Hawaii County's Denial of Permit to Temple Did Not Meet Strict Scrutiny Test

In Spirit of Aloha Temple v. County of Maui, (D HI, Aug. 11, 2023), in a case that has been in litigation for more than seven years, a Hawaii federal district court entered partial summary judgment for plaintiffs on one issue in the case. It held that the state had not met the strict scrutiny test on plaintiffs RLUIPA, free exercise and equal protection challenges to the denial of a special use permit to allow Spirit of Aloha Temple to use agriculturally-zoned land for a church and several other church-operated facilities including a wedding venue site. The court concluded that the denial was neither narrowly tailored nor the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. However, a number of other issues remain to be decided before determining whether there were statutory or constitutional violations. There remains the question of whether denial of the special use permit imposed a substantial burden on the Temple. According to the court, for purposes of RLUIPA that, in turn, depends on whether plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of being able to build a religious institution on the land when they acquired it. For plaintiffs' federal and state free exercise claims, plaintiffs must show that their operation of the property was rooted in religious belief and that the county had an intent to discriminate. The court went on to hold that the RLUIPA non-discrimination (as opposed to its "substantial burden") provisions do not turn on strict-scrutiny review, but instead on whether there was religious discrimination.  When the regulation is neutral, that requires showing an intent to discriminate.

6th Circuit Hears Oral Arguments in RLUIPA Land Use Dispute

The U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals yesterday (July 19) heard oral arguments (audio of full oral arguments) in a RLUIPA land use case, Catholic Healthcare International, Inc. v Genoa Charter Township, Michigan. The dispute is summarized by a Michigan federal district court in one of its opinions:

CHI acquired title to a parcel of undeveloped property... and requested Township approval to construct a grotto/prayer area with associated parking and drive access on the Property.... In response, the Township informed a CHI representative that the proposed construction would be considered a special land use requiring special land use and site plan approval.... Despite this instruction from the Township, CHI erected the desired religiously symbolic structures: a Station of the Cross, similar in size and appearance to a birdhouse, and a shrine consisting of an image within a brick wall, referred to as a “grotto,” on the Property without approval or permits from the Township....

The complex history of the case is outlined on the website of the American Freedom Law Center. Yesterday's oral arguments, which focused in part on the issue of ripeness, are discussed by Courthouse News Service.

County Did Not Show Compelling Interest in Requiring Amish Plaintiffs to Use Septic Tanks

In Must v. County of Fillmore, (MN App., July 10, 2023), a Minnesota state appellate court in a suit brought under RLUIPA held that the county had not shown that it has a compelling interest in requiring appellants-- 3 members of the Amish community-- to use septic tanks in violation of their religious beliefs. The court said in part:

[T]he district court relied on speculation in making key findings about the harmful content of Amish gray water, the amount of water the Amish use, the number of objecting households, and the amount of Amish gray-water discharge. The district court’s reliance on speculation is precisely what the Supreme Court forbids in Fulton [v. City of Philadelphia]. Thus, we conclude that the record evidence is insufficient to support the district court’s ruling that the septic-tank requirement furthers a compelling state interest specific to these appellants.

In 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court had remanded the case for consideration in light of the Fulton decision. (See prior posting.) Courthouse News Service reports on yesterday's Minnesota court decision.

6th Circuit: Michigan Prisons Must Recognize Christian Identity As A Religion

In Fox v. Washington, (6th Cir., June 26, 2023), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Michigan Department of Corrections had not adequately justified its refusal to recognize Christian Identity as a religion for purposes of the Michigan prison system. The court had previously remanded the case for the state to demonstrate that it met the requirement under RLUIPA that it has a compelling governmental interest in not recognizing Christian Identity, and that it has employed the least restrictive means in doing so. The state focused on the safety concerns growing out of the white supremacist ideology of the religious movement. The 6th Circuit concluded that this is insufficient, in part because the prison system had not considered alternatives short of non-recognition, saying in part:

Begin with the Department’s “policy directive” for “religious beliefs and practices of prisoners.” It plainly does not allow unfettered group worship simply because the Department recognizes a religion....

