use of “abolish” and “any means necessary” on “whatever Harvard professor Noel Ignatiev meant.” Those phrases in a vacuum may suggest violence, but such a reading “ignores” Damsky’s “undeniable reference to” Ignatiev. Morse.... Damsky’s reference to an academic further undermines any conclusion that he was threatening imminent violence....

On November 29, the court issued an Order (full text) staying the injunction until December 3 to allow the University to seek a stay pending appeal from the 11th Circuit.

Fox News reports on the court's decision.

CAIR Sues Texas Governor

As previously reported, earlier this week Texas governor Greg Abbott issued a Proclamation designating CAIR as a Foreign Terrorist and Transnational Criminal Organizations under Texas law. CAIR has now responded by filing suit against the governor and the Texas attorney general in a Texas federal district court. The complaint (full text) in Council on American-Islamic Relations Texas Dallas Fort Worth v. Abbott, (WD TX, filed 11/20/2025), alleges in part:

57. Wrongfully and unilaterally designating Plaintiffs as “foreign terrorist organizations,” and declaring them unable to purchase land in the state of Texas harms Plaintiffs’ advocacy work, fundraising initiatives, and reputation as organizations. 

58. Given that state law is preempted by federal law, Plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief prohibiting Defendant Paxton from enforcing the Proclamation against them....

65.  Governor Abbott’s Proclamation deprives Plaintiffs of their procedural due process rights by designating them as “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” under Texas Penal Code 71.01, “Transnational Criminal Organizations” under Texas Property Code § 5.251, and proscribed entities via designation by the governor under Texas Property Code § 5.254 without providing Plaintiffs the right to respond to and challenge the designations....

77. Governor Abbott’s Proclamation identifies no criminal conduct by Plaintiffs. Instead, it relies almost entirely on political speech and advocacy – particularly remarks by CAIR’s Executive Director encouraging civic engagement, political participation, and representation by American Muslims. 

78. These statements are quintessential political and religious expressions. Yet Governor Abbott invoked them to claim Plaintiffs seek to “advance Sharia law in America,” a characterization rooted in stereotype and hostility rather than evidence.

79. A state official may not wield governmental power to punish an organization or silence its advocacy because of disagreement with its speech, its religious identity, or the communities it represents....

96. ... [T]he Proclamation substantially infringes Plaintiffs’ First Amendment right to expressive association by deterring individuals and organizations from joining, supporting, partnering with, or participating in Plaintiffs’ lawful advocacy....

CAIR issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Religious Based Proxy Advisors Challenge New Texas Regulatory Law

Texas S.B.2337 enacted by the Texas legislature earlier this year imposes new disclosure requirements on proxy advisory services that provide advice or research to institutional investors on how to vote on shareholder proposals if the service bases its advice in whole or part on non-financial factors such as environmental and social goals, corporate governance, or diversity, equity or inclusion. Suit was filed this week in a Texas federal district court challenging the law on free speech and vagueness grounds. Two of the plaintiffs have a specific religious focus. A third focuses on sustainability issues.  According to the complaint (full text) in Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility v. Paxton, (WD TX, filed 11/10/2025)

6. Plaintiff Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) is a coalition of investors who believe their faith or their values should—and as fiduciaries must—guide their investing decisions, including their investment stewardship. Plaintiff United Church Funds (UCF) is a faith-based organization that provides investment services to United Church of Christ (UCC) churches and other faith-based nonprofit organizations nationwide.  Plaintiff Ceres is a nonprofit organization dedicated to the notion that accounting for sustainability is a financial imperative for companies.

The complaint goes on to contend: 

7. The State of Texas can disagree with ...  Plaintiffs ICCR’s and UCF’s view that their values and religious beliefs are relevant to investment-related decisions. What it cannot do is compel Plaintiffs to speak in furtherance of Texas’s views about these issues. 

75. ... SB 2337’s stated goal of “prevent[ing] fraudulent or deceptive acts and practices in this state,” S.B. 2337 § 1(4), is mere pretext for regulating disfavored views, rendering the Act’s stated interest unlikely to be genuine....

80. The Act discriminates based on the content of speech and is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest and thus violates the First Amendment.  

