Catholic Clergy Sue ICE Detention Center for Restricting Their Ability to Minister to Detainees

 A suit was filed on Monday in a Missouri federal district court alleging that a detention center housing 150 immigration detainees is violating the free exercise rights of detainees and Catholic clergy. The complaint (full text) in Rozanski v. Stolzer, (ED MO, filed 10/5/2026), the Archdiocese of St. Louis alleges in part:

1. Under the First Amendment—and federal and state statutes that protect the rights enshrined in it—the government may not (a) ban the exercise of religion or (b) treat religious practice differently than it treats analogous secular activity.  Yet the Ste. Genevieve County Detention Center manages to commit both sins by imposing a visitation policy that prevents Catholic priests from meaningfully ministering to Catholic federal detainees housed there (while readily allowing exceptions to the policy for non-religious reasons). 

2.   ...The jail’s visitation policy prohibits this basic religious exercise in two ways.  First, it allows only “no contact” visits, which are not private and prevent face-to-face interactions.  This prevents priests from administering the sacraments of confession and communion.  Second, the policy permits clergy visits for only a single, four-hour period once a week.  This severely restricts priests’ ability provide pastoral care, as priests cannot meet with all detainees who wish to see a Catholic priest (and have only limited time with those they do visit).   Priests are also prohibited from saying Mass.... 

3. Worse still, the policy applies to clergy but not to lawyers or consular officials, for whom exceptions to the policy are readily made.  That constitutes more favorable treatment for secular activity than religious exercise....   

4. ... [T]he visitation policy violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, the Missouri Religious Freedom Restoration Act ... and the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”)....

St. Louis Public Radio reports on the lawsuit.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court: 1st Amendment Free Exercise Claim Requires "Burden", Not "Substantial Burden" On Religious Practice

In  Alsyrawan v. Department of Human Services, (PA Sup. Ct., Oct. 5, 2026), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that to show a 1st Amendment free exercise violation, litigants only need to show a "burden", rather than a "substantial burden", on their religious exercise. At issue in the case was the denial of a Muslim family's application for a waiver of a rule (the 40/60 Rule) that limited the number of hours each week that a state program would compensate relatives for acting as caregivers, here for a Down Syndrome adult male. According to the court:

 Alsyrawan adheres to Islamic law, as established in the Quran, which forbids unrelated males and females from being alone together and prohibits unrelated males from offering personal care concerning nudity or uncovered private parts to other males....  As articulated by Mother, due to Alsyrawan’s religious obligations, only immediate relatives (such as sisters, brothers, father, mother, and grandparents) are permitted to administer private personal care to him.... Mother testified further that even if an unrelated male aide did not provide Alsyrawan with private personal care — thus, not breaching Alsyrawan’s religious obligations — her religious beliefs prohibit her from being alone with an unrelated male, even if this unrelated male is taking care of Alsyrawan.

The majority reviewed a number of recent U.S. Supreme Court free-exercise opinions and found that the Supreme Court has been referring only to a "burden" and not to a "substantial burden" in those opinions. The majority concluded:

... [A] litigant satisfies the threshold showing of a burden on their religious practice by demonstrating that they must choose between receiving a government benefit or abiding by their religious beliefs.  In other words, they must make a “forced choice” – the state actor does not provide a benefit option where the litigant can have both.

RFPA [Pennsylvania’s Religious Freedom Protection Act ] and the Free Exercise Clause are different legal routes for litigants to allege violations of their right to freely exercise their religion.  The Supreme Court’s recent decisions indicate that a violation of the Free Exercise Clause may occur only when an individual’s religious exercise is simply burdened, as opposed to substantially burdened as required prior to Smith. Therefore, analysis of constitutional claims under the U.S. Constitution and statutory claims under RFPA cannot be conflated.  Evidence of a substantial burden is required for claims under RFPA, but only a burden is required for such claims under the Free Exercise Clause. The appropriate standard of review — strict scrutiny or rational basis — is determined by assessing whether the burden is imposed by government policy or conduct that is not neutral or generally applicable....

Justice Mundy filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

I would hold that because the 40/60 Rule is neutral and generally applicable, and survives rational basis scrutiny, Appellant lacks a valid First Amendment claim.  I would also conclude the 40/60 Rule does not impose a substantial burden on Appellant’s religious exercise, meaning he also lacks a valid RFPA Claim.  Therefore, I would affirm the order of the Commonwealth Court.

Justice Wecht filed an opinion concurring in the majority's analysis, but contending that the court should have vacated and remanded the lower court's decision, rather than reversing and remanding it so the lower court could more fully consider whether the 40/60 Rule was generally applicable.

Backers of Hasidic School May Move Ahead with Challenges to Zoning Denials

Congregation Rabbinical Institute of Tartikov, Inc. v. Village of Pomona, NY, (SD NY, Sept.28, 2026), is the latest decision in a long-running attempt by members of the Hasidic Jewish community to build a rabbinical institute in Pamona, New York, that will provide facilities to train rabbinical judges and will include housing for its students and their families.  In an 80-page opinion, a New York federal district court allowed plaintiffs to move ahead with their as-applied federal and state equal protection, free exercise, freedom of speech and association, Fair Housing Act and RLUIPA claims. At issue are plaintiff's compliance with two local laws--one allowing only accredited educational institutions to be constructed in the village, and the second placing a number of restrictions on design of dormitories.

The court said in part:

... Plaintiffs plausibly allege that Defendants enforced the Challenged Laws with discriminatory intent.

  ... [T]he New York State Education Department no longer provides institutional accreditation....  

