Court Says States Lack Standing to Challenge EEOC's New PWFA Abortion-Accommodation Rule [CORRECTED]

In States of Tennessee et. al. v. EEOC, (ED AR, June 17, 2024), an Arkansas federal district court held that 17 states that are plaintiffs in the case lack standing to challenge an EEOC Final Rule implementing the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act.  At issue is the Rule's requirement that employers provide reasonable accommodation for employees' elective abortions. The court said in part:

[The states] press dual theories of injury -- sovereign harms and economic harms. The sovereign harms, the States say, are twofold: the rule will abridge their ability to regulate abortions and their interests in maintaining a pro-life message in dealing with state employees. The economic harms are the rule-related compliance costs the States say they will incur in response to potential enforcement....

The sovereign harms are not imminent because there is no credible threat of enforcement. ...

Even assuming an injury in fact, though, the States' sovereign-injury theory still fails for lack of causation and redressability. ...

Unlike in situations involving private employers, the EEOC cannot bring enforcement actions against state employers....  If an agreement isn't reached within thirty days after a charge is filed, the EEOC "shall take no further action and shall refer the case to" the Department of Justice"....

That leaves the alleged economic harms. The States don't claim any sunk costs. They only say that their compliance costs are imminent.. This economic-harm theory fails for two reasons.

First, the challenged costs-- those resulting only from rule-related compliance activities associated with illegal, elective abortions are neither concrete nor particularized. ...

Second, even assuming some concrete and particularized compliance costs related to illegal, elective abortions, these costs are not fairly traceable to any threat of enforcement....

Beyond the intense controversy surrounding abortion, there are no signs that this is a major questions case. Chevron's general rule applies.

CORRECTION: An earlier version of this post incorrectly said this was decided by a Tennessee federal district court. 

A Louisiana federal district court has just reached the opposite conclusion (see prior posting.) [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Court Says EEOC Exceeded Its Authority in New Rules Under Pregnant Workers Fairness Act

In State of Louisiana v. EEOC, (WD LA, June 17, 2024), a Louisiana federal district court granted a preliminary injunction to the states of Louisiana and Mississippi, as well as to the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops and two Louisiana dioceses, postponing the effectiveness of new EEOC rules under the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act that require employers to accommodate employees' elective abortions. The court said in part:

If Congress had intended to mandate that employers accommodate elective abortions under the PWFA, it would have spoken clearly when enacting the statute, particularly given the enormous social, religious, and political importance of the abortion issue in our nation at this time (and, indeed, over the past 50 years).  The Court is therefore not persuaded, on the record before it, that Congress could reasonably be understood to have granted the EEOC the authority to interpret the scope of the PWFA in a way that imposes a nationwide mandate on both public and private employers – irrespective of applicable abortion-related state laws enacted in the wake of Dobbs – to provide workplace accommodation for the elective abortions of employees.

In this sense, EEOC’s use of its regulatory power to insert the issue of abortion into a law designed to ensure healthy pregnancies for America’s working mothers squarely implicates the “major questions doctrine” as enunciated by the Supreme Court....  The major questions doctrine applies when an “agenc[y] assert[s] highly consequential power beyond what Congress could reasonably be understood to have granted.”...

Clearly, EEOC failed to include a broad religious exception in the Final Rule, and... EEOC’s interpretation of the PWFA religious exception – inasmuch as it mirrors the religious exception in Title VII, an antidiscrimination statute – does not square with the PWFA.

See prior related posting.

Catholic Bishops Sue EEOC Over Rules Implementing Pregnant Workers Fairness Act

Suit was filed last month in a Louisiana federal district court by the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Catholic University of America and two Louisiana Catholic dioceses challenging rules adopted in April of this year by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission implementing the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act.  The Act requires employers to provide reasonable accommodation for employees in connection with pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions. At issue in the recent lawsuit is the EEOC's inclusion of abortion as a related medical condition. The complaint (full text) in United States Conference of Catholic Bishops v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, (WD LA, filed 5/22/2024) alleges in part:

The PWFA is not an abortion accommodation mandate. Rather, it fills a gap in federal employment law by ensuring pregnant women receive workplace accommodations to protect their pregnancies and their preborn children. Plaintiff United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) enthusiastically supported the law’s bipartisan passage. That support reflected the PWFA’s uncontroversial and laudable purpose, which is fully consistent with the Catholic Church’s belief that all human life is imbued with innate dignity and its goal of ensuring a fairer workplace for women. But EEOC has now shoehorned a mandate that employers across the country knowingly support abortion into a statute explicitly designed to protect the health and safety of preborn babies and their mothers.  

