Oklahoma AG Sues to Overturn Charter School Board's Strategic Factual Record In Rejecting Religious School

As previously reported, in May 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court split evenly, 4-4, on the constitutionality Oklahoma funding a religiously sponsored charter school. The even split was caused by Justice Barrett recusing herself, apparently because of her connection to those promoting the school. Subsequently, a new test case was created, as the National Ben Gamla Jewish Charter School Foundation applied to create for a statewide virtual high school. (See prior posting.) This Tuesday, the Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board voted to reject the Ben Gamla School's most recent application and gave as its formal reason only that under Oklahoma law, a charter school is a public school and must be nonsectarian.  The next day, Oklahoma's Attorney General filed suit against the Charter School Board in an Oklahoma state trial court contending that there were additional unrelated reasons for rejection of Ben Gamla's application. The suit seeks a writ of mandamus to require the Board to identify and incorporate into the record other valid, non-constitutional grounds for the rejection.

The petition (full text) in Drummond v. Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board, (OK Dist. Ct., filed 3/11/2026), alleges in part:

[T]he Board's refusal to list all of the reasons for rejecting the revised application is not coincidental. It is a deliberate decision designed to avoid issues of state law when Ben Gamla files a lawsuit seeking to overturn the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in Drummond v. Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board.... Oklahoma law does not permit the Board to strategically withhold valid grounds for rejection....

Presumably, if other grounds for the application denial were included, the U.S. Supreme Court might refuse to decide the federal constitutional issue posed by state funded religious schools on the ground that there were other reasons for the Board's rejection of the Ben Gamla application.

VINnews reports on the lawsuit.

Cemetery Loses Free Exercise and Establishment Clause Challenges to Permit Denial

In Steelmantown Church v. Carlton County, Minnesota, (D MN, March 11, 2026), a Minnesota federal district court dismissed claims under the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses, RLUIPA, and Minnesota law brought by a nonprofit corporation that was refused permission to establish a cemetery that would perform "green burials." While Minnesota law allowed "religious corporations" to establish private cemeteries, Steelmantown was not formed as a Minnesota religious corporation. The court, explaining its rejection of Steelmantown's 1stAmendment claims, said in part:

... [E]stablishing and operating a cemetery of any sort is not inherently or exclusively a religious practice, and Section 307.01 on its face does not “aid or oppose particular religions” or “establish[] a denominational preference.”...  The statute expressly authorizes “any private person” or “any religious corporation,” regardless of whether they adhere to any religious faith, to establish a private cemetery on land the person or corporation owns....  The statute’s reference to “any religious corporation,” meaning those incorporated under Chapter 315, establishes only a preference toward a specific type of incorporated entity, not a particular religious faith or denomination.... 

Steelmantown effectively seeks preferential treatment because of its religious beliefs that a secular but otherwise identical institution—that is, a foreign nonprofit corporation whose “identity and mission” are not “derived from religious or spiritual traditions,” ... would not receive in the same circumstances.  If anything, that outcome would appear to be closer to a violation of the Establishment Clause than the conduct Steelmantown challenges here....

Steelmantown’s claim, in essence, appears to be that its religious practices are burdened by the requirement to incorporate (or reincorporate) under Chapter 315....  But nowhere does Steelmantown allege any facts that show this requirement “significantly inhibit[s] or constrain[s]” any “conduct or expression that manifests some central tenet” of its religious beliefs, “meaningfully curtail[s]” its “ability to express adherence” to those beliefs, or denies it a “reasonable opportunity to engage in those activities.” ... It does not explain, for instance, why maintaining its status as a foreign nonprofit corporation under Chapter 303 is central to its ability to express its religious beliefs or engage in its religious practices.  Nor does Steelmantown allege facts that suggest the requirement “operates so as to make the practice of [its] religious beliefs more expensive.”...

5th Circuit: Principal Lacks Qualified Immunity for Barring Teachers' Praying in View of Students

In Barber v. Rounds, (5th Cir., March 9,2026), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals held that Texas high school principal Bryan Rounds does not have qualified immunity as to a teacher's First Amendment claims in a suit challenging his prohibition on teachers' engaging in any prayer that students might observe. The dispute grew out of the principal cautioning teachers in connection with a staff "See You At the Flagpole" event.  The court said in part:

Barber asserts that the complaint alleges a blanket prohibition by Rounds on teachers engaging in any prayer that students might observe—regardless of whether the prayer was connected to a student-led event.  Rounds, on the other hand, urges a narrower, contextual reading:  that his directives were limited to ensuring teachers did not participate in the student-initiated SYATP gathering.   