Plaintiffs further allege that Tartikov explained to the ZBA that it cannot obtain accreditation through private means because AARTS requires a rabbinical institute to be operational before it can obtain accreditation, leaving Tartikov unable to obtain accreditation without first operating and unable to operate in the Village without first obtaining accreditation....  Rather than address this alleged “Catch-22,” the ZBA chairperson suggested that Tartikov rent a facility outside the Village, operate there until it obtained accreditation, and then return to the Village....  

The ZBA subsequently denied Tartikov’s variance application because Tartikov had not sufficiently established that it could not become accredited.... It did so despite the Rockland County Department of Planning’s conclusion that lack of accreditation, standing alone, presented no significant land-use impacts....

Thus, despite Tartikov’s repeated efforts to obtain permission for student-family housing, Defendants effectively conditioned consideration of that request on Tartikov first overcoming the Accreditation Law—the same requirement that Plaintiffs allege Tartikov cannot satisfy without first operating its rabbinical institute....  These procedural irregularities and alleged delays further support an inference that Defendants acted with discriminatory intent....

At this early stage, Plaintiffs’ allegations of repeated procedural irregularities, the circumstances surrounding Defendants’ application of the Challenged Laws, and alleged anti-Hasidic animus among Village officials and community members plausibly support an inference that Defendants applied the Challenged Laws in a discriminatory manner. ...

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Defendants’ application of the Challenged Laws imposes a substantial burden on their religious exercise. 

... Plaintiffs allege that the Institute requires a Torah community, which in turn requires prospective students to reside with their families....  Yet the Dormitory Law prohibits the very housing necessary to accommodate Tartikov’s Torah community by excluding single-family, two-family, and multifamily dwelling units from the definition of a dormitory and prohibiting separate cooking, dining, or housekeeping facilities.... These allegations plausibly establish more than a “minimal impact on religious exercise”.... 

These allegations plausibly allege that the Institute would foster protected expression and that Defendants burdened that expression through their application of the Accreditation Law....

Plaintiffs have also plausibly alleged that the Accreditation Law burdens their ability to associate for the purpose of engaging in that protected activity...

Although Plaintiffs will ultimately bear the burden of demonstrating that the Dormitory Law has a significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on Hasidic Jews, they need not make that evidentiary showing at this stage in the litigation....

Student Organizations Challenge University's Consolidation of Christian Student Groups Under One Campus Minister

Suit was filed last month in a Virginia federal district court by two Christian student groups at Virginia State University challenging the school's new Campus Ministries Policy.  The complaint (full text) in Women of Victory at Virginia State University v. Branch, (ED VA, filed 9/24/2026), alleges in part:

3. ... VSU recently instituted a Campus Ministries Policy ... that strips religious organizations of their registered student organization (“RSO”) status and accompanying benefits, brings student-led ministries under the “governance and influence” of a University-appointed Campus Minister, and yet exempts secular student groups as well as the Muslim and non-Christian student ministries on campus from the Policy’s onerous requirements. 

4. The burden of this Policy falls on the Plaintiff chapters of Women of Victory and Bethel Campus Fellowship. These are VSU chapters of national organizations that provide religious support to students on college campuses through Bible studies, leadership trainings and events, and numerous other opportunities for spiritual growth, both on- and off-campus....

8. ... [O]n August 6, 2026, VSU’s Campus Ministries office circulated its new Campus Ministries Policy, informing student leaders that “student-led ministries” could no longer affiliate with their national organizations or hold RSO status. Instead, faith-based groups (unlike secular groups) would be absorbed into VSU’s Campus Ministries, subject to the sole authority of VSU’s Campus Minister and a newly appointed Board of Advisors, made up of various faculty members, including a Public Safety officer, a Facility Quality Assurance Director, and the VSU President’s Deputy Chief of Staff, among others. 

9. Under the new Policy, Christian organizations lose access to RSO benefits, including funding, event-planning resources, and event-promotion rights. Further, the VSU Campus Minister is granted control of all Christian, student-led ministries, with complete discretion to approve or reject requests for religious meetings, events, guest speakers, and all other religious activities on campus....

148. Forcing Christian student organizations to submit to a single religious figure employed by a public university violates religious students’ constitutional rights.....

The complaint alleges that the new policy violates plaintiffs' rights under the Free Exercise Clause, Establishment Clause, and Equal Protection Clause and violates their rights of expressive association and freedom of assembly.  Christian Post reports on the lawsuit.

Requiring Foster Parents to Affirm Child's Religious Beliefs That They Reject Violates 1st Amendment

In McIntire v. Senn, ((WD WA, Sept. 29, 2026), a Washington federal district court refused to require Washington's Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) to issue plaintiff a foster care license even though the court found that plaintiff had plausibly alleged free speech and free exercise violations. The court found that DCYF had a neutral independent ground for denying the license-- the condition of plaintiff's home. However, the court extensively discussed plaintiff's 1st Amendment claim that requiring plaintiff as a foster care parent to support a child's religious and spiritual practices violates plaintiff's free speech and free exercise rights. The court said in part:

DCYF interprets the requirement to "support" and "affirm" a foster child's religious beliefs as limiting what McIntire may say about her own beliefs. This is a content-based restriction because it "applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed."...  It is also a viewpoint-based restriction....

... DCYF argues that the protection of a foster child's religious freedom is a compelling interest. It asserts that this minor restriction on speech is "narrowly tailored to protect foster children while allowing McIntire unbridled freedom to speak in every other context."...

