2nd Circuit: Trial Court Must Make Further Findings in Wedding Photographer's Challenge to NY Public Accommodation Law

In Emilee Carpenter, LLC, dba Emilee Carpenter Photography v. James, (2d Cir., July 12, 2024), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a New York federal district court's dismissal of a free speech challenge by a wedding photographer to New York's public accommodation law that bars discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  The photographer refuses because of her religious and personal beliefs to photograph same-sex weddings.  The court held that the case must be remanded for further fact finding in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's intervening decision in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis. The court said in part:

... [W]hether Carpenter’s actual wedding photography services constitute expressive conduct is an open threshold question for the district court to consider on remand...

To state a compelled speech claim, it is not enough for a plaintiff to show that the service at issue involves a medium of expression.  The plaintiff must also demonstrate that the expressive activity is her own – that is, she created the expressive content herself or, by compiling or curating third-party content in some forum, she is also engaged in her own expressive activity....

Here, to the extent Carpenter is using her photographs or website to host the expressive content of third parties (such as the wedding couple who hired her), rather than her own, the district court must determine ... whether the law compels Carpenter’s own speech....

Specifically, the court should assess whether Carpenter’s blogging is more akin to, for instance, advertisement than to a service Carpenter offers to the general public, which her customers purchase from her—in other words, whether Carpenter’s blogging is a good or service regulated by New York’s public accommodations laws....

The court rejected the photographer's expressive association, free exercise, Establishment Clause and vagueness claims, saying in part:

Nowhere in her complaint does Carpenter allege that she offers as a service to the public her active religious participation in the weddings that she photographs.  New York’s laws therefore do not require Carpenter to sing, pray, follow an officiant’s instructions, act as a “witness” of the union “before God,” or otherwise participate in any same-sex wedding....

Courthouse News Service and ADF report on the decision. 

Pharmacist Violated Sex Discrimination Ban in Refusing to Fill Prescription for Emergency Contraceptive

 In Anderson v. Aitkin Pharmacy Services, LLC, (MN App., March 18, 2024), a Minnesota state appellate court held that a pharmacist violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act that prohibits intentionally refusing to do business with a person because of the person's sex. The pharmacist refused to dispense plaintiff's prescription for the emergency contraceptive ella because of his conscientious objection to dispensing any medication that prevents the implantation of a fertilized egg. The statute defines sex discrimination as including discrimination because of pregnancy. The court said in part:

Badeaux refused to dispense Anderson’s valid prescription because Badeaux believed she may have been pregnant.  Thus, pregnancy was a substantial causative factor in Badeaux’s refusal to dispense ella....

Badeaux did not assert a constitutional defense in district court and does not argue that the MHRA actually violates his constitutional rights.  Instead, he argues on appeal that the sex-discrimination language in the MHRA should be interpreted to avoid a constitutional conflict.... But we do not apply the constitutional-avoidance canon to a party’s proposed interpretation of a statute if the interpretation is contrary to the plain language of the statute.

The court however refused to reverse the jury's finding that the Pharmacy, as opposed to the individual pharmacist, did not violate the sex discrimination ban. The court said in part:

The evidence shows that Aitkin Pharmacy wanted to fill all valid prescriptions and had a pharmacist on staff who was willing to dispense emergency contraception.  The evidence also shows that, when Badeaux called Anderson on January 21, he communicated both that he was unwilling to dispense ella and that there was another pharmacist scheduled to work who was willing to dispense her prescription.... [T]here is a reasonable theory of the evidence to support the verdict that Aitkin Pharmacy did not intentionally refuse to do business with Anderson...

The court also concluded that, because of erroneous jury instructions, plaintiff should have been granted a new trial on her claim that the pharmacy violated the state's public accommodation law that bans denial of the full and equal enjoyment of goods and services in places of public accommodation because of sex. Courthouse News Service reports on the decision. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Minnesota Court Hears Oral Arguments on Pharmacist's Refusal To Dispense Morning-After Pill

The Minnesota Court of Appeals yesterday heard oral arguments (audio of full oral arguments) in Anderson v. Aitkin Pharmacy Services, LLC, (Dec. 21, 2023). At issue is whether a pharmacist violated the sex discrimination provisions of the Minnesota Human Rights Act when, because of his religious belief, he refused to dispense the morning-after emergency contraception drug ella and instead referred her to another pharmacist who could fill her prescription the next day. ADF issued a press release regarding the case.

