9th Circuit Refuses En Banc Review of Decision Allowing Transfer of Apache Holy Area to Copper Mining Company

In the long-running litigation over the transfer of 2500 acres of National Forest land that includes Apache ceremonial religious ground to Resolution Copper Mining LLC, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals again refused to grant a rehearing or a rehearing en banc of the decisions allowing the land transfer to go through. In Arizona Mining Reform Coalition v. United States Forest Service, (9th Cir., Sept. 29, 2026), three opinions dissenting from the denial of en banc review were filed. Chief Judge Murguia said in part:

Unless the Supreme Court steps in, a mining project will obliterate Oak Flat and destroy “the very foundation of the Apache religion.” 

Judge Graber, joined by 4 other active judges and 5 senior judges filed an opinion respecting the denial of an en banc rehearsing, saying in part:

The proposed mining project at issue here— which will convert the sacred site into a crater approximately 2 miles across and 1,000 feet deep—plainly will “substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.  In Apache Stronghold v. United States, 101 F.4th 1036 (9th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (per curiam), a bare majority of the en banc court held to the contrary. 

We were wrong....  Our interpretation in Apache Stronghold indisputably contradicts the plain meaning of the statutory text.  The complete destruction of the sacred site here clearly qualifies as a “substantial[] burden” on the exercise of religion, under any dictionary or ordinary meaning of the phrase....

Judge Bumatay, joined by 4 other judges filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Would turning a holy site into a giant crater “substantially burden” the exercise of religion?  “To ask the question is to answer it.” ...  Yet for the second time, a panel of this court says no. 

It’s not the panel’s fault.  Its hands were bound by our badly fractured decision in Apache Stronghold v. United States, 101 F.4th 1036 (9th Cir. 2024) (en banc).  There, an en banc majority said that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”) categorically doesn’t apply to the “disposition of government real property” absent some minor exceptions.....  

Thus, the utter destruction of Oak Flat—land used by the Western Apache to commune with their Creator—isn’t subject to RFRA’s protection simply because it’s federal land.  But even if RFRA could be read as carving out the government’s property when it was enacted in 1993, that interpretation simply cannot survive Congress’s 2000 update to RFRA.  Congress has now expressly decoupled RFRA from the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise caselaw and added protection for the religious use of “real property.”  Thus, the land transfer of Oak Flat must meet RFRA’s demanding requirements....

Court Rejects Religious Challenge to Nebraska's Ban on Midwives Attending Home Births

In Tvrdy v. Hilgers, (D NE, Sept. 26, 2026), a Nebraska federal district court upheld a state law prohibiting certified nurse midwives (CNM) from attending home births without a physician also being present. Midwives may attend births alone only in a license health care facility. In the case, two pregnant mothers sued claiming that the ban violates their religious beliefs. The court explained:

The plaintiffs assert they are devout, practicing Christians.... They explain there are “two religious commitments” at play here.  The first is that childbirth “should occur in a manner consistent with their convictions regarding family life, maternal responsibility, and the proper exercise of parental judgment”... Those convictions include their beliefs that “children are gifts from God and that parents are entrusted with the responsibility to make conscientious decisions regarding childbirth” and “the welfare of their children”...   

The second is that they have a “religious obligation to act as faithful stewards of the lives and health of both mother and child by taking reasonable measures to promote safety during labor and delivery”....  In their view, neither a hospital birth nor an unassisted home birth allows them to honor both commitments.  They believe a CNM attended home birth does.

Plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction under Nebraska's First Freedom Act and the First Amendment. The court said in part:

The Court concludes, at least at this preliminary stage, that the defendants have demonstrated the government has a compelling interest in protecting the health and safety of the plaintiffs and their children....

 ,,, At least two children have died in Nebraska in the last four years in home births attended by midwives....

The Court also concludes that the defendants have demonstrated the Act’s restriction on solo CNM-attended home births is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest, as to both Nebraska mothers and children and as to the plaintiffs in this particular instance.....

The Act does not prevent physicians or PAs from attending home births, and it does not prevent CNMs from attending births in birthing centers—low-intervention environments which aim to simulate the home-birth experience.  In summary, the plaintiffs have not persuaded the Court that they are likely to prevail on their Freedom Act claim.

The court rejected plaintiffs' 1st Amendment claim because the restriction is a neutral law of general applicability.

Pacific Legal Foundation provides additional background on the case. 

Ohio Pastor's Conviction for Fire Code Violations Reversed and Remanded

In State of Ohio v. Avell, (OH App., Sept. 25, 2026), an Ohio state appellate court reversed the criminal conviction of Christopher Avell, the founder of Dad's Place, a Christian church in Bryan, Ohio, which offers an "overnight ministry" to provide shelter to anyone who needs it.  Avell and the city have been in litigation (both civil and criminal) over whether the "overnight ministry" triggers fire code requirements for residential use, including an expensive sprinkler system.  A Municipal Court convicted Avell of knowingly violating the city's fire code and sentenced him to a suspended jail sentence and a $200 fine. On appeal, in a 2-1 decision, the Ohio appellate court remanded the case to the trial court because the trial court had failed to rule on Avell's constitutional arguments.