Viewing the facts in McIntire's favor, the Court concludes that McIntire has plausibly alleged that DCYF unconstitutionally denied her application because she would not refrain from stating her religious beliefs were true. Whether DCYF can ultimately establish that the restriction satisfies strict scrutiny as applied presents a separate question that the Court need not resolve at this stage. This is especially true here, where WAC 110-148-1520 has since been amended to provide foster parents with a choice of whether to connect foster children with resources that support and affirm their needs or refrain from impeding DCYF's efforts in facilitating those resources....

DCYF's motion to dismiss McIntire's First Amendment free speech claim is DENIED.

McIntire also claims that DCYF violated her First Amendment right to free exercise when it denied her application because she "could not support a child's religion or spiritual practices" as required by WAC 110-148-1520(8). Dkt. 1-2 at 103.

DCYF moves to dismiss, asserting that the purpose of the regulation is not to infringe upon the religious practices of foster care applicants but rather to ensure that the religious rights of foster care children are protected....

McIntire acknowledges that, if a foster child asked her what she believed to be true, she would answer that she believes the Bible and that "her beliefs in God consistent with Christianity are true."...  But she maintains that "she would respect the beliefs of others if different from hers and she would not refuse care based on differing beliefs."... She asserts that DCYF forced her to "choose between being a licensed foster parent or adhering to her Christian faith."...

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to McIntire, the Court concludes that McIntire has plausibly alleged that WAC 110-148-1520(7) and (8) are not applied neutrally in practice. McIntire asserts:  

If I had a child placed in my care who was part of another religion, I would support and happily transport them to/from their regular services in close proximity. If they are part of established youth groups or classes, I would support them with transport as well as any ‘at home’ work they wanted/needed to do. . . I also do not want to be forced to say that I approve of or condone a thing I don’t agree with.... 

Yet, in denying her application, DCYF focused not on what McIntire would do to support the child’s religion, but on what she would say about her own.... 

9th Circuit Refuses En Banc Review of Decision Allowing Transfer of Apache Holy Area to Copper Mining Company

In the long-running litigation over the transfer of 2500 acres of National Forest land that includes Apache ceremonial religious ground to Resolution Copper Mining LLC, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals again refused to grant a rehearing or a rehearing en banc of the decisions allowing the land transfer to go through. In Arizona Mining Reform Coalition v. United States Forest Service, (9th Cir., Sept. 29, 2026), three opinions dissenting from the denial of en banc review were filed. Chief Judge Murguia said in part:

Unless the Supreme Court steps in, a mining project will obliterate Oak Flat and destroy “the very foundation of the Apache religion.” 

Judge Graber, joined by 4 other active judges and 5 senior judges filed an opinion respecting the denial of an en banc rehearsing, saying in part:

The proposed mining project at issue here— which will convert the sacred site into a crater approximately 2 miles across and 1,000 feet deep—plainly will “substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.  In Apache Stronghold v. United States, 101 F.4th 1036 (9th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (per curiam), a bare majority of the en banc court held to the contrary. 

We were wrong....  Our interpretation in Apache Stronghold indisputably contradicts the plain meaning of the statutory text.  The complete destruction of the sacred site here clearly qualifies as a “substantial[] burden” on the exercise of religion, under any dictionary or ordinary meaning of the phrase....

Judge Bumatay, joined by 4 other judges filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Would turning a holy site into a giant crater “substantially burden” the exercise of religion?  “To ask the question is to answer it.” ...  Yet for the second time, a panel of this court says no. 

It’s not the panel’s fault.  Its hands were bound by our badly fractured decision in Apache Stronghold v. United States, 101 F.4th 1036 (9th Cir. 2024) (en banc).  There, an en banc majority said that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”) categorically doesn’t apply to the “disposition of government real property” absent some minor exceptions.....  

Thus, the utter destruction of Oak Flat—land used by the Western Apache to commune with their Creator—isn’t subject to RFRA’s protection simply because it’s federal land.  But even if RFRA could be read as carving out the government’s property when it was enacted in 1993, that interpretation simply cannot survive Congress’s 2000 update to RFRA.  Congress has now expressly decoupled RFRA from the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise caselaw and added protection for the religious use of “real property.”  Thus, the land transfer of Oak Flat must meet RFRA’s demanding requirements....

Court Rejects Religious Challenge to Nebraska's Ban on Midwives Attending Home Births

In Tvrdy v. Hilgers, (D NE, Sept. 26, 2026), a Nebraska federal district court upheld a state law prohibiting certified nurse midwives (CNM) from attending home births without a physician also being present. Midwives may attend births alone only in a license health care facility. In the case, two pregnant mothers sued claiming that the ban violates their religious beliefs. The court explained:

The plaintiffs assert they are devout, practicing Christians.... They explain there are “two religious commitments” at play here.  The first is that childbirth “should occur in a manner consistent with their convictions regarding family life, maternal responsibility, and the proper exercise of parental judgment”... Those convictions include their beliefs that “children are gifts from God and that parents are entrusted with the responsibility to make conscientious decisions regarding childbirth” and “the welfare of their children”...   

The second is that they have a “religious obligation to act as faithful stewards of the lives and health of both mother and child by taking reasonable measures to promote safety during labor and delivery”....  In their view, neither a hospital birth nor an unassisted home birth allows them to honor both commitments.  They believe a CNM attended home birth does.

Plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction under Nebraska's First Freedom Act and the First Amendment. The court said in part:

The Court concludes, at least at this preliminary stage, that the defendants have demonstrated the government has a compelling interest in protecting the health and safety of the plaintiffs and their children....

 ,,, At least two children have died in Nebraska in the last four years in home births attended by midwives....

The Court also concludes that the defendants have demonstrated the Act’s restriction on solo CNM-attended home births is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest, as to both Nebraska mothers and children and as to the plaintiffs in this particular instance.....

