No 1st Amendment Violation in Requiring Seller of Pre-Designed Wedding Outfit to Sell It for Same-Sex Wedding

In In re New York State Division of Human Rights v. D. Auxilly NYC LLC, (NY App., Oct. 22, 2026), a New York state appellate court upheld the award of $5000 compensatory damages and a $20,000 civil penalty in a suit alleging that a clothing retailer violated the New York Human Rights Law by refusing to sell a bridal jump suit to a bride for her same-sex wedding. The court said in part:

Complainant, at the time a Missouri resident, emailed D. Auxilly, a New York based business that produces and sells attire, including bridal outfits, to inquire about a bridal jumpsuit she had seen advertised on one or more of D. Auxilly's social media pages.... Complainant also informed D. Auxilly that as her fiancÉ had "fallen in love" with it after struggling to find anything she liked, complainant wanted to purchase it for their upcoming wedding. ... D. Auxilly's owner and operator, responded ... advising complainant ... that she would not be able to make the garment for a same-sex wedding because it would go against her religious beliefs. She also urged complainant and her fiancÉ to reconsider getting married....

The First Amendment does not shield D. Auxilly from liability for this discrimination. Unlike the baker in Masterpiece Cakeshop v Colorado Civil Rights Comm...., D. Auxilly was not asked to design and create customized items which might constitute an "expressive statement." Nor was it tasked with creating a customized wedding website, as in 303 Creative LLC v Elenis.... Instead, D. Auxilly refused to sell the wedding garment it had previously designed and which it had marketed to the public. While the garment likely would need to be adjusted for sizing, this potential sizing alteration would not constitute an expressive statement. Neither would D. Auxilly's "speech" be compelled here by requiring it to sell the previously designed and marketed garment...

Enforcement of the NYSHRL here also does not violate D. Auxilly's right to free exercise of religion. The statute is "neutral, both on its face and due to a lack of evidence that it targets religious conduct for a distinctive treatment"....

Evangelist Sues Over Exclusion of Leafleting at Neighborhood Christmas Festival

Suit was filed earlier this month in an Arizona federal district court by a Christian evangelist challenging Tucson's decision in 2025 to exclude religious, political, and issue-based leafleting at the annual Winterhaven Festival of Lights, a neighborhood display of Christmas and seasonal lights. Instead, leafleting was permitted outside the Festival in a "free expression zone." The complaint (full text) in Hoffman v. City of Tucson, (D AZ, filed 10/2/2026), alleges that the exclusion violates plaintiff's free speech, free exercise and due process rights. First Liberty Institute issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Christian Counselors Sue to Invalidate Lincoln, Nebraska's Conversion Therapy Ban

Suit was filed last week in a Nebraska federal district court asking the court to enjoin enforcement of Lincoln, Nebraska Ordinances that prohibit conversion therapy for minors. The complaint (full text) in Dierks v. City of Lincoln, Nebraska, (D NE, filed 10/6/2026), alleges that that the challenged Ordinance is almost identical to the Colorado statute that the U.S. Supreme Court found unconstitutional on free speech grounds in Chiles v. Salazar. The complaint alleges in part:

3. Since Chiles was decided, Plaintiffs' attorneys have contacted the Lincoln City Attorney several times, beginning on April 16, 2026. By letter of that date, Plaintiffs requested the City of Lincoln to repeal the Ordinance no later than June 15, 2026.... 

4. There followed one telephone call and two phone messages with the Lincoln City Attorney....

5. By way of another email on July 16, the Plaintiffs' attorneys then requested to know whether, even if the City of Lincoln is unwilling to repeal the Ordinance, the City of Lincoln at least is willing to agree not to enforce it as applied to talk therapy.... The City of Lincoln was informed in that email that if the City took no action, Plaintiffs would have no alternative but to sue the City. The City of Lincoln has not responded to Plaintiffs' attorneys as of the date of this filing.

Thomas More Society issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Backers of Hasidic School May Move Ahead with Challenges to Zoning Denials

Congregation Rabbinical Institute of Tartikov, Inc. v. Village of Pomona, NY, (SD NY, Sept.28, 2026), is the latest decision in a long-running attempt by members of the Hasidic Jewish community to build a rabbinical institute in Pamona, New York, that will provide facilities to train rabbinical judges and will include housing for its students and their families.  In an 80-page opinion, a New York federal district court allowed plaintiffs to move ahead with their as-applied federal and state equal protection, free exercise, freedom of speech and association, Fair Housing Act and RLUIPA claims. At issue are plaintiff's compliance with two local laws--one allowing only accredited educational institutions to be constructed in the village, and the second placing a number of restrictions on design of dormitories.

The court said in part:

... Plaintiffs plausibly allege that Defendants enforced the Challenged Laws with discriminatory intent.

  ... [T]he New York State Education Department no longer provides institutional accreditation....  