Presiding Judge Osowik dissented in part, saying that the court should have reversed the conviction, instead of remanding it for further proceedings. He based his decision in part on the city's loss last April in an action for an injunction against Dad's Place (See prior posting). Judge Osowik said in part:

To begin, this court recently determined that the City's enforcement of the fire code was not generally applicable and therefore, strict scrutiny applied to Dad's Place's Free Exercise claim under the U.S. Constitution....  

In [the prior civil decision] ... there was no dispute that appellant sincerely believed that he was called to operate a 24/7 ministry. Accordingly, we looked to whether Dad's Place's religious exercise was burdened by the enforcement of the fire code and determined that it was, noting that Dad's Place did not have the financial means to install a sprinkler system, that the installation of said sprinkler system would require Dad's Place to cease its religious exercise for a significant period of time, that Dad's Place could not open a second location for sleeping accommodations, nor would that satisfy its religious beliefs, because they required Dad's Place to welcome all people into the church, not an offsite homeless shelter....

Next, we found that the enforcement of the fire code was not generally applicable because "it allows the government to exercise significant discretion in the enforcement of the code."...

In sum, in [the civil case] ..., this court held that strict scrutiny review applied to Dad's Place's Free Exercise claim under the U.S. Constitution....

[The Ohio Constitution's Conscience Clause] provides broader protections of religious rights than that of the federal Constitution.... Therefore, laws that even "tangentially affect religion" and even simply interfere with the rights of the conscience are unconstitutional unless they pass strict scrutiny...

The City believes that its prosecution of appellant boils down to the enforcement of uniform fire safety codes on a building designated as mercantile and assembly, but is being used as a congregate residential facility. The City contends that appellant's "use places visitors to Dad's Place in danger as well as the residents of the second-floor apartments, neighboring businesses, and first responders. The safety of these people clearly demonstrates a compelling state interest." I disagree—the fact that many exceptions to the fire code exist and are applied to similarly situated facilities for non-safety reasons, destroys the State's argument that its enforcement of the fire code is for safety purposes.

The City attempts to rebut the comparisons between Dad's Place and the residential buildings exempted from the fire code by looking to differences such as communal space in the church versus separate apartments or hotel rooms.... Notably, however, the City continuously goes back to what it deems as the "most important" distinction between Dad's Place and the exempted residential facilities—that they received their occupancy based on the fire code in place at the time of issuance, or in other words, that these other buildings were grandfathered into the current fire code. I believe that this is fatal to the City's argument.

... The reality ... is that these buildings are not compliant with the City's fire code ...  because of a cost-based exemption that they are grandfathered into.

First Liberty Institute issued a press release announcing the decision.

Oklahoma Cannot Require State-Funded Charter Schools to Be Secular

In National Ben Gamla Jewish Charter School Foundation v. Shellem, (WD OK, Sept. 24, 2026), an Oklahoma federal district court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting Oklahoma from enforcing a provision in its Charter Schools Act that requires a charter school to be “nonsectarian.” The court said in part:

Here, like in Carson [v. Makin], the state created a generally available benefit: the opportunity to apply for and contract with a sponsor to establish a charter school. But the state categorically excludes religious institutions from participating. As Carson plainly stated, “[t]hat is discrimination against religion.”...  The nonsectarian requirement “expressly discriminates against otherwise eligible recipients by disqualifying them from a public benefit solely because of their religious character” and in doing so, violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Trinity Lutheran, 582 U.S. at 462. Oklahoma’s purported interest in a “greater separation of church and State than is already ensured under” the federal constitution “cannot qualify as compelling” in the face of a free exercise violation....

The Defendant-intervenors have a rejoinder to Carson and its forerunners. They argue that this line of authority does not apply because charter schools are either governmental entities, engaged in state action, and/or public schools, and it would plainly violate the Establishment Clause for a state actor or public school to promote religion. These arguments are not without force. But a district court is obliged to follow Supreme Court precedent and the Court is persuaded that the relevant cases support Plaintiffs’ position....

Oklahoma Voice reports on the decision.

Dispute Over Access to A Rabbinical Court Lands on Supreme Court's Shadow Docket

Last week, an Emergency Application (full text) was filed with the U.S. Supreme Court seeking a stay pending appellate review in Strulovich v. Bain, (Sup. Ct., filed 9/17/2026). The case involves a dispute between business associates over whether their business issues should be decided by a rabbinical court or a civil court, and if the former, which rabbinical court. (See prior posting and decisions below).  The Emergency Application filed with Justice Sotomayor says in part:

A New York trial court has directly intruded on the free exercise of religion by ordering Applicant Samuel Strulovitch, who is a religious Jew, to refrain from trying to resolve a monetary dispute in a rabbinical court (Hebrew: “beis din”), as he sincerely believes he must. That alone would be extraordinary. But the trial court went further still by ordering Strulovitch to attempt to convince that same rabbinical court to reverse a religious determination that he agrees with.  