The Act does not prevent physicians or PAs from attending home births, and it does not prevent CNMs from attending births in birthing centers—low-intervention environments which aim to simulate the home-birth experience.  In summary, the plaintiffs have not persuaded the Court that they are likely to prevail on their Freedom Act claim.

The court rejected plaintiffs' 1st Amendment claim because the restriction is a neutral law of general applicability.

Pacific Legal Foundation provides additional background on the case. 

Ohio Pastor's Conviction for Fire Code Violations Reversed and Remanded

In State of Ohio v. Avell, (OH App., Sept. 25, 2026), an Ohio state appellate court reversed the criminal conviction of Christopher Avell, the founder of Dad's Place, a Christian church in Bryan, Ohio, which offers an "overnight ministry" to provide shelter to anyone who needs it.  Avell and the city have been in litigation (both civil and criminal) over whether the "overnight ministry" triggers fire code requirements for residential use, including an expensive sprinkler system.  A Municipal Court convicted Avell of knowingly violating the city's fire code and sentenced him to a suspended jail sentence and a $200 fine. On appeal, in a 2-1 decision, the Ohio appellate court remanded the case to the trial court because the trial court had failed to rule on Avell's constitutional arguments.

Presiding Judge Osowik dissented in part, saying that the court should have reversed the conviction, instead of remanding it for further proceedings. He based his decision in part on the city's loss last April in an action for an injunction against Dad's Place (See prior posting). Judge Osowik said in part:

To begin, this court recently determined that the City's enforcement of the fire code was not generally applicable and therefore, strict scrutiny applied to Dad's Place's Free Exercise claim under the U.S. Constitution....  

In [the prior civil decision] ... there was no dispute that appellant sincerely believed that he was called to operate a 24/7 ministry. Accordingly, we looked to whether Dad's Place's religious exercise was burdened by the enforcement of the fire code and determined that it was, noting that Dad's Place did not have the financial means to install a sprinkler system, that the installation of said sprinkler system would require Dad's Place to cease its religious exercise for a significant period of time, that Dad's Place could not open a second location for sleeping accommodations, nor would that satisfy its religious beliefs, because they required Dad's Place to welcome all people into the church, not an offsite homeless shelter....

Next, we found that the enforcement of the fire code was not generally applicable because "it allows the government to exercise significant discretion in the enforcement of the code."...

In sum, in [the civil case] ..., this court held that strict scrutiny review applied to Dad's Place's Free Exercise claim under the U.S. Constitution....

[The Ohio Constitution's Conscience Clause] provides broader protections of religious rights than that of the federal Constitution.... Therefore, laws that even "tangentially affect religion" and even simply interfere with the rights of the conscience are unconstitutional unless they pass strict scrutiny...

The City believes that its prosecution of appellant boils down to the enforcement of uniform fire safety codes on a building designated as mercantile and assembly, but is being used as a congregate residential facility. The City contends that appellant's "use places visitors to Dad's Place in danger as well as the residents of the second-floor apartments, neighboring businesses, and first responders. The safety of these people clearly demonstrates a compelling state interest." I disagree—the fact that many exceptions to the fire code exist and are applied to similarly situated facilities for non-safety reasons, destroys the State's argument that its enforcement of the fire code is for safety purposes.

The City attempts to rebut the comparisons between Dad's Place and the residential buildings exempted from the fire code by looking to differences such as communal space in the church versus separate apartments or hotel rooms.... Notably, however, the City continuously goes back to what it deems as the "most important" distinction between Dad's Place and the exempted residential facilities—that they received their occupancy based on the fire code in place at the time of issuance, or in other words, that these other buildings were grandfathered into the current fire code. I believe that this is fatal to the City's argument.

... The reality ... is that these buildings are not compliant with the City's fire code ...  because of a cost-based exemption that they are grandfathered into.

First Liberty Institute issued a press release announcing the decision.

Oklahoma Cannot Require State-Funded Charter Schools to Be Secular

In National Ben Gamla Jewish Charter School Foundation v. Shellem, (WD OK, Sept. 24, 2026), an Oklahoma federal district court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting Oklahoma from enforcing a provision in its Charter Schools Act that requires a charter school to be “nonsectarian.” The court said in part:

Here, like in Carson [v. Makin], the state created a generally available benefit: the opportunity to apply for and contract with a sponsor to establish a charter school. But the state categorically excludes religious institutions from participating. As Carson plainly stated, “[t]hat is discrimination against religion.”...  The nonsectarian requirement “expressly discriminates against otherwise eligible recipients by disqualifying them from a public benefit solely because of their religious character” and in doing so, violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Trinity Lutheran, 582 U.S. at 462. Oklahoma’s purported interest in a “greater separation of church and State than is already ensured under” the federal constitution “cannot qualify as compelling” in the face of a free exercise violation....

The Defendant-intervenors have a rejoinder to Carson and its forerunners. They argue that this line of authority does not apply because charter schools are either governmental entities, engaged in state action, and/or public schools, and it would plainly violate the Establishment Clause for a state actor or public school to promote religion. These arguments are not without force. But a district court is obliged to follow Supreme Court precedent and the Court is persuaded that the relevant cases support Plaintiffs’ position....

Oklahoma Voice reports on the decision.

