In Ciraci v. J.M. Smucker Company, (6th Cir., March 14, 2023), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals held that employees of a company that sells food products to the federal government may not assert a 1st Amendment free-exercise claim against the company for denying them a religious exemption from a COVID vaccine mandate imposed by the company after the federal government required government contractors to do so. The court said in part:
Constitutional guarantees conventionally apply only to entities that exercise sovereign power, such as federal, state, or local governments.... Smucker’s may be a big company. But it is not a sovereign. Even so, did Smucker’s become a federal actor—did it exercise sovereign power?—for purposes of this free-exercise claim when it sold products to the federal government and when it imposed the vaccine mandate because the federal government required it to do so as a federal contractor? No, as the district court correctly held. We affirm....
Smucker’s does not perform a traditional, exclusive public function; it has not acted jointly with the government or entwined itself with it; and the government did not compel it to deny anyone an exemption. That Smucker’s acted in compliance with a federal law and that Smucker’s served as a federal contractor—the only facts alleged in the claimants’ complaint—do not by themselves make the company a government actor.
The court went on to suggest that even if the company were a state actor, there may be no cause of action against them:
To the extent the claimants seek damages directly under the First Amendment against a federal official, they must rely on the kind of implied cause of action created by Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). But extending Bivens is “disfavored” ...
That leaves claimants’ demands for a declaratory judgment, reinstatement, and other equitable relief. In equity, it is true, claimants sometimes may “sue to enjoin unconstitutional actions by state and federal officers” even in the absence of a statutory cause of action.... But today’s claimants seek more than a prohibitory injunction. They seek reinstatement and other affirmative relief. It is not clear whether, as a matter of historical equitable practice, we may infer, imply, or create a cause of action for such relief. But because the parties have not briefed or argued these points and because they do not go to our jurisdiction, we need not decide them today.
