Suit Challenges Illinois Requirements for Insurance Policies to Cover Abortions

Suit was filed yesterday in an Illinois federal district court challenging on both constitutional and federal statutory grounds Illinois statutes that requires health-insurance policies to cover elective abortions on the same terms as other pregnancy-related benefits and to cover, without co-pays, abortion inducing drugs. The complaint (full text) in Students for Life of America v. Gillespie, (ND IL, filed 11/20/2024), alleges that these provisions violate free exercise rights, the right of expressive association, the federal Comstock Act, the Coates-Snow Amendment and the Weldon Amendment. Thomas More Society issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Suit Against Church for Negligent Retention of Pastor Can Move Ahead

 In Exum v. St. Andrews-Covenant Presbyterian Church, Inc., (NC App, Nov. 19, 2024), a North Carolina state appellate court held that claims for negligent retention, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and breach of fiduciary duty brought against a church do not need to be dismissed under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine because they can be decided using neutral principles of law. Plaintiff and his wife attended St. Andrews-Covenant Church.  The church's pastor, Derek Macleod, entered a romantic relationship with plaintiff's wife. After plaintiff and his wife were divorced, Plaintiff sued the church and its parent bodies. The court said in part:

Exum alleges that St. Andrews-Covenant was negligent in allowing Macleod’s tortious conduct to occur because St. Andrews-Covenant knew or should have known that Macleod had engaged in similar misconduct in his capacity as a church leader in prior roles. ...

 “[T]here is no necessity for th[is] [C]ourt to interpret or weigh church doctrine in its adjudication of” Exum’s claims premised on alleged negligence in placing and retaining Macleod at St. Andrews-Covenant....  “It follows that the First Amendment is not implicated and does not bar” Exum’s claims against St. Andrews-Covenant....  As the Court in Smith [v. Privette] explained, a contrary holding “would go beyond First Amendment protection and cloak such [religious] bodies with an exclusive immunity greater than that required for the preservation of the principles constitutionally safeguarded.”....

Parents Sue California High School Alleging Long History of Tolerating Antisemitism

Suit was filed last week in a California federal district court by parents of six high school students in the Sequoia Union High School District charging the high school with tolerating antisemitism expressed by students and teachers.  The complaint (full text) in Kasle v. Puttin, (ND CA, filed 11/15/2024), alleges in part:

SUHSD has a long history of tolerating casual antisemitism on its campuses.  Students and faculty have openly joked about Nazis and the Holocaust, while certain teachers have peddled antisemitic falsehoods about Middle East history without facing consequences.  District leadership has consistently turned a blind eye to such behavior.  SUHSD’s antisemitism problem worsened significantly after October 7, 2023, when Hamas—a U.S.-designated terrorist organization—invaded southern Israel and then mutilated, raped, and murdered more than 1,200 people.  Although quick to address other global injustices, SUHSD remained conspicuously silent about this historic massacre of Jews, contradicting the District’s professed commitment to equity....

The 64-page complaint alleges violation of Title VI, of the 1st and 14th Amendments as well as of parallel provisions of California law and asks for an injunction in part:

prohibiting Defendants’ discriminatory and harassing treatment of Plaintiffs in violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional and statutory rights; 

prohibiting the District, its employees, agents, and representatives from engaging in any form of antisemitic behavior or conduct, including, but not limited to, verbal, written, or physical actions that demean, harass, or discriminate against individuals based on their Jewish identity or their identification with and commitment to Israel;

ordering the District to adopt and implement a clear and comprehensive policy specifically addressing antisemitism, as defined by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s Working Definition of Antisemitism....

It also asks the court to appoint a Special Master to monitor the district's implementation of policies against antisemitism. 

Ropes & Gray issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit. 

Court Asks Parties for More Information on Whether Vaccine Mandate Was Generally Applicable

In Rodriguez v. Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority, (ND CA, Nov. 12, 2024), a California federal district court refused to dismiss a suit brought by employees of a public transportation provider who were denied religious exemptions from their employer's Covid vaccine mandate. The court ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs on whether or not the vaccine mandate exemption process was generally applicable in order to determine whether to apply strict scrutiny in evaluating plaintiffs' Free Exercise claim. The court said in part:

Although the VTA’s exemption review process did not involve the entirely unfettered discretion that the Supreme Court rejected in Fulton, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that this process contained enough individualized discretion to “permit discriminatory treatment of religion or religiously motivated conduct.” ...