In this case, Strulovitch brought an underlying commercial dispute between two Jewish parties to a beis din, attempting to have the parties voluntarily agree to resolve it under Jewish law—as he sincerely believes he must. The beis din then issued a seruv (a religious censure of recalcitrance, with no civil consequences) against Respondent Moshe Bain for having previously sought and obtained an order enjoining Strulovitch from fulfilling his obligation under Jewish law to pursue his case in Jewish court. Strulovitch believes the beis din was right, as a matter of Jewish law, to issue the seruv.... The trial court nonetheless ordered him to cease his efforts before the beis din and “take all steps necessary” to undo the seruv, including withdrawing the proceeding altogether....  

That unconstitutional order squarely violates the First Amendment....

Justice Sotomayor ordered Bain to file a response to the petition by Sept. 23.

National Review reports on the case.

Homeschooling Parent Sues Over Discrimination Against Religious Homeschooling Materials

Oregon's Hillsboro School District has a Homeschooling Partnership program that, among other things, reimburses homeschooling parents for educational materials. However, the district will not reimburse parents for curricular materials that are embedded with a religious perspective. A homeschooling parent filed suit this week in an Oregon federal district court challenging this policy. The complaint (full text) in Bulzan v. Hillsboro School District, (D OR, filed 9/22/2026), contends that the district's refusal to reimburse plaintiff for Christian centered curricular materials violates plaintiff's rights under the 1st and 14th Amendments. The complaint alleges in part:

83. Through HSDHP, the District reimburses materials and experiences that promote a wide range of worldviews, including instruction that contradicts Christian beliefs and instruction with other spiritual themes....

130. District and HSDHP staff repeatedly declined Mrs. Bulzan’s reimbursement based only on the religious character of her homeschooling curriculum....

212. For Mrs. Bulzan, government school is premised on assumptions that are antithetical to her faith, and thus a government-school curriculum cannot educate her children consistent with her religious beliefs....

246. ... States cannot “discriminate[] against otherwise eligible recipients by disqualifying them from a public benefit” based on “religious character.” Trinity Lutheran, 582 U.S. at 462. 

247. ... Oregon does not have to subsidize homeschool materials, but once it “decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some [homeschool materials] solely because they are religious.”...

271. Because Defendants substantially interfered with Mrs. Bulzan’s religious upbringing of her children—an “unacceptable” burden on religious exercise—Defendants’ actions receive strict scrutiny regardless of whether the policy is neutral and generally applicable....

288. Mrs. Bulzan’s right to direct her children’s education and upbringing includes the right to homeschool, and specifically the right to use religious instruction in her homeschool....

307. Defendants’ actions implicate—and violate—the First Amendment because they put “restraints on the way” that Mrs. Bulzan can speak by refusing to provide otherwise available funds for that speech,...

322. Where, as here, the government’s differential treatment is based on religion, the Equal Protection Clause demands strict scrutiny....

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

8th Circuit Hears Arguments on Posting of 10 Commandments in Classrooms

The U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals yesterday heard oral arguments (audio of full oral arguments) in Samantha Stinson v. State of Arkansas, (Docket No. 26-1722, argued 9/22/2026). In the case, an Arkansas federal district court, finding both Establishment clause and Free Exercise clause problems with the law, issued a permanent injunction barring the state from enforcing Arkansas' statute that requires the posting of a particular version of the Ten Commandments in every public-school classroom. (See prior posting.) Arkansas Advocate reports on the oral arguments.

RLUIPA Does Not Apply to Addiction Treatment Center Imposed as Alternative to Criminal Sentence

In Bryson v. Page, (SD GA, September 17, 2026), a Georgia federal district court dismissed RLUIPA, Establishment Clause and free exercise claims brought against Augusta-Richmond County and against Crystal Page, Coordinator for the Richmond County Accountability Court. Georgia's Accountability Court program facilitates treatment for drug and alcohol offenders and allows for reduced criminal sentences. Plaintiff Ivan Bryson who is Jewish was forced to participate in Christian based activities at a treatment center (Penfield) for three months until he was transferred to another facility.

Rejecting plaintiff's RLUIPA claim, the court held that RLUIPA by its terms only applies to persons confined in a "jail, prison, or other correctional facility" and Penfield does not fall within that definition. The court said in part:

The Court finds the evidence does not support that Penfield was a jail, prison, or correctional facility under RLUIPA based on the Accountability Court DUI program and nature of the facility.... As referenced in RLUIPA, the plain meaning of the word "correctional facility" refers to a prison....

Although few courts have addressed this issue, courts generally have declined to apply RLUIPA in facilities beyond jails, prisons, or pretrial detention facilities....  Here, Plaintiff underwent treatment at a rehabilitation center following an alcohol offense as part of the Accountability Court program....  The Court refrains from broadening the meaning of an institution under RLUIPA....

The court rejected plaintiff's Establishment Clause claim, finding that county funds were given to Penfield for a secular purpose. It rejected plaintiff's free exercise claim, saying in part:

... [N]ot only did Defendant Page lack authority to move Plaintiff upon his initial request, but she was also unaware that Penfield would impose religious programing. As such, the Court finds that Defendant Page, in her individual capacity, did not substantially burden Plaintiff's practice of religion.