Barber’s reading is consonant with the complaint’s language.  Her pleading alleges that Rounds told her she could not pray “in the presence of students” and could not engage in prayer where she would be “visible to students,” even away from the flagpole and even “when the teachers [are] not on school time.” ...

The second question is whether the First Amendment rights at issue were clearly established when Rounds’s challenged conduct occurred....

Barber contends that Kennedy [v. Bremerton School District] supplied the requisite clarity.  Again, it does.  As Barber points out, Kennedy expressly rejected the proposition that religious expression by a public-school employee may be restricted merely because students might observe it.  The Kennedy Court rejected the rule that “visible religious conduct by a teacher or coach” may “be deemed—without more and as a matter of law—impermissibly coercive on students.”  597 U.S. at 540.

Vital Law reports on the decision.

Suit Challenges Library's Policy on Use of Meeting Room

Suit was filed this week in an Alabama federal district court by Eagle Forum, a Christian community educational organization, challenging the policy of the Tuscaloosa Public Library that bars use of its large meeting room by "religious or sectarian groups for the purpose of preaching or otherwise demonstrating the beliefs of their members." The complaint (full text) in Eagle Forum of Alabama v. Tuscaloosa Public Library Bord of Trustees, (ND AL, filed 3/10/2026), alleges in part:

101. By putting Eagle Forum to a choice between exercising its religious beliefs through faith-based programming at its events and using the Rotary Room, the Defendants burden and “penalize[ ] the free exercise of religion.” ...

112. There is no compelling government interest to justify these content- and viewpoint-based restrictions, and the Reservation Policy is not narrowly tailored to advance any compelling governmental interest.

113. Even if the Rotary Room could only be considered a limited public forum ...  it is well established that “speech discussing otherwise permissible subjects cannot be excluded from a limited public forum on the ground that the subject is discussed from a religious viewpoint.”

The complaint also alleges that the library's policy violates the Equal Protection clause and the Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Wyoming Governor Signs Heartbeat Abortion Law While Expressing Concern Over Its Constitutionality

On March 9, Wyoming Governor Mark Gordon signed Enrolled Act No. 29 / House Bill 126, the Human Heartbeat Act (full text), into law (press release). The law prohibits an abortion when there is a detectable fetal heartbeat. The only exception is a "medical emergency", defined as a need to terminate a pregnancy to avert the mother's death or where there is serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function. 

The law then sets out an alternative less-restrictive set of provisions which will take effect only if fetal heartbeat ban is found to be unconstitutional. These are the provisions that were in effect before the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs. These provisions ban abortions after viability, except when necessary to preserve the woman from an imminent peril that substantially endangers her life or health. These alternate provisions also require that in most cases an abortion patient be given an opportunity to view an active ultrasound. The alternative provisions also set out lengthy procedures where a minor is seeking an abortion.

Governor Gordon's Signing Letter (full text) questions the constitutionality of the new law. It says in part:

Despite the upright, moral intentions of HEA 29, I believe this act very likely puts us back in the all too familiar and unfortunate territory of pro-life litigation....

The central obstacle remains the Wyoming Supreme Court's interpretation of Article 1, Section 38 of the Wyoming Constitution in State v. Johnson...

In the Johnson case, the Wyoming Supreme Court by a vote of 4-1 held that Wyoming's nearly total abortion ban and its medication abortion ban violate Art. I, §38, of the Wyoming Constitution which provides that every competent adult has the right to make his or her health care decision, subject to reasonable and necessary restrictions imposed by the legislature. (See prior posting).

The Governor's signing letter also said that he would have preferred if the law had contained exceptions for rape and incest.

WyoFile reports on these developments.