Michigan Agency Charges Hair Salon with Gender Identity Discrimination

The Michigan Department of Civil Rights this week filed a charge of sex (gender identity) discrimination on behalf of three claimants with the Michigan Civil Rights Commission. The complaint (full text) in Michigan Department of Civil Rights v. Studio 8 Hair Lab, LLC, (MI Civil Rts. Commn, filed 11/15/2023), says that a Traverse City hair salon posted the following on its business Facebook page:

If a human identifies as anything other than a man/woman please seek services at a local pet groomer. You are not welcome at this salon. Period. Should you request to have a particular pronoun used Please note we may simply refer to you as hey you,,,, This small business has a right to refuse services. We are not bound to any oaths as relators are regarding discrimination.

Follow-up postings included the statement: "There are 2 genders; anything more is a mental health issue." The complaint contends that this posting violates the public accommodation provisions of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. The Department of Civil Rights issued a press release announcing the filing of the discrimination charge.

Consent Decree Affirms Public Accommodation Law Exemption for Catholic Bookstore

 A Florida federal district court entered a Consent Order (full text) yesterday in The Catholic Store, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, (MD FL, Sept. 7, 2023).  The Order concludes that plaintiff, a privately-owned, for-profit Catholic bookstore qualifies for the religious-organization exemption in Jacksonville, Florida's public accommodation law. This exempts the bookstore from the non-discrimination provisions relating to sexual orientation and gender identity. In its original complaint, the store contended that the public accommodation law would have required that employees address customers using their preferred pronouns and titles, regardless of their biological sex. The store also said it wants to post its Catholic beliefs about sexuality on its website and on social media. (See prior posting.) ADF issued a press release announcing the settlement in the case.

New Jersey Issues Guidance On Public Accommodation Law Coverage After 303 Creative Decision

Earlier this week (July 31), the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights issued a Guidance on the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis (full text) (press release). The Release says in part:

The Supreme Court’s ruling exempts from anti-discrimination laws like the LAD only a narrow set of services offered by some places of public accommodation. In order to assert an exemption, at a minimum, a public accommodation must establish that (1) its creative services are “original” and “customized and tailored” for each customer; (2) the creation is “expressive” and expresses the creator’s own First Amendment-protected speech; and (3) the public accommodation’s refusal to provide the creative service to a customer is based on the message it conveys, not the customer’s identity or protected characteristic standing alone. As a practical matter, many of the products or services that meet that narrow definition—for example, a documentary film created by a movie director—are created by artists or businesses that fall outside the LAD’s definition of a public accommodation already. Moreover, because the overwhelming majority of places of public accommodation do not provide “customized,” “original,” and “expressive” products or services to the public that express the creator’s own speech, the Court’s decision does not exempt most places of public accommodation—or most goods and services—from the LAD. That is why, as the Court itself acknowledged, state civil rights law still applies to “a vast array of businesses” selling “innumerable goods and services.”

[Thanks to Jeff Pasek for the lead.] 

Supreme Court GVR's Case on Bakers' Refusal To Design Cake For Same-Sex Wedding

On Friday, in Klein v. Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries, (Docket No. 22-204, GVR'd June 30, 2023) (Order List) the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the lower court's judgment and remanded the case to the Oregon Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of the Supreme Court's decision the same day in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis. At issue in Klein was a finding by the state Bureau of Labor and Industries that the owners of Sweetcakes bakery violated Oregon's public accommodation law when they refused on religious grounds to design and create a wedding cake for a same-sex wedding. (See prior posting.)

Supreme Court: Web Designer's Free Speech Rights Allow Her to Refuse to Design Websites for Same-Sex Weddings

The U.S. Supreme Court today in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, (Sup. Ct., June 30, 2023), in a 6-3 decision, held that the 1st Amendment's free speech protections bars Colorado from using its public accommodation anti-discrimination law to require a wedding website designer to design websites for same-sex weddings in violation of her religious beliefs. Justice Gorsuch's majority opinion says in part:

The Tenth Circuit held that the wedding websites Ms. Smith seeks to create qualify as “pure speech” under this Court’s precedents.... We agree....

Under Colorado’s logic, the government may compel anyone who speaks for pay on a given topic to accept all commissions on that same topic—no matter the underlying message—if the topic somehow implicates a customer’s statutorily protected trait.... Taken seriously, that principle would allow the government to force all manner of artists, speechwriters, and others whose services involve speech to speak what they do not believe on pain of penalty. The government could require “an unwilling Muslim movie director to make a film with a Zionist message,” or “an atheist muralist to accept a commission celebrating Evangelical zeal,” so long as they would make films or murals for other members of the public with different messages.....

