NYC Health Department Employees Sue Claiming Anti-Jewish Discrimination

Suit was filed this week in a New York federal district court by seven employees of the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) alleging discrimination on the basis of religion, creed, ethnicity, ancestry, and national origin. The 110-page complaint (full text) in Cohen v. City of New York, (SD NY, filed 11/10/2026), alleges in part:

2. DOHMH operates an Employee Resource Group (ERG) program that confers official recognition, an agency e-mail account, a SharePoint page, a place on the agency’s ERG calendar, and a $5,000 annual budget on employee groups that “share common identities or backgrounds.” DOHMH has recognized six ERGs. 

3. Since July 2025, DOHMH has twice refused to recognize a Jewish ERG on the stated ground that Jewish identity is “religious” and that “ERG identity cannot be based on religious groups.” The written denial so ruled although HINENU’s application and charter stated, repeatedly and expressly, that the group is organized around the shared peoplehood, ancestry, ethnic heritage, culture, and history of the Jewish people, that it “will not engage in political advocacy, religious worship, or religious instruction,” and that it “is not organized to advance, oppose, or practice any religion.” ...

5. On December 16, 2025, days after two gunmen murdered Jews gathered for a Hanukkah celebration at Bondi Beach in Sydney, Australia, HINENU sent from its agency e-mail account, to the approximately eighty-five DOHMH employees on its mailing list, a Hanukkah message mourning the victims and quoting a New York rabbi’s public statement that “anti-Zionism kills Jews,” and convened an online support space for grieving Jewish employees. The next day ... DOHMH’s EEO Director ordered HINENU to “desist” from using its agency e-mail account.  

6. DOHMH then opened an EEO investigation of eight leaders of HINENU ...  for “racial and religious discrimination,” on a complaint by fourteen co-workers...., several of whom had organized the Department’s own anti-Israel programming. 

7. Over a nearly four-month investigation, DOHMH’s investigators interrogated HINENU leaders about their beliefs concerning Zionism, Israel, and the meaning of the slogan “globalize the intifada,” pressed them to concede that quoting a rabbi’s condemnation of that slogan was “inflammatory,” “political,” and “triggering,” and suggested that Jews who fear those who chant “globalize the intifada” thereby express hostility to Arabs and Muslims....

9. These acts occurred as part of an environment at DOHMH, prevailing since October 7, 2023, hostile to Jews, embodied primarily in severe and pervasive messaging of animus toward the State of Israel and support for its enemies....

National Jewish Advocacy Center issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit. JTS reports on the lawsuit.

Librarian Fired for Displaying Trans Friendly Book Alleges Religious Discrimination

 A lawsuit claiming religious, racial and sex discrimination as well as free speech, due process and equal protection violations was filed last month in a Georgia federal district court by the former manager of a public library in Pierce County, Georgia. Plaintiff, a black woman, was removed from her position because she included in a book display a children's book about a transgender family. The complaint (full text) in Moore v. Three Rivers Regional Library System, (SD GA, filed 10/26/2026), alleges in part:

19. The theme for the State of Georgia’s statewide summer reading program in 2025 was “Color Our World.” 

20. As the library manager in Pierce County, Moore invited local families, parents and children, to select books from within the library with colorful book covers to put on display in celebration of the Color Our World theme.... A family whom Moore considers to be gender fluid selected the children’s book, When Aidan Became a Brother....

23. Moore did not censor the family’s selection and allowed the book to be displayed in the Pierce County library as part of a larger selection of books selected for Color Our World.

24. The book display was posted on social media....

26.  In an email to [the County] Commissioners ... local resident Crystal Winn, who has a history of anti-LGBTQ activism and is affiliated with the Alliance for Faith and Family, stated in part, “[T]his kind of mental manipulation (also known today as mental rape) of children where adults get children to focus on their sexuality and confuse them, teaching them God made them incorrectly is immensely harmful!”...

35. Pierce County directed Three Rivers to terminate Moore’s employment, and Three Rivers complied on June 18, 2025....

38. Three Rivers replaced Moore with a white woman as the library manager in Pierce County and retained a white, gay man in a leadership position....

41. Title VII prohibits employers from discharging or otherwise discriminating against an employee because of her religious beliefs. 

42. Defendants terminated Moore because, consistent with her beliefs, she associated with a gender fluid family and allowed that family to select and display a book in the library about a trans child....