81. Because it subjects only certain speech with a certain viewpoint to rigorous regulation, SB 2337 discriminates based on viewpoint, in violation of the First Amendment. Worse, it compels private speakers to adopt and parrot the government’s viewpoint on hotly contested topics and to align with management views.

Baptist News Global reports on the lawsuit.

6th Circuit En Banc: Banning Student-on-Student Use of Biological Pronouns Violates Free Speech Rights

In Defending Education v. Olentangy Local School District Board of Education, (6th Cir., Nov. 6, 2025), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 10-7 en banc decision held that the free speech rights of public-school students are infringed when the school prohibits them from calling fellow-students who are transgender by their biological pronouns rather than the pronouns preferred by their fellow students.  A 3-judge panel of the 6th Circuit had reached an opposite conclusion. (See prior posting.) Plaintiff students and parents hold religious beliefs that gender is immutable. Opinions in the en banc case span 112 pages. The en banc court's majority opinion said in part:

A school district may not restrict personal speech on matters of public concern unless the speech would “materially and substantially disrupt” school activities or infringe the legal “rights of others” in the school community.  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).  In this case’s current posture, the school district has fallen far short of meeting this demanding standard.  It introduced no evidence that the use of biological pronouns would disrupt school functions or qualify as harassment under Ohio law....

 ... [T]he School District has regulated personal expression—the use of biological pronouns to convey a student’s scientific and religious beliefs—that addresses a “sensitive topic of public concern.” ... As part of the broader debate over transgender rights, the question whether speakers should use preferred pronouns to refer to transgender individuals—and whether we should treat the commonplace (and non-antagonistic) use of biological pronouns as proper or offensive—has stirred a “passionate political and social debate” in our society....

... [T] the School District has not just entered this policy debate.  It has taken a side.  The School District has “targeted” a speaker’s use of biological pronouns as improper while allowing students to use preferred pronouns (no matter how novel)....

... The School District is right that schools may bar abusive “invective” that targets “specific” students—whether transgender students, religious students, female students, Hispanic students, or any others.... That is, a school could bar a student from abusively ridiculing a transgender classmate’s “physical characteristics” in the same way it could bar a student from abusively ridiculing a smaller student’s physical characteristics.... But the School District is wrong to treat the use of biological pronouns alone as analogous to this abusive invective.  Defending Education’s members want to use biological pronouns not because they seek to ridicule others but because they want to speak what they view as the truth.... 

Ohio law defines “harassment, intimidation, or bullying” to cover speech directed at another student only if the speech both “[c]auses mental or physical harm to the other student,” and “[i]s sufficiently severe, persistent, or pervasive that it creates an intimidating, threatening, or abusive educational environment for the other student.”  Ohio Rev. Code § 3313.666(A)(2)(a).  And the School District has offered no evidence that the commonplace use of biological pronouns would create an intimidating, threating, or abusive environment....

Judge Batchelder filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

... [E]ven if the School District were to produce overwhelming evidence of disruption, that evidence would still not justify the compelled-speech or viewpoint-discrimination aspects of its preferred-pronoun policies.

Judge Kethledge filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

 ... [T]o determine whether the plaintiffs here should prevail on their First Amendment claim, we should begin with the right question:  namely, whether the historic common law would have subjected a student to punishment (as a matter of public law or private) for referring to a classmate with biological pronouns that the classmate had insisted the student not use.  Considering the speech alone, the answer is likely no.  For one thing, as noted above, offense or dignitary harm was not cognizable at law....  And the right to express one’s opinions in good faith would almost certainly protect the speech at issue here....

A final point is hortatory rather than legal.  That the law permits certain action does not mean that an individual should necessarily engage in it....

Judges Thapar and Nalbandian filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:  

In the end, the School District’s policy “mandates orthodoxy, not anti-discrimination,” and fails to recognize that “[t]olerance is a two-way street.”...  The District chose a side in a hotly contested debate and tried to squelch the opposing viewpoint by imposing an ideological speech code.  When it did so, it unlawfully discriminated based on viewpoint.  And while we appreciate the majority’s thoughtful Tinker approach, we worry that students’ rights to speak freely on important matters of public interest should not hang in the balance while district courts perform ad hoc inquiries into how “disrupt[ive]” they find the students’ viewpoint....