County Employee Sues Over Denial of Religious Accommodation So He Could Avoid Celebrating Pride Month

Suit was filed yesterday in a California federal district court by an employee of the Los Angeles County Department of Public Works alleging that the county violated Title VII as well as the 1st and 14th Amendments and California law by denying him a religious accommodation so he would not have to celebrate Pride Month. The complaint (full text) in Batman v. Los Angeles County, (CD CA, filed 3/10/2026), alleges in part:

4. Beginning in March 2023, the County directed all of its government departments to ensure that the “Pride Progress Flag” was flown at every government department.... The policy revisions also directed the government offices to adopt ways to demonstrate that all government offices celebrate so-called “Pride Month” and make its celebration overt, express, and universal.  

5. As a result of his sincerely held religious beliefs and a conflict with his employer’s open and notorious celebration of something Batman considers a sin, Batman requested a simple accommodation of working remotely during the one month of the year that his employment requirements conflict with his sincerely held religious beliefs.....

82. Rather than provide Batman a reasonable accommodation that was plainly available and not burdensome to anyone, Batman was instructed that he could simply use the back entrance....  

83. The Department also suggested to Batman that he seek mental health counseling for any distress he may feel as a result of the conflict between his sincerely held religious beliefs and the Department’s denial of his requested accommodation.... In other words, the Department suggested to Batman that his religious beliefs required mental health counseling rather than accommodation.

The complaint sets out at length the Biblical basis for plaintiff's beliefs.

Liberty Counsel issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Federal Jury Awards Muslim Inmates $667,000 After Guards Violently Disrupted Their Prayers

In a press release, CAIR Legal Defense Fund announced that on Monday a jury in federal district court in the Eastern District of Missouri has awarded $667,000 in damages to eight Muslim inmates whose prayer gathering was broken up by prison guards who pepper-sprayed them. The complaint (full text) in Clemons v. Precythe, (ED MO, filed 3/2/2023), alleged in part:

1. With the permission of state prison guards and officials, nine Muslims gathered for prayer on the evening of February 28, 2021. They did so in their housing unit, just as they had hundreds of times in the months preceding the sadistic, violent attack that gives rise to this action. 

2. As Plaintiffs ... stood shoulder to shoulder in prayer, out of the blue, Defendant Basham ordered that there be no more praying in the housing unit. Two plaintiffs—Kent and Smith—abruptly stopped their prayers and stepped away. The others sought to quickly finish up. Nevertheless, five were pepper sprayed and one was viciously beaten, just because they prayed. 

3. Viewing Muslims as nothing more than a gang, more than a dozen guards participated in this violent episode. The brutality began as an effort to disrupt Muslims praying together but morphed into a protracted effort to punish those who prayed—dispersing Plaintiffs throughout the state via transfers and otherwise retaliating against them.

USCIRF Releases 2026 Annual Report

Last week, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom released its 2026 Annual Report (full text) containing its recommendations for designations of "countries of particular concern" under the International Religious Freedom Act. The Introduction to the 92-page report says in part:

USCIRF’s 2026 Annual Report assesses religious freedom violations and progress in 29 countries during calendar year 2025 and makes independent recommendations for U.S. policy.... This report’s primary focus is on two groups of countries: first, those that USCIRF recommends the State Department should designate as CPCs under IRFA and second, those that USCIRF recommends the State Department should place on its Special Watch List (SWL). The report also includes USCIRF’s recommendations of nonstate actors for designation by the State Department as EPCs under IRFA. 

In addition, the report analyzes the U.S. government’s implementation of IRFA during the reporting year, recognizes the ways that the administration and Congress met USCIRF’s recommendations to more effectively advance religious freedom abroad, and provides new and updated policy recommendations for the same. This year, the report delineates USCIRF’s recommendations in a standalone chapter, including all relevant designations as well as policy options for the administration and Congress.

The Report recommends the following countries be designated "countries of particular concern": Afghanistan, Burma, China, Cuba, Eritrea, India, Iran, Libya, Nicaragua, Nigeria, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Vietnam.

Discussing the Report, Religion Unplugged said in part:

The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom’s 2026 annual report, released on March 4, focused on international issues — but was overshadowed by controversy over its critique that other branches of government have undercut protections for religious freedom.

It criticized, for example, cuts to USAID programs, since many of those programs were specifically aimed at protecting religious freedom. 