RLUIPA ... requires an individual inquiry even when group worship is the sought accommodation.... Indeed, each plaintiff testified that he was nonviolent and would prevent others from acting aggressively at group services. The Department offered silence in response—it did not, for example, present any evidence that plaintiffs or any other inmates who follow Christian Identity are violent. True, Bechler linked Christian Identity to racial violence outside the prison setting. But nothing in the record links plaintiffs to any prison violence, racially motivated or otherwise. In short, the Department presented evidence regarding Christian Identity as a whole, but not concerning plaintiffs. In failing to conduct an individualized inquiry, the Department’s decision-making process was deficient....

Although the record links Christian Identity to white nationalist groups, nothing in the record addresses how many Christian Identity adherents are members of those groups. The Department has the burden to show that refusing to recognize Christian Identity is the least restrictive means to advance facility security.... It cannot meet that burden by simply gesturing toward some Christian Identity adherents being members of white supremacist groups and rely on this court to fill in the gaps....

AP reports on the decision.

Court Says Center's Food Distribution Is Likely a Religious Exercise Under RLUIPA

In Micah's Way v. City of Santa Ana, (CD CA, June 8, 2023), a California federal district court refused to dismiss a suit by a center that provides aid to impoverished and disabled individuals claiming that the city has violated its rights under RLUIPA and the First Amendment by refusing to issue it a Certificate of Occupancy unless it agrees to stop providing food and beverages to its clients. While the center had operated for 5 years without a certificate of occupancy, the city began a concerted effort to get Micah's Way as well as a needle exchange program nearby to move out of the neighborhood after the city's mayor who lived nearby experienced a break-in at his home. The court held that Micah's Way plausibly alleged that its food distribution activities are a "religious exercise" under RLUIPA and that the city has substantially burdened that religious exercise. The court also concluded that plaintiff has plausibly alleged a violation of the 1st Amendment's Free Exercise clause. Voice of OC reports on the decision.

11th Circuit: Plaintiff Can Move Ahead with Claims Stemming from Denial of Kosher Meals in Jail

In Ravan v. Talton, (11th Cir., Feb. 27, 2023), the U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals held that plaintiff who is Jewish should have been able to move ahead with RLUIPA claims against a food service and 1st Amendment free exercise claims against two food service workers for denial of kosher meals on seven different occasions while he was in a county detention center. The court said in part:

[I]ndividual defendants argue that depriving Ravan of a handful of meals over a period of months doesn’t constitute an impermissible burden on his religion. But the number of missed meals is not necessarily determinative because being denied three Kosher meals in a row might be more substantial of a burden on religion being denied three meals in three months, and for a diabetic, the denial of one meal may be a substantial burden. And the record is (at best) muddled about the number and timing of Kosher meals that Ravan was denied....

But we reach a different conclusion as to Summit Food Service. To state a claim against Summit Food Service, Ravan had to plead that the company had a custom or policy of not providing Kosher meals, or acquiesced in or ratified its employees’ doing so..... Ravan has not done so...

[I]nstitutions that receive federal funding are liable for monetary damages for violating RLUIPA.... But individual defendants aren’t.... We therefore reverse the dismissal of Ravan’s claim against Summit Food Service and affirm the dismissal of Ravan’s claims against the individual defendants.

Alaska Supreme Court Reverses Dismissal of Muslim Inmate's RLUIPA Claims

In Din v. State of Alaska, Department of Corrections, (AK Sup. Ct., Feb. 22, 2023) the Alaska Supreme Court vacated a trial court's dismissal of a suit brought under RLUIPA and the Alaska constitution by a Muslim inmate and remanded the case for further factual development.  At issue was the inmate's requests to pray five time per day using scented prayer oils and to eat halal meat as part of his diet. Prison rules only allowed use of scented oils for weekly outdoor congregate religious activities and only provided vegetarian or vegan meals for those requesting a halal diet. The court concluded that both restrictions imposed a substantial burden on the inmate's religious exercise. It went on:

Prison security is a compelling government interest. But DOC’s position that possessing prayer oils is prohibitively dangerous is difficult to reconcile with the fact that it allows inmates to possess “skin cream/oil.” Inmate and staff health are also important government interests, and DOC asserts that “even a seemingly mild scent may cause an adverse respiratory reaction.” But DOC’s position is difficult to reconcile with its policies allowing prisoners to possess other fragranced items, like deodorant, hair spray, and air fresheners....