Of course, as the State emphasizes, Ms. Smith offers her speech for pay and does so through 303 Creative LLC, a company in which she is “the sole member-owner.”... But none of that makes a difference. Does anyone think a speechwriter loses his First Amendment right to choose for whom he works if he accepts money in return? Or that a visual artist who accepts commissions from the public does the same? Many of the world’s great works of literature and art were created with an expectation of compensation. Nor, this Court has held, do speakers shed their First Amendment protections by employing the corporate form to disseminate their speech. This fact underlies our cases involving everything from movie producers to book publishers to newspapers....

In this case, Colorado seeks to force an individual to speak in ways that align with its views but defy her conscience about a matter of major significance. In the past, other States in Barnette, Hurley, and Dale have similarly tested the First Amendment’s boundaries by seeking to compel speech they thought vital at the time. But, as this Court has long held, the opportunity to think for ourselves and to express those thoughts freely is among our most cherished liberties and part of what keeps our Republic strong.

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

A public accommodations law has two core purposes. First, the law ensures “equal access to publicly available goods and services.”...

Second, a public accommodations law ensures equal dignity in the common market. Indeed, that is the law’s “fundamental object”: “to vindicate ‘the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments.’”...

Time and again, businesses and other commercial entities have claimed constitutional rights to discriminate. And time and again, this Court has courageously stood up to those claims—until today. Today, the Court shrinks....

This Court has long held that “the First Amendment does not prevent restrictions directed at commerce or conduct from imposing incidental burdens on speech.”...

CADA’s Accommodation Clause and its application here are valid regulations of conduct. It is well settled that a public accommodations law like the Accommodation Clause does not “target speech or discriminate on the basis of its content.”... Rather, “the focal point of its prohibition” is “on the act of discriminating against individuals in the provision of publicly available goods, privileges, and services.”...

Petitioners remain free to advocate the idea that same-sex marriage betrays God’s laws.... Even if Smith believes God is calling her to do so through her for-profit company, the company need not hold out its goods or services to the public at large. Many filmmakers, visual artists, and writers never do....

The decision threatens to balkanize the market and to allow the exclusion of other groups from many services. A website designer could equally refuse to create a wedding website for an interracial couple, for example. How quickly we forget that opposition to interracial marriage was often because “‘Almighty God . . . did not intend for the races to mix.’”... Yet the reason for discrimination need not even be religious, as this case arises under the Free Speech Clause. A stationer could refuse to sell a birth announcement for a disabled couple because she opposes their having a child.... And so on.....

AP reports on the decision.

Baker Cannot Refuse to Provide Non-expressive Cake to Transgender Customer

In Scardina v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., (CO Ct. App., Jan. 26, 2023), a Colorado state appellate court held that Masterpiece Cakeshop and its co-owner Jack Phillips violated the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act when they refused a transgender woman's order for a pink cake with blue frosting.  The woman sought the cake to celebrate her birthday and her gender transition. The court said in part:

[A] proprietor may not refuse to sell a nonexpressive product to a protected person based on that person’s intent to use the product as part of a celebration that the producer considers offensive....

We conclude that creating a pink cake with blue frosting is not inherently expressive and any message or symbolism it provides to an observer would not be attributed to the baker. Thus, CADA does not compel Masterpiece and Phillips to speak through the creation and sale of such a cake to Scardina....

Masterpiece and Phillips argue, requiring them to make a cake that they know will be used to celebrate an occasion that their faith informs them is an affront to God’s design violates their right to freely exercise their religion.

In the context of providing public accommodations, however, a proprietor’s actions based on their religious beliefs must be considered in light of a customer’s right to be free from discrimination based on their protected status. The Supreme Court has long held that the Free Exercise Clause does not relieve a person from the obligation to comply with a neutral law of general applicability.... CADA is a neutral law of general applicability.... 

The Supreme Court has consistently held that the state has a legitimate, indeed compelling, interest in eliminating discrimination from public accommodations.,,, Thus, CADA is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. Accordingly, CADA may be enforced against Masterpiece and Phillips without violating their right to the free exercise of religion.

In a press release, ADF said that it would appeal the decision.

