Ministerial Exception Applies to Slander, But Not Contract Claims

In Gackenheimer v. Southern New England Conference of the United Church of Christ, Inc., (CT Super., June 29, 2023), a minister who was fired from his position as executive director of a church's conference center sued the church and its senior leaders for defamation, infliction of emotional distress and breaches of express and implied contract.  Plaintiff alleged that the leaders misrepresented the reasons for his firing in communications to community religious leaders and church volunteers. A Connecticut trial court applied the ministerial exception doctrine to dismiss defamation related claims, but permitted plaintiff to move ahead with his contract claims. The court said in part:

The ministerial exception ... does not categorically preclude all claims brought against a religious institution. ..."...[E]ven if it is established that the plaintiff's primary duties render him a ministerial employee ... Connecticut courts must consider whether adjudicating the particular claims and defenses in the case would require the court to intrude into a religious institution's exclusive right to decide matters pertaining to doctrine or its internal governance or organization."... Therefore, the court will separately examine each of the plaintiff's causes of action in order to determine whether they are barred by the ministerial exception.

In counts one and two, the plaintiff alleges slander and slander per se causes of action based on two statements allegedly made by SNE's senior leaders to members of the community.... Therefore, to adjudicate the plaintiff's slander claims, the court would necessarily have to delve into the veracity of comments made by SNE's leaders regarding its decision to terminate the plaintiff's employment.... Such an examination into the decision-making process of church leadership is exactly what the ministerial exception prohibits. Accordingly, the court strikes counts one and two.

Counts three and four state claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress... based on SNE's decision to terminate his employment and the immediate aftermath of the process... . "[T]hese claims arise directly from, and in furtherance of, the defendants' decision to terminate the employment of the plaintiff...." On that basis, the court grants the motion to strike counts three and four....

Unlike the claims brought by the plaintiff in counts one through four, counts five through eight do not involve the plaintiff's termination process and the reasons behind it. Rather, in these counts, the plaintiff asks the court to determine if SNE breached its employment contract with him or, alternatively, ... the plaintiff is entitled to relief under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Importantly, the plaintiff alleges that he earned this claimed compensation years before he was fired. Therefore, when deciding this dispute, the court will not be excessively entangled in SNE's decision about whether to retain the plaintiff as its minister.... The court ... therefore denies the motion to strike counts five, six, seven and eight.

Ministerial Exception Doctrine Requires Dismissal of Hostile Work Environment Claims

In Montgomery v. St. John's United Church of Christ, (OH App., April 6, 2023), an Ohio state appellate court held that the ministerial exception doctrine requires dismissal of plaintiffs' hostile work environment claims. In the case, the church's minister and a pastoral assistant contended that they were sexually harassed by a lay leader of the church, and that their employment was terminated because of their resistance to this conduct. The court said in part:

The [trial] court found that due to the nature of relationships of the parties involved and the subject matter of the conversations and communications between them, it could not “adjudicate the sexual harassment claims of Appellants without distinguishing between Appellee Martin as a parishioner in the congregation seeking counsel, guidance, and comfort from his pastor and pastoral assistant, and Martin as a church officer engaging in harassing or hostile behavior.”... The court found that it could not make this distinction or determination without “delving deeply into the relationships and expectations of the parties and their church and their faith.” ... 

We agree that this is precisely the kind of state inquiry into church employment decisions that the First Amendment forbids....

6th Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Minister's Hostile Work Environment Claim

In Middleton v. United Church of Christ Board, (6th Cir., Nov. 22, 2021), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a Title VII racial discrimination suit brought by a minister claiming an anti-Black hostile work environment. The three-judge panel unanimously agreed that while plaintiff may have been treated badly, it did not rise to the level of a hostile work environment. Two of the judges (Boggs and Larsen, JJ) went on to hold:

[T]he ministerial exception bars any judicial consideration of a church’s tangible employment actions taken against a minister in a discrimination claim, regardless of its underlying basis....  Otherwise, the church would be required to respond that its tangible employment actions were motivated not by discriminatory animus, but by nondiscriminatory reasons.... [T]he court would then be required to conduct a pretext inquiry to determine the church’s true motivation. This would involve an examination of the church’s reasons for determining the fitness and qualifications of its ministers—a determination necessarily informed by religious belief. This is precisely the kind of state inquiry into church employment decisions that the First Amendment forbids.

Judge Moore in a concurring opinion argued that the court need not reach the ministerial exception issue. [Thanks to Heather Kimmel for the lead.] 

 

Ministerial Exception Doctrine Does Not Apply To Hostile Work Environment Claim

In Middleton v. United Church of Christ, (ND OH, Aug. 26, 2020), an Ohio federal district court held that the ministerial exception doctrine does not preclude a minister bringing a hostile work environment claim, at least where the claim does not involve the court in excessive entanglement with religious matters. The court said in part:

[A]fter examining Middleton’s first cause of action, the court concludes that it does not implicate “any matters of church doctrine or practice.” ... Middleton’s hostile workplace claim involves allegations of racial and gender harassment that are wholly unrelated to Defendants’ religious teachings. ....

Nevertheless the court went on to dismiss the hostile work environment claim, saying in part:

While Middleton describes interactions that are unprofessional and unpleasant, none of the alleged conduct was physically threatening or humiliating. At most, these sporadic comments constituted “offensive utterances,” which “do not rise to the level required by the Supreme Court’s definition of a hostile work environment.”

The court held that plaintiff's breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims were barred by the ministerial exception doctrine. [Thanks to Heather Kimmel for the lead.]

Baptist, Jewish Groups Join As Plaintiffs In Challenge To North Carolina Same-Sex Marriage Ban

The United Church of Christ announced today that two national religious bodies and a number of individual clergy have joined as plaintiffs in its lawsuit that contends that North Carolina law makes it a criminal offense for a member of the clergy to conduct a same-sex marriage ceremony.  This, they argue, infringes the free exercise and expressive associational rights of clergy whose religious teachings and beliefs embrace same-sex marriage.  The national groups joining the lawsuit are the Alliance of Baptists and the Central Conference of American Rabbis.