Dispute Over Access to A Rabbinical Court Lands on Supreme Court's Shadow Docket

Last week, an Emergency Application (full text) was filed with the U.S. Supreme Court seeking a stay pending appellate review in Strulovich v. Bain, (Sup. Ct., filed 9/17/2026). The case involves a dispute between business associates over whether their business issues should be decided by a rabbinical court or a civil court, and if the former, which rabbinical court. (See prior posting and decisions below).  The Emergency Application filed with Justice Sotomayor says in part:

A New York trial court has directly intruded on the free exercise of religion by ordering Applicant Samuel Strulovitch, who is a religious Jew, to refrain from trying to resolve a monetary dispute in a rabbinical court (Hebrew: “beis din”), as he sincerely believes he must. That alone would be extraordinary. But the trial court went further still by ordering Strulovitch to attempt to convince that same rabbinical court to reverse a religious determination that he agrees with.  

In this case, Strulovitch brought an underlying commercial dispute between two Jewish parties to a beis din, attempting to have the parties voluntarily agree to resolve it under Jewish law—as he sincerely believes he must. The beis din then issued a seruv (a religious censure of recalcitrance, with no civil consequences) against Respondent Moshe Bain for having previously sought and obtained an order enjoining Strulovitch from fulfilling his obligation under Jewish law to pursue his case in Jewish court. Strulovitch believes the beis din was right, as a matter of Jewish law, to issue the seruv.... The trial court nonetheless ordered him to cease his efforts before the beis din and “take all steps necessary” to undo the seruv, including withdrawing the proceeding altogether....  

That unconstitutional order squarely violates the First Amendment....

Justice Sotomayor ordered Bain to file a response to the petition by Sept. 23.

National Review reports on the case.

UPDATE: On Sept. 29, Justice Sotomayor denied the application for a stay, "without prejudice to applicants again seeking relief, if necessary, once state court remedies are exhausted."

Homeschooling Parent Sues Over Discrimination Against Religious Homeschooling Materials

Oregon's Hillsboro School District has a Homeschooling Partnership program that, among other things, reimburses homeschooling parents for educational materials. However, the district will not reimburse parents for curricular materials that are embedded with a religious perspective. A homeschooling parent filed suit this week in an Oregon federal district court challenging this policy. The complaint (full text) in Bulzan v. Hillsboro School District, (D OR, filed 9/22/2026), contends that the district's refusal to reimburse plaintiff for Christian centered curricular materials violates plaintiff's rights under the 1st and 14th Amendments. The complaint alleges in part:

83. Through HSDHP, the District reimburses materials and experiences that promote a wide range of worldviews, including instruction that contradicts Christian beliefs and instruction with other spiritual themes....

130. District and HSDHP staff repeatedly declined Mrs. Bulzan’s reimbursement based only on the religious character of her homeschooling curriculum....

212. For Mrs. Bulzan, government school is premised on assumptions that are antithetical to her faith, and thus a government-school curriculum cannot educate her children consistent with her religious beliefs....

246. ... States cannot “discriminate[] against otherwise eligible recipients by disqualifying them from a public benefit” based on “religious character.” Trinity Lutheran, 582 U.S. at 462. 

247. ... Oregon does not have to subsidize homeschool materials, but once it “decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some [homeschool materials] solely because they are religious.”...

271. Because Defendants substantially interfered with Mrs. Bulzan’s religious upbringing of her children—an “unacceptable” burden on religious exercise—Defendants’ actions receive strict scrutiny regardless of whether the policy is neutral and generally applicable....

288. Mrs. Bulzan’s right to direct her children’s education and upbringing includes the right to homeschool, and specifically the right to use religious instruction in her homeschool....

307. Defendants’ actions implicate—and violate—the First Amendment because they put “restraints on the way” that Mrs. Bulzan can speak by refusing to provide otherwise available funds for that speech,...

322. Where, as here, the government’s differential treatment is based on religion, the Equal Protection Clause demands strict scrutiny....

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

8th Circuit Hears Arguments on Posting of 10 Commandments in Classrooms

The U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals yesterday heard oral arguments (audio of full oral arguments) in Samantha Stinson v. State of Arkansas, (Docket No. 26-1722, argued 9/22/2026). In the case, an Arkansas federal district court, finding both Establishment clause and Free Exercise clause problems with the law, issued a permanent injunction barring the state from enforcing Arkansas' statute that requires the posting of a particular version of the Ten Commandments in every public-school classroom. (See prior posting.) Arkansas Advocate reports on the oral arguments.

RLUIPA Does Not Apply to Addiction Treatment Center Imposed as Alternative to Criminal Sentence

In Bryson v. Page, (SD GA, September 17, 2026), a Georgia federal district court dismissed RLUIPA, Establishment Clause and free exercise claims brought against Augusta-Richmond County and against Crystal Page, Coordinator for the Richmond County Accountability Court. Georgia's Accountability Court program facilitates treatment for drug and alcohol offenders and allows for reduced criminal sentences. Plaintiff Ivan Bryson who is Jewish was forced to participate in Christian based activities at a treatment center (Penfield) for three months until he was transferred to another facility.

Rejecting plaintiff's RLUIPA claim, the court held that RLUIPA by its terms only applies to persons confined in a "jail, prison, or other correctional facility" and Penfield does not fall within that definition. The court said in part:

The Court finds the evidence does not support that Penfield was a jail, prison, or correctional facility under RLUIPA based on the Accountability Court DUI program and nature of the facility.... As referenced in RLUIPA, the plain meaning of the word "correctional facility" refers to a prison....

Although few courts have addressed this issue, courts generally have declined to apply RLUIPA in facilities beyond jails, prisons, or pretrial detention facilities....  Here, Plaintiff underwent treatment at a rehabilitation center following an alcohol offense as part of the Accountability Court program....  The Court refrains from broadening the meaning of an institution under RLUIPA....