Another Catholic Parish Sues Michigan Over Expanded Interpretation of State's Anti-Discrimination Laws

 As previously reported, in August the Michigan Supreme Court interpreted the state's civil rights law which bans sex discrimination to cover discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. Yesterday, a Catholic parish, including its school, as well as several parents of students in the school filed suit in a Michigan federal district court alleging that, interpreted in this manner, the employment, education and public accommodation provisions of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act violate plaintiffs' First and 14th Amendment rights.  The complaint (full text) in Sacred Heart of Jesus Parish v. Nessel, (WD MI, filed 12/22/22), alleges in part:

To comply with Michigan’s re-understood laws, Sacred Heart Parish and its school, Sacred Heart Academy, would be forced to hire faculty and staff who lead lives in direct opposition to the Catholic faith, speak messages that violate Church doctrine, and refrain from articulating Catholic beliefs in teaching its students and when advertising the school to prospective students or job applicants. All of this violates Sacred Heart’s free speech and free exercise rights. Rather than defy Catholic doctrine in these ways, Sacred Heart would shut down. 

But if Sacred Heart cannot operate consistent with its Catholic faith, the parental and free exercise rights of its families are also implicated. Parents have explicitly opted out of public schools in favor of sending their children to Sacred Heart for an authentic Catholic education where their children would never be exposed to harmful ideas and ideologies that contradict the Catholic faith. When Michigan prevents Sacred Heart from operating its school consistent with its Catholic beliefs, it also necessarily violates the fundamental parental and free exercise rights of Sacred Heart families.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.  Earlier this month, a different Catholic parish filed a similar lawsuit.

NY Appellate Court Says Yeshiva University Must Recognize LGBTQ Student Group

In YU Pride Alliance v. Yeshiva University, (NY App. Div., Dec. 15, 2022), a New York state appellate court affirmed a trial court's decision that New York City's public accommodation law requires Yeshiva University to officially recognize as a student organization an LGBTQ group, YU Pride Alliance. The appellate court said in part:

[The trial court] correctly held that Yeshiva does not meet the definition of "religious corporation incorporated under the education law or the religious corporation law," which would exempt it from the prohibitions against discrimination in public accommodations as an organization "deemed to be . . . distinctly private" (Administrative Code of City of NY §§ 8-102, 8-107[4][a][1][a])....

Turning to defendants' First Amendment arguments, we find that providing the Pride Alliance with full and equal access to public accommodations does not intrude on Yeshiva's asserted right "to decide matters 'of faith and doctrine'" ... The record demonstrates that Yeshiva already recognizes LGBTQ+ student organizations at three of its graduate schools... and made clear as early as 1995 that this recognition did not mean Yeshiva endorsed or accepted the views of those student groups.... [W]e find that denial of recognition for the Pride Alliance is not "essential" to Yeshiva's "central mission"...

Similarly, we find no violation of Yeshiva's free exercise of religion. The City HRL's public accommodations provision is both neutral and generally applicable.... 

Finally, we reject the contention that recognizing the Pride Alliance as a student club violates Yeshiva's freedom of expression and association, as a "school does not endorse or support student speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis".... Moreover, there is no violation of Yeshiva's associational rights where plaintiff Pride Alliance members are already enrolled students, Yeshiva already engaged in many discussions with the Pride Alliance about sexual orientation and gender identity issues, Yeshiva continued to express the desire to foster diversity and inclusion in association with Pride Alliance members when denying official recognition, and Yeshiva even explained several actions it was undertaking to bring about "greater awareness and acceptance" and "create a space where students, faculty and Roshei Yeshiva to continue this conversation" about sexual orientation and gender identity....

The Forward reports on the decision.

Catholic Parish Sues Michigan Over Expansion of Its Civil Rights Act

Suit was filed this week in a Michigan federal district court by a Catholic parish which operates an elementary school claiming that the Michigan Supreme Court's interpretation of the state's anti-discrimination law violates the parish's First Amendment rights.  The complaint (full text) in St. Joseph Parish St. Johns v. Nessel, (WD MI, filed 12/5/2022), alleges in part:

5. In a series of actions culminating in a Michigan Supreme Court decision from July 2022, the Michigan Attorney General, the Michigan Department of Civil Rights, and the Michigan Civil Rights Commission ... reinterpreted the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (“ELCRA”) such that provisions which previously prohibited conduct based only on biological sex now also apply to distinctions made based on sexual orientation and gender identity....