Conversely, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the exemption process was “tied directly to limited, particularized, business-related, objective criteria” such that it was generally applicable.....  Unlike Fulton, no individual here exercised “sole discretion.”....  Instead, the committee rendered decisions as a group based on set criteria.... A reasonable jury could find that the VTA committee exercised a degree of discretion that preserved the policy’s general applicability.

Eviction Did Not Violate Plaintiff's Free Exercise Rights

In Wexler v. City of San Diego, California, (SD CA, Nov. 4, 2024), a California federal district court rejected plaintiff's claim that his free exercise rights were violated when he was evicted from rental property he had occupied for a few days. The court said in part:

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dup-A-Key harmed him by changing the rental unit’s door locks on the Sabbath....  Plaintiff alleges harm from Defendant Rough Rider Real Estate because he “had to record” Defendant’s employee drilling of a “No Trespass” sign onto the property on the Sabbath.... Plaintiff further alleges harm from Defendant Police Officers because the alleged unlawful eviction occurred on the Sabbath....  However, these actions are not violations under the Free Exercise Clause.  Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants Dup-A-Key and Rough Rider Real Estate were government entities.  Nor does Plaintiff sufficiently allege that any government policy was not neutral or not generally applicable.  Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s First Amendment § 1983 claims against all Defendants with leave to amend.

The court also rejected a variety of other challenges to the eviction alleged by plaintiff, including a claim that police officers discriminated against him because he mentioned to them that he was an Orthodox Jewish person.

George Mason Law Students Sue Claiming "No-Contact" Order Violates Their Free Speech and Free Exercise Rights

Suit was filed last week in a Virginia federal district court by two Christian female law students at George Mason University contending that a "no-contact" order issued against them by the University's DEI Office violates their free speech and free exercise rights. The complaint (full text) in Ceranksoky v. Washington, (ED VA, filed 11/1,2024), relates that plaintiffs were ordered to avoid contact, including through social media, with a classmate (identified in the complaint only as Mr. Doe) who is the Law School's representative on the Graduate and Professional Studies Assembly. Through an online chat platform, Mr. Doe proposed having hygiene products available in men's rest rooms as well as in women's in order to accommodate transgender men. According to the complaint:

5. [Plaintiff posted] ... her concern that if GMU adopted a policy “allow[ing] biological females into male restrooms to access period products as ‘trans men,’” then that would mean “female bathrooms will welcome male occupants.” She asked her classmate to “recognize the concerns of biological female students” and how they would feel “considerably uncomfortable if there are males using private women’s spaces on campus.” She noted that “[w]omen have a right to feel safe in spaces where they disrobe.” ...

7. Their classmate, who had claimed to be their representative to the student government and initially promised to “advocate for all” students and viewpoints, responded by mocking their concerns and labeling their views as bigoted for questioning others’ gender identity. 

8. Two weeks later ... [plaintiffs] received no-contact orders from GMU’s Office of Diversity, Equity, & Inclusion (“DEI Office”), prohibiting them from having any contact with their classmate....

152....  Defendants have singled out Plaintiffs’ expression and prevented them from engaging in religious expression with Mr. Doe.

153. Defendants’ no-contact orders have also chilled Plaintiffs from engaging in religious expression with other students at the Law School or the rest of GMU....

175.  Plaintiffs are motivated by their sincerely held religious beliefs to speak on-campus on many topics from a Christian worldview. Plaintiffs believe their on-campus speech is a way to share the Gospel of Jesus Christ with non-Christians and a way to disciple and equip other Christians on campus to grow and mature in their faith.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

9th Circuit Reinstates Claim of Christian-Israelite Inmate Who Was Refused Passover Diet

In Fuqua v. Raak, (9th Cir., Nov. 1, 2024), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals partially reversed an Arizona federal district court's dismissal of a suit by Michael Fuqua, a Christian-Israelite (Christian Identity) state prison inmate who was refused Passover dietary meals. The prison chaplain and other prison officials denied Fuqua's request for a Kosher for Passover diet on the ground that Fuqua's belief that Christian-Israelites were descended from the Tribes of Israel was wrong.  Officials said that supporting materials furnished by Fuqua suggested that he only needed to observe Passover with a memorial service using flatbread and grape juice. In reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on Fuqua's free exercise and equal protection claims, the court said in part:

... [W]e conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could find that Fuqua was denied his requested dietary accommodation, not based on his failure to follow a neutral and valid procedural rule for requesting accommodations, but rather based on [Chaplain] Lind’s own theological assessment of the correctness and internal doctrinal consistency of Fuqua’s belief system.