Metro Weekly reports on the lawsuit.

Trump Nominates Matthew Zandi To EEOC

Yesterday the White House announced that President Trump has sent to the Senate the nomination of Matthew Zandi to be a member of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for a term ending July 1, 2031. Zandi, if confirmed, will fill the position formerly held by Jocelyn Samuels who had been appointed by President Trump for a term ending in July 2026, but who was removed from her position by Trump in January 2025 along with Charlotte Burrows (Background). Zandi currently serves as chief of staff and special counsel in the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice. Initial reaction to Zandi's nomination suggests that he will face at least some opposition. The EEOC enforces federal laws barring discrimination in employment, including religious discrimination.

4th Circuit Refuses to Expand Exemptions from Anti-Discrimination Laws for Religious Employers

In Doe v. Catholic Relief Services, (4th Cir., Oct. 16. 2026), the U.S.4th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision affirmed a Maryland federal district court's holding that Catholic Relief Services violated Title VII and the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act by denying health insurance coverage to an IT analyst's same-sex spouse. In a 66-page majority opinion, the court said in part:

Here, CRS asks us to expand both statutory and constitutional protections for religious employers.  CRS argues that either Title VII’s exemption or the Religion Clauses should immunize all employment decisions by religious organizations so long as the decision is based on the employer’s religious belief, regardless of whether race, sex, or national origin is a but-for cause of the decision or whether the employee plays a ministerial role.  We will not.  The extremely broad and nearly unbounded immunity CRS seeks is not required by any statute or constitutional provision.

Judge Wynn also filed a concurring opinion responding in length to the dissent. Judge Wynn said in part:

Constitutional doctrines require boundaries. The dissenting opinion offers none that can reliably confine its principle to the circumstances it evidently has in mind. If a religious employer possesses constitutional immunity whenever an adverse employment decision confronts sincerely held religious doctrine, it is difficult to see why the principle would stop with objections concerning sexual orientation or gender identity. A sincere religious belief might likewise be asserted for an employment decision based on sex, race, national origin, or some other characteristic protected by law. 

Recognizing the problem, the dissenting opinion simply asserts that employers would not do such a thing—at least when it comes to race....  [C]onstitutional law cannot rest so comfortably upon assurances of self-restraint....

Judge Quattlebaum filed an 88-page dissenting opinion, saying in part: 

Rooted in the text, history and tradition of the First Amendment, the church autonomy doctrine prevents courts from reviewing a religious organization’s conduct based on its faith, doctrine or governance. John Doe’s lawsuit against Catholic Relief Services (CRS) asks the federal courts to do just that....

Recent Supreme Court precedent makes clear that regulations that burden the exercise of religion must satisfy strict scrutiny if their exceptions favor secular interests over religious ones. The majority interprets the statutes to do just that, and none are narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest....

This appeal involves the use of secular laws to regulate churches and religious organizations, not the general use of religion to justify discriminatory conduct. That’s why I attempted to describe the history of conflict between governments and the church on the church’s autonomy. On that point, it’s accurate that until recently, the government’s use of antidiscrimination laws to interfere with the internal doctrinal decisions of churches and religious organizations on issues that relate to their mission was uncommon. It’s also accurate that until recently, religious employers have not commonly faced claims under antidiscrimination laws for setting employment terms that require compliance with their sincerely held beliefs....

[Thanks to Eugene Volokh via Religionlaw for the lead.] 

4th Circuit Debates When the Reason for Seeking an Accommodation Under Title VII Is "Religious"

In Wilkins-Bailey v. Essity Professional Hygiene North America, LLC, (4th Cir., Sept. 1, 2026), the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, held that a North Carolina federal district court wrongly granted summary judgment to an employer charged with religious and racial discrimination under Title VII. The employer denied an exemption from its Covid vaccine mandate to a black female sales administrator who is a Jehovah's Witness. Plaintiff's refusal to be vaccinated led to her dismissal by the company. The company contended that plaintiff's reasons for seeking an exemption were secular, not religious. In rejecting that contention, the 4th Circuit's majority said in part:

... Wilkins-Bailey, by connecting her refusal to vaccinate to her belief that her “body is a temple,” has based her claim on a belief which is religious....  She blends her explanation of her beliefs with numerous references to personal safety and the natural or non-natural character of vaccination and other medical treatments, as well as historical concerns about discriminatory practices in medicine.....