Judge Bush filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

Rather than employ the traditional monsieur (for a man) and madame or mademoiselle (for women) or use longstanding aristocratic titles..., the French revolutionaries replaced those words with the masculine citoyen or feminine citoyenne (both translated as “citizen”) to refer to all men and women, respectively, regardless of station....  

Like the French revolutionaries, communists also sought to revolutionize forms of address for political ends.  Communist regimes strongly encouraged and sometimes mandated use of “comrade” instead of traditionally employed honorifics to refer to another person, just as the French revolutionaries insisted on the use of “citizen.”  That was not surprising.  “[T]he history of authoritarian government . . . shows how relentless authoritarian regimes are in their attempts to stifle free speech . . . .” ...

Governments in the United States—federal or state—never operated that way.  Our Constitution forbids mandatory use of certain titles to refer to others....

American history and tradition uphold the majority’s decision to strike down the school’s pronoun policy.  Over hundreds of years, grammar has developed in America without governmental interference.  Consistent with our historical tradition and our cherished First Amendment, the pronoun debate must be won through individual persuasion, not government coercion.  Our system forbids public schools from becoming “enclaves of totalitarianism.”

Judge Stranch joined by Judges Moore, Clay, Davis, Mathis, Bloomekatz and Ritz, filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

In this case, the School District has repeatedly affirmed that the children of Defending Education members will have the right to express beliefs about transgender identities.  Those children will be permitted to express the view that sex is immutable.  But it is not viewpoint discrimination to require those students to share those beliefs in a manner that does not disrupt the education of others....

The District made clear in its Policies that the purpose of the ban on intentional use of non-preferred pronouns is to prevent disruption in the form of trauma to transgender or nonbinary students of a degree likely to hamper those students’ ability to learn.  Evidence of that purpose was before the district court.....

Though the record satisfied Tinker’s requirement that the School District’s forecast be reasonable, the majority opinion concluded otherwise, positing and applying a new approach:  that “the closer the speech resembles political expression at the First Amendment’s core, the more evidence a school must present of the potential disruption or violation of rights.”...

... Existing precedent provides educators—those most attuned to the issues in their schools—with a reasonable level of agency to develop productive, civilized educational settings while protecting both student rights and student safety.

Columbus Dispatch reports on the decision.

Suit Seeking Damages for False Prediction of the Rapture Is Dismissed Under Anti-SLAPP Law

 In March 2025, a New York resident filed suit in a Connecticut state trial court against a Christian YouTube channel and the preacher who appears on it claiming that the preacher's prediction of imminent coming of the rapture caused plaintiff severe emotional distress and mental anguish. The complaint (full text) in Diver v. Cote, (CT Super. Ct., filed 3/20/2025), alleged claims for infliction of emotional distress, fraud and for violation of the state's Unfair Trade Practices Act. Defendants sought dismissal of the lawsuit under Connecticut's anti-SLAPP law which allows quick dismissal of unmeritorious suits that, among other things, challenge defendant's exercise of his free speech rights when defendant's speech relates to a "public figure". Now, in Diver v. Cote, (CT Super. Ct., Nov. 3, 2025), the court dismissed this suit and a related one under the anti-SLAPP law, saying in part:

... [Defendants] have shown ... that the complaints in both actions are based on the exercise of their right of free speech on matters of public concern, that is, issues related to health, community well-being and a public figure; namely Jesus Christ. §52-196a(a)(1). The defendants' speech was made in a public forum; namely You Tube websites open to the public as required by §52-196a(a)(2).

Inside Investigator covered the lawsuit here and here.

Religious College Challenges Exclusion from Chicago's Student Teacher Program

Suit was filed this week in an Illinois federal district court by the Moody Bible Institute challenging the Chicago Board of Education with excluding its students from participating in the Chicago student teacher program in violation of the Constitution and of state law. The complaint (full text) in Moody Bible Institute of Chicago v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, (ND IL, filed 11/4/2025), alleges in part:

... Chicago Public Schools insists that Moody sign two agreements that contain provisions prohibiting Moody from employing only those who share its religious beliefs and agree to comply with its standards of Christian conduct (the “Employment Provisions”)....