The court however affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for defendants on Fuqua's RLUIPA claim, saying in part:

that the Spending Clause does not allow Congress to impose individual damages liability on state or local officials who are not themselves the recipients of federal funds.

In Fuqua v. Ryan, (9th Cir., Nov. 1, 2024) (unpublished), the 9th Circuit upheld the dismissal of Fuqua's free exercise claims against two correctional officers because there was no evidence that they were personally involved in the challenged actions. It upheld dismissal of claims against the kitchen manager on qualified immunity grounds. It also upheld the trial court's refusal to allow Fuqua to read from his Bible on the witness stand, saying in part:

The district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that, while Fuqua could explain the sincerity of his religious beliefs by reference to relevant scriptural passages, he did not need to have a physical Bible with him on the stand or to read the relevant passages verbatim.

6th Circuit Hears Oral Arguments in Transgender Bathroom Access Case

On Tuesday, the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments (audio of full oral arguments) in Doe No. 1 v. Bethel Local Board of Education, (6th Cir., Docket No. 23-3740). In the case, an Ohio federal district court (see prior posting) dismissed a wide-ranging group of challenges-- including due process, equal protection and free exercise challenges-- to a school board policy allowing students to use school bathrooms corresponding to their gender identity. Ohio Capital Journal reports on the oral arguments.

7th Circuit Hears Oral Arguments Challenging Schol's Derecognition of "Students For Life" Club

On Tuesday, the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments (audio of full oral arguments) in E. D. v. Noblesville School District, (7th Cir., Docket No. 24-1698), In the case (E.D. v. Noblesville School District, SD IN, March 15, 2024), an Indiana federal district court dismissed various First Amendment and other claims against a school district and district officials who derecognized a high school Students For Life Club on the ground that it was not entirely run by students.  The derecognition followed lengthy discussions over the club's advertising flyers. ADF issued a press release announcing the oral arguments.

Volunteer Prison Minister's Challenge to Requirements for Addressing LGBTQ Inmates Is Rejected

In Kuenzi v. Reese, (D OR, Oct. 28, 2024), an Oregon federal district court rejected 1st Amendment challenges to an Oregon prison system rule requiring volunteers in prison facilities to sign an acknowledgement statement that calls for volunteers to use appropriate gender pronouns when addressing transgender, intersex and non-binary adults in custody.  Plaintiff, a former volunteer Christian minister in a women's correctional facility, contends that this requirement conflicts with her free exercise and free speech rights. She is no longer allowed to minister at the prison facility without signing the statement which conflicts with her religious belief that gender is an immutable characteristic determined by biology, and that homosexual conduct is sinful. The court concluded that the prison policy is neutral and generally applicable and that:

... the policy is rationally related to ODOC’s legitimate interest in “promot[ing] a respectful environment that reinforces prosocial norms for ODOC’s AICs.” 

It also concluded that:

Because Plaintiff was speaking as an employee and not as a private citizen, her speech falls outside the protections of the First Amendment.

9th Circuit: California IDEA Rules Violate Free Exercise Clause

In Loffman v, California Department of Education, (9th Cir., Oct. 28, 2024), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a California federal district court's dismissal of a suit by the parents of a special needs child that challenges as a violation of the Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses a portion of California's rules implementing the federal Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). In California, a private school may be certified as a NPS (non-public school offering special education programs) so long as the school is non-sectarian. When a local educational agency refers a child to an NPS, the state pays the child's full tuition there. However, religiously affiliated schools may not be certified as NPS's even if the curriculum offered to special needs children is secular. Here, plaintiffs wanted to send their children to an Orthodox Jewish school but obtain the benefits available from an NPS. The 9th Circuit said in part:

 ... [A]ny religiously affiliated school seeking to enter into an NPS contract in California must choose whether to maintain its religious affiliation or to serve as an NPS eligible for consideration ... in determining whether it may be in the best position to provide an IEP [individualized education program] for an individual child.  