DOC also asserts that the estimated additional cost of providing “halal/kosher meals . . . to accommodate all Alaska inmates who claim to need a special halal/kosher diet . . . would exceed $1,000,000 annually.” Din contends that this is not a compelling reason because providing him pre-packaged halal food would cost DOC approximately $7,700 more than the cost of regular meals, a small sum compared to its massive budget. 

Cost management obviously is an important government interest. But Congress contemplated that RLUIPA may “require a government to incur expenses in its own operations to avoid imposing a substantial burden on religious exercise”....

The court also concluded that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether present policies are the least restrictive means to achieve the state's interests. 

Faith-Based Resource Center for Homeless Sues Over Right to Serve Snacks to Its Clients

Suit was filed this week in a California federal district court by a Resource Cener for impoverished and disabled individuals alleging that the city of Santa Ana has violated its rights under RLUIPA and the First Amendment by insisting that it stop serving snacks to its clients in order to receive a Certificate of Occupancy, even though it had been operating without one for 15 years.  The complaint (full text) in Micha's Way v. City of Santa Ana, (CD CA, filed 1/30/2023), asks for an injunction and declaratory relief.  Voice of OC, reporting on the lawsuit, summarizes the allegations in the 44-page complaint:

For years, homeless people would come by the red roof house on 4th Street in Santa Ana for help with the basics: Personal documents, mail collection, maybe motel vouchers on a good day.

And on their way back out the door, they’d likely take a pastry from the faith-based center called Micah’s Way — a small parting token in the service of Christian ministry, but an unpermitted property use in the eyes of Santa Ana city officials....

On Monday, Micah’s Way attorney Edmond Connor filed a lawsuit against the city, citing federal protections for religious exercises like feeding and sheltering the homeless.

It accuses city officials of scapegoating Micah’s Way for neighborhood impacts from a nearby needle exchange program.

Chabad's Long-Running Suit Over Land Use Dismissed In Part

In Lubavitch of Old Westbury, Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Old Westbury, New York, (ED NY, Jan. 31, 2023), a New York federal magistrate judge recommended that the district court dismiss on various procedural and jurisdictional grounds (including statute of limitations) a number of the claims in a long-running suit by an Orthodox Jewish Chabad organization that has been unable to obtain permission to use some seven acres of property for religious education, worship and related activities. The magistrate judge began his lengthy Report and Recommendation as follows:

Presently before the Court is a motion to partially dismiss this action, which has been pending for more than fourteen years and involves factual allegations going back to 1994. In the years since the initial complaint was filed on December 17, 2008, this case has been assigned (and then reassigned) to four District Judges ... and four Magistrate Judges.... Furthermore, numerous law firms and attorneys have come and gone on behalf of the parties over this lengthy time span. As a reminder to the parties, they have an affirmative obligation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 1 "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."...

A 237-page Second Amended Complaint in the case asserted 17 causes of action under the 1st, 4th, 5th and 14th Amendments, RLUIPA and the state Constitution.

4th Circuit: Church Loses Challenges to Zoning Restrictions

In Alive Church of the Nazarene, Inc. v. Prince William County, Virginia, (4th Cir., Jan. 31, 2023), the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a church's challenges to zoning restrictions that prevented it from using property it purchased for religious services. The church purchased 17 acres of land zoned for agricultural use.  The church originally planned to comply with the agricultural use requirements by making non-alcoholic cider from fruit trees on the property. It would then be classified as a farm winery or limited-license brewery, could build any buildings it wished on the property and could hold events in them. However, the church discovered that in order to qualify, it also was required to obtain a license from the state Alcoholic Beverage Control Board. It concluded that doing this would violate its religious beliefs against the promotion of alcohol. Its only other route was to comply with provisions of a Special Use Permit which required construction that it could not afford. The court rejected the church's equal terms, non-discrimination and substantial burden challenges under RLUIPA, as well as its constitutional Equal Protection, Free Exercise and Peaceable Assembly challenges to the restrictions imposed on it. Courthouse News Service reports on the decision.