The court rejected plaintiff's Establishment Clause claim, finding that county funds were given to Penfield for a secular purpose. It rejected plaintiff's free exercise claim, saying in part:

... [N]ot only did Defendant Page lack authority to move Plaintiff upon his initial request, but she was also unaware that Penfield would impose religious programing. As such, the Court finds that Defendant Page, in her individual capacity, did not substantially burden Plaintiff's practice of religion.

Today Is Constitution Day

Today is Constitution Day, the 239th anniversary of the signing of the U.S. Constitution. President Trump yesterday issued a Proclamation (full text) declaring September 17 through 23 as Constitution Week. The President's Proclamation reads in part:

Guided by the most righteous political document ever conceived, America remains the greatest force for good in the history of the world.  Americans enjoy freedom of speech, freedom of religion, equal justice under the law, and the Second Amendment — among other unalienable rights — hard won by the selfless men and women who have fought, bled, and died across the generations to preserve them for citizens of every race, religion, color, and creed.... 

These values now face a new threat:  a rise in anti-American rhetoric from communists and far-left radicals, who seek to divide our communities, rob our children of their futures, and poison the minds of our citizens through slanderous fabrications of our great American story.  Where our Constitution recognizes rights as gifts of Almighty God that no earthly power may take away, socialism and communism treat them as favors of the State to be rationed and revoked, demanding total submission to a movement that is only capable of bringing poverty, persecution, and ruin wherever it has been tried.  These failed ideologies do not make life more affordable or prosperous — they destroy opportunity, create hardship, and leave working families with less.  That same contempt for our Constitution took root at home under the previous administration, which turned its power against the very citizens it was sworn to serve and let our institutions rewrite the very story of America itself.

On my watch, the weaponization of Government has ended, and America is once again upholding its constitutional principles enshrined at the founding of our Republic....

Christian Doctors Challenge Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Law

Suit was filed last week in a Colorado federal district court contending that the 1st and 14th Amendment rights of Christian doctors are being violated by applying to them the Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation of the state's Anti-Discrimination Act. In Boe v. Children's Hospital Colorado, (CO Sup. Ct., May 18, 2026), the Colorado Supreme Court held that a children's hospital was violating the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) by complying with a federal effort to end gender-affirming care for minors. The Department of Health and Human Services threatened to cut off federal health care payments to medical providers that continued to offer such services. Now, the 87-page complaint (full text) in Christian Medical & Dental Associations v. Sullivan, (D CO, filed 9/9/2026), alleges in part:

1. Colorado is once again at war with common sense, sound science, and religious freedom. After a recent Colorado Supreme Court decision, state law now forces doctors to medically transition their patients—including children—even when doing so violates their conscience and medical judgment. That’s bad for doctors and patients alike. It’s also unconstitutional. Colorado is not allowed to conscript those who have sworn to do no harm into harming the very children and adults entrusted to their care. The First Amendment trumps Colorado’s mandate to embrace the lie of gender ideology.... 

6. CMDA members and Button Family Practice also want to explain their medical services policies and position on pronoun usage by sharing their beliefs about identity to the public. But Colorado makes that illegal, too. If they publish their policies, they could be liable for indicating that they would deny service to someone because of sex, disability, or gender identity or expression—even though they serve people within their scope of practice, no matter a person’s status. To avoid that result, the providers have refrained from posting those statements.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of last week's lawsuit.

9th Circuit: Church Loses Challenge to Washington's Abortion Coverage Mandate

In Cedar Park Assembly of God of Kirkland, Washington v. Kuderer, (9th Cir., Sept. 14, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision (with opinions spanning 110 pages) held that Washington's Reproductive Parity Act taken together with its conscience protection law creates a neutral and generally applicable requirement as to health insurance coverage which survives a claim that the laws violate Cedar Park Church's free exercise rights. Taken together, the two laws require employee health insurance to cover abortions and contraceptives but allow employers who oppose abortion to furnish employees a policy under which the insurer, or the state health department, pays for abortion and contraception coverage. The court said in part:

... Plaintiff argues that, even if the challenged laws do not require it to purchase abortion coverage, the laws have prevented it from obtaining an abortion-excluding group health plan that is “comparable” to the one that it had before the Parity Act took effect.... 

But Plaintiff does not point to any evidence refuting the fact that, in 2019 and 2020, a different health carrier, Cigna, offered to sell Plaintiff a fully insured group health plan that excluded direct coverage for abortion....

Nevertheless, Plaintiff asserts that the conscience statute “allows carriers to force houses of worship—like [Plaintiff]—to pay for nominally ‘excluded’ abortion coverage.”  Plaintiff’s argument goes like this:  Under the conscience statute, carriers cannot deny enrollees in Plaintiff’s health plan “coverage of, and timely access to, any service or services excluded” from Plaintiff’s “benefits package,” ... 

But section 4 of the conscience statute states that “[n]othing in [the statute] requires a health carrier, health care facility, or health care provider to provide any health care services without appropriate payment of premium or fee.” ...Plaintiff contends that section 4 “empowers carriers to pass along the cost of covering abortion and [objectionable contraceptives] to houses of worship in the form of increased premiums, ‘administrative’ or ‘overhead’ expenses, or other fictitious costs.” 

Plaintiff’s conjecture is premised on a plainly erroneous and ungrammatical reading of section 4 ...

The question remains whether the challenged laws coerce Plaintiff into “facilitating access to” abortion services in violation of its religious beliefs....