10. As a result, Michigan’s new understanding of “sex” discrimination deems it unlawful for St. Joseph’s to follow the 2,000-year-old teachings of the Catholic Church, including its teaching that marriage is a lifelong commitment between one man and one woman, that sexual relations are limited to marriage, and that human beings are created as either male or female....

11. Michigan’s reinterpretation poses an imminent threat to St. Joseph. St. Joseph needs to hire new employees and to publicize its job openings. St. Joseph’s advertisements would note, as they have in the past, that applicants must be “practicing Catholic[s] with the ability to infuse Catholic faith and teaching throughout the curriculum.”... 

12. St. Joseph is also reviewing applications for new families seeking to send their children to its school. And families at St. Joseph Catholic School enter a “Family – School Agreement.” This agreement requires, among other things, that parents and students agree “to live their lives in a way that supports, rather than opposes, the mission of our school and our faith beliefs.”

13. Also at stake is St. Joseph’s ability to rent its facilities—like its gymnasium and soccer fields—and whether it can carry out its parish activities open to all, like attending Mass, without being held liable as a public accommodation....

15. St. Joseph’s religious decisions regarding how to advance its mission and ministry are protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Michigan cannot force the Catholic Church to compromise its religious character simply as a function of its doors being open to all.

Becket has a case page with more details on the case.

Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Wedding Website Designer Who Opposes Same-Sex Marriage

Today the U.S. Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in 303 Creative v. Elenis. In the case, the U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the application of Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Act to a wedding website design company whose owner for religious reasons refuses to create websites that celebrate same-sex marriages. The Court granted certiorari only on the question of "Whether applying a public-accommodation law to compel an artist to speak or stay silent violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment." Over 75 amicus briefs have been filed in the case.  The SCOTUSblog case page has links to them and to other filings in the case. The arguments will be broadcast live beginning at 10:00 AM at this link. SCOTUSblog has a preview of the arguments. I will update this post with links to the recording and transcript of the arguments when they become available later today.

UPDATE: Here are links to the transcript and audio of this morning's oral arguments.

9th Circuit: Requiring Beauty Pageant to Include Transgender Female Violates Its Free Speech Rights

In Green v. Miss United States of America, LLC, (9th Cir., Nov. 2, 2022), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that it violates the free speech rights of the Miss USA Pageant to require it under Oregon's Public Accommodations Act to include a transgender female in the Pageant. The court's majority, in an opinion by Judge VanDyke joined by Judge Bea, said in part:

Requiring Miss United States of America to allow Green to compete in its pageants would be to explicitly require Miss United States of America to remove its “natural born female” rule from its entry requirements. This in turn would directly affect the message that is conveyed by every single contestant in a Miss United States of America pageant. With the Pageant’s “natural born female” rule, every viewer of a Miss United States of America pageant receives the Pageant’s message that the “ideal woman” is a biological female, because every contestant is a “natural born female.” If the Pageant were no longer able to enforce its “natural born female” rule, even if a given transgender contestant or contestants never openly communicated to anyone outside of the Pageant their transgender status and were otherwise fully indistinguishable from the “natural born female” contestants (at least as presented in the Pageant)—and more fundamentally, even if no transgender contestants were to enter a Miss United States of America pageant—the Pageant’s expression would nonetheless be fundamentally altered. Without the “natural born female” rule, viewers would be viewing a fundamentally different pageant from that which presently obtains: one which could contain contestants who are not “natural born female[s].” Thus, the Pageant’s desired expression of who can be an “ideal woman” would be suppressed and thereby transformed through the coercive power of the law if the OPAA were to be applied to it....

Application of the OPAA would force the Pageant to include Green and therefore alter its speech. Such compulsion is a content-based regulation under our caselaw, and as such warrants strict scrutiny.

Judge VanDyke also filed a concurring opinion speaking only for himself, saying that forced inclusion of a transgender female in the Pageant infringes the Pageant's freedom of association as well as its freedom of speech.

Judge Graber dissented, contending that the court should not reach the constitutional question until it is determined whether the Oregon Public Accommodations Act even applies to the Miss USA Pageant.  Reuters reports on the decision.