Refusal To Approve Athletic Field Lights for Catholic School Did Not Violate RLUIPA

In Edgewood High School of the Sacred Heart, Inc. v. City of Madison, Wisconsin, a Wisconsin federal district court rejected RLUIPA, free speech and other challenges by a Catholic high school to the city's denial of a permit for outdoor lighting at its athletic fields. The surrounding residential neighborhood association objected to the proposal.  The court said in part:

The initial question is whether putting lights on an athletic field is a religious exercise for plaintiff Edgewood at all....  Edgewood suggests that athletics have long been a part of Edgewood, consistent with the Sinisawa Dominican tradition of educating the whole person. Yet this case is not about athletics in general; it is about Edgewood’s ability to install lights in order to use its athletic field at night.... [U]se of the field at night has never been a part of Sinisawa’s Dominican strategy, which largely takes place during regular school hours.

In fairness, plaintiff also suggests that the field could be used for liturgies and other religious ceremonies, but there is nothing in the record indicating that Edgewood ever uses the field for such purposes, much less that it has a need to do so at night....

Even if the court were to assume that night football (as opposed to a variety of sports conducted in gym classes and at practices) is an important element of Edgewood’s religious exercise, which is certainly not a given, plaintiff offers no evidence that it is substantially burdened by having to play night home games at a different field....

[I]t would be a misreading of [two prior cases cited by plaintiffs] to hold that public outcry is sufficient to show unequal treatment under RLUIPA absent proof of a substantial burden on religious exercise, something simply lacking in this case.

6th Circuit: Temporary Shortening of Prison Worship Time Upheld

In Dykes-Bey v. Schroeder, (6th Cir., Dec. 27, 2022), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought under the 1st Amendment and RLUIPA by a Michigan inmate, concluding that the Michigan prison system had not imposed a "substantial burden" on the inmate's free exercise of religion. According to the court:

[D]efendants reduced the worship time for all religious groups from one hour to 30 minutes. As a result of this reduction in worship time, Dykes-Bey, a Moorish American Moslem, was unable to read the proclamation or conduct the closing prayer at four weekly meetings of the Moorish Science Temple of America....

Finding no 1st Amendment violation, the court said in part: 

Dykes-Bey sufficiently alleged a sincerely held religious belief or practice—reading the proclamation and conducting the closing prayer at meetings of the Moorish Science Temple of America. But the defendants' conduct did not rise to the level of a substantial burden on his religious exercise....

Focusing on plaintiff's RLUIPA claim, the court said in part:

Dykes-Bey sought only monetary relief from the defendants, which is not authorized by RLUIPA.

9th Circuit Reverses Dismissal of Inmate's Complaint Over Exclusion of NOI Texts

In Jones v. Shinn, (9th Cir., Dec.14, 2022), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court should not have dismissed an inmate's claim that his rights under RLUIPA were violated when prison authorities denied him access to four texts by Elijah Muhammad. The court said in part:

[T]he district court erred in characterizing the religious exercise at issue as whether Jones was denied all Nation of Islam texts rather than whether the exclusion of the specific texts constitutes a substantial burden on his exercise of religion.... 

And because Jones provided evidence that all texts by Elijah Muhammad are “essential religious texts needed to practice the Islamic faith in accordance with the Nation of Islam,” he raised a triable dispute as to whether the exclusion of the texts constitutes a substantial burden on his exercise of religion.

However, the court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's 1st Amendment free exercise claims, because defendants showed the exclusion was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.

5th Circuit: District Court's Order on Religious Rights in Execution Chamber Was Too Broad

In Barbee v. Collier, (5th Cir., Nov. 11, 2022), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded for further proceedings an injunction issued by a Texas federal district court that barred the execution of convicted murderer Stephen Barbee until the Texas Department of Criminal Justice publishes a clear policy on inmates' religious rights in the execution chamber. Barbee wants his spiritual advisor to pray aloud with him and hold his hand. (See prior posting.) The 5th Circuit said in part:

While a written policy may be desirable ..., the available remedy for Barbee’s RLUIPA violation “is an injunction ordering the accommodation,” ... As it stands, the preliminary injunction ordering the Defendants to enact a written policy on religious accommodation that would apply to all executions is overbroad and must be vacated. The district court may instead consider what relief specific to Barbee is consistent with Ramirez and is appropriate in this case.