Chicago Public Schools has allowed other universities and colleges to participate in the Pre-Service Teaching Program even though they have similar hiring practices to Moody....

Plaintiff alleges that this violates their rights under the First Amendment's religion and speech clauses, the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause and the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

School May Bar Teacher from Hanging Crucifix on Classroom Wall

In Arroyo-Castro v. Gasper, (D CT, Nov. 3, 2025), a Connecticut federal district court in a 54-page opinion rejected claims of a public middle-school teacher that her free speech and free exercise rights were violated when she was disciplined for hanging a crucifix on a classroom wall near her desk.  The court said in part:

... Ms. Castro acted pursuant to her job duties as a teacher when she decorated the walls of her classroom with items the students would see during instructional time. The question is whether Ms. Castro was doing otherwise when she hung items she calls “personal expressive items” on the wall, including the crucifix. Ms. Castro specifically states that posting such items makes the classroom environment more conducive to learning because the items humanize the teacher to their students. In that way, therefore, Ms. Castro was acting pursuant to her official duties as a teacher by displaying the items....

Accepting Ms. Castro’s argument that teachers have a First Amendment free speech right to post “personal expressive items” related to matters of public concern on classroom walls—where they are visible to students during instructional time—would mean the District could not control the messages conveyed to students while the students are required to be present in the classroom for learning. Instead, with respect to each such item a teacher posted on the classroom wall, the District would need to engage in a Pickering balancing analysis and could prohibit only those items that are sufficiently disruptive.  

... I conclude that Ms. Castro is unlikely to prevail on her claim that her display of the crucifix on the wall of the classroom constitutes speech as a private citizen rather than pursuant to her job duties as a teacher. Therefore, I conclude she is not likely to prevail on her free speech claim....

Ms. Castro says that she “sincerely believes that her religion compels her to display her crucifix, not hide it under her desktop” and “[s]tifling her religious expression through concealment of the crucifix ‘would be an affront to [her] faith....  

I have already concluded that the crucifix display on the classroom wall was pursuant to Ms. Castro’s official duties and is therefore speech attributed to the District. The speech is thus, for constitutional purposes, the government’s own speech....

Defendants argue that allowing the crucifix to remain on the classroom wall would constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause or, at the very least, expose the District to a risk of liability for such a violation....

Based on the existing record, I conclude that Ms. Castro is unlikely to show that Defendants did anything other than make “a reasonable, good faith judgment” that permitting Ms. Castro to hang the crucifix on the classroom wall during instructional time “runs a substantial risk of incurring a violation of the Establishment Clause.... I agree with Defendants, therefore, that a preliminary injunction should not issue....

As noted, under binding Second Circuit cases, the District must be afforded some leeway in balancing the free exercise rights of its employees and the risk of an Establishment Clause violation.... Unlike the coach’s prayer in Kennedy, the crucifix display is a religious message on the classroom wall broadcast to a “captive audience” of students required to be in the classroom. ...

First Liberty Institute issued a press release announcing the decision.

[Thanks to Eugene Volokh via Religionlaw for the lead.] 

Splintered 5th Circuit Says Suit Against City for Failing to Train Police on 1st Amendment Rights Can Move Ahead

 In Hershey v. City of Bossier City, (5th Cir., Oct. 7, 2025), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals in a splintered decision reversed a Louisiana federal district court's dismissal of a suit against the city by plaintiff who was passing out booklets for the Christian Vegetarian Association outside a concert arena in which a Christian rock concert was taking place.  The arena is in a public park, is managed by a private company and was rented out for the concert. Both police and private security guards provided security. They informed plaintiff that he could not hand out his material because he was on private property. Plaintiff sued the officers and guards for violating his 1st Amendment rights and sued the city for failing to train the police and the security guards. The case generated three separate opinions which, when put together reversed the trial court's dismissal of the claim against the city, but affirmed on qualified immunity grounds, the dismissal of claims against the police and security guards.