Even so, we think it is plainly clear that Wilkins-Bailey has connected her refusal to receive the COVID-19 vaccine with her religious beliefs by stating that it “is God’s law” that she must “be protective of [her] temple.”... Indeed, a claimant’s mixed secular and religious motives do not preclude protection under Title VII....

Wilkins-Bailey has clearly provided sufficient evidence to permit a jury to find that her refusal to vaccinate is connected to her religious beliefs....

Moreover, “courts should not expect, much less require, exemption requests to sound like they were written by someone with legal training.”...

Even though Wilkins-Bailey’s beliefs are sufficiently religious, it may be that they do not impose on her a “religious obligation to refuse” vaccination....  Essity contends that because Wilkins-Bailey believes she may personally interpret the requirements of her religion, that her interpretation is therefore the product of a “personal decision.”...

We do not agree.  This interpretation of Title VII would leave millions of religious Americans unprotected in their workplaces.  Many religions permit and even encourage their adherents to discern or interpret official texts, teachings, and tenets in order to decide for themselves which actions are required to fulfill religious obligations.  Some religions have no centrally managed canons, nor agreed-upon sacred commandments.... Title VII protects even those religions which do not require strict adherence to a written catechism....

The court, however, affirmed dismissal of plaintiff's racial discrimination claim, saying in part:

Essity has proffered a nondiscriminatory reason for its differential treatment of Wilkins-Bailey and her posited white comparators: it viewed their requests as stating “religious” reasons, while Wilkins-Bailey’s stated “secular” reasons....  For the purposes of a race discrimination claim, that differentiation is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason....

Judge Floyd dissented as to the religious discrimination claim, saying in part: 

I would ... require a plaintiff bringing a religious accommodation claim to put forward more than a mere scintilla of evidence to factually support the conclusion that her belief is connected with her refusal to comply with an employment requirement....

Wilkins-Bailey has not presented the court with a record that could allow a jury to find that her refusal to receive the vaccine is connected to her religious beliefs....

In practice, the majority’s low evidentiary bar would allow any plaintiff who brings a religious discrimination claim to reach a jury so long as they testify that their personal decisions are cloaked in religiosity.  This is improper at summary judgment stage....  Under the majority’s reasoning, an employee who obliquely references Psalm 127:2 ... (“In vain you rise early and stay up late, toiling for food to eat—for he grants sleep to those he loves.”) to refuse to work before noon creates a jury question as to whether the company religiously discriminates when it declines to accommodate that employee’s schedule....

... Wilkins-Bailey prays and then reaches a personal decision, and she concedes that she is not obliged by her religion to come to a particular conclusion.  Her belief that her religion vests her with the ability to make that personal decision is one step removed from her ultimate decision.  Indeed, Wilkins-Bailey “concedes that none of her religious beliefs requires [sic] her to object to the COVID-19 vaccine.”...

Clergy Duties Do Not Excuse Compliance With Forum Selection Clause In Employment Agreement

In Luzingu v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., (D ME, July 31, 2026), a Maine federal district court rejected a claim by a Christian pastor that in a civil rights action under Title VII and state statutes against his former employer, Abbott Laboratories, he should be able to ignore a forum selection clause in his employment agreement that requires any litigation against his employer be brought in state or federal court in northern Illinois. Plaintiff worked in an Abbott Lab facility in the state of Maine beginning in 2016 when he came to the United States from Angola because of persecution in his home country. His Abbott employment was terminated in 2022. He now is employed as a Christian pastor and is pursuing a master's degree online. He filed suit against Abbott in a Maine federal district court. According to the court:

Plaintiff argues that transfer [of the case to Illinois] would be unfair, unjust, and against public policies that favor the free exercise of religion and nondiscrimination.... Plaintiff is “the sole pastor at his church” and “leads three services per week.” ...  Because of his religious calling and his duties, he maintains, “[t]raveling to Illinois for a deposition or trial would make it far more difficult for him to fulfill his pastoral duties than if the deposition or trial occurred in Maine.”...  

I am not persuaded that Plaintiff’s religious practices and duties as a pastor justify giving him a special dispensation to avoid application of the Forum-Selection Clause....  And as for the burden itself, assuming that a special dispensation might be appropriate based on individual needs pertaining to the inconvenience of a particular forum, the Defendant has indicated that Plaintiff’s deposition will take place in Maine.  Moreover, Defendant fairly observes that a trial in Illinois should take only a few days and that telecommunications technology enables Plaintiff to remain connected to his parishioners when court is not in session.  I agree with Defendant that the limited time required to conduct a trial of this case in Illinois will not unduly disrupt Plaintiff’s religious observance, even if religious observance is a proper basis to nullify the consequences of a forum-selection clause. 