Today Is Constitution Day

Today is Constitution Day, the 239th anniversary of the signing of the U.S. Constitution. President Trump yesterday issued a Proclamation (full text) declaring September 17 through 23 as Constitution Week. The President's Proclamation reads in part:

Guided by the most righteous political document ever conceived, America remains the greatest force for good in the history of the world.  Americans enjoy freedom of speech, freedom of religion, equal justice under the law, and the Second Amendment — among other unalienable rights — hard won by the selfless men and women who have fought, bled, and died across the generations to preserve them for citizens of every race, religion, color, and creed.... 

These values now face a new threat:  a rise in anti-American rhetoric from communists and far-left radicals, who seek to divide our communities, rob our children of their futures, and poison the minds of our citizens through slanderous fabrications of our great American story.  Where our Constitution recognizes rights as gifts of Almighty God that no earthly power may take away, socialism and communism treat them as favors of the State to be rationed and revoked, demanding total submission to a movement that is only capable of bringing poverty, persecution, and ruin wherever it has been tried.  These failed ideologies do not make life more affordable or prosperous — they destroy opportunity, create hardship, and leave working families with less.  That same contempt for our Constitution took root at home under the previous administration, which turned its power against the very citizens it was sworn to serve and let our institutions rewrite the very story of America itself.

On my watch, the weaponization of Government has ended, and America is once again upholding its constitutional principles enshrined at the founding of our Republic....

Christian Doctors Challenge Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Law

Suit was filed last week in a Colorado federal district court contending that the 1st and 14th Amendment rights of Christian doctors are being violated by applying to them the Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation of the state's Anti-Discrimination Act. In Boe v. Children's Hospital Colorado, (CO Sup. Ct., May 18, 2026), the Colorado Supreme Court held that a children's hospital was violating the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) by complying with a federal effort to end gender-affirming care for minors. The Department of Health and Human Services threatened to cut off federal health care payments to medical providers that continued to offer such services. Now, the 87-page complaint (full text) in Christian Medical & Dental Associations v. Sullivan, (D CO, filed 9/9/2026), alleges in part:

1. Colorado is once again at war with common sense, sound science, and religious freedom. After a recent Colorado Supreme Court decision, state law now forces doctors to medically transition their patients—including children—even when doing so violates their conscience and medical judgment. That’s bad for doctors and patients alike. It’s also unconstitutional. Colorado is not allowed to conscript those who have sworn to do no harm into harming the very children and adults entrusted to their care. The First Amendment trumps Colorado’s mandate to embrace the lie of gender ideology.... 

6. CMDA members and Button Family Practice also want to explain their medical services policies and position on pronoun usage by sharing their beliefs about identity to the public. But Colorado makes that illegal, too. If they publish their policies, they could be liable for indicating that they would deny service to someone because of sex, disability, or gender identity or expression—even though they serve people within their scope of practice, no matter a person’s status. To avoid that result, the providers have refrained from posting those statements.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of last week's lawsuit.

9th Circuit: Church Loses Challenge to Washington's Abortion Coverage Mandate

In Cedar Park Assembly of God of Kirkland, Washington v. Kuderer, (9th Cir., Sept. 14, 2026), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision (with opinions spanning 110 pages) held that Washington's Reproductive Parity Act taken together with its conscience protection law creates a neutral and generally applicable requirement as to health insurance coverage which survives a claim that the laws violate Cedar Park Church's free exercise rights. Taken together, the two laws require employee health insurance to cover abortions and contraceptives but allow employers who oppose abortion to furnish employees a policy under which the insurer, or the state health department, pays for abortion and contraception coverage. The court said in part:

... Plaintiff argues that, even if the challenged laws do not require it to purchase abortion coverage, the laws have prevented it from obtaining an abortion-excluding group health plan that is “comparable” to the one that it had before the Parity Act took effect.... 

But Plaintiff does not point to any evidence refuting the fact that, in 2019 and 2020, a different health carrier, Cigna, offered to sell Plaintiff a fully insured group health plan that excluded direct coverage for abortion....

Nevertheless, Plaintiff asserts that the conscience statute “allows carriers to force houses of worship—like [Plaintiff]—to pay for nominally ‘excluded’ abortion coverage.”  Plaintiff’s argument goes like this:  Under the conscience statute, carriers cannot deny enrollees in Plaintiff’s health plan “coverage of, and timely access to, any service or services excluded” from Plaintiff’s “benefits package,” ... 

But section 4 of the conscience statute states that “[n]othing in [the statute] requires a health carrier, health care facility, or health care provider to provide any health care services without appropriate payment of premium or fee.” ...Plaintiff contends that section 4 “empowers carriers to pass along the cost of covering abortion and [objectionable contraceptives] to houses of worship in the form of increased premiums, ‘administrative’ or ‘overhead’ expenses, or other fictitious costs.” 

Plaintiff’s conjecture is premised on a plainly erroneous and ungrammatical reading of section 4 ...

The question remains whether the challenged laws coerce Plaintiff into “facilitating access to” abortion services in violation of its religious beliefs....