Judge Ho wrote in part:

“The dissemination of ... religious views and doctrines is protected by the First Amendment.”...

This right plainly encompasses the distribution of religious pamphlets—the activity at issue in this case....

So anyone who is “rightfully on a street which the state has left open to the public carries with him there as elsewhere the constitutional right to express his views in an orderly fashion.”...

Hershey’s right to evangelize on a public sidewalk is not undermined by the fact that the city-owned facility abutting the sidewalk happens to be managed by a private corporation.  Nor should it matter that his rights were violated by private security guards working alongside police officers.  Municipalities cannot abrogate the constitutional rights of their citizens simply by delegating their coercive governmental powers to private agents.

He also concluded that the city's failure to train amounted to deliberate indifference.

Judge Dennis said in part:

The City’s failure to train officers that the park was a public forum led officers to believe that the park was private property and that citizens could be ejected without violating their First Amendment rights. Hershey also alleged that the officers who removed him from the park held this belief and told him he had to leave the park because it was private property. Hershey has pleaded facts sufficient to show that the City’s complete lack of training was the cause of his injury.

Judge Richman would have upheld the dismissal of the claim against the city, saying in part:

This is a single-incident case in which Hershey relies on his own confrontation with city officers and private security guards to establish municipal liability.  This case does not present the “rare” and “narrow and extreme circumstances” that our court and the Supreme Court has said permit “drawing the inference” of “deliberate indifference.”

The court also by a different 2-1 vote upheld dismissal of damage claims against the officers and security guards on qualified immunity grounds. Judge Dennis would have reversed the trial court's dismissal on qualified immunity grounds, saying in part:

Because the law clearly established Hershey’s right to leaflet in a traditional public forum without viewpoint discrimination, qualified immunity is inappropriate.

Judge Richman disagreed, saying in part:

... [G]iven that the Supreme Court has indicated that sidewalks on public property are not automatically public forums and that the district court considered several cases concerning the forum status of spaces surrounding arenas that do not speak in unison, the forum status of the space in question was not clearly established.... 

Judge Ho reluctantly agreed that precedent required concluding that the right involved was clearly established, but expressed his disagreement with that precedent, saying in part:

 “[i]t seems absurd to suggest that the most egregious constitutional violations imaginable are somehow immune from liability precisely because they’re so egregious.  It would make a mockery of our rights to grant qualified immunity just because no one in government has yet to be abusive enough to commit that particular violation—and then stubborn enough to litigate it, not only before a district court, but also in the court of appeals (or the Supreme Court).”

Supreme Court Hears Oral Arguments in Conversion Therapy Ban Case on Tuesday

Tomorrow (Oct. 7), the U.S. Supreme Court hears oral arguments in Chiles v. Salazar. In the case, the U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision held that Colorado's Minor Conversion Therapy Law that bans mental health professionals from providing conversion therapy to minors does not violate the free speech or free exercise rights of mental health professionals. (See prior posting.)  Only the free speech issue was raised in the petition for review by the Supreme Court. At issue tomorrow is whether the ban on talk therapy for minors aimed at changing their gay or transgender identity is fully protected speech. Or may that therapy be regulated as primarily professional conduct that the legislature deems to constitute substandard medical care.

Here is the SCOTUSblog case page that provides link to all the briefs and motions filed in the case, as well as to commentary on the case. The oral arguments will be live streamed by the Court at this page beginning at 10:00 AM Eastern Time. Links to a recoding and written transcript of the arguments can be accessed here later in the day on Tuesday.

Supreme Court Term Opens Monday with Several Cases of Interest on Its Docket

The U.S. Supreme Court's fall term opens tomorrow, Oct. 6. There are a number of cases on the Court's Docket for this term that are of interest to readers of Religion Clause Blog. Here are the cases with links to their case pages on SCOTUSblog:

Chiles v. Salazar (to be argued on Oct. 7). Is Colorado's ban on conversion therapy for minors constitutional.

Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety, (to be argued Nov. 10, 2025). Can a government official be sued in his individual capacity for violating the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.