Plaintiffs further allege that Tartikov explained to the ZBA that it cannot obtain accreditation through private means because AARTS requires a rabbinical institute to be operational before it can obtain accreditation, leaving Tartikov unable to obtain accreditation without first operating and unable to operate in the Village without first obtaining accreditation....  Rather than address this alleged “Catch-22,” the ZBA chairperson suggested that Tartikov rent a facility outside the Village, operate there until it obtained accreditation, and then return to the Village....  

The ZBA subsequently denied Tartikov’s variance application because Tartikov had not sufficiently established that it could not become accredited.... It did so despite the Rockland County Department of Planning’s conclusion that lack of accreditation, standing alone, presented no significant land-use impacts....

Thus, despite Tartikov’s repeated efforts to obtain permission for student-family housing, Defendants effectively conditioned consideration of that request on Tartikov first overcoming the Accreditation Law—the same requirement that Plaintiffs allege Tartikov cannot satisfy without first operating its rabbinical institute....  These procedural irregularities and alleged delays further support an inference that Defendants acted with discriminatory intent....

At this early stage, Plaintiffs’ allegations of repeated procedural irregularities, the circumstances surrounding Defendants’ application of the Challenged Laws, and alleged anti-Hasidic animus among Village officials and community members plausibly support an inference that Defendants applied the Challenged Laws in a discriminatory manner. ...

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Defendants’ application of the Challenged Laws imposes a substantial burden on their religious exercise. 

... Plaintiffs allege that the Institute requires a Torah community, which in turn requires prospective students to reside with their families....  Yet the Dormitory Law prohibits the very housing necessary to accommodate Tartikov’s Torah community by excluding single-family, two-family, and multifamily dwelling units from the definition of a dormitory and prohibiting separate cooking, dining, or housekeeping facilities.... These allegations plausibly establish more than a “minimal impact on religious exercise”.... 

These allegations plausibly allege that the Institute would foster protected expression and that Defendants burdened that expression through their application of the Accreditation Law....

Plaintiffs have also plausibly alleged that the Accreditation Law burdens their ability to associate for the purpose of engaging in that protected activity...

Although Plaintiffs will ultimately bear the burden of demonstrating that the Dormitory Law has a significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on Hasidic Jews, they need not make that evidentiary showing at this stage in the litigation....

Student Organizations Challenge University's Consolidation of Christian Student Groups Under One Campus Minister

Suit was filed last month in a Virginia federal district court by two Christian student groups at Virginia State University challenging the school's new Campus Ministries Policy.  The complaint (full text) in Women of Victory at Virginia State University v. Branch, (ED VA, filed 9/24/2026), alleges in part:

3. ... VSU recently instituted a Campus Ministries Policy ... that strips religious organizations of their registered student organization (“RSO”) status and accompanying benefits, brings student-led ministries under the “governance and influence” of a University-appointed Campus Minister, and yet exempts secular student groups as well as the Muslim and non-Christian student ministries on campus from the Policy’s onerous requirements. 

4. The burden of this Policy falls on the Plaintiff chapters of Women of Victory and Bethel Campus Fellowship. These are VSU chapters of national organizations that provide religious support to students on college campuses through Bible studies, leadership trainings and events, and numerous other opportunities for spiritual growth, both on- and off-campus....

8. ... [O]n August 6, 2026, VSU’s Campus Ministries office circulated its new Campus Ministries Policy, informing student leaders that “student-led ministries” could no longer affiliate with their national organizations or hold RSO status. Instead, faith-based groups (unlike secular groups) would be absorbed into VSU’s Campus Ministries, subject to the sole authority of VSU’s Campus Minister and a newly appointed Board of Advisors, made up of various faculty members, including a Public Safety officer, a Facility Quality Assurance Director, and the VSU President’s Deputy Chief of Staff, among others. 

9. Under the new Policy, Christian organizations lose access to RSO benefits, including funding, event-planning resources, and event-promotion rights. Further, the VSU Campus Minister is granted control of all Christian, student-led ministries, with complete discretion to approve or reject requests for religious meetings, events, guest speakers, and all other religious activities on campus....

148. Forcing Christian student organizations to submit to a single religious figure employed by a public university violates religious students’ constitutional rights.....

The complaint alleges that the new policy violates plaintiffs' rights under the Free Exercise Clause, Establishment Clause, and Equal Protection Clause and violates their rights of expressive association and freedom of assembly.  Christian Post reports on the lawsuit.

Requiring Foster Parents to Affirm Child's Religious Beliefs That They Reject Violates 1st Amendment

In McIntire v. Senn, ((WD WA, Sept. 29, 2026), a Washington federal district court refused to require Washington's Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) to issue plaintiff a foster care license even though the court found that plaintiff had plausibly alleged free speech and free exercise violations. The court found that DCYF had a neutral independent ground for denying the license-- the condition of plaintiff's home. However, the court extensively discussed plaintiff's 1st Amendment claim that requiring plaintiff as a foster care parent to support a child's religious and spiritual practices violates plaintiff's free speech and free exercise rights. The court said in part:

DCYF interprets the requirement to "support" and "affirm" a foster child's religious beliefs as limiting what McIntire may say about her own beliefs. This is a content-based restriction because it "applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed."...  It is also a viewpoint-based restriction....