Plaintiff’s belief that Providence’s plans are religiously permissible undercuts each of the three theories that Plaintiff advances, and on which the dissenting opinion relies, to assert that the challenged laws coerce Plaintiff into facilitating access to abortion, even without any indirect payment for coverage.... Plaintiff’s first theory of burden-via-facilitation posits that the challenged laws burden Plaintiff’s religious practice because Plaintiff’s purchase of a health plan is a but-for cause of its employees having access to covered abortion services....

Plaintiff’s second theory—that the challenged laws would coerce it into facilitating access to abortion under Cigna’s abortion-excluding plan because Plaintiff’s employees would use the same insurance card both for covered services and for services excluded from the plan—falls apart quickly....

Plaintiff’s third and final theory—that the challenged laws would coerce it into facilitating access to abortion because the carrier of an abortion-excluding plan would provide notice to enrollees about how to obtain access to covered abortion services outside the plan—fails for a similar reason....

 Because the challenged laws are neutral and generally applicable, rational basis review applies, and we “must” uphold the laws if they are “rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.”...

Plaintiff does not contest that the challenged laws “easily satisf[y] that forgiving standard.”

Judge Callahan's 47-page dissent says in part:

The Parity Act burdens Cedar Park’s exercise of religion.  It does so by effectively placing religiously coercive conditions upon a State-controlled privilege: the ability to procure a State-approved group health plan....

The problem with the majority’s position is that it fails to recognize the core distinction between Cedar Park’s former Kaiser plan and any Parity Act-compliant health plan that Cedar Park could obtain... —even if the plans are financially comparable, the new plan under the Parity Act must still provide plan enrollees with access to abortion services....  As far as Cedar Park is concerned, this basic fact—that no Parity Act-compliant plan can actually exclude abortion coverage—makes any Parity Act-compliant plan that Cedar Park could purchase insufficiently comparable to its prior Kaiser plan....

The record strongly suggests that the law operates as a counter to federal regulations that expanded employers’ religious exemptions from paying for or facilitating abortion services in their group health care plans.  In my view, the evidence at minimum raises a serious dispute as to that question, making summary judgment inappropriate.  And while Washington’s overt motivation may not have been specifically hostile towards religion, that does not necessarily make the Parity Act neutral towards religion....

 In addition to its lack of neutrality, the Parity Act is not generally applicable and therefore requires strict scrutiny review for this reason as well....

Court Enjoins Enforcement Against Synagogue's Voluntary Security Team of Ban on Firearms in Houses of Worship

In Silver Spring Jewish Center, Inc. v. Montgomery County, Maryland, (D MD, Sept. 10, 2026), a Maryland federal district court granted a preliminary injunction barring enforcement against plaintiffs of Montgomery County's ban on possession of firearms in their place of worship. The court however refused to issue a broader injunction against other portions of the Ordinance.  Silver Spring Jewish Center is an Orthodox synagogue that has implemented its own security plan which includes a trained, armed security team made up of volunteer synagogue members. The county Ordinance impacts those volunteers and also prevents the synagogue's rabbi who walks to synagogue on the Sabbath for religious reasons from carrying a firearm because he walks past other places of public assembly. The court concluded that a portion of the Ordinance likely violates both the Second Amendment and the 1st Amendment's Free Exercise clause. The court said in part:

... [T]he sources on which Defendants rely do not demonstrate that the historical analogues for firearm restrictions in places of worship were well-accepted....

Therefore, SSJC and Rabbi Shapiro, at this preliminary stage, have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits as to their as-applied Second Amendment claim of the Code’s firearm restrictions as to places of worship....

SSJC and Rabbi Shapiro allege that “[h]alachically, reliance on volunteer members of the community, rather than outsourcing the religious obligation to others, is preferred under Jewish Law” and cite the following sources in support: Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Kiddushin 41a; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 250:1....

... The beliefs of SSJC and Rabbi Shapiro are sincere.  Accordingly, at this stage, SSJC and Rabbi Shapiro have demonstrated a burden on their sincere religious practice. Because SSJC and Rabbi Shapiro have shown a burden on their religious exercise, the next step is to evaluate whether the law is neutral and generally applicable....

... [B]ecause the challenged provisions of Chapter 57 apply differently as to places of worship in comparison to not only fraternal lodges, but numerous other privately owned businesses and properties, these portions of the Code are not neutral and generally applicable....

Overall, Plaintiffs demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits as to their as-applied Free Exercise challenge to Section 57-1(1)(B) and Section 57-11(a) regarding the restriction of firearms in their respective place of worship....

The claim regarding all buffer zones, however, fails at this stage.  Because Rabbi Shapiro must walk to the synagogue on certain days, and thus cannot avail himself of the provisions in Section 57-10—which allows vehicle transportation of firearms even within 100 yards of a place of assembly ...he contends that the buffer zones for other places of public assembly suffer from the same constitutional infirmities as the ban on firearm possession within a place of worship.  That does not necessarily follow.  A different provision is at work—one that applies to all designated places of public assembly.  The 100-yard restriction is a neutral and generally applied provision and only a rational basis must be shown. 

SSJC and Rabbi Shapiro allege that the prohibition on carrying firearms at houses of worship violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by “telling religious institutions what items worshippers may ‘possess’ in places of worship and how religious institutions may (and may not) protect worshippers during their worship.” ...  Plaintiffs argue that the choice of how a religious institution protects itself is an internal management matter that is “essential to [its] central mission.”...