First Choice Women’s Resource Centers v. Platkin, (argument date not yet set). Can a faith-based pregnancy resource center that has been served with a state investigatory subpoena challenge the subpoena on free speech grounds in federal court, or must the challenge be adjudicated in state court.

Little v. Hecox, (argument date not yet set). West Virgina v. B.J.P, (argument date not yet set). Do laws that bar transgender women from participating on women's sports teams in public schools and colleges violate Title IX or the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.

Olivier v. City of Brandon, Mississippi, (argument date not yet set). Can a street preacher sue to enjoin a city ordinance that limits demonstrations to a designated area within three hours of an event at the city's amphitheater, or would that undermine his prior state conviction for violating the ordinance.

______________

There are also two cases of interest on the Court's Emergency Docket (sometimes called its "Shadow Docket") These cases are usually decided without full briefing and oral argument. 

Trump v. Orr. Asks the Supreme Court should stay a district court injunction that requires the State Department to allow passport applicants to select the sex designation that will appear on their passports. Applicants have the choice of "M", "F", or "X", regardless of their biological sex.

We the Patriots USA v. Ventura Unified School District. Asks the Supreme Court to issue an injunction allowing school children whose parents object to vaccines on religious grounds to attend school while challenges to the absence of religious exemptions from school vaccine mandates are being appealed.

Canceling Church's Sunday Lease on School Gym Violated 1st Amendment

 In Truth Family Bible Church Middleton v. Idaho Housing and Finance Association, (D ID, Sept. 22, 2025), an Idaho federal district court held that plaintiff's First Amendment rights were violated when its lease to use a public charter school's gymnasium for Sunday services was terminated. The court said in part:

... Truth Family had a month-to-month lease with Sage International Network of Schools (“SAGE”), a public charter school, where they would pay rent for the use of the school’s gymnasium on Sundays for church services.... SAGE submitted an application to IHFA to participate in the Public Charter School Facilities Program [under which] it could receive bonds for facility improvements and construction.  

IHFA reviewed SAGE’s application and indicated the lease with Truth Family could be a problem because the bond proceeds could not be used for religious purposes under Article IX Section 5 of the Idaho Constitution (otherwise known as the “Blaine Amendment”).... Ultimately, SAGE decided to terminate the lease in order to proceed with bond financing.....

IHFA did not single out Truth Family’s lease in a way that was neutral or generally applicable, and SAGE did not terminate Truth Family’s lease in a manner that was neutral or generally applicable. Therefore, Truth Family met its burden of showing there was a violation of the Free Exercise Clause here....

To refuse the issuance of bonds to anyone who contracts with a religious organization to use their facilities is likely not narrowly tailored to any government interest that could possibly be served by the Blaine Amendment....

... [T]he government is still indicating a preference for a certain religion or non-religion when it excludes another. When Truth Family was prevented from using facilities to participate in worship services, that indicated IHFA and SAGE’s preference for non-religion in violation of the Establishment Clause....

SAGE terminated the lease solely due to Truth Family’s status as a religious organization. While the motivation might have been money rather than a direct issue with the message itself, the result is the same: Truth Family could no longer spread its message at the school because it was a religious one. This is a violation of the Free Speech Clause, and summary judgment is proper....

Idaho Ed News reports on the decision.

9th Circuit Upholds Requirement to Use Only Secular Curricular Materials in Charter School Home Instruction Programs

In Woodlard v. Thurmond, (9th Cir., Sept. 11, 2025), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected First Amendment challenges to California's refusal to purchase and permit the use of religious curricular materials in home-based independent study programs of two charter schools. The court said in part:

Plaintiffs ... argue that the defendant charter schools’ independent study programs are really homeschooling and that the schools’ provision of curricular materials should be treated as a generally available public benefit in aid of homeschooling, access to which cannot be denied based on Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs. The argument is premised on three recent Supreme Court decisions holding that when a state creates a generally available public benefit, it cannot exclude a potential recipient from the benefit because of religious status or religious use....

... [N]ot all government decisions that engender religious objections impose burdens on religion that fall afoul of the Free Exercise Clause. As the Supreme Court made clear in Carson, a state’s decision to provide a “strictly secular” public education does not do so....