The report stated that the State Department’s suspension of foreign aid “left hundreds of victims of religious persecution receiving support in immediate need of lifesaving assistance in countries such as Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, Nigeria, and Vietnam.” It added that U.S. funding cuts “contributed to 11.6 million refugees, including many fleeing religious persecution, losing access to humanitarian assistance,” and that as a result 130,000 refugees, including about 15,000 registered Iranian Christians, remain in limbo....

Republican members of the commission officially dissented from these statements. They did not say that the findings were wrong but that they went far beyond the scope of USCIRF's own mandate, which is specifically international in focus....

Former Charismatic Religious Leader Sued for Sexual Exploitation

At the end of last month, three women filed suit in a Tennessee federal district court against the former religious leader of Global Outreach Developments International, also known as G.O.D. International. The complaint (full text) in Jane Doe I v. Garner, (MD TN, filed 2/27/2026) alleges in part:

Between 2022 to 2025, Gregg Garner, the charismatic leader of G.O.D. International, sexually abused and assaulted multiple women who were members of G.O.D., coercing his victims to participate in numerous sex acts, including sexual intercourse. Garner also coerced his victims through the threat of serious harm into providing unpaid labor and services. Garner exploited his position of trust as the spiritual leader of G.O.D., using the tools of cult indoctrination, such as food and sleep deprivation, social isolation, and extreme emotional abuse, to further his psychological control of his victims. Garner controlled every aspect of his victims’ lives, including their schooling, their employment, their spouse’s employment, their housing, even the schooling of their children, and used this control to reward compliance with his abusive scheme and to ensure his victims’ silence. While Garner preached a message of sexual purity, his victims endured his acts of sexual prurience for years, terrified that any resistance would tear apart their lives.

Entities controlled by Garner as well as church leaders are also named as defendants.

Ministry Watch reports on the lawsuit.

Certiorari Denied in Unification Church Dispute

Yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court denied review in Family Federation for World Peace and Unification International v. Moon, (Docket No. 25-634, certiorari denied 3/9/2026) (Order List). In the case, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's final dismissal of a lawsuit surrounding a long-running schism and succession dispute in the Unification Church. (See prior posting.) The Petition for Certiorari identified the Question Presented as:

Where necessary to resolve a church-property dispute, does the First Amendment prohibit courts from examining church-related facts to determine who leads the church?

Alabama Supreme Court Orders Trial Courts to Hear Claims of United Methodist Conference In Deciding Church Property Ownership

In Ex parte Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc., (AL Sup. Ct., March 6, 2026), the Alabama Supreme Court by a vote of 5-2 granted writs of mandamus in 15 cases involving disputes between break-away Methodist congregations and their parent body. In the cases, the local churches filed quiet title actions in trial courts to clarify that they owned their church buildings after their disaffiliations. The parent body (the Conference and its Board of Trustees) filed counterclaims contending that the church properties belong to, or are held in trust for, the Conference. The trial courts dismissed the counterclaims for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine precluded civil courts from adjudicating the disputes. The Conference appealed by filing petitions for writs of mandamus, asking the Alabama Supreme Court to order the trial courts to vacate the orders that dismissed their counterclaims. The local churches contended that writs of mandamus were not the proper vehicle for reviewing the trial courts' decisions. The Supreme Court disagreed.

Justice Sellers, joined by Justice Cook, wrote in part:

If mandamus relief is not available in these cases, the question of subject-matter jurisdiction over the petitioners' counterclaims, which appear for the most part to be allegedly supported by the same sort of secular materials upon which the local churches rely in support of their quiet-title actions, will not be considered until after the parties and the trial courts in each action are, respectively, required to litigate and to preside over the local churches' claims to their final resolution. 

At play here is the substantial possibility of significantly wasting the litigants' and the trial courts' time and resources....

It is true that the petitioners also point to trust provisions set out in the United Methodist Church's Book of Discipline, which is the governing document of the United Methodist Church.  But that does not transform these actions from standard real-property disputes to ecclesiastical disputes. ...The petitioners' counterclaims, to the extent that they rely on the Book of Discipline, do not appear to require resolution of a dispute over doctrinal or ecclesiastical matters.  Instead, the petitioners rely on provisions of the Book of Discipline that, they say, call for the real property at issue to be held in trust and that are referenced or implicated by deeds and other secular legal documents....