... [A] single trial court decision is an insufficient basis on which to conclude that a religious organization’s need to provide security translates into the absolute right to provide that security through an armed volunteer group.  In any event, at this early stage, with the likelihood of success findings on the other First Amendment claim and the Second Amendment claim as to houses of worship, it is not necessary to proceed further on this claim....

Links to some of the pleadings in the case are available here. New Civil Liberties Alliance issued a press release announcing the decision.

Maine's Compulsory School Vaccination Law Upheld

In We the Patriots USA, Inc. v. Makin, (D ME, Sept. 8, 2026), a Maine federal district court rejected free exercise and Establishment Clause challenges to Maine's compulsory vaccination law for school children. Plaintiff contended that Maine's removal of religious exemptions from the law render it unconstitutional. The court said in part:

Plaintiffs argue 20-A M.R.S. § 6355 is neither neutral nor generally applicable and, separately, that even if it is neutral and generally applicable, it substantially interferes with Mr. Childs’s right to direct his son’s religious upbringing .... 

... [W]hen the Maine Legislature repealed the religious and philosophical beliefs exemption in 2019, it repealed all personal belief exemptions, “and thus did not single out religion alone.” ... Neither the Legislature’s choice to eliminate certain exemptions, nor the process by which it did so, demonstrates hostility to religion....

... [T]he medical exemption serves rather than undermines Maine’s interest in health and safety. ...

Second, the medical exemption is bounded in a way a religious exemption is not. It rests on an individualized, evidence-based judgment from a licensed provider—subject to professional discipline—and statewide medical exemption rates have stayed below 1.5% in every surveyed grade cohort since 2018....

... [B]ecause Plaintiffs have identified neither a comparable secular activity treated more favorably than religious conduct nor a mechanism for individualized exemptions, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on their claim that § 6355 is not generally applicable. ...

Mr. Childs ... argue[s] that § 6355 burdens his right to direct his son’s religious upbringing because compliance would require him to authorize a vaccination he considers an act of sin, thereby undermining his ability to instruct his son in their shared faith and its demands.... On this record, the Court finds that Mr. Childs holds this belief sincerely. Even so, Plaintiffs have not shown that the burden Mr. Childs describes shares the same character of the burden Yoder, Mahmoud, and Mirabelli address. Those cases do not measure a burden by how heavily it presses on the parent who bears it. They measure whether the State has stepped into the relationship between parent and child to compete for the child’s own beliefs. In each case, the challenged practice reached the child directly, through the school itself, by exposing the child to—or facilitating—values contrary to those the parents sought to instill.....

Catholic Sisters Challenge Illinois End-of-Life Options for Terminally Ill Patients Act

Several orders of Catholic sisters as well as Chicago Archbishop Cupich filed suit yesterday in an Illinois federal district court challenging the constitutionality of requiring them to comply with Illinois End-of-Life Options for Terminally Ill Patients Act. The 93-page complaint (full text) in Carmelite Sisters for the Aged and Infirm, Inc. v. Prince, (ND IL, filed 9/3/2026) alleges in part:

9. Through its euphemistically-named End-of-Life Options for Terminally Ill Patients Act, and the Act’s incorporation of burdens imposed by the Health Care Right of Conscience Act, Illinois has conscripted even religious healthcare providers and institutions to participate in the provision of physician-assisted suicide. 

10. Beginning September 12, medical providers caring for terminally ill Illinois residents will have to proactively inform and counsel their patients about their “option” to kill themselves....

12. These national and international norms against doctors raising assisted suicide with their dying patients exist for good reason. Public health researchers have extensively documented that an increase in the public discussion of suicide is often followed by an increase in suicide rates....  

23. The Court can address these problems by enforcing federal law and the First Amendment and finding that Illinois cannot coerce religious providers in this way. That approach would leave the End-of-Life Options Act generally in force. Alternatively, the Court could also invalidate the entire End-of-Life Options Act, because it violates the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Supremacy Clause. 

24. Either way, Illinois’ effort to control religious providers and their patients is unlawful and cannot stand.

Becket Fund issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit. Catholic World Report discusses the lawsuit.

Court Allows Suit by Jewish School Denied Zoning Approval to Move Ahead

Bet Midrash Ohr Hachayim Hakadosh, Inc., v. City of Hollywood, Florida, (FL Bkr., Aug. 28, 2026), is a civil rights action being pursued in federal bankruptcy court because plaintiff is in Chapter 11 federal bankruptcy proceedings and the case is related to those proceedings. The court said in part:

Plaintiff Bet Midrash Ohr Hachayim Hakadosh, Inc., is a Jewish religious nonprofit that operates a synagogue. It purchased commercial property ... in Hollywood, Florida with the intention of opening a K–12 Jewish day school. To do so, it needed a special exception under the City of Hollywood’s Zoning and Land Development Regulations. The City denied Bet Midrash’s special exception application. Bet Midrash contends the denial was unconstitutional – that the City applied a zoning scheme that has already been found unconstitutional in another case by a District Court Judge in this District, and that the denial violated its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Defendant City of Hollywood moved to dismiss the complaint ..., arguing that the special exception criteria are facially neutral and generally applicable, that they are subject only to rational basis review....