... [I]n contrast to private homeschooling, parents in independent study programs can teach only under the supervision of state employees. The extensive legal requirements applicable to the defendant charter schools’ independent study programs make the programs sufficiently public to defeat Plaintiffs’ free exercise claim....

Plaintiffs’ compelled speech claim fares no better. It is premised on the argument that “[w]hen parents in the Blue Ridge and Visions programs select a diverse array of curricula for their children’s diverse needs,” the parents are speaking, not the government. However, we have held that a public school’s curriculum is an “expression of its policy,” ... and that “information and speech ... present[ed] to school children may be deemed to be part of the school’s curriculum and thus School District speech,” 

School Rules on Non-gendered Pronouns Do Not Violate Free Exercise or Free Speech Rights

In Hyland v. State Board of Education, (NJ App., Sept. 9, 2025), a New Jersey state appellate court rejected a 1st and 14th Amendment challenge to amended Board of Education rules that, among other things, eliminated gendered pronouns in the rules. The court said in part:

Hyland argues the State Board may not establish a "religion of secularism" by adopting amendments that define gender as "indeterminate," which can be decided based on the student's feelings, resulting in the treatment of comparable secular activity more favorably than religious exercise.  He further argues the amendments force students who adhere to a "Biblical worldview," to act and operate under a law that directly contradicts those beliefs, and the students or parents are not allowed to opt out of the imposition of those beliefs....

A fair reading of the amended chapter demonstrates the State Board does not seek to promote a "religion of secularism," nor does it create a constitutionally prohibited entanglement.  The students and parents retain the right to opt-out of any instruction related to health, family life education, or sex education or educational activity that violates their religious beliefs.... Thus, the amendments do not violate either the Free Exercise or Establishment Clauses, as they apply uniformly to all students and do not seek to regulate religious conduct or belief.,,,

We are satisfied that the record establishes there is no violation of the First Amendment free speech rights.  Here, the amendments to Chapter 7 do not regulate or target the speech of students or parents.  While the amendments define gender identity, they neither compel nor coerce students or parents to endorse this definition.  Nor do they prevent students or parents from publicly expressing a different view....

11th Circuit: Government Can Insist on Secular Presenters in Intervention Program for Domestic Abusers

In Nussbaumer v. Secretary, Florida Department of Children and Families, (11th Cir., Sept. 4, 2025), the U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected free speech and free exercise challenges to Florida's requirements for becoming certified as a provider in the state's batterers' intervention program. Anyone convicted of domestic violence is required to complete the intervention program offered by a certified provider.  Nussbaumer is a Florida minister and licensed clinical Christian psychologist. He was denied certification because state rules require that the program's curriculum not include any faith-based ideology associated with a particular curriculum and not identify poor impulse control as a cause of domestic violence or suggest anger management techniques to prevent domestic violence. The court held that plaintiff's free speech rights were not violated because the curriculum and its presentation are government speech. Similarly, it held that his free exercise rights were not infringed, saying in part:

“the government’s own speech cannot support a claim that the government has interfered with a private individual’s free exercise rights.”... “The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens.”

Christian Families Challenge Foster Care Rules on Support of Transgender Children

Two families, asserting Christian religious beliefs, filed suit yesterday in a Massachusetts federal district court challenging on 1st and 14th Amendment grounds a policy of the Massachusetts Department of Children and Families that requires foster parents to agree that they will "[s]upport, respect, and affirm the foster child’s sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression." The complaint (full text) in Jones v. Mahaniah, (D MA, filed 9/3/2025), alleges in part:

3. Both families will provide a loving and respectful home for any child, including transgender, gay, or lesbian foster children. But that is insufficient for Massachusetts....

4. ... [T]he State requires the Joneses and the Schrocks to promise to use a child’s chosen pronouns, verbally affirm a child’s gender identity contrary to biological sex, and even encourage a child to medically transition, forcing these families to speak against their core religious beliefs. 

5. Second, DCF infringes on Plaintiffs’ free-exercise rights through a policy that is not neutral or generally applicable,,,,  A foster parent must promise in advance to use opposite-sex pronouns and encourage a hypothetical child’s gender transition, even if they never have and never will host a child who struggles to accept their natural body....