... DCYF argues that the protection of a foster child's religious freedom is a compelling interest. It asserts that this minor restriction on speech is "narrowly tailored to protect foster children while allowing McIntire unbridled freedom to speak in every other context."...

Viewing the facts in McIntire's favor, the Court concludes that McIntire has plausibly alleged that DCYF unconstitutionally denied her application because she would not refrain from stating her religious beliefs were true. Whether DCYF can ultimately establish that the restriction satisfies strict scrutiny as applied presents a separate question that the Court need not resolve at this stage. This is especially true here, where WAC 110-148-1520 has since been amended to provide foster parents with a choice of whether to connect foster children with resources that support and affirm their needs or refrain from impeding DCYF's efforts in facilitating those resources....

DCYF's motion to dismiss McIntire's First Amendment free speech claim is DENIED.

McIntire also claims that DCYF violated her First Amendment right to free exercise when it denied her application because she "could not support a child's religion or spiritual practices" as required by WAC 110-148-1520(8). Dkt. 1-2 at 103.

DCYF moves to dismiss, asserting that the purpose of the regulation is not to infringe upon the religious practices of foster care applicants but rather to ensure that the religious rights of foster care children are protected....

McIntire acknowledges that, if a foster child asked her what she believed to be true, she would answer that she believes the Bible and that "her beliefs in God consistent with Christianity are true."...  But she maintains that "she would respect the beliefs of others if different from hers and she would not refuse care based on differing beliefs."... She asserts that DCYF forced her to "choose between being a licensed foster parent or adhering to her Christian faith."...

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to McIntire, the Court concludes that McIntire has plausibly alleged that WAC 110-148-1520(7) and (8) are not applied neutrally in practice. McIntire asserts:  

If I had a child placed in my care who was part of another religion, I would support and happily transport them to/from their regular services in close proximity. If they are part of established youth groups or classes, I would support them with transport as well as any ‘at home’ work they wanted/needed to do. . . I also do not want to be forced to say that I approve of or condone a thing I don’t agree with.... 

Yet, in denying her application, DCYF focused not on what McIntire would do to support the child’s religion, but on what she would say about her own.... 

6th Circuit: Tennessee's Ban on Recruiting a Minor to Obtain an Abortion Is Unconstitutional

In Welty v. Dunaway, (6th Cir. Sept. 24, 2026), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision held unconstitutional both as applied and on its face a provision of Tennessee law that criminalizes recruiting a minor for purposes of obtaining an abortion, even if the abortion is to be performed in another state where it is legal. The law was challenged by two anti-abortion activists who regularly counsel minors seeking abortions. The majority, in a 45-page opinion, said in part:

As applied to Welty and Behn, the Recruitment Provision restricts their ability to speak freely about abortion; it is therefore a content-based regulation that is presumptively unconstitutional….

… The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Chiles is instructive on this point.  Chiles concerned an as-applied challenge by a mental health counselor to a Colorado statute proscribing mental health professionals from engaging in conversion therapy with minors….

... [T]he statute expressly allowed mental health professionals to provide “acceptance, support, and understanding for the facilitation of an individual’s identity exploration and development,” as well as “assistance to a person undergoing gender transition.”…  The only question before the Court in Chiles was whether this statute was subject to strict scrutiny, and the Court concluded that it was, because it discriminated based on content and ... viewpoint…. 

Like Chiles, Welty and Behn regularly counsel minors.  But when one of their minor clients seeks guidance regarding her pregnancy, the Recruitment Provision “regulates how [Welty and Behn] may respond.”…  Nothing in Tennessee’s law would prevent them from encouraging a minor to carry her pregnancy to term.... But the Recruitment Provision does restrict Welty’s freedom to share with clients her view that abortion is “safe, common and normal.”  It likewise prevents her and Behn alike from supporting and encouraging their clients’ decisions to obtain legal abortions and sharing information about how they may do so…. 

… [T]he Recruitment Provision discriminates based on content as well as the viewpoint of the speaker…..

… [T]he Recruitment Provision is unconstitutional as applied to speakers who seek to encourage and support minors to obtain legal abortions.  This represents a substantial portion of speech to which the statute might apply... Such applications could include the speech of adults who occupy a virtually limitless range of roles in a pregnant minor’s life (except her parents or legal guardians), as long as they encourage her to obtain a legal abortion.  These adults could be an aunt or uncle, grandparent, older sibling, teacher, school counselor, therapist, physician, pastor, youth minister, family friend, mentor, or anyone else a pregnant minor might encounter or herself seek out whose speech might impact her decision.  As the adage goes, it takes a village to raise a child.  Anyone in that village is capable of “recruit[ing]” her to obtain a legal abortion….

By its own terms and under Tennessee law, the Recruitment Provision could also apply to out-of-state residents who recruit minor Tennesseans to obtain legal abortions elsewhere….

Because “a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep,”... we hold that the Recruitment Provision is substantially overbroad and facially unconstitutional….