... [I]t is unreasonable to suspect that Defendant is enforcing the Forum-Selection Clause against Plaintiff in a selective manner based on the burden that litigation in Illinois would impose on his pastoral duties.  Defendant has similarly moved to enforce its forum-selection clause in cases brought by plaintiffs who do not point to their religious practice as cause to avoid the consequences of the Forum-Selection Clause....

DC Circuit Gives Pleading Leeway to Pro Se Muslim Plaintiff Who Claims Religious Discrimination

 In Naz v. Wright, (DC Cir., June 9, 2026), the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision reversed a district court's dismissal of a religious discrimination claim brought by a Muslim woman of Pakistani origin who was fired from her position at the Department of Energy.  The majority said in part:

Naz alleged that, in May or June 2019, she asked Gross—who by then had become her supervisor—whether during the month of Ramadan, he could adjust the start time of their weekly team meetings by 30 minutes and grant her a flexible work schedule to accommodate her religious observance....  But “instead of accommodating m[y] request,” Naz alleges, Gross “bluntly replied to me that [the Department] is a workplace, not a religious institution, and he does not believe in Islamic religious extremism.” ...   

The district court’s opinion, though, does not expressly take account of Naz’s allegation about Gross’s statement. Granted, Naz did not include the allegation in her complaint, instead stating it in her opposition to the Department’s motion to dismiss.  But as noted, our precedents generally call for considering a pro se plaintiff’s allegations in an opposition to a dismissal motion even if they are not in the complaint....

Judge Katsas filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

... [M]y colleagues vacate the dismissal of the discrimination claims, based on a contestable argument raised neither by Naz nor by the amicus curiae whom we appointed to support her position.  Specifically, my colleagues conclude that the district court erred in not plucking an allegation out of Naz’s 148-page opposition to the government’s motion to dismiss, deeming that allegation to be part of Naz’s complaint, and then considering whether it tipped the balance against dismissal.  Rather than inject that contention into this appeal, I would instead apply ordinary party-presentation principles, which compel an affirmance....

HRD reports on the decision.

Children's Minister May Not Sue Church for Wrongful Discharge

In Elmore v. Mount Vernon Baptist Church, (WV App, May 27, 2026), a West Virginia state appellate court affirmed the dismissal of a suit by the former Children’s Minister at Mount Vernon Baptist Church claiming that she was unlawfully terminated by a vote of the Board of Deacons and subsequently a vote of the congregation. Plaintiff contends that she was terminated because she reported another employee for suspected child abuse and accused the church's male youth minister of sexually harassing her daughter. The majority said in part:

We find it unnecessary to resolve the parties’ dispute over the extent to which the “ministerial exception” recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court bars Ms. Elmore’s claims in this matter. As noted, the circuit court found that Ms. Elmore’s claims stemming from her termination were also barred by respondents’ constitutional right to freedom of religion under the SCAWV’s decision in Gillespie v. Elkins Southern Baptist Church....

While it is true that the SCAWV recognized that the Gillespie petitioner alleging wrongful discharge did not assert that his termination violated a substantial public policy, the Court further explained that it could not have addressed the merits of his claim even if he had....

Chief Judge Greear filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

I fully concur with the majority’s decision holding that Ms. Elmore’s claims are barred. I write separately because I would resolve this case under the “ministerial exception” recognized in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012).

Ministerial Exception May Not Apply to Non-Catholic 1st Grade Teacher in Catholic School

In Coates v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Savannah, (MD GA, April 6, 2026), a Georgia federal district court refused at this point in the litigation to dismiss on ministerial exception grounds claims of racial discrimination in employment brought against a Catholic school by an African American 1st grade teacher. The court said in part:

... [T]he amended complaint plausibly alleges Coates did not serve a ministerial function at SPCCS [St. Peter Clavar Catholic School].  Coates alleges that before her employment with SPCCS even began, Coates told Hillig [the school's principal] she was not Catholic and would not accept employment if it would require her to “participate in Catholic doctrine or worship services.”... Hillig responded by assuring Coates that religious instruction would not be her responsibility and that she would only need to escort the students to Mass on Wednesdays and monitor behavior.... During Coates’ employment, Coates did not teach religion or lead students in worship or prayer.... Nor did she participate in “Catholic worship or practices.” ... Yet, Coates received positive performance reviews....