On Monday, Barbee filed with U.S. Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito an Application for a Stay of Execution (full text) and a Petition for Certiorari (full text). Yesterday, the state filed a Brief in Opposition to Barbee's filings (full text). Barbee's execution is currently scheduled for 6:00 pm Central Time today.  Courthouse News Service reports on these developments.

UPDATE: On Wednesday, Nov. 16, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Barbee's application for a stay of execution and his petition for certiorari. (Full text of Order.). Courthouse News Service reports.

Texas Prisons Must Adopt Formal Policy on Religious Rights in Execution Chamber

In Barbee v. Collier, (SD TX, Nov. 3, 2022), an inmate whose execution had been scheduled sought a court order from a Texas federal district requiring Texas to allow his spiritual advisor to be present with him in the execution chamber, to pray audibly with him and have physical contact with him, holding his hand, to confer a blessing on him. The Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice filed a series of affidavits assuring the court that these requests would be granted and moved dismiss the lawsuit as moot. The court, however, was unconvinced, saying in part:

In Ramirez [v.  Collier], the Supreme Court encouraged States to "adopt clear rules" and "streamlined procedures" that would protect an inmate's religious rights in the execution chamber.... TDCJ has not responded by enacting any formal policy guaranteeing religious expression in the execution chamber. Instead, TDCJ has left in place an official execution protocol that contains provisions describing the presence, approval process, and vetting requirements for spiritual advisors. Hence, the 2021 protocol is silent as to what a spiritual advisor may do, if anything, inside the execution chamber.,,, 

TDCJ has apparently left the question of what a spiritual advisor may do to the discretion of prison officials.... Until quite recently, TDCJ officials interpreted the silence in the official protocol to prohibit any physical touch or audible prayer in the execution chamber. Now, TDCJ would have the Court accept their latest pronouncement that the same provisions may be read to allow physical contact and audible prayer.... TDCJ officials have initiated a practice of allowing physical contact and audible prayer when the requests are sufficiently timely and permit security checks.

However, the defendants have not specifically formalized in a policy or otherwise described what the basis is for it unwritten practice....

[TDJC] has been encouraged by the highest court in the land to develop a policy that can be reviewed.  The stubbornness of TDCJ to enact a policy that removes all discretion, except in critical instances, militates against extending the lesser burden to TDCJ.

The court entered a Preliminary Injunction that provides:

Texas [TDCJ] may proceed with the execution of Stephen Barbee on November 16, 2022, only after it publishes a clear policy that has been approved by its governing policy body that (1) protects an inmate's religious rights in the execution chamber and (2) sets out any exceptions to that policy, further describing with precision what those exceptions are or may be.

Prisoner's RLUIPA Suit Remanded for Consideration of Statute's "Safe harbor" Provision

 In Richardson v. Clarke, (4th Cir., Nov. 7, 2022), the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals held that a prison's former policy that required inmates to remove head coverings, including religious head coverings, in certain areas of the prison imposed a substantial burden on plaintiff's religious exercise. The court remanded the case to the district court for consideration of the applicability of RLUIPA's safe harbor that allows prisons to avoid liability under RLUIPA by changing the policy or practice that imposes a substantial burden or by providing exemptions from it.

Special Permit Requirement Only For Houses Of Worship Violates 1st Amendment

In Omar Islamic Center Inc. v. City of Meriden, (D CT, Sept. 30, 2022), a Connecticut federal district court held that a zoning regulation that required places of worship to obtain a special permit to operate in areas zoned M-4 (Planned Industrial District) violates plaintiffs' 1st Amendment free exercise rights. Plaintiff sought to use a vacant commercial building as a mosque. The court said in part:

Regulations allowed hotels, motels, and convention centers, as well as numerous shops and stores including bakeries, restaurants, and theaters, to operate as of right in the M-4 district, without needing to apply for a special permit.... Places of worship, however, were required to obtain a special permit before opening their doors. It is clear to the Court that, under the test set forth by the Supreme Court in Tandon, at least some comparable secular activities were therefore treated more favorably than religious activities under the Regulations. Thus, the law is not neutral and generally applicable under free exercise principles, and it must be examined with strict scrutiny.