Plaintiff’s belief that Providence’s plans are religiously permissible undercuts each of the three theories that Plaintiff advances, and on which the dissenting opinion relies, to assert that the challenged laws coerce Plaintiff into facilitating access to abortion, even without any indirect payment for coverage.... Plaintiff’s first theory of burden-via-facilitation posits that the challenged laws burden Plaintiff’s religious practice because Plaintiff’s purchase of a health plan is a but-for cause of its employees having access to covered abortion services....

Plaintiff’s second theory—that the challenged laws would coerce it into facilitating access to abortion under Cigna’s abortion-excluding plan because Plaintiff’s employees would use the same insurance card both for covered services and for services excluded from the plan—falls apart quickly....

Plaintiff’s third and final theory—that the challenged laws would coerce it into facilitating access to abortion because the carrier of an abortion-excluding plan would provide notice to enrollees about how to obtain access to covered abortion services outside the plan—fails for a similar reason....

 Because the challenged laws are neutral and generally applicable, rational basis review applies, and we “must” uphold the laws if they are “rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.”...

Plaintiff does not contest that the challenged laws “easily satisf[y] that forgiving standard.”

Judge Callahan's 47-page dissent says in part:

The Parity Act burdens Cedar Park’s exercise of religion.  It does so by effectively placing religiously coercive conditions upon a State-controlled privilege: the ability to procure a State-approved group health plan....

The problem with the majority’s position is that it fails to recognize the core distinction between Cedar Park’s former Kaiser plan and any Parity Act-compliant health plan that Cedar Park could obtain... —even if the plans are financially comparable, the new plan under the Parity Act must still provide plan enrollees with access to abortion services....  As far as Cedar Park is concerned, this basic fact—that no Parity Act-compliant plan can actually exclude abortion coverage—makes any Parity Act-compliant plan that Cedar Park could purchase insufficiently comparable to its prior Kaiser plan....

The record strongly suggests that the law operates as a counter to federal regulations that expanded employers’ religious exemptions from paying for or facilitating abortion services in their group health care plans.  In my view, the evidence at minimum raises a serious dispute as to that question, making summary judgment inappropriate.  And while Washington’s overt motivation may not have been specifically hostile towards religion, that does not necessarily make the Parity Act neutral towards religion....

 In addition to its lack of neutrality, the Parity Act is not generally applicable and therefore requires strict scrutiny review for this reason as well....

Court Enjoins Enforcement Against Synagogue's Voluntary Security Team of Ban on Firearms in Houses of Worship

In Silver Spring Jewish Center, Inc. v. Montgomery County, Maryland, (D MD, Sept. 10, 2026), a Maryland federal district court granted a preliminary injunction barring enforcement against plaintiffs of Montgomery County's ban on possession of firearms in their place of worship. The court however refused to issue a broader injunction against other portions of the Ordinance.  Silver Spring Jewish Center is an Orthodox synagogue that has implemented its own security plan which includes a trained, armed security team made up of volunteer synagogue members. The county Ordinance impacts those volunteers and also prevents the synagogue's rabbi who walks to synagogue on the Sabbath for religious reasons from carrying a firearm because he walks past other places of public assembly. The court concluded that a portion of the Ordinance likely violates both the Second Amendment and the 1st Amendment's Free Exercise clause. The court said in part:

... [T]he sources on which Defendants rely do not demonstrate that the historical analogues for firearm restrictions in places of worship were well-accepted....

Therefore, SSJC and Rabbi Shapiro, at this preliminary stage, have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits as to their as-applied Second Amendment claim of the Code’s firearm restrictions as to places of worship....

SSJC and Rabbi Shapiro allege that “[h]alachically, reliance on volunteer members of the community, rather than outsourcing the religious obligation to others, is preferred under Jewish Law” and cite the following sources in support: Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Kiddushin 41a; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 250:1....

... The beliefs of SSJC and Rabbi Shapiro are sincere.  Accordingly, at this stage, SSJC and Rabbi Shapiro have demonstrated a burden on their sincere religious practice. Because SSJC and Rabbi Shapiro have shown a burden on their religious exercise, the next step is to evaluate whether the law is neutral and generally applicable....

... [B]ecause the challenged provisions of Chapter 57 apply differently as to places of worship in comparison to not only fraternal lodges, but numerous other privately owned businesses and properties, these portions of the Code are not neutral and generally applicable....

Overall, Plaintiffs demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits as to their as-applied Free Exercise challenge to Section 57-1(1)(B) and Section 57-11(a) regarding the restriction of firearms in their respective place of worship....

The claim regarding all buffer zones, however, fails at this stage.  Because Rabbi Shapiro must walk to the synagogue on certain days, and thus cannot avail himself of the provisions in Section 57-10—which allows vehicle transportation of firearms even within 100 yards of a place of assembly ...he contends that the buffer zones for other places of public assembly suffer from the same constitutional infirmities as the ban on firearm possession within a place of worship.  That does not necessarily follow.  A different provision is at work—one that applies to all designated places of public assembly.  The 100-yard restriction is a neutral and generally applied provision and only a rational basis must be shown. 

SSJC and Rabbi Shapiro allege that the prohibition on carrying firearms at houses of worship violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by “telling religious institutions what items worshippers may ‘possess’ in places of worship and how religious institutions may (and may not) protect worshippers during their worship.” ...  Plaintiffs argue that the choice of how a religious institution protects itself is an internal management matter that is “essential to [its] central mission.”...

... [A] single trial court decision is an insufficient basis on which to conclude that a religious organization’s need to provide security translates into the absolute right to provide that security through an armed volunteer group.  In any event, at this early stage, with the likelihood of success findings on the other First Amendment claim and the Second Amendment claim as to houses of worship, it is not necessary to proceed further on this claim....