To be sure, the complaint also alleges facts suggesting Coates may have served a ministerial role at SPCCS. Coates signed an employment contract designating her role as “ministerial” and requiring her to model the Catholic faith regardless of religion..... Still, on a motion to dismiss, Coates’ need only plausibly allege she served a non-ministerial function.... Coates has alleged facts suggesting that, despite SPCCS’ formal designation of Coates’ position as ministerial, SPCCS did not actually expect Coates to perform ministerial functions at the school, and ...accepted Coates until she participated in a police investigation against another teacher. Perhaps, as discovery develops, the undisputed facts will show that SPCCS, like most religious schools, has a sincere mission to promote religious education, and that Coates, even as a non-Catholic, served a vital role in that mission. But because the amended complaint plausibly alleg[es] that Coates’ position was non-ministerial, Defendants’ motion to dismiss her employment claims on the basis of the ministerial exception is DENIED...

The court dismissed plaintiff's Title VII religious discrimination claims on the basis of the religious institution exclusion in Title VII.

4th Circuit Hears Oral Arguments In 3 Employment Discrimination Cases Involving Religiously Affiliated Institutions

On March 17, the U.S.4th Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments in three cases of interest:

(1) In Zinski v. Liberty University, Inc., (audio of full oral arguments) the court heard an appeal in a Virginia federal district court case. The district court had refused to dismiss a Title VII sex discrimination lawsuit against Liberty University brought by a former employee whose employment as an IT Apprentice was terminated because she underwent a male to female sex transition. (See prior posting).

(2) In Doe v. Catholic Relief Services, (audio of full oral arguments), the court heard an appeal in a Maryland federal district court case that held that the religious corporation exemption from the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act does not apply to the termination of spousal health care benefits of the same-sex spouse of a data analyst and advisor working for Catholic Relief Services. (See prior posting.)

(3) In General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Horton, (audio of full oral arguments) the court heard an appeal in a Maryland federal district court case which denied a preliminary injunction in a suit challenging the Maryland Supreme Court's interpretation of the religious exemption in the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act. The Maryland Supreme Court has held that the exemption is limited to claims brought by employees who perform duties that directly further the core mission of the religious entity. (See prior posting).

European Court Says German Catholic Organization Cannot Dismiss Employee Who Left the Church

In Katholische Schwangerschaftsberatung, (CJ EU, March 17, 2026), in a referral from the Federal Labor Court (Germany), the Court of Justice of the European Union, interpreted Council Directive 2000/78 that, among other things, bans employment discrimination on the basis of religion or belief. The Court said in part:

2.  The request [for a Preliminary Ruling] has been made in proceedings between the Katholische Schwangerschaftsberatung (a Catholic association counselling on pregnancy, Germany) ... and JB concerning the legality of the dismissal of the latter on the grounds of an alleged infringement of the duty to act in good faith and with loyalty to the Association’s ethos....

24. JB, who is the mother of five children, entered the service of the Association in 2006. Until her parental leave, which began on 11 June 2013 and which ended on 31 May 2019, she was entrusted with pregnancy counselling. In October 2013, JB, under the procedure provided for by the national provisions, declared before the competent local authority that she was leaving the Catholic Church. The grounds she stated for leaving the Catholic Church were that the Diocese of Limburg levied, in addition to the State church tax, an additional church levy on Catholic persons who, like JB, are in an interfaith marriage with a high-earning spouse.

25      After unsuccessfully attempting to persuade JB to rejoin the Catholic Church, the Association, on 1 June 2019, dismissed JB on the grounds that she had left that church.... [I]n the pregnancy counselling service in which JB was working the Association employed four employees who were members of the Catholic Church and two employees who were not members of that church....

... [T]he Court (Grand Chamber) hereby rules: Article 4(1) and (2) of Directive 2000/78 ... must be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which a private organisation the ethos of which is based on a religion may require of an employee who is a member of a certain church practising that religion not to leave that church during the employment relationship, on pain of dismissal or, in order to continue the employment relationship, to rejoin that church after leaving it, even though--  that organisation employs other persons to carry out the same duties as those of the employee in question, without requiring that those persons be members of that church, and  –  that employee does not openly act in a manner that is antagonistic to the church concerned, where ... those occupational requirements are not genuine, legitimate and justified having regard to that organisation’s ethos.