Defendants have not defended the law under either a rational basis or strict scrutiny standard. In fact, they have proffered no rationale underlying the law whatsoever.

The court also found that the regulation violated plaintiff's equal protection rights. The court refused to pass on plaintiff's RLUIPA claims because it was unclear whether or not plaintiff had an actual property interest in the building.

Suit By Mosque Over Zoning Denials Can Move Ahead

In Adam Community Center v. City of Troy, (ED MI, Sept. 28., 2022), a Michigan federal district court refused to dismiss RLUIPA and constitutional claims against the city of Troy, Michigan. Plaintiff alleged wrongful denial of necessary zoning variances so plaintiff could use its property for Muslim religious services and classes. The court said in part:

Plaintiff has identified pieces of circumstantial evidence that may lead a fact-finder to conclude Troy acted with discriminatory animus towards Muslims. Thus, a question of fact on this claim exists and summary judgment is denied....

[T]here exists a question of fact for trial as to whether ZO § 6.21 was actually applied in a neutral manner or whether it was applied for the purpose of excluding Muslim assemblies from Troy...

The record contains ample evidence to support Adam’s contention that Troy’s stated reasons for denying Adam’s variance application were pretextual and intended to prevent Adam from opening a mosque in the City. Thus, a factfinder could conclude that Adam’s constitutional rights were violated.

The court previously concluded that the city had violated the equal terms and substantial burden provisions of RLUIPA, and now ordered a hearing on damages for those violations. Detroit News reports on the decision.

3rd Circuit Remands RLUIPA Challenge To Sex-Offender Treatment Program

In Robins v. Wetzel, (3d Cir., Sept. 28, 2022), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the dismissal of a portion of a Pennsylvania federal district court opinion in a suit in which an inmate challenged the sex offender treatment program that was required for his release on parole.  The program required him to admit his guilt. According to the court:

Although he was willing to admit that he engaged in sexual relations with his wife, who was a minor child at the time, he was unwilling to admit that that conduct was illegal....

He contended that:

[M]arriage was a sacred tenet of his religion, and he could not admit the illegality of his sexual conduct, which he construed as denouncing his religious marital vows, without violating his religious beliefs.

The court held:

[T]his Court has not had occasion to consider an acceptance-of-responsibility component of a sex-offender treatment program in the context of RLUIPA or RFRA. Given the lack of controlling precedent, we ... remand for the District Court to address the RLUIPA and RFRA claims in the first instance.

RLUIPA Suit Charges City Attempt To Prevent Growth Of Orthodox Jewish Population

Suit was filed earlier this month in an Ohio federal district court by a University Heights, Ohio homeowner who was told by the city that he needed to obtain a special use permit in order to hold Jewish prayer services with ten friends in his home. The complaint (full text) in Grand v. City of University Heights, Ohio, (ND OH, filed 9/8/2021), says in part:

3. Since Grand moved into his home in 2019, he experienced discrimination based on his religion. After Grand’s invitation for friends to join him in Orthodox Jewish prayer in January of 2021, the City, led by its mayor, waged a zealous campaign of capricious enforcement of its local ordinances specifically targeting Grand and several other Orthodox Jewish prayer groups. This campaign is directly responsive to a hostile segment of the mayor’s constituency that seeks to prevent the growth of the City’s Orthodox Jewish population by limiting the locations where Orthodox Jews can pray.

4. Additionally, the City has targeted Grand individually for intentional, arbitrary, and discriminatory application of its ordinances that have caused him substantial injuries.

5. This action challenges certain provisions of the [city ordnances under] ... the United States Constitution, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et seq. (“RLUIPA”), the Ohio Constitution, and Ohio common law.

News5 Cleveland reports on the lawsuit.