Religious entities that are equally or better qualified than secular ones to provide special education and related services are disqualified solely because they are “owned, operated, controlled by, or formally affiliated with a religious group or sect, whatever might be the actual character of the education program or the primary purpose of the facility.”...

As we have previously recognized, a statutory scheme that requires a family to “forgo a sectarian education . . . in order to receive” special education benefits otherwise available in a private school setting imposes a “burden on their free exercise rights.”  ...

Parent Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged “that a government entity has burdened [their] sincere religious practice pursuant to a policy that is not ‘neutral’ or ‘generally applicable,’” so the focus “shifts to the defendant” to show that the challenged action survives strict scrutiny....

[E]ven if the State Appellee could demonstrate a compelling interest in neutrality here, it has failed to demonstrate that the nonsectarian requirement is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.  Thus, we conclude that the State Appellee fails to demonstrate that the nonsectarian requirement satisfies strict scrutiny.

National Catholic Register reports on the decision.

Suit Challenges Oklahoma Bible Education Mandate and Purchase of Bibles

Suit was filed this week by public-school parents, their minor children, teachers, and clergy challenging Oklahoma's recently imposed requirement for all public schools to incorporate the Bible in their curricula. The suit was filed in the Oklahoma Supreme Court asking it to assume original jurisdiction because of the importance and time-sensitiveness of the case. The suit seeks a declaratory judgment, injunction and writ of mandamus providing that the Bible Education Mandate is invalid and unenforceable and seeks orders preventing the purchase of Bibles under the RFP issued by the state. (See prior posting.) The complaint (full text) in Walke v. Walters, (OK Sup. Ct., filed 10/17/2024), alleges in part:

The planned $3 million in spending on Bibles would unlawfully support an invalid rule.  The spending is also illegal for a number of other reasons.  No statutory or other legislative authority exists for Respondents to spend state funds on curricular materials that they select; rather, their authority is limited to providing state funds to individual school districts that the districts can then spend on texts of their own choice.  Respondents intend to spend on the Bibles funds that were designated for other purposes and have not been lawfully reallocated.  The Request for Proposal to supply Bibles violates state procurement requirements because it is gerrymandered to favor two particular providers.  And religious freedom provisions of Oklahoma’s Constitution—specifically Section 5 of Article II and Section 2 of Article I—prohibit spending state funds on the Bibles, because they are religious items and the spending would support one particular religious tradition.

AP reports on the lawsuit.

Local Congregation Cannot Sue Parent in Property Dispute After All Its Members Were Excommunicated

Church of God of Crandon v. Church of God, (WI App., Oct. 15, 2024), involved a dispute between a local congregation-- the Crandon Church-- and its parent body, Church of God (COG). The Crandon Church opposed the parent body's decision that the local church would be merged with a congregation in a different location and the Crandon Church property would be sold. Crandon members filed suit against the parent body seeking a declaration confirming its interest in local church building and its bank accounts. In response, the COG Bishop issued a Declaration excommunicating Crandon Church members and then moved to dismiss the lawsuit against COG on the ground that Crandon no longer had any members so that it effectively has ceased to exist and has no interest in Crandon property. The appellate court agreed, saying in part:

... [T]he 1994 warranty deed states that all property—both real and personal—becomes the property of the COG should a “local congregation” “cease to … exist.”  The Crandon Church cannot file a lawsuit to obtain an interest in property that it does not own.  Because we conclude that the First Amendment prohibits our review of the Declaration, the Crandon Church lacks standing to bring the current lawsuit seeking interests in the property and the CoVantage accounts....

... [A] civil court cannot, under the First Amendment, review:  whether the 2018 Minutes [giving the Bishop the authority to excommunicate unruly or uncooperative members] complied with due process or the Bible; what the COG meant by “unruly or uncooperative”; or whether Cushman properly determined that the excommunicated members were “unruly or uncooperative.”  Similarly, the First Amendment prohibits a civil court from examining the International Executive Committee’s review of those issues.  To hold otherwise “would undermine the general rule that religious controversies are not the proper subject of civil court inquiry.” ... Under the facts of this case, we must defer to the resolution of any ecclesiastical issues by the International Executive Committee, which denied the excommunicated members’ appeal.

