Certiorari Granted in RLUIPA Damages Case

The U.S. Supreme Court today granted review in Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections, (Docket No. 23-1197, certiorari granted 6/23/2025) (Order List). At issue in the case is whether an action for damages lies under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act in a suit against a prison official in his personal capaciy. (Petition for Certiorari). Plaintiff, a Rastafarian, had his dreadlocks forcibly shaved by prison