Justice McCool and Special Justices Edwards and Minor concurred in the result.

Acting Chief Justice Bryan dissented, saying in part:

Rather than identify an appropriate use of the writ of mandamus established by this Court, the petitioners have inconsistently argued that these cases present an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction, but not really.  I do not regard that argument as sufficient to meet their burden under these circumstances.... 

Justice Mendheim dissented, saying in part:

I understand the main opinion's desire to be helpful in resolving these disputes, but we cannot do so without entangling the courts in matters that are best left to the moral judgments of the parties involved....

... [A] proper understanding "of the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine should come from a desire to protect religious freedom rather than an unfounded fear that religious ideas might taint our civil jurisprudence."... The neutral-principles-of-law approach ...  asks courts to do the impossible: interpret church practices and guidelines through a "secular" lens. ...

If the courts elect to enter this fray between local churches and a church denomination's organizing bodies, they should do so absent any reference to the Book of Discipline and its trust clause because there is no way to read that document or that paragraph "in purely secular terms." Courts should not determine whether ecclesiastical abstention applies in a case based on the false notion that there is a distinct bright line between what is "secular" and what is "religious."

Four Justices recused themselves. 

AL.com reported on the decision.

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

• Jeremy Kessler, Selective Service and the Separation of Powers, (106 Boston University Law Review __ (2026)).
• Harold Anthony Lloyd, Bowers v. Hardwick Postmortems at Forty: Timely Dissections of Its Tradition, Enumeration, and Other Errors, (William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, Volume 35 (Forthcoming)).
• Nguyen, Lam Tien, A Theocracy Within a Democracy: Revisiting the Limits of Accommodation and Pluralism in a Pluralist Democracy, (February 07, 2026).
• James M. Oleske, Jr., Mahmoud, Skrmetti, and 303 Creative: Ignoring Original Meaning, Rewriting Precedent, and Discounting Harm to LGBTQ People, (26 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol’y (forthcoming)).
• Reva B. Siegel, It's Alive! When the Original Meaning of "Person" Protected by the Fourteenth Amendment Is Not a Fixed, But Living Word, (Yale Law School, Public Law Research Paper Forthcoming).
• Emily Maurin-Waters & Deborah Lolai, Hate Crime or Bullying? The High Cost of Framing Harm Among Youth, (113 Va. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2027)).
• Benjamin Eidelson, Testimony for U.S. Civil Rights Commission Hearing on Antisemitism on America’s College and University Campuses: Current Conditions and the Federal Response, (February 06, 2026).
• Michele Goodwin & Allison Whelan, Reproductive Policing: A Review, (Annual Review of Criminology, volume 9, issue 1, 2026).
• Greer Donley& William M. Carter, Jr., An Originalist Critique of Fetal Personhood, (175 U. Pa. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2026)).

From SSRN (Parental Rights):

• Maxine Eichner, Mary E. Ziegler & Naomi R. Cahn, Opting Out: Mahmoud, Public Education, and the Future of Parental Rights, (___ Duke L.J. ___ (forthcoming 2026)).
• Zalman Rothschild, Vaccines and 'Religious Parental Rights', (Harv. L. Rev. F. (forthcoming)).

From SSRN (Religious Philosophy):

• Maurice Izunwa& OD Michael, Conceptualising Jesus as The 'Living Customary Law: a Christological Re-reading of  The "African Charter on Human And People's Rights" For Restorative Justice and  Socio-economic Rights In Africa, (January 03, 2026).
• Edward L. Rubin, The Concept Of Mercy As A Pragmatic Decision Protocol, (Vanderbilt Law Research Paper, (October 3, 2025)).
• Hakan Ibrahim Apaydin, How Texts Became Sacred Revelation, Writing, and the Historical Construction of Sacredness, (January 29, 2026).
• Hannah Walser, Religion as Private Law, (February 01, 2026).

From SSRN (Non-U.S. Law):

• Amal Sethi, The Taliban's Multitextual Constitution: Cultivated Ambiguity as Authoritarian Technique, (2026 Forthcoming, Richard Albert (ed), Multi-Textual Constitutions of the World).
• Gareth T. Davies, Can Prejudice Justify Discrimination? The Case of Religion in EU Law, (Effective Judicial Protection in EU Equality Law (2026)).
• Donata Garsia, Cultural Development Zones: A Governance Framework for Mission Integrity in Community-Based Cultural Organizations, (February 02, 2026).