Federal Court Refuses to Enjoin Distribution of Notice from Rabbinical Court

In Esses v. Rosen, (ED NY, Oct. 15, 2024), a New York federal district court refused to issue a preliminary injunction barring defendants from disseminating in plaintiff's neighborhood a rabbinical court's notice (a sieruv) that plaintiff has failed to respond to a summons from the rabbinical court. Plaintiff also asked that the seiruv be taken down or removed from places where it had been posted. Plaintiff alleged claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The court said in part:

While plaintiff does not dispute that she brought the claims in this case before a secular court rather than a religious one, she suggests that the seiruv is defamatory because it indicates that her doing so was “improper[].”  That statement is nowhere contained in the seiruv itself.  But even if the seiruv is read to convey that implication through its reference to plaintiff’s civil filing, the First Amendment would prevent this Court from second-guessing a religious court’s view of impropriety. ... 

Plaintiff next claims that the instructional document distributed with the seiruv is defamatory because it falsely conveys “that the rabbis of the beth din were encouraging social ostracism and shaming in this case.” ... In any event, the Establishment Clause would preclude this Court from finding defamation on that ground.  To decide whether the instructional document was true or false in its asserted characterization of plaintiff’s seiruv, the Court would be “called upon to inquire into the rules and customs governing rabbinical courts as they are utilized in the Orthodox Jewish religion,”

[Thanks to Volokh Conspiracy for the lead.]

Religious College Sues Georgia Seeking Inclusion in State Grant and Scholarship Programs

Yesterday suit was filed in a Georgia federal district court challenging the constitutionality of excluding Luther Rice College and Seminary from state scholarship and grant programs for students attending private colleges. Georgia law excludes schools or colleges of theology or divinity. The complaint (full text) in Luther Rice College and Seminary v. Riley, (ND GA, filed 10/15/2024), alleges in part:

9. Georgia allows other religious schools—including schools with religious missions that offer religious undergraduate degree programs like Luther Rice—to participate in Georgia student aid programs....

11. If Luther Rice did not have a religious mission, offer religious degree programs, and teach all courses from a Christian worldview, its undergraduate students could receive Georgia student aid.

12. So Luther Rice faces a choice between (a) maintaining its religious mission and degree programs and teaching all courses from a Christian worldview, or (b) giving up that religious character and exercise to participate equally with other schools in the State.

13. Putting the school to that choice is unconstitutional....

Plaintiffs allege that the exclusion violates the free exercise and Establishment Clauses, the equal protection clause and plaintiff's free expression rights. ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Certiorari Denied in Dispute Over Standing to Challenge Covid Restrictions on Churches

The U.S. Supreme Court today denied review in Grace Bible Fellowship v. Polis, (Docket No. 24-226, certiorari denied 10/15/2024). (Order List). (Certiorari petition). In the case, the U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals (10th Circuit opinion) held that plaintiffs lacked standing to obtain prospective declaratory relief in their challenge to Colorado's authority to impose public health restrictions on houses of worship.

7th Day Adventists Sue Maryland Over Narrow Interpretation of Fair Employment Practices Act Exemption

Last week, the Seventh Day Adventist Church filed suit against officials and members of the Maryland Civil Rights Commission challenging as unconstitutional the Maryland Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the religious institution exemption from the anti-discrimination provisions of the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA). Last year in Doe v. Catholic Relief Services, the Maryland Supreme Court held that the religious institution exemption only applies to "claims brought by employees who perform duties that directly further the core mission (or missions) of the religious entity." (See prior posting.) The complaint (full text) in General Conference of the Seventh Day Adventists v. Horton, (D MD, filed Oct. 2, 2024), alleges that the Catholic Relief Services interpretation of FEPA exemption violates plaintiffs' rights under the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses as well as other 1st and 14th Amendment rights. The complaint says in part:

Plaintiffs believe that all their employees are representatives of the Church and are responsible for sharing the Church’s faith with the world. It is therefore a critical component of Plaintiffs’ religious exercise that all their employees embrace the Church’s faith, support its religious mission, and share the faith with others. This is why Plaintiffs’ employment policies have long required all those they employ to be members of the Church in regular standing and to conduct themselves in accordance with the Church’s religious beliefs....

What is more, applying Catholic Relief Services’ gloss on MFEPA would require the government to engage in a “fact-intensive inquiry” to “determine[] what constitutes a core mission” for each Plaintiff, and then assess which roles “directly” further those mission(s)...."  Applying this amorphous standard would require courts to delve into entangling questions of religious doctrine.