Links to some of the pleadings in the case are available here. New Civil Liberties Alliance issued a press release announcing the decision.

Maine's Compulsory School Vaccination Law Upheld

In We the Patriots USA, Inc. v. Makin, (D ME, Sept. 8, 2026), a Maine federal district court rejected free exercise and Establishment Clause challenges to Maine's compulsory vaccination law for school children. Plaintiff contended that Maine's removal of religious exemptions from the law render it unconstitutional. The court said in part:

Plaintiffs argue 20-A M.R.S. § 6355 is neither neutral nor generally applicable and, separately, that even if it is neutral and generally applicable, it substantially interferes with Mr. Childs’s right to direct his son’s religious upbringing .... 

... [W]hen the Maine Legislature repealed the religious and philosophical beliefs exemption in 2019, it repealed all personal belief exemptions, “and thus did not single out religion alone.” ... Neither the Legislature’s choice to eliminate certain exemptions, nor the process by which it did so, demonstrates hostility to religion....

... [T]he medical exemption serves rather than undermines Maine’s interest in health and safety. ...

Second, the medical exemption is bounded in a way a religious exemption is not. It rests on an individualized, evidence-based judgment from a licensed provider—subject to professional discipline—and statewide medical exemption rates have stayed below 1.5% in every surveyed grade cohort since 2018....

... [B]ecause Plaintiffs have identified neither a comparable secular activity treated more favorably than religious conduct nor a mechanism for individualized exemptions, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on their claim that § 6355 is not generally applicable. ...

Mr. Childs ... argue[s] that § 6355 burdens his right to direct his son’s religious upbringing because compliance would require him to authorize a vaccination he considers an act of sin, thereby undermining his ability to instruct his son in their shared faith and its demands.... On this record, the Court finds that Mr. Childs holds this belief sincerely. Even so, Plaintiffs have not shown that the burden Mr. Childs describes shares the same character of the burden Yoder, Mahmoud, and Mirabelli address. Those cases do not measure a burden by how heavily it presses on the parent who bears it. They measure whether the State has stepped into the relationship between parent and child to compete for the child’s own beliefs. In each case, the challenged practice reached the child directly, through the school itself, by exposing the child to—or facilitating—values contrary to those the parents sought to instill.....

Catholic Sisters Challenge Illinois End-of-Life Options for Terminally Ill Patients Act

Several orders of Catholic sisters as well as Chicago Archbishop Cupich filed suit yesterday in an Illinois federal district court challenging the constitutionality of requiring them to comply with Illinois End-of-Life Options for Terminally Ill Patients Act. The 93-page complaint (full text) in Carmelite Sisters for the Aged and Infirm, Inc. v. Prince, (ND IL, filed 9/3/2026) alleges in part:

9. Through its euphemistically-named End-of-Life Options for Terminally Ill Patients Act, and the Act’s incorporation of burdens imposed by the Health Care Right of Conscience Act, Illinois has conscripted even religious healthcare providers and institutions to participate in the provision of physician-assisted suicide. 

10. Beginning September 12, medical providers caring for terminally ill Illinois residents will have to proactively inform and counsel their patients about their “option” to kill themselves....

12. These national and international norms against doctors raising assisted suicide with their dying patients exist for good reason. Public health researchers have extensively documented that an increase in the public discussion of suicide is often followed by an increase in suicide rates....  

23. The Court can address these problems by enforcing federal law and the First Amendment and finding that Illinois cannot coerce religious providers in this way. That approach would leave the End-of-Life Options Act generally in force. Alternatively, the Court could also invalidate the entire End-of-Life Options Act, because it violates the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Supremacy Clause. 

24. Either way, Illinois’ effort to control religious providers and their patients is unlawful and cannot stand.

Becket Fund issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit. Catholic World Report discusses the lawsuit.

Court Allows Suit by Jewish School Denied Zoning Approval to Move Ahead

Bet Midrash Ohr Hachayim Hakadosh, Inc., v. City of Hollywood, Florida, (FL Bkr., Aug. 28, 2026), is a civil rights action being pursued in federal bankruptcy court because plaintiff is in Chapter 11 federal bankruptcy proceedings and the case is related to those proceedings. The court said in part:

Plaintiff Bet Midrash Ohr Hachayim Hakadosh, Inc., is a Jewish religious nonprofit that operates a synagogue. It purchased commercial property ... in Hollywood, Florida with the intention of opening a K–12 Jewish day school. To do so, it needed a special exception under the City of Hollywood’s Zoning and Land Development Regulations. The City denied Bet Midrash’s special exception application. Bet Midrash contends the denial was unconstitutional – that the City applied a zoning scheme that has already been found unconstitutional in another case by a District Court Judge in this District, and that the denial violated its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Defendant City of Hollywood moved to dismiss the complaint ..., arguing that the special exception criteria are facially neutral and generally applicable, that they are subject only to rational basis review....

... [T]he City argues that the as-applied challenge ... is deficient because Bet Midrash does not allege that the City applied the special exception criteria in a manner that was hostile to its expressive activity, or that the City selectively enforced the special exception provision against it.... Second, Bet Midrash argues that it is engaged in First Amendment protected activity – operating a synagogue and seeking to expand into religious education – and that the Free Exercise Clause protects that activity...

The First Amendment protects the free exercise of religion. Religious education – particularly the operation of a Jewish day school by a religious nonprofit that also operates a synagogue – is a form of religiously motivated conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause.  At the pleading stage, the Court accepts these allegations as true. Whether Bet Midrash can ultimately prove that its proposed school constitutes protected religious exercise is a question for another day. For now, the allegations are sufficient....