From SmartCILP:

• Clara Spera & Katherine Fleming, Conservative Family Values as Constitutional Law: Private Regulation and the Erosion of Fundamental Rights, 65 Santa Clara Law Review 651-730 (2025).

Father's Rights Not Violated by School's Refusal to Dismiss Son Early on Fridays for Religious Services

In Sapp v. Trenton Board of Education, (D NJ, March 6, 2026), a New Jersey federal district court dismissed a suit brought pro se against school officials who refused to allow plaintiff to pick up his fourth-grade son every Friday two-and-one-half hours early to take the son to Muslim religious services. Plaintiff had joint custody of his son. The son's mother, as well as school officials, objected to the father's request, even though the father had court-ordered parenting time with the son on Fridays. When plaintiff persisted, the Board of Education barred him from school premises. Plaintiff asserted nine causes of action against school officials. Dismissing his due process claim, the court said in part:

Courts have held that “[t]he right of parents to raise their children without undue state interference is well established.”...  Moreover, the Third Circuit has held that “[i]t has long been recognized that parents have a constitutional right to control the education of their children.”...  But such a right is “neither absolute nor unqualified.”... 

Liberally construed, the SAC [second amended complaint] asserts that Defendants deprived Plaintiff of his right to be on school grounds without affording him due process.  However, the Third Circuit has declined to find that such a right exists....

Dismissing Plaintiff's 1st Amendment claims, the court said in part:

Plaintiff next alleges that Defendants violated his First Amendment rights by “unduly preferring non-religion over religion and interfering with [his] right to peaceably assemble for religious purposes.”...

To support his First Amendment claim, Plaintiff alleges that after picking his son up from school early two Fridays in a row for prayer and submitting a letter to the school seeking a religious exemption, he was turned away by security the next Friday....  Plaintiff also alleges that [school principal] Ramcharan told Plaintiff that his son could pray at school because two-and-a-half hours once per week was too much time for Plaintiff’s son to miss....  Plaintiff was banned from school grounds shortly afterwards....  Even accepting these allegations as true, Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that Defendants violated his First Amendment rights.  Plaintiff fails to allege how the inability to remove his son from school impacts Plaintiff’s right to assemble and to exercise his religious rights.  

Moreover, there is no suggestion that Defendants acted to suppress Plaintiff’s religious views or ideas....  As a result, the Court finds that Plaintiff does not plausibly allege a First Amendment freedom of assembly violation....

The court then added a lengthy footnote which reads in part:

Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim also fails if construed under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment....  “[T]he First Amendment is only implicated if the governmental burden on religion is ‘substantial,’ which essentially means that the state may not compel an individual to act contrary to his religious beliefs.” ... Here, Plaintiff has pled no facts upon which the Court could infer that Plaintiff’s religious rights were substantially burdened based on his inability to pick up his son from school on two occasions.

Indiana Trial Court Permanently Enjoins Enforcement of Abortion Ban Against Women with Conflicting Religious Beliefs

In Anonymous Plaintiff 1 v. Individual Members of the Medical Licensing Board of Indiana, (Super. Ct., March 5, 2026), an Indiana state trial court, invoking Indiana's Religious Freedom Restoration Act, issued a permanent injunction barring enforcement of Indiana's abortion ban against individuals whose religious exercise would be substantially burdened by the ban. A state appellate court had already decided that plaintiffs were entitled to a preliminary injunction. (See prior posting.) In granting the permanent injunction, the trial court said in part:

The Abortion Law would allow a plaintiff to seek an abortion if her pregnancy were the result of rape, but not if it were mandated by her religious beliefs. The State has not justified this differential treatment by establishing that its interest in the same prenatal life changes based upon the reason for terminating a pregnancy. The fact that the Abortion Law expressly allows for abortion in other circumstances, in at least one circumstance at any gestational age, demonstrates the lack of a compelling interest in “protecting life” under all circumstances and from fertilization. Id.