The July 2025 Opinion of the Advocate General, the Court's Press Release on the case, and the Court's explanatory video on the case are available from the Court's website.

Courthouse News Service reports on the decision.

Canadian Province Awards $750,000 In Damages to LGBTQ Teachers For Trustee's Hate Speech

In the Canadian province of British Columbia, the province's Human Rights Tribunal has ordered a Board of Education trustee to pay damages of $750,000 (Canadian) to compensate LGBTQ teachers in the Chilliwack School District for injury to their dignity, feelings and self-respect caused by respondent's discriminatory and hate speech that violated the British Columbia Human Rights Law.  In Chilliwack Teachers’ Association v. Neufeld, (BC HRT, Feb. 18, 2026), the Tribunal (in a 141-page opinion) said in part:

... In 2017, the Ministry approved resources and tools aimed at fostering a SOGI [Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity]-inclusive education environment in all schools....

The backlash to SOGI 1 2 3 was immediate. One of its loudest critics was the Respondent, Barry Neufeld. At the time, Mr. Neufeld was an elected trustee of the Chilliwack Board of Education ....  For the next five years of his tenure as a trustee, Mr. Neufeld engaged in a high-profile public campaign against SOGI 1 2 3 and the values underlying it. He did this through social media posts, as well as in statements made in Board meetings, rallies, and interviews. Throughout these publications, 30 of which are at issue here, Mr. Neufeld broadcast the message that SOGI 1 2 3 is a “weapon of propaganda”, which threatens “traditional family values” and instructs children about the “absurd theory” that “gender is not biologically determined, but a social construct”. This “lie”, he warned, alienates children from their parents and primes them for sexual abuse....

 We declare that Mr. Neufeld violated ss. 7(1)(a), (b) and 13 of the Code....

... [A]lthough Mr. Neufeld occasionally alluded to his religion, at no point in this complaint did he assert, or lead evidence to support, that his right to freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter was engaged. In our view, it would not be appropriate to speculate about s. 2(a) of the Charter without a factual foundation or proper argument. For that reason, we have not considered whether our decision appropriately balances Mr. Neufeld’s religious freedoms....

Christian Post reports on the decision.

Firing of Synagogue Religious Teacher for Anti-Israel Blog Post Is Upheld By NY's Top Court

In Sander v. Westchester Reform Temple, (NY Ct. App., Dec. 16, 2025), the New York Court of Appeals (New York's highest court) affirmed the dismissal of a suit alleging that plaintiff was fired from her position with a synagogue in violation of §201-d of New York's employment discrimination law. That section prohibits, among other things, discharging an employee because of the person's legal recreational activities. Plaintiff was fired from her teaching position at a Reform synagogue less than three weeks after she began because of a blog post critical of Israel and Zionism that she co-authored. Plaintiff claimed that her firing was because of blogging which is a lawful recreational activity. The majority opinion by Judge Halligan, joined by 4 other judges, held that her suit should be dismissed under the ministerial exception doctrine. The opinion said it was unnecessary to decide whether of not blogging is a "recreational activity" under §201-d.

Judge Rivera filed a concurring opinion relying on the exclusion in §201-d for activities that create a material conflict of interest relating to the employer's business interest.

Judge Troutman concurred in the result for the reasons stated by the appellate court below, namely that plaintiff was not discharged for the activity of blogging, but for the content of the blog post.

Church Autonomy Doctrine Requires Dismissal of Catholic School Employee's Discrimination Claim

In MoChridhe v. Academy of Holy Angels, (MN App. Dec. 1, 2025), a Minnesota state appellate court rejected an employment discrimination claim by a former media specialist/librarian at a Catholic school. The school refused to renew her contract when she disclosed that she was undergoing gender transition to present as a female. The school based its decision on MoChridhe's refusal to abide by the "Guiding Principles for Catholic Schools and Religious Education Concerning Human Sexuality and Sexual Identity." The court said in part:

Does the First Amendment protect a religious employer from discrimination claims by a terminated non-minister employee if the termination was based on a religious reason?  Given the facts alleged in MoChridhe’s complaint and the absence of any binding precedent suggesting otherwise, we discern no basis to conclude that the broader religious protections of the First Amendment church autonomy doctrine are not available to the religious employer in that situation....