... [T]he City argues that the as-applied challenge ... is deficient because Bet Midrash does not allege that the City applied the special exception criteria in a manner that was hostile to its expressive activity, or that the City selectively enforced the special exception provision against it.... Second, Bet Midrash argues that it is engaged in First Amendment protected activity – operating a synagogue and seeking to expand into religious education – and that the Free Exercise Clause protects that activity...

The First Amendment protects the free exercise of religion. Religious education – particularly the operation of a Jewish day school by a religious nonprofit that also operates a synagogue – is a form of religiously motivated conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause.  At the pleading stage, the Court accepts these allegations as true. Whether Bet Midrash can ultimately prove that its proposed school constitutes protected religious exercise is a question for another day. For now, the allegations are sufficient....

InterVarsity Christian Fellowship Sues for Recognition as Student Organization

Suit was filed last week in a New York federal district court by a Christian student organization at Broome Community College that is part of the State University of New York system. The group was denied recognition as an official student organization because its proposed constitution requires all student leaders of the organization to affirm its Statement of Faith. The school says that this religious leadership requirement violates the school's non-discrimination policy. The complaint (full text) in Intervarsity Christian Fellowship/USA v. SUNY Broome Community College, (ND NY, filed 8/21/2026), alleges in part:

... [I]n over 150 years of precedent, the Supreme Court has emphasized that religious organizations have the right “to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.”... SUNY Broome’s actions here not only interfere but also seek to control a core component of InterVarsity’s governance, faith, and doctrine....

... [I]n the past decade, the Supreme Court has warned governments three times that they cannot deny religious organizations access to benefits because of their religious beliefs....

In 14 counts, the complaint alleges violation of the free exercise, free speech and equal protection provisions of the U.S. and New York constitutions as well as violation of New York's Human Rights Law. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship also filed an emergency motion for a preliminary injunction and a Memorandum of Law supporting that motion.

Becket Fund has issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Compliance With Building Code Does Not Impose Substantial Burden on Plaintiff's Religious Exercise

In Hadez v. City of Springfield, Illinois, (CD IL, Aug. 28, 2026), a state trial court had ordered plaintiff to cease residing in structures on his property that inspectors found to be unsafe and in violation of the city's Building Code. The structures lack toilets, a sewage system, running water and smoke alarms. Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction from an Illinois federal district court granting him emergency occupancy of his property. He argues that the city's land use regulations impose a substantial burden on his religious exercise in violation of RLUIPA and the 1st Amendment. According to the court:

Plaintiff claims he is an adherent of the Celestican Church of Christ and holds sincere religious beliefs that require him "to live off-grid in a faith-based tiny-home or POD structure on real property that he owns or controls.".... Plaintiff states that Scripture teaches him Jesus was a carpenter and he acquired the vacant lot at 1705 E. Carpenter Street as an "intentional act of religious exercise and devotion." ... Plaintiff is allegedly homeless due to the state court injunction and order.

Rejecting plaintiff's petition, the court said in part: 

... [T]he City's Zoning and Building Codes are facially neutral ordinances that pertain to public safety, welfare, and the single family nature of the residence. The ordinance does not treat Plaintiff's exercise of his religion differently from any other activity that he might do in his home.... The City is not simply prohibiting Plaintiff from exercising his faith at the property. It is prohibiting him from doing anything at the property while residing there based on health and safety concerns. If Plaintiff's home was built in compliance with the City's Codes, the City would not be seeking to enjoin Plaintiff from living on the property and Plaintiff could practice his religion at his home. Plaintiff has not shown how a structure that meets the City's Code would substantially burden his religious practice. The fact that he might incur significant costs in bringing his property up to code is not enough to show that the regulation imposes a substantial burden on Plaintiff's religious exercise.

Court Says No "Substantial Burden" On Religion When Impacted Belief Is Not Central to Plaintiff's Religion

 In John v. Aviles-Ramos, (ED NY, Aug. 27, 2026), a New York federal district court rejected claims by a former special education teacher that his former colleagues and supervisors discriminated against him because he was a Jehovah's Witness and placed a substantial burden on his practice of his religion. Rejecting plaintiff's free exercise claim, the court said in part:

This claim is based on three alleged instances of misconduct.  First, that he was forced to sing “happy birthday” during school birthday celebrations; second, that he was required to bring his students to a school Christmas party; and third, that he was asked to take down a “God is love” sign....  Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that Defendants imposed any policy targeting his religion, and none of the alleged incidents of misconduct rises to the level of a violation of his right to free exercise of his religion....

As an initial matter, Plaintiff has not shown that the alleged incidents of misconduct resulted from non-neutral policies.... The Complaint does not allege any facts suggesting that the school’s policies surrounding the birthday parties, the Christmas celebration, or the affixing of religious signs were created specifically to target Jehovah’s Witnesses. 