120. Because DCF compels applicants to speak and express the DCF’s preferred views on human sexuality while prohibiting speech expressing other views it regulates speech based on content and viewpoint, it engages in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination....

134. 110 C.M.R. 7.104(1)(d) is not neutral nor generally applicable because it imposes special disabilities based on religious beliefs, categorically excludes people from foster-care licenses based on religious beliefs, prefers certain religious and secular beliefs over the Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs, and provides for categorical and individualized exemptions without extending an exemption to religious persons like Plaintiffs.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Supreme Court Review Sought by California Baker

A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed this week in Miller v. Civil Rights Division, (Sup. Ct., certiorari filed 8/26/2025). In the case, a California state appellate court held that a bakery, Cathy's Creations, and its owner violated the anti-discrimination provisions of California law when they refused to sell a predesigned cake to a customer because the cake would be used at a same-sex wedding reception. The California court rejected defendant's free exercise and free speech defenses. (See prior posting.) The California Supreme Court denied review. Washington Times reports on the petition seeking U.S. Supreme Court review.

LA Sued Over Its handling of Permit Application for Christian Revival Event

Suit was filed last week in a California federal district court by leaders of May Day USA, a nationwide Christian revival event, contending that the manner in which Los Angeles officials handed their application for a permit to hold a revival on Hollywood Boulevard violated their 1st and 14th Amendment rights. The 54-page complaint (full text) in Donnelly v. City of Los Angeles, California, (CD CA, filed 8/21/2025), alleges in part:

15. LAPD wielded the unconstitutionally unbridled discretion afforded it under the City’s permitting scheme to subject MayDay to lengthy and pretextual administrative hurdles....

16. Among the LAPD’s many demands was a requirement that MayDay conduct a petition of Hollywood Boulevard’s business owners and vendors to ensure at least 51% approved of MayDay’s expressive activity and speech....

19. The City’s permitting scheme thus enshrined an unconstitutional heckler’s veto upon MayDay and its expressive activities....

21. The City refused to provide MayDay with any concrete answer on its permit application until the last minute, prohibiting MayDay from finalizing their planned event, advertising it, or otherwise adequately preparing to engage in the event....

23. Three days prior to its requested event, the City denied the permit actually requested by MayDay ...and “granted” the application to host the event at a location ... it never requested and out of the site of the hecklers who Defendants believed would veto MayDay’s speech. In essence, the City tried to put MayDay unconstitutionally out of sight, and out of mind....

25. Simply put, the City said MayDay could speak, but only if it did it quietly, quickly, and where no one who might object would be forced to hear it. Defendants denied MayDay’s permit application on the basis of the views it planned to espouse and out of concern that Hollywood Boulevard was not an appropriate place for their religious speech, exercise, and expression.

Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

School Counselor's Office Display of Anti-Trans Books Is Permissible Only When No Students Are in His Office

In Theis v. Intermountain Education Service Board of Directors, (D ORA, Aug. 20, 2025), a social worker employed by the district to administer standardized tests individually to students sued claiming his constitutional rights were violated when the district found that his display of two particular books in his office violated the district's bias policy. The district found that the display of the books-- titled He is He and She is She--constituted a hostile expression toward a person because of their gender identity. Plaintiff was ordered to stop displaying the books. 

The court concluded that the district's policy did not violate plaintiff's free exercise rights, saying in part:

... Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant’s Speech Policy is not neutral. There is no indication that the ESB Policy restricts any religious practices because of their religious motivations. Indeed, the policy explicitly seeks to prevent discrimination or harassment based on religion. And even if the ESB Policy adversely impacted religious practices, it is addressing the legitimate concern of ensuring an open and welcoming school environment for all students and employees.

Plaintiff also has not shown that Defendants were “hostile” towards his religious beliefs....

The court however agreed in part with plaintiff's free speech claim, saying that "only his display when no students are present is protected under the First Amendment." It explained: 

When no students were present in Plaintiff’s office, the message of the books would not be reasonably attributable to IMESD, and the display could not press Plaintiff’s views on impressionable or captive students.