... [C]onsideration of MoChridhe’s claims would require consideration of the Archdiocese’s religious reason for the employment decision, would interfere with the Archdiocese’s internal decision to require compliance with the Guiding Principles in the school setting—which relates to the church’s mission to educate young people in its faith— and would foster excessive governmental entanglement with religion.  The potential inapplicability of the ministerial exception does not change that conclusion, and there is no precedent indicating that it must...

Andrea Lucas Named Chair of EEOC

Last week, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission announced that Andrea R. Lucas has been designated by President Trump as Chair of the Commission. She has been a member of the Commission since 2020. She was confirmed by the Senate in July 2025 to serve a second term on the Commission. She has been serving as Acting Chair of the EEOC since January of this year. (Background.) According to Lucas' biography on the EEOC website:

She prioritizes evenhanded enforcement of civil rights laws for all Americans, including by rooting out unlawful DEI-motivated race and sex discrimination; protecting American workers from anti-American national origin discrimination; defending the biological and binary reality of sex and related rights, including women’s rights to single-sex spaces; protecting workers from religious bias and harassment; and remedying other areas that have been historically under-enforced by the agency.

On Oct. 7, the U.S. Senate confirmed Brittany Panuccio as an EEOC member, restoring sufficient members for a quorum. The EEOC lost its quorum when President Trump removed two Biden-appointed Commissioners in January. (Background.)

The EEOC administers federal laws barring employment discrimination, including discrimination on the basis of religion.

Challenge To Narrow Religious Exemption in Maryland Employment Law Is Dismissed In Part

In General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Horton, (D MD, June 18, 2025), a Maryland federal district court denied a preliminary injunction in a suit challenging the Maryland Supreme Court's interpretation of the religious exemption in the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act. The Maryland Supreme Court has held that the exemption is limited to claims brought by employees who perform duties that directly further the core mission of the religious entity. As summarized by the court, plaintiffs allege in part:

(1) the exemption violates Plaintiffs' church autonomy rights under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment; (2) it violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because it excessively entangles government with religion; (3) it violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment; (4) it violates the Establishment Clause by discriminating against Plaintiffs based on their denomination; (5) it violates Plaintiffs' First Amendment right to expressive association; (6) it violates Plaintiffs' First Amendment right to assembly; and (7) it violates the right to due process of law under the Fifthand Fourteenth Amendments because it is unconstitutionally vague.

In a 43-page opinion, the court found that plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits of any of these claims. However it refused to dismiss outright three of plaintiff's claims, saying in part:

... [T]he Court recognizes that Plaintiffs are in good faith seeking an extension of the law in Count 1 [church autonomy], and that on Count 3 [free exercise], Plaintiffs have a different interpretation of the law on the issue of the applicable level of scrutiny that is not strictly foreclosed by precedent. Ordinarily, a court should refrain from dismissing outright a claim asserting a novel legal theory that can better be assessed after factual development....

... [T]he Court finds that under its view of the legal landscape, Plaintiffs have not stated a viable claim of a violation of the right to expressive association. Nevertheless, as with Counts 1 and 3, where Plaintiffs are seeking an extension of the law to have claims based on expressive association apply to the employment context, and further factual development is arguably warranted before full disposition of this claim, the Motion to Dismiss will be denied as to this claim.

9th Circuit Hears Oral Arguments Over Religious Exemptions from Washington Antidiscrimination Law

On June 3, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments (video of full arguments) in Union Gospel Mission of Yakima Washington v. Brown. In the case, a Washington federal district court granted a preliminary injunction to a religious organization that operates a homeless shelter and thrift stores. The injunction bars the state's attorney general from enforcing the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) against plaintiff for limiting all its hiring to coreligionists who adhere to the organization's religious tenets and behavior requirements. In 2021 the Washington Supreme Court interpreted the exemption in the WLAD for non-profit religious organizations to apply only to hiring for ministerial positions. (See prior posting.) Washington State Standard reports on the oral arguments.

Christian Foster Care Ministry Can Limit Hiring to Those of Its Own Faith

In Gracehaven, Inc. v. Montgomery County Department of Job and Family Services, (SD OH, April 21, 2025), an Oho federal district court issued a preliminary injunction restoring contracting and funding by the county to a Christian ministry that provides foster care services to girls who are victims of sex trafficking and abuse. The county had refused to renew its contract with Gracehaven because of the ministry's policy of hiring only employees that shared its religious faith.  The court said in part:

Gracehaven will likely succeed on the merits of its claim that Montgomery County’s actions violated the Free Exercise Clause because it excluded Gracehaven from an otherwise available public benefit based on Gracehaven’s choice to employ those who share the same faith....