Certiorari Petition Filed Again In Bakery's Refusal To Design Wedding Cake For Same-Sex Marriage

Last week, a petition for certiorari (full text) was filed with the U.S. Supreme Court in Klein v. Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries, (Sup. Ct., filed 9/7/2022). This is the second time the case has worked its way up to the Supreme Court. (See prior posting.) At issue is a finding by the state Bureau of Labor and Industries that Sweetcakes bakery violated the state's public accommodation law when it refused on religious grounds to design and create a wedding cake for a same-sex wedding. In January, the state court of appeals remanded the case to the Bureau of Labor and Industries for it to determine a remedy after finding that the Bureau's first determination of damages was tainted by non-neutrality. (See prior posting.) In August, the Bureau imposed damages of $30,000. First Liberty has additional background.

District Court: Public Accommodation Law Violates Wedding Photographer's Free Speech Rights

In Chelsey Nelson Photography, LLC v. Louisville/ Jefferson County, (WD KY, Aug. 30, 2022), a Kentucky federal district court held that Louisville's public accommodation ordinance violates the free speech rights of a Christian wedding photographer who has moral and religious objections to same-sex marriages. The court said in part:

Courts across the country have addressed whether bakers, florists, website designers, and other creative professionals must either provide their services for weddings that violate their beliefs or else abstain entirely from the wedding business. And those courts’ disagreement on whether this amounts to prohibited discrimination or protected dissent is what the U.S. Supreme Court has set out to resolve during its upcoming term....

This is a real conflict between nondiscrimination and speech that cannot be wished away: compelling access for all necessarily clashes with the liberty of some. The City contends that Nelson’s speech demeans same-sex couples, while Nelson says the City’s Ordinance demeans her speech....

The First Amendment’s protections for religious exercise ... are unlikely to help those in Nelson’s position: at least as currently construed, that aspect of the Constitution does not shield people whose sincerely held religious beliefs conflict with generally applicable laws....

But the government’s authority over public accommodations does not extend to “abridging the freedom of speech.”...

So although Louisville may require restaurants and hotels and stores to provide services regardless of the proprietors’ views or their customers’ legal status, the government may not force singers or writers or photographers to articulate messages they don’t support.

The court also concluded that the ordinance violates the Kentucky Religious Freedom Restoration Act. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Michigan Supreme Court: State's Public Accommodation Law Bars Sexual Orientation Discrimination

In Rouch World, LLC v. Department of Civil Rights, (MI Sup. Ct., July 28, 2022), the Michigan Supreme Court, in a 5-2 decision, held that the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act's ban on sex discrimination on the basis of sex includes discrimination based on sexual orientation. The case was brought in the state Court of Claims by two businesses which, on religious grounds, refused to serve LGBT clients. One of the plaintiffs had refused to host a same-sex wedding at its event center. The other had refused to provide electrolysis hair-removal services to a transgender woman. The Court of Claims, bound by higher state court precedent, held that the ELCRA did not cover sexual orientation discrimination. However, lacking state court precedent on its application to transgender discrimination, the Court of Claims held that the ECLRA does ban discrimination on the basis of gender identity.  Only the holding regarding sexual orientation was appealed to the state Supreme Court.

Justice Clement's majority Supreme Court opinion said in part:

[W]e conclude that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation necessarily involves discrimination because of sex in violation of the ELCRA. In so doing, we find persuasive Bostock’s application of Title VII’s but-for standard. While we are encouraged but not bound to consider persuasive Title VII federal case law, ... we find that Bostock offers a straightforward analysis of the plain meaning of analogous statutory language and we agree with its reasoning....

Plaintiff Rouch World, along with the dissent, also criticizes this conclusion as inconsistent with the intent of the 1976 Legislature that enacted the ELCRA. It argues that the ELCRA’s legislative history demonstrates that the Legislature intentionally chose to exclude protections from discrimination based on sexual orientation, both at the time of its enactment by declining to include the specific language and repeatedly thereafter by rejecting proposed amendments that would have added the specific language. However, the legislative history of a statute is relevant to the statute’s meaning only where the statute is ambiguous.... When the statute’s language is clear, as it is here, we rely on that plain language as the best evidence of its meaning.

Judge Zahra, dissenting, said in part:

I take no issue with the merits of the policy adopted today by a majority of this Court. I also harbor no doubt that my colleagues in the majority are acting in good faith, with pure hearts and the best of intentions.

Yet ... this Court’s duty is to say what the law is, not what it thinks the law ought to be.

The majority opinion declares that “because of . . . sex” means something that nobody in 1976 thought it meant.... [T]he majority opinion also declares that phrase to encompass something that the enacting Legislature specifically and explicitly considered including but ultimately chose not to embrace.... If we are to be faithful to our constitutional mandate to say what the law is, we simply cannot pretend that the ELCRA says something that it does not say.