Chief Judge Sutton filed a 28-page dissenting opinion, saying in part:

… Welty and Behn’s abortion counseling and advocacy, in their own words, do not include efforts to induce Tennessee minors to obtain abortions without their parents’ knowledge, within the State or outside the State.  In providing information about abortion options and in allowing minors to “make [their] own decision[s],” … they are committed pro-choice advocates.  But they do not, in the words of the statute, claim to “intentionally” “recruit[]” minors to obtain abortions or otherwise engage in abortion “trafficking” of minors without parental consent…. 

That should be the end of this case, and it should take less than ten pages to say so….  In the absence of a limitation on the words they plan to use, their free-speech case disappears…. 

All of this back and forth returns us to one mystery of this case already mentioned and identifies another.  The one:  Why won’t Welty and Behn and the court simply agree to eliminate any risks to their work by supporting and announcing a decision that the Act does not cover anything the plaintiffs have done in the past or wish to do in the future?  The other:  Does the court think there is any way to write a law that bans “abortion trafficking of a minor” without violating the First Amendment?...

Welty and Behn perceive unconstitutional vagueness in “recruiting,” which they say breaks the boundaries of clarity.  This argument collides with the Act’s text, which not only prohibits recruiting but also requires that the recruiting be “intentional[]” and “for the purpose of” concealing or obtaining an abortion for the minor….  A word that is already clear, plus a mental state that clarifies it still further, provides all the notice that citizens need….

... A litigation loss for Welty and Behn, it’s worth adding, would amount to a “real-world win.”... Such a decision, it is true, would not enjoin the Act.  But such a decision, it is also true, would lead to a federal court ruling that the Act does not apply to the activities that Welty and Behn want to undertake.  That is difficult to describe as a loss.

The Tennessean reports on the decision.

[Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Journalist Sues Dearborn for Favoring Muslims Over Christians and Jews

Suit was filed yesterday in a Michigan federal district court by a journalist who is a resident of Dearborn, Michigan, alleging that the city of Dearborn has violated the 1st and 14th Amendments by favoring Muslims over Christian and Jewish residents of the city. The complaint describes a number of incidents but particularly focuses on the city's placing of Ramadan banners on city property in 2025, and its refusal to hang similar banners for Easter or Passover. The complaint (full text) in Cleveland v. City of Dearborn, Michigan, (ED MI, filed 9/17/2026), alleges in part:

107. ... Defendants have deprived Plaintiff of her right to freedom of speech in violation of the First Amendment.....  

108. Plaintiff engaged in multiple activities protected by the First Amendment, including her reporting at The Federalist and her work as a journalist; her public comments on X criticizing Defendant Hammoud for excusing and justifying terrorism and for discriminating against Christians and Jews.... 

109. Defendant Hammoud, acting under color of state law, took adverse action against Plaintiff because of that protected activity, including the following: authorizing the additional installation of lighted Ramadan signs as a direct affront to Plaintiff’s request for Christian and Jewish displays..... 

111. Defendant Hammoud’s actions as set forth in this Complaint were retaliatory and intended to discourage Plaintiff from speaking and thus exercising her rights to free speech, including her right to petition her government for the redress of grievances, protected by the First Amendment....

121. By retaliating against Plaintiff for engaging in activity protected by the First Amendment based the content and viewpoint of her speech, which Defendants disfavor, Defendants have deprived Plaintiff of the equal protection of the law....

127. Defendant City of Dearborn ,... sponsored, funded, and promoted religious displays, banners, symbols, and religious events for the Islamic faith, including Ramadan, on City property and through City resources, while providing no comparable sponsorship, funding, or promotion for Christian or Jewish observances, including Easter and Passover, despite Plaintiff’s repeated requests to do so. 

128. The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that the government may not officially prefer one religion, religious denomination, or faith tradition over another. 

129. By selectively permitting and promoting religious expression for Muslims but denying similar expression for Christians and Jews, ... Defendants have conveyed and effected governmental preference for one faith tradition over another.

American Freedom Law Center issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Christian Doctors Challenge Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Law

Suit was filed last week in a Colorado federal district court contending that the 1st and 14th Amendment rights of Christian doctors are being violated by applying to them the Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation of the state's Anti-Discrimination Act. In Boe v. Children's Hospital Colorado, (CO Sup. Ct., May 18, 2026), the Colorado Supreme Court held that a children's hospital was violating the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) by complying with a federal effort to end gender-affirming care for minors. The Department of Health and Human Services threatened to cut off federal health care payments to medical providers that continued to offer such services. Now, the 87-page complaint (full text) in Christian Medical & Dental Associations v. Sullivan, (D CO, filed 9/9/2026), alleges in part:

1. Colorado is once again at war with common sense, sound science, and religious freedom. After a recent Colorado Supreme Court decision, state law now forces doctors to medically transition their patients—including children—even when doing so violates their conscience and medical judgment. That’s bad for doctors and patients alike. It’s also unconstitutional. Colorado is not allowed to conscript those who have sworn to do no harm into harming the very children and adults entrusted to their care. The First Amendment trumps Colorado’s mandate to embrace the lie of gender ideology.... 