Moreover, “the [Indiana] General Assembly has declined to explicitly define human beings to include zygotes, embryos, or all fetuses.” Id. (code citations omitted). The Abortion Law specifically exempts from its coverage in vitro fertilization procedures—a process that results in post-fertilization embryos, even though “there is the potential for life that might be destroyed in the process of this procedure.” ... “That broad exemption suggests any compelling interest by the State is absent at fertilization.” Id.

The State has not satisfied its burden under RFRA to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest in enforcing the Abortion Law against sincere religious practice, either in general or as to the plaintiffs.

... The State may prefer the statute’s existing “secular” exceptions to religious ones, but it cannot escape the fact that the law is underinclusive.... Given that the statute is underinclusive, the State bears the burden of “adequately explain[ing] its differential treatment.” Id. It has not.

The court would suggest that the State has already found ways to accommodate competing interests by putting parameters on the exceptions. There is no reason that the same accommodations could not be made with the conflict with RFRA. An outright ban is simply not the least-restrictive mean.

ReligiousLiberty.tv comments on the decision.

UPDATE: Indiana Capital Chronicle reports that the Attorney General has appealed the ruling.

Florida Governor's Order Declaring CAIR a Foreign Terrorist Organization Is Held Unconstitutional

As previously reported, last December Florida Governor Ron DeSantis issued an Executive Order declaring CAIR to be a foreign terrorist organization and barring it and anyone providing material support or resources to it from receiving state contracts or state benefits. In CAIR-Foundation, Inc. v. DeSantis, (ND FL, March 4, 2026), a Florida federal district court held that the Executive Order violates CAIR's free speech rights. The court said in part:

Plaintiff contends that preliminary injunctive relief is necessary to prevent future harm and to remedy ongoing harm to its First Amendment right to free speech due to Defendant’s coercion of third parties to suppress its speech. As evidence of the coercive nature of Defendant’s EO, Plaintiff points to a Florida-based production company that withdrew from a proposed podcast agreement to launch Plaintiff’s civil rights podcast, citing its concerns about the EO, and notes that the company would reconsider its withdrawal from the agreement in the event the EO was found to be unlawful....

A government official “cannot do indirectly what [he] is barred from doing directly: . . . coerce a private party to punish or suppress disfavored speech on [his] behalf.” 

Defendant’s EO threatens those who platform, collaborate with, or otherwise provide support to Plaintiff.... 

... [T]he production company is an intermediary intending to platform Plaintiff’s speech. By threatening the production company— indeed, by broadly threatening anyone who wishes to do business in Florida— Defendant stifles Plaintiff’s speech....

It should be lost on no one that Defendant’s EO targets one of America’s largest Muslim civil rights organization for indirect suppression of speech. But, as we all know, it is easy for those in power to target minority groups with little pushback. Sadly, history teaches that it is often minority religious groups who find themselves in the crosshairs. And here, the Muslim community presents an especially easy target for Defendant, inasmuch as they make up less than 1% of Florida’s population...

CAIR issued a press release announcing the decision.

Muslim Woman Forced to Remove Hijab During Booking Can Proceed on Some of Her Claims

In Khan v. City of Richardson, (ND TX, March 4, 2026), a Muslim woman sued after she was required to remove her hijab during the intake, photo and fingerprinting process at the Richardson police department and the Dallas County Jail. The court allowed Plaintiff to proceed on her claims under RLUIPA, and under the Texas Constitution, saying in part:

While “appropriate relief “does not include monetary damages against states, “municipalities and counties may be held liable for money damages under RLUIPA....

Richardson and Dallas assert that Plaintiff’s claims arising under Article I, § 6 of the Texas Constitution should be dismissed to the extent that they seek money damages. Plaintiff does not dispute that the Texas Constitution does not provide a private cause of action to recover monetary damages for a violation of rights under the Texas Constitution. Instead, Plaintiff avers that she is only seeking equitable relief, which is permitted.

The court dismissed without prejudice plaintiff's claim under the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act because she did not satisfy TRFRA’s pre-suit notice requirements.

The court dismissed with prejudice plaintiff's Section 1983 claim because Plaintiff did not sufficiently plead a policy or custom that was promulgated or ratified by a policymaker and did not adequately plead a failure to train.

The court also dismissed plaintiff's claim under the Texas Tort Claims Act because Plaintiff has alleged an intentional tort which is barred by sovereign immunity.