Becket Fund issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Cert. Petition Filed in Oklahoma Religious Charter School Case

A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed yesterday with the U.S. Supreme Court in Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board v. Drummond, (Sup. Ct., cert. filed 10/7/2024). In the case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the state Charter School Board's authorization of a Catholic sponsored publicly-funded charter school violates Oklahoma statutes, the Oklahoma Constitution and the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. (See prior posting.) The petition for review contends that exclusion of religious schools from the state's charter school program violates the 1st Amendment's free exercise clause and that religious instruction by a state-funded charter school does not constitute state action. ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the petition for review.

Pregnancy Centers Sue California AG To Stop Enforcement of Business Fraud Statutes Against Them

Suit was filed last week in a California federal district court by a California anti-abortion pregnancy center and a Christian organization of pregnancy centers challenging the California attorney general's attempts to apply the state Business Fraud statutes to plaintiffs' promotion of abortion pill reversal. The 86-page complaint (full text) in National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Bonta, (CD CA, filed 10/2/2024), alleges that the Attorney General's enforcement threats violate plaintiffs' free speech and free exercise rights, saying in part:

12. Plaintiffs here ... wish to truthfully inform the public that it may be possible to counteract the first abortion drug’s lethal effects if women change their minds and seek treatment within the first three days after taking it. 

13. Plaintiffs wish to say the same (and similar) things about APR that the other nonprofits have. But the Attorney General’s actions show that if they do, they may be subject to injunctions, civil penalties of up to $2,500 per “violation,” and potential jail time....

18. The Attorney General says he supports a woman’s right to choose whether to keep her pregnancy, yet he seeks to deprive a woman who changes her mind, or who was coerced or tricked into taking the first abortion drug, of truthful information about a safe and effective way to save her pregnancy. 

19. The Constitution protects Plaintiffs’ right to speak to the public and women about lawful medical treatments provided by licensed medical professionals.  

20. This action seeks to enjoin the Attorney General from targeting, chilling, and punishing Plaintiffs’ speech about APR and a declaration that his actions violate Plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to speak freely, to practice their religion, and to due process under the law.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Organization Did Not Show That Its Anti-Abortion Views Are Religious Beliefs

In Oregon Right to Life v. Stolfi, (D OR, Sept. 30, 2024), an Oregon federal district court refused to issue a preliminary injunction against Oregon's requiring Oregon Right to Life to cover abortion and certain contraceptives in its employee health plan. The organization asserted a 1st Amendment free exercise claim.  The court said in part:

... Plaintiff is not affiliated with any religious practice or institution and does not have any religious requirement for being an employee or director.  The “specific purpose” and “personal life perspectives” that Plaintiff’s directors are required to subscribe to is free of any religious elements, requiring only that they subscribe to a belief in the importance of human life and oppose abortion, euthanasia, assisted suicide, and “life-destroying research.”  As noted, Plaintiff has over 25,000 members, who are not required to subscribe to any religious belief and are responsible for electing two members of Plaintiff’s board of directors.  Other than a fleeting reference to “Judeo-Christian ethics,” there is nothing in the articles of incorporation that would suggest any religious element in Plaintiff’s organization.   

There are many reasons why an individual or entity might oppose abortion and contraception, which range from deeply held religious conviction to the purely philosophical.  Plaintiff asserts in this litigation that its reasons, as an organization, are religious, but that assertion is not fully supported by the record.  It is not necessary for the Court, at this early stage of the case, to conclusively resolve whether Plaintiff’s beliefs are, in Plaintiff’s own scheme of things, religious.  But the Court’s review of Plaintiff’s organizational documents and requirements for membership, employment, and leadership cast doubt on whether Plaintiff’s opposition is genuinely religious in nature.  This doubt undermines Plaintiff’s showing of likely success on the merits.  

Defendant also challenges whether Plaintiff actually holds the beliefs professed in the Complaint.  As noted, a major aspect of Plaintiff’s objection the RHEA mandate is the provision of certain forms of contraception.  Plaintiff has maintained a health benefit plan through Providence Health Plans since 2015, years prior to the passage of the RHEA, and now objects that Providence Health Plans is not acceptable to them because it covers challenged forms of contraception.  The fact that Plaintiff maintained benefits through Providence Health Plans prior to the passage of the RHEA, despite its provisions concerning contraception, likewise casts doubt on Plaintiff’s claim.