6. CMDA members and Button Family Practice also want to explain their medical services policies and position on pronoun usage by sharing their beliefs about identity to the public. But Colorado makes that illegal, too. If they publish their policies, they could be liable for indicating that they would deny service to someone because of sex, disability, or gender identity or expression—even though they serve people within their scope of practice, no matter a person’s status. To avoid that result, the providers have refrained from posting those statements.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of last week's lawsuit.

InterVarsity Christian Fellowship Sues for Recognition as Student Organization

Suit was filed last week in a New York federal district court by a Christian student organization at Broome Community College that is part of the State University of New York system. The group was denied recognition as an official student organization because its proposed constitution requires all student leaders of the organization to affirm its Statement of Faith. The school says that this religious leadership requirement violates the school's non-discrimination policy. The complaint (full text) in Intervarsity Christian Fellowship/USA v. SUNY Broome Community College, (ND NY, filed 8/21/2026), alleges in part:

... [I]n over 150 years of precedent, the Supreme Court has emphasized that religious organizations have the right “to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.”... SUNY Broome’s actions here not only interfere but also seek to control a core component of InterVarsity’s governance, faith, and doctrine....

... [I]n the past decade, the Supreme Court has warned governments three times that they cannot deny religious organizations access to benefits because of their religious beliefs....

In 14 counts, the complaint alleges violation of the free exercise, free speech and equal protection provisions of the U.S. and New York constitutions as well as violation of New York's Human Rights Law. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship also filed an emergency motion for a preliminary injunction and a Memorandum of Law supporting that motion.

Becket Fund has issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Court Says No "Substantial Burden" On Religion When Impacted Belief Is Not Central to Plaintiff's Religion

 In John v. Aviles-Ramos, (ED NY, Aug. 27, 2026), a New York federal district court rejected claims by a former special education teacher that his former colleagues and supervisors discriminated against him because he was a Jehovah's Witness and placed a substantial burden on his practice of his religion. Rejecting plaintiff's free exercise claim, the court said in part:

This claim is based on three alleged instances of misconduct.  First, that he was forced to sing “happy birthday” during school birthday celebrations; second, that he was required to bring his students to a school Christmas party; and third, that he was asked to take down a “God is love” sign....  Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that Defendants imposed any policy targeting his religion, and none of the alleged incidents of misconduct rises to the level of a violation of his right to free exercise of his religion....

As an initial matter, Plaintiff has not shown that the alleged incidents of misconduct resulted from non-neutral policies.... The Complaint does not allege any facts suggesting that the school’s policies surrounding the birthday parties, the Christmas celebration, or the affixing of religious signs were created specifically to target Jehovah’s Witnesses. 

In any event, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the incidents he describes substantially burdened his freedom to exercise his religious beliefs.  The determinative question in assessing whether an action imposes a substantial burden “is whether participation in the [event] . . . is considered central or important to [the plaintiff’s] practice of [his religion].” Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 593–94 (2d Cir. 2003). “A burden on religious exercise is not substantial when it ‘comfortably could be said that a belief or practice is so peripheral to the plaintiff’s religion that any burden can be aptly characterized as constitutionally de minimis.’”  ...

... Though Plaintiff does not celebrate birthdays due to his religious beliefs, ... there is no basis for his claims that being instructed to sing “happy birthday” at a student’s birthday celebration ... would meaningfully burden his ability to practice as a Jehovah’s Witness.

Plaintiff next alleges that Granger informed him “that he would have to bring the kids to the room” for a Christmas party, and that he “was told there were no exceptions.” ... [A] requirement to merely escort students to a school Christmas party — but without requiring him to actually participate in the celebrations at that party — is not a substantial burden protected by the Free Exercise Clause....

Finally, Plaintiff claims that he was told to take down a sign he had “put up” reading “God is love.” ...  However, it is well established that “the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired.” ...

The court also held that plaintiff failed to allege adequate facts to support his disparate treatment and failure to accommodate claims.

Suit Challenges New Jersey School Policy on Social Transitioning

Suit was filed last week in a New Jersey federal district court challenging a school board's policy on dealing with students who seek social gender transition. The school policy provides in part:

Once a student notifies a school official that s/he would like to be referred to by a different pronoun or name, or requests to use the facilities associated with a different gender, his/her school counselor will meet with the student to confidentially discuss the request. During such meeting, the school counselor will also assess the student’s parent/guardian’s knowledge, if any, of the student’s request. If the student’s parent/guardian is not aware of the request, the school counselor will assess whether, and to what extent, parents/guardians can be involved….

The complaint (full text) in Moms for Liberty v. School District of Chathams Board of Education, (D NJ, filed 8/24/2026) contends that this policy violates recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions. The complaint contends in part:

Parents A and B are practicing Christians who sincerely believe that God created only two genders, male and female....  As Christians, they believe it would be morally wrong to deny one’s God-given status as male or female and purport to be the opposite gender. They also believe that no public school has any right to interfere with the moral and religious formation of their children contrary to their religious beliefs against what they view as the immoral ideology of “transgenderism.”...