Justice Viviano filed a dissenting opinion which says in part:

The relevant statutory provision, MCL 37.2302(a), prohibits certain discriminatory actions taken “because of . . . sex,” among other things. Properly interpreted, this requires that the defendant maintain some prejudice, bias, animus, or belief about “sex” or the other characteristics protected by the statute....

[D]iscrimination on the basis of one’s sexual orientation is not discrimination because of some prejudice, bias, animus, or belief about the male sex or the female sex.

Bridge Michigan reports on the decision.

Yeshiva University Must Recognize LGBTQ Student Group

In YU Pride Alliance v. Yeshiva University, (NY Cty. Sup.Ct., June 14, 2022), a New York state trial court held that New York City's public accommodation law requires Yeshiva University to officially recognize as a student organization an LGBTQ group, YU Pride Alliance.  The University must immediately grant the organization the full and equal treatment accorded to other student organizations.  The court rejected the University's claim that it is exempt from coverage under the definitions in NY Admin Code §8-102 which excludes from coverage a "religious corporation incorporated under the education law."  While Yeshiva University is incorporated under the education law, according to the court:

Yeshiva's organizing documents do not expressly indicate that Yeshiva has a religious purpose. Rather, Yeshiva organized itself as an "educational corporation" and for educational purposes, exclusively.... [T]he inquiry must focus on the purpose of the institution, which is typically expressed in a corporation's organizing documents. There may be schools organized under the education law that have a stated religious purpose so that they are exempt.... Since Yeshiva has not done so, the court does not need to reach this issue.

The court went on to hold that applying the public accommodation provisions of the New York City Human Rights Law to Yeshiva does not violate its First Amendment free exercise or free speech rights, saying in part:

Assuming arguendo that Yeshiva's refusal to recognize an LGBTQ student group is part of its exercise of religion, the NYCHRL's impact on Yeshiva's exercise of religion is only incidental to the NYCHRL's ban on discrimination. There can be no dispute that the NYCHRL is a neutral law of general applicability. It does not target religious practice....

... Yeshiva's Free Speech rights will not be violated by application of the NYCHRL. Formal recognition of a student group does not equate with endorsement of that group's message....

Washington Examiner reports on the decision.

3rd Circuit: Foster Parents Have Religious Discrimination Claim For License Suspension Over Their Anti-LGBT Views

In Lasche v. State of New Jersey, (3rd Cir, March 1, 2022), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court's dismissal of a suit by former foster parents who alleged that their free exercise rights were infringed when their foster care license was suspended because of their religious opposition to same-sex marriage and their religious belief that homosexual conduct is sinful. The court remanded for further proceedings plaintiffs' claims under 42 USC §1983 and §1985(3).  It also remanded for further proceedings their claim that defendants' action violated New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination, finding that the state's Division of Child Protection and Permanency is a "place of public accommodation" under that law.

Oregon Court Rejects Part Of Its Earlier Decision In Wedding-Cake Dispute

In Klein v. Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries, (OR App., Jan. 26, 2022), the Oregon Court of Appeals, in a case on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, reaffirmed its prior decision in part in a challenge to the religious refusal by a bakery (Sweetcakes by Melissa) to provide a wedding cake for a same-sex marriage. The court reaffirmed its conclusion that the refusal violates the anti-discrimination provisions of the state's public accommodation law that prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. It held that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia does not change its earlier conclusion, saying in part:

the Kleins have not demonstrated that Fulton alters our prior conclusion that ORS 659A.403 is a “generally applicable” law for purposes of Smith, nor our related conclusion that, under Smith, the application of the law to Aaron’s conduct of denying cake-making services based on sexual orientation does not violate the Kleins’ rights under the Free Exercise Clause.

The court however did set aside the damage order entered by the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries, finding that, in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's Masterpiece Cakeshop decision, BOLI’s decision on damages violates the Free Exercise Clause.  The court said in part:

[T]he prosecutor’s closing argument apparently equating the Kleins’ religious beliefs with “prejudice,” together with the agency’s reasoning for imposing damages in connection with Aaron’s quotation of Leviticus, reflect that the agency acted in a way that passed judgment on the Kleins’ religious beliefs, something that is impermissible under Masterpiece Cakeshop.

The Oregonian reports on the decision.