“When otherwise eligible recipients are disqualified from a public benefit ‘solely because of their religious character,’” the Court must apply strict scrutiny to the reason the benefit was denied.

Religious Corporation Exemption to Maryland Anti-Discrimination Law Does Not Excuse LGBT Discrimination Against Data Analyst

In Doe v. Catholic Relief Services, (D MD, April 21, 2025), a Maryland federal district court held that the religious corporation exemption from the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act does not apply to the termination of spousal health care benefits of the same-sex spouse of a data analyst and advisor working for Catholic Relief Services. The Maryland Supreme Court had previously held that "in order for the exemption to apply, the employee’s duties must directly further the core mission(s) – religious or secular, or both – of the religious entity." Finding the exemption inapplicable here, the court said in part:

... [T]he evidence preponderantly demonstrates that Doe’s ... duties and responsibilities were sufficiently apart from effectuating CRS goals (and core mission) such that his ... job activities and responsibilities were far attenuated from, and not reasonably capable of bringing about (or preventing effectuation of), CRS goals or missions.  Doe did not directly serve the poor and vulnerable overseas, solicit or secure funding for projects, or possess authority to determine how CRS would pursue its mission through its programs.  Nor did Doe manage or supervise any employee with such responsibilities.... The evidence is that from time to time, he may have been called upon to assist those who were responsible for undertaking actions that effect CRS’s goals; yet he was always one or more steps removed from taking action that effect CRS goals or that bear such responsibility. ...

Because the court concludes that none of Doe’s five full-time positions with CRS directly furthered a CRS mission, and that each of his positions was one or more steps removed from taking the actions that effect CRS goals, the court similarly concludes that CRS has not met its burden to show that MFEPA’s religious entity exemption applies here. ...

Assuming without deciding that CRS has made the threshold showing of a burden on its free exercise rights by operation of MFEPA,.., the court concludes that CRS fails to demonstrate that MFEPA is not neutral and generally applicable in its application to CRS here.

Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine Requires Dismissal of Sex Discrimination Claim by Pastor Applicant

In Turman v. Abyssinian Baptist Church, (SD NY, March 31, 2025), a New York federal district court held that the ministerial exception doctrine requires dismissal of a state-law sex discrimination and breach of contract suit in which plaintiff contends that she was not advanced to the final round of the application process to become a senior pastor because she is a woman. The court rejected plaintiff's claim that the church had waived the ministerial exception defense when it included a non-discrimination statement in the notice and job description for the senior pastor position. The court said in part:

To be sure, one might question the propriety of an organization holding itself out as an equal opportunity employer and reaping the public relations benefits of that self-description, only to turn around and say that it is immune from liability under antidiscrimination statutes when someone alleges that the organization has unlawfully discriminated.  But in this case specifically, mindful of the presumption against waiver and having carefully evaluated the antidiscrimination statement on the job posting, the Court concludes that the statement on the job posting does not clearly demonstrate that Abyssinian waived its First Amendment rights....

... [E]mployment discrimination claims against churches require special solicitude.  By their very nature, these claims routinely pose a substantial entanglement concern.  Accordingly, courts routinely apply the ministerial exception to bar them at the motion to dismiss stage....

... There is no way for this Court to resolve Dr. Marshall Turman’s employment discrimination claim without becoming entangled with Abyssinian’s ecclesiastical innerworkings....

Dr. Marshall Turman “cannot evade the ministerial exception by asserting a contract claim based upon the same underlying facts as her statutory discrimination claims,”....  The ministerial exception, therefore, bars Dr. Marshall Turman’s contract claim, and it is dismissed....

Dr. Marshall Turman also seeks to hold Grant, as the chairperson of the Pulpit Search Committee, individually liable for employment discrimination....  But because the ministerial exception prevents this employment discrimination suit from proceeding against Abyssinian, it also requires this Court to dismiss the claims against Grant.  That is, because the First Amendment prohibits religious organizations from being sued under antidiscrimination laws regarding ministerial roles, it similarly prohibits those organizations’ agents from being sued under the same laws.....