These provisions ... further violate the parental rights of Parents A and B by allowing the District to change a student’s name and “gender identity” without parental consent and then allowing the “transitioning” student to live an entire double life at school hidden from his or her parents, solely at the student’s request as affirmed by a school counselor who has no right to interfere in the student’s moral and religious development or to handle the obvious psychological issues involved in a student’s professed gender dysphoria....

Parents A and B have counseled Students C and D to adhere to their Christian beliefs by refusing to pretend that a fellow student has changed his or her gender and must now be referred to by a different name and/or different pronouns that do not correspond to the reality of that student’s God-given gender of male or female.  

Students C and D wish to speak what they believe is the truth of this matter in all its aspects without fear of punishment, both in school and away from school grounds...; For example, they would refuse to say that Tommy is now Sally or that he is now to be referred to as “they” as this would involve uttering what they believe to be lies that contradict their own religious and moral beliefs....

Thomas More Society issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Parents and Students Sue School District Over Field Trip to Mosque

Earlier this month, a number of parents, students and community members filed suit against the Palo Alto school district contending that a 2005 school field trip to a mosque violated the 1st and 14th Amendments as well as various provisions of California law. The complaint (full text) in Community Members for Neutrality in Public Schools v. Kline, (ND CA, filed 8/7/2026), alleges that the field trip violated the Establishment Clause and free-speech rights, saying in part:

2. During the Fall 2025 school-sponsored visit to a mosque, students allegedly were encouraged to wear Islamic religious attire, were given Qurans, observed prayer, engaged with participants in a Quran-memorization program, and were exposed to messaging that portrayed Islam as uniquely aligned with social justice work.  

3. Further, students were photographed in religious attire inside the mosque and that identifiable images of students were later publicly disseminated by the host institution without specific, informed parental consent for photography and public use in a religious context.  

4. Plaintiffs also allege that students were exposed during the same field trip to speaker Zahra Billoo, who is a controversial outside speaker with publicly documented hostile statements concerning Jews, without adequate district vetting, safeguards, or balancing presentation....

56. Defendants, acting under color of state law, organized, sponsored, facilitated, endorsed, and/or permitted school-sponsored activities that had the purpose and effect of endorsing and preferring one religion, specifically Islam, through a public-school program....

61. By allegedly encouraging or requiring students to don religious attire, participate in a religious setting, and appear in photographs that publicly associated them with a particular faith, Defendants compelled expressive conduct and religious association that students and their parents may not have wished to adopt or convey....

The complaint also alleges that the field trip violated federal protection of parental rights as well as the Equal Protection Clause and state law privacy protections, prohibitions on religious discrimination and involved negligent supervision.

On August 19, the Muslim Community Association issued n statement in response to the lawsuit, saying in part:

MCA has a long-standing tradition of welcoming students, teachers, neighbors, and people of all faiths to learn about Islam and the rich diversity of our community. We believe that mutual understanding, rather than fear, builds a stronger and more connected society.

Religion News Service reports on the lawsuit.

6th Circuit Questions Whether "Secular Purpose" Is Still Part of Establishment Clause Compliance

 In Gordon v. City of Hamtramck, (6th Cir., Aug. 21, 2026), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Free Speech, Establishment Clause and Equal Protection challenges to a city Ordinance that changed the rules on what flags could be flown from a group of 18 city-owned flag poles. The flag poles historically were maintained by the city's Human Relations Committee (HRC). Originally, the city would fly any flag a resident requested. After the HRC honored a resident's request to fly the Pride flag, City Council passed a Resolution limiting flags that could be flown to the American, Michigan, Hamtramck, and Prisoner of War flags, and the flags of nations representing Hamtramck’s international character. When two members of the HRC, in defiance of this Resolution, again flew the Pride flag, they were removed from the HRC and the HRC's authority over city flag poles was removed. The two HRC members sued. The court said in part:

Before Resolution 2023-82, we assume without deciding that the flagpoles conveyed private speech and that they were a designated public forum.  But because we conclude that Resolution 2023-82 closed the flagpoles as a forum for private speech, we hold that the plaintiffs’ free-speech claim fails....

Gordon and Stackpoole ... altogether ignore Kennedy and do not attempt to grapple with its effects on Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  Instead, they cite Lemon and its progeny for the proposition that legislation must have a secular purpose...

... [A]lthough Kennedy recognized the abrogation of “Lemon and its progeny,” ...  it is unclear if it disturbed the Court’s pre-Lemon Establishment Clause case law that requires government action to possess a secular purpose....

Councilmember Choudhury’s statement, during an hours-long hearing, that “we have to respect the religious,” ...  fails to demonstrate that Resolution 2023-82’s primary purpose was to advance religion....

The court also concluded that plaintiffs had forfeited their Equal Protection claim by not developing the claim on appeal.