Worse, at the same time that it expands federal law into fraught areas, EEOC also insists on nullifying the explicit religious exemption that Congress wrote into the PWFA. In the PWFA, Congress imported Title VII’s religious exemption, which expressly allows employers to make employment decisions based on sincere religious beliefs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000gg-5(b). Of course, since the PWFA concerns only pregnancy in the workplace, this makes clear that Congress meant to allow religious exemptions from pregnancy-accommodation claims. Yet now EEOC claims the exemption bars only religious discrimination claims—which aren’t authorized by the PWFA in the first place. That renders the exception a nullity, protecting employers from PWFA claims that don’t exist.

National Review yesterday reported on the lawsuit.

NJ Anti-Discrimination Law Creates Defense for Catholic School That Requires Teachers to Follow Catholic Teachings

 In Cristello v. St. Theresa School, (NJ Sup. Ct., Aug. 14, 2023), the New Jersey Supreme Court dismissed a suit against a Catholic school which had fired an art teacher/ toddler room caregiver who was unmarried and become pregnant.  The teacher's employment agreement required her to abide by the teachings of the Catholic Church and prohibited employees from engaging in premarital sex. The teacher sued under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) alleging pregnancy and marital status discrimination.  The court's majority opinion held that the LAD provision creating an exception for religious organizations following the tenets of its religion in establishing employment criteria gives the school an affirmative defense. The majority said in part:

Determining whether a religious employer’s employment action was based exclusively on the tenets of its religion requires application of only neutral principles of law and does not impermissibly entangle the courts in ecclesiastical matters.

Justice Pierre-Louis filed a concurring opinion taking the position that the religious tenet provision does not create an affirmative defense, but instead shifts to plaintiff the requirement to show that the purported reason for the firing was a pretext for prohibited discrimination. However here plaintiff did not show that this was a pretext.

Washington Examiner reports on the decision.

Proposed Regulations Under Pregnant Workers Fairness Act Include Abortion as Pregnancy Related Condition

Yesterday the EEOC filed for publication in the Federal Register Proposed Rules (full text) under the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act. The Act requires employers with 15 or more employees to provide reasonable accommodations for employees and applicants arising out of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions, absent undue hardship on the operation of the business. "Related medical conditions" are defined by the proposed regulations as including "termination of pregnancy, including via miscarriage, stillbirth, or abortion." Anti-abortion advocacy organizations say the proposed regulations will force employers to violate their religious beliefs. (See ADF press release.)

EEOC Commissioner, In Unusual Procedure, Targets Abortion Travel Benefits By Employers

 Bloomberg Law reported yesterday:

Republican EEOC Commissioner Andrea Lucas is deploying a rarely used agency procedure to silently initiate targeted discrimination probes against at least three companies providing their employees with abortion travel benefits....

The investigations triggered by Commissioner Charges are based on claims by Lucas that by favoring employees seeking abortions and not furnishing comparable benefits to pregnant workers or disabled workers, employers are violating the pregnancy discrimination ban in Title VII or the Americans with Disabilities Act. Bloomberg Law also reports that the EEOC's former general counsel, even though she no longer held a position with the agency after being fired by the Biden administration, last month sent letters to a number of employers warning them of the possibility of such actions by the EEOC.

Firing Only Unmarried Pregnant Teachers Is Not Proper Enforcement of Catholic School's Morals Code

 In Crisitello v. St. Theresa School, (NJ App., Nov. 19, 2020), a New Jersey state appellate court reversed the dismissal of a pregnancy discrimination lawsuit brought against a Catholic school by one of its former teachers. The court summarized its holding:

In this action brought under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49, we are asked to determine whether a parochial school's knowledge of the pregnancy of an unmarried lay teacher, who started as a teacher's aide for toddlers, later taught art, and had no responsibility for religious instruction, can serve as the nondiscriminatory basis for the teacher's termination for violating the school's morals code, where the school never made any effort to determine whether any of its other employees have violated the school's prohibition against "immoral conduct" that is allegedly incorporated into each employees' terms of employment. We now hold that knowledge or mere observation of an employee's pregnancy alone is not a permissible basis to detect violations of the school's policy and terminate an employee.

Bridgewater Courier News reports on the decision.

Suit Filed Against Pharmacies That Refused To Fill Emergency Contraceptive Prescription

A suit was filed earlier this week in a Minnesota state trial court against two pharmacies and an individual pharmacist by a woman who was turned down at both pharmacies when she attempted to full a prescription  for ella-- a morning-after emergency contraceptive. The suit contends that defendants discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of sex, in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act. The Act defines "sex" as including pregnancy, childbirth, and related conditions. The complaint (full text) in Anderson v. Grand St. Paul CVS, LLC,(MN Dist. Ct., filed 12/9/2019) sets out the facts of plaintiff's discrimination claim:

[Anderson] had her doctor send [her prescription] to the McGregor Thrifty White pharmacy. She acted quickly because any delay in obtaining emergency contraception increases the risk of pregnancy. The pharmacist on duty told her that he would be unable to fill her prescription because of his “beliefs.” He also warned her against trying Shopko, another pharmacy in the surrounding area. The pharmacist did not provide Anderson with any information about how she could get her prescription filled.

Anderson next tried a CVS pharmacy in Aitkin, Minnesota, a town roughly 20 miles away. The CVS pharmacist also indicated that she could not fill the prescription. The pharmacist then claimed that she called a pharmacist at the Walgreens in Brainerd Minnesota, who told her that they could not fill the prescription either. Anderson later confirmed with that Walgreens pharmacist that they did speak with a pharmacist from CVS, but that they had told the CVS pharmacist that Walgreens could fill the prescription.

Though Anderson finally found a pharmacy that was willing to fill her prescription, it was over fifty miles from her home. Meanwhile, a massive snowstorm was headed to central Minnesota.  Given the increased risk of pregnancy from any delay in taking emergency contraception, Anderson drove over 100 miles round trip in the snowstorm in order to fill her prescription....

 NBC News reports on the lawsuit. [Thanks to Tom Rutledge for the lead.]

Teacher May Sue Catholic School For Pregnancy Discrimination

In Crisitello v. St. Theresa School, (NJ App., July 24, 2018), a New Jersey state appellate court reversed a trial court's dismissal of a discrimination suit brought against a Catholic parochial school by a former preschool lay teacher who had been fired for engaging in premarital sex. The teacher was terminated for violating the Church's ethical standards when it was found that she was pregnant and unmarried. Plaintiff sued under New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination, claiming pregnancy discrimination. The court said in part:

To be clear, in this case, plaintiff does not raise any challenge to defendant's religious doctrines or its right to specify a code of conduct for its employees based on that doctrine. Rather, she seeks an adjudication of her claim that she has been singled out for application of that doctrine as a pretext for impermissible discriminatory reasons. If proven, such conduct by defendant would be a violation of secular law protecting against discrimination....

In a case involving the firing of a pregnant employee, evidence of how male employees were treated is particularly useful in determining whether unmarried pregnant women are treated differently. Absent evidence that men are treated the same way as women who are terminated for engaging in premarital sex, a religious institution violates LAD because if "'women can become pregnant [and] men cannot,' it punishes only women for sexual relations because those relations are revealed through pregnancy." 

Factual Questions Remain On Ecclesiastical Abstention and Ministerial Exception

In Kelley v. Decatur Baptist Church, (ND AL, May 1, 2018), an Alabama federal magistrate judge refused to dismiss a Title VII pregnancy discrimination lawsuit brought by a maintenance and child care employee of a church.  The court held that factual questions exist as to whether the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applies. Plaintiff claims she was fired because she was pregnant.  Defendant contends she was fired because she engaged in sexual conduct outside of marriage in violation of Biblical standards.  The court also held that factual questions exist as to whether the ministerial exception doctrine applies.  Plaintiff challenged defendant's characterization of her as a minister charged with equipping, training, and evangelizing the next  generation according to biblical standards and morals.

2nd Circuit: Pregnancy Discrimination Claim Against Synagogue Can Proceed

In Shultz v. Congregation Shearith Israel of the City of New York, (2d Cir., Aug. 10, 2017), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals held that giving an employee a notice of termination of employment can be an "adverse employment action" under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act even though the notice is rescinded before the date that the firing becomes effective.  The court thus allowed a long-time Program Director for a New York synagogue to move ahead with her claim that she was given a termination notice because of disapproval of the fact that she was pregnant at the time of her recent marriage.  The court also allowed her to move ahead with her claim under the Family Medical Leave Act. [Thanks to Rabbi Michael Simon for the lead.]