In any event, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the incidents he describes substantially burdened his freedom to exercise his religious beliefs.  The determinative question in assessing whether an action imposes a substantial burden “is whether participation in the [event] . . . is considered central or important to [the plaintiff’s] practice of [his religion].” Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 593–94 (2d Cir. 2003). “A burden on religious exercise is not substantial when it ‘comfortably could be said that a belief or practice is so peripheral to the plaintiff’s religion that any burden can be aptly characterized as constitutionally de minimis.’”  ...

... Though Plaintiff does not celebrate birthdays due to his religious beliefs, ... there is no basis for his claims that being instructed to sing “happy birthday” at a student’s birthday celebration ... would meaningfully burden his ability to practice as a Jehovah’s Witness.

Plaintiff next alleges that Granger informed him “that he would have to bring the kids to the room” for a Christmas party, and that he “was told there were no exceptions.” ... [A] requirement to merely escort students to a school Christmas party — but without requiring him to actually participate in the celebrations at that party — is not a substantial burden protected by the Free Exercise Clause....

Finally, Plaintiff claims that he was told to take down a sign he had “put up” reading “God is love.” ...  However, it is well established that “the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired.” ...

The court also held that plaintiff failed to allege adequate facts to support his disparate treatment and failure to accommodate claims.

Suit Challenges New Jersey School Policy on Social Transitioning

Suit was filed last week in a New Jersey federal district court challenging a school board's policy on dealing with students who seek social gender transition. The school policy provides in part:

Once a student notifies a school official that s/he would like to be referred to by a different pronoun or name, or requests to use the facilities associated with a different gender, his/her school counselor will meet with the student to confidentially discuss the request. During such meeting, the school counselor will also assess the student’s parent/guardian’s knowledge, if any, of the student’s request. If the student’s parent/guardian is not aware of the request, the school counselor will assess whether, and to what extent, parents/guardians can be involved….

The complaint (full text) in Moms for Liberty v. School District of Chathams Board of Education, (D NJ, filed 8/24/2026) contends that this policy violates recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions. The complaint contends in part:

Parents A and B are practicing Christians who sincerely believe that God created only two genders, male and female....  As Christians, they believe it would be morally wrong to deny one’s God-given status as male or female and purport to be the opposite gender. They also believe that no public school has any right to interfere with the moral and religious formation of their children contrary to their religious beliefs against what they view as the immoral ideology of “transgenderism.”...

These provisions ... further violate the parental rights of Parents A and B by allowing the District to change a student’s name and “gender identity” without parental consent and then allowing the “transitioning” student to live an entire double life at school hidden from his or her parents, solely at the student’s request as affirmed by a school counselor who has no right to interfere in the student’s moral and religious development or to handle the obvious psychological issues involved in a student’s professed gender dysphoria....

Parents A and B have counseled Students C and D to adhere to their Christian beliefs by refusing to pretend that a fellow student has changed his or her gender and must now be referred to by a different name and/or different pronouns that do not correspond to the reality of that student’s God-given gender of male or female.  

Students C and D wish to speak what they believe is the truth of this matter in all its aspects without fear of punishment, both in school and away from school grounds...; For example, they would refuse to say that Tommy is now Sally or that he is now to be referred to as “they” as this would involve uttering what they believe to be lies that contradict their own religious and moral beliefs....

Thomas More Society issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Parents Seek State Funds for Catholic School Attendance Without Requirement to First Attend Failing Public School

Suit was filed this week in a Georgia state trial court challenging on free exercise grounds the eligibility requirements for participating in the Georgia Promise Scholarship Program. Plaintiff families live in districts with low-performing public schools. The Promise Scholarship Program requires a student to be enrolled for one year in a failing school in order to qualify for funds to use for alternatives. The complaint (full text) in Tootle v. Green, (GA Super., filed 8/24/2026), alleges in part:

3. Each family knows they could obtain a free education at their assigned public schools.  But they also know that their assigned public schools would substantially interfere with their children’s religious education and that public schools impose a pressure to conform to contrary viewpoints and lifestyles.  From experience, they know that every subject would be taught in a secular manner, and that full school days would leave their children with little time for additional religious instruction.  Plaintiffs also know that peers and teachers would favor secular ways of thinking that denigrate their children’s faith and pressure their children to hide their rich spiritual heritage....

6. ... [T]o be eligible, the Promise Scholarship generally requires that a child must have been enrolled in a public school through two consecutive state enrollment counts—roughly one full school year—before becoming eligible (the attendance requirement), and the child must be assigned to a failing public school (the assignment requirement). 

7. Plaintiffs regard both the attendance requirement and the assignment requirement as burdens on their free exercise.  The attendance requirement substantially burdens free exercise by opening scholarship access only if Plaintiffs forfeit their right to provide a religious education to their children by enrolling them in public school for two semesters.  The assignment requirement substantially burdens free exercise by opening scholarship access only if Plaintiffs subject their families to the stress and financial loss of moving to a failing public school district—harms Plaintiffs believe their religion obliges them to avoid.

8. These substantial burdens would be resolved if Defendant granted a religious accommodation from the attendance and the assignment requirements, so that Plaintiffs would no longer be compelled to forfeit their religious exercise to access public benefits....

WRDW News reports on the lawsuit.