Judge Thapar filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

The Resolution doesn’t resemble any founding-era hallmarks of established religion.  The City hasn’t exerted any control over religious belief or exercise by limiting the content of its flag display.  Even assuming religion motivated certain City Councilmembers to pass the ordinance, the City hasn’t compelled its residents to proclaim any religious creed or adopt those Council members’ beliefs.  Rather, Hamtramck’s residents remain free to express their contrary views....

... The Supreme Court couldn’t have been any clearer—Lemon is dead.  But the majority cracks the door open for the ghost of Lemon to keep haunting the Sixth Circuit.  That crack risks subjecting future Establishment Clause plaintiffs to an amorphous test “flawed in its fundamentals, unworkable in practice, and inconsistent with our history and our precedents.”... [W]e should recognize what our sister circuits have already understood:  Any inquiry into whether the government acted with a secular purpose has no place in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.

Satanic Temple Sues Over Denial of Use of Iowa Capitol Rotunda for Holiday Events

In Iowa, private organizations and individuals may request use of space on the Capitol Grounds, including the Capitol Rotunda, for events that are open to the public. Earlier this month, The Satanic Temple filed suit in an Iowa federal district court alleging that applications for holiday events they have filed have been denied in violation of the organization's 1st Amendment rights and its rights under Iowa law. The complaint (full text) in The Satanic Temple, Inc. v. Campbell, (SD IA, filed 8/13/2026), alleges in part:

11. The First and Fourteenth Amendments protect TST-Iowa’s right to expression. Defendants’ ongoing exclusion of TST-Iowa from engaging in protected religious speech, grounded in their beliefs of Satanism and the governing tenets of TST, at the Rotunda is based on their religious viewpoint. This exclusion constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination and is presumptively unconstitutional. The exclusion is also a content-based restriction and is not narrowly tailored to, or the least restrictive means of, achieving a compelling interest.... 

12. The First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Iowa Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“Iowa RFRA”) protect TST-Iowa’s right to freely exercise their religion. By denying TST-Iowa’s applications to hold an event at the Rotunda because of their religious beliefs, Defendants have violated their clearly established constitutional and statutory right to the free exercise of religion, and this exclusion cannot survive strict scrutiny.  

13. Additionally, by allowing other religious events, but prohibiting TST-Iowa’s events, Defendants have engaged in unlawful disparate treatment against TST-Iowa based on their religion, protected speech, and membership in a suspect class. This exclusion cannot survive strict scrutiny and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  

14. Finally, Defendants have also violated TST-Iowa’s statutory rights under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”). For the past two years and on an ongoing basis, Defendants have discriminated against TST-Iowa by denying them services and public accommodations, both (1) on the basis of their religion and/or their perception of their religion and (2) in retaliation for their prior reports of discrimination.....

ACLU issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Police Enforcement of Rules Set by Farmers' Market Does Not Support a Section 1983 Action

In Conwell v. City of Benson, Minnesota, (D MN, Aug. 14, 2026), a Minnesota federal district court denied a motion for a temporary restraining order filed by an anti-abortion preacher who was cited for trespass by police after he insisted on evangelizing at a privately-run farmer's market held on city property without registering as a vendor and paying a vendor's fee. The court held that there was insufficient state involvement to support a claim under 42 USC §1983, saying in part:

... Conwell was initially approached by a volunteer working for the Market.  Then, he was approached and cited by city police working in their official capacity.   

The Court finds that Conwell is unable to show a likelihood of success on these facts.  Neither the City nor the police were involved in the creation of the Market’s vendor rules.  The police did not plan to enforce these rules by providing routine security....  The police merely responded to a call from a private citizen who volunteered at the Market.  Had Conwell ... followed the volunteer’s instruction, there would be no police involvement.  Conwell cannot manufacture a § 1983 claim by refusing to follow the Market’s rules, necessitating the involvement of police.  

Without a strong showing on the merits, the extraordinary measure of a preliminary injunction is inappropriate....

Teacher's Free-Speech Rights Not Infringed by Requirement to Use Students' Preferred Names and Pronouns

In Ellis v. The Brooke Charter Schools, (D MA, Aug. 13, 2026), a Massachusetts federal district court rejected claims by a public charter high school teacher that her free-speech rights were infringed when she was dismissed for refusing on religious grounds to comply with the school's requirement that teachers use students' preferred names and pronouns. While the firing was triggered by the teacher's refusal to use a former student's preferred pronouns in a requested letter of recommendation, the teacher's lawsuit alleged that the firing was because of her refusal to comply more broadly with the school's policy. The court said in part:

... [T]he Court finds that ... the requirement that Plaintiff comply with the BCS policy to use students’ preferred names and pronouns, was part of Plaintiff’s official duties as a BCS employee.... [A]ddressing students, particularly in the classroom, is essential to teaching.  A teacher’s official job-related duties, for which she is compensated, require her to communicate with students at her place of employment, including by addressing them in accord with school policy. ...

... [T]o teach effectively, which is inherent in the job duties, requires a teacher to interact with students in a way that does not create a barrier to learning or an unnecessary distraction....

