In Ex Parte Halprin, (TX Ct. Crim. App., Nov. 6, 2024), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in a 6-3 decision granted a new trial to one of the so-called Texas Seven prison escapees who had been sentenced to death for murdering a police officer during the robbery of a sporting goods store shortly after their escape. The court concluded that the trial judge, Vickers Cunningham, was biased against Halprin because Halprin is Jewish. The court said in part:
The evidence adduced in these habeas proceedings concerning Halprin’s judicial bias claim consists primarily of anti-Semitic statements attributed to Cunningham that, according to the witnesses, he made in generally private or semi-private settings rather than from the bench in open court or in chambers....
The uncontradicted evidence supports a finding that Cunningham formed an opinion about Halprin that derived from an extrajudicial factor—Cunningham’s poisonous anti-Semitism. Cunningham’s references to Halprin are not to “the fucking [murderer]” or “the filthy [criminal]” or “the [murderer] Halprin,” which might be fairly said to derive from the evidence presented at Halprin’s capital murder trial. Rather, Cunningham’s derogatory references to Halprin are expressly tied to Halprin’s Jewish identity.
Judge Richardson, joined by Judges Newell and Walker filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:
This is not a case in which the action of a trial judge may just “look bad.” This is not a case in which there is merely the “appearance of impropriety.” This is a case where a person’s lifelong hatred and prejudice against Jews made him unfit to preside over this case. And that toxic viewpoint runs counter to our concept of the Rule of Law because “[o]ur law punishes people for what they do, not who they are.”
Thus, no precedent, rule, technicality, or excuse can justify allowing such a demonstrably biased person to constitutionally stand in judgment over a member of a class of people the judge espouses to hate. It violates our fundamental sense of fair play and the Supreme Court’s motto “Equal Justice Under Law” beneath which our precedent arises.
Judge Yeary filed a concurring opinion saying that the majority reached the correct result but used the wrong standard to reach it. He said in part:
... [T]he question is “not whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in [the challenged judge’s] position is ‘likely’ to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’”
Presiding Judge Keller, joined by Judges Keel and Slaughter filed a dissenting opinion saying in part:
The Court misunderstands the law regarding disqualification of a judge for bias. It grants Applicant relief on the basis of the trial judge’s personal views and out-of-court comments about Applicant’s religion. But under Supreme Court precedent, in order for a judge who holds derogatory views about a defendant’s religion to be disqualified, there must be a showing that the judge’s conduct in the criminal proceedings was influenced by his derogatory views. What a judge does can violate the Constitution. What he thinks cannot. Nothing in the record on habeas or at trial shows, or even suggests, that the trial judge’s views influenced how he conducted the criminal proceedings in this case.
Texas Public Radio and AP report on the decision. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]