With regards to the letter of recommendation, which again is not the basis of Plaintiff’s free speech claim, although writing letters of recommendation may not be part of a teacher’s principal responsibilities—that is, instructing students on academic curriculum—it is still within the realm of a teacher’s traditional and typical duties.  Recommendation letters are typically written about and derived from knowledge of a student’s classroom performance, communicated via official school channels such as email or letterhead....

The Court, however, need not reach a conclusion as to whether the speech that Plaintiff would have made in connection with the recommendation letter referenced in her complaint would have been a part of her official duties because Plaintiff does not specifically allege or otherwise argue that her refusal to write the letter was the reason for her termination or the basis for her free speech claim....

Further, even if Plaintiff’s speech fell outside of her official duties, her speech did not involve a matter of public concern.... Put simply, “the act of referring to a particular student by a particular name does not contribute to the broader public debate on transgender issues.”...

The school did not ask the court to dismiss plaintiff's free exercise claims.

Fellowship of Christian Athletes Sues to Challenge School's Ban on Outside Adults at Student Religious Club Meetings

Suit was filed this week in a New Jersey federal district court by the Fellowship of Christian Athletes (FCA) challenging a New Jersey school district's ban on outside adults attending on-campus meetings of student religious groups. The ban was put in place after a complaint from the Freedom from Religion Foundation.  Fellowship of Christian Athletes organizes student chapters called "huddles" in which students pray, engage in Bible study, support one another in their faith and athletics, and eat pizza. FCA staff and adult volunteers also attend the huddles. The complaint (full text) in Fellowship of Christian Athletes v. Board of Education of the Hopewell Valley Regional School District, (D NJ, filed 8/11/2026), alleges in part:

... [T]he District’s new religious-clubs-only volunteer ban does indeed discriminate against religious clubs and single them out for disfavored treatment. While FFRF had claimed that FCA’s adult supporters were being given “unique access” to students, this is simply false. The District expressly permits adult visitors on its campuses for a variety of different reasons. And other non-religious student groups are allowed to—and regularly do—take advantage of this permission as a matter of course....

... FCA’s student leaders want to meet with fellow students and adult volunteers on campus so they can model to fellow students and coaches what it looks like to follow Christ in their school communities—something they cannot do if they’re forced to meet elsewhere.  

Having adult staff and volunteers present on campus is also critical to FCA’s religious mission because it allows FCA to see how student leaders are doing and give the students invited feedback and guidance....

Plaintiffs allege that the school's action violates their free exercise, free speech and equal protection rights as well as the federal Equal Access Act and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. 

Becket Fund issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Suit Challenges Illinois End of Life Options Act

Suit was filed yesterday in an Illinois federal district court by four Catholic doctors, a Catholic bishop and a Lutheran skilled nursing facility objecting to the requirement that they comply with Illinois' recently enacted End of Life Options Act. The complaint (full text) in Kirchoff v. Treto, (ND IL, filed 8/11/2026), alleges in part:

... Illinois’s “End-of-Life Options” Act ...—which takes effect on September 12th—both legalizes assisted suicide and mandates that doctors who conscientiously object to it nonetheless promote its alleged “benefits” to “terminally ill” patients and, if requested, refer or transfer those patients to someone who is “able and willing” to help them commit suicide..... 

Illinois’s conscription of objecting practitioners into its new assisted suicide regime blatantly violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Indeed, EOLO plainly compels or restricts speech based on content and viewpoint by requiring such practitioners to (a) discuss assisted suicide’s alleged “benefits” and make specific “referrals” for the same....

EOLO also violates the First Amendment right of expressive association by forcing health care entities to hire and otherwise associate with health care professionals who promote or even directly participate in assisted suicide. 

EOLO additionally violates the First Amendment’s protection for the free exercise of religion and church autonomy. Put simply, requiring only a narrow class of “health care professionals” to discuss the “benefits” of and “refer” for assisted suicide with respect only to “terminally ill” patients, contrary to those professionals’ deeply held religious beliefs, is neither neutral nor generally applicable. And requiring health care entities to hire and retain employees who promote and even participate in assisted suicide violates the internal governance of religious institutions in deciding whom they authorize to carry out their religious mission to save and promote the dignity of every patient’s life....

Thomas More Society issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

UPDATE: On Oct. 5, the court issued a temporary restraining order (full text) that had been agreed to by all parties. It replaced an earlier (Aug. 2026) stipulated restraining order.

Suit Challenges Town's Refusal to Permit Nativity Display on Town Square

Suit was filed last week in a New York federal district court challenging an upstate New York town's refusal to permit placing of a privately-sponsored nativity display in the town square during the Christmas season. The complaint (full text) in Polverino v. Town of Brighton, New York, (WD NY, filed 7/21/2026), alleges that the town every year permits a Menorah display sponsored by Chabad Lubavitch, while Brighton town officials have ignored, evaded and effectively denied plaintiff's Nativity display requests for more than two years. Plaintiff alleges that this violates his free speech and free exercise rights, as well as the 1st Amendment's Establishment Clause and the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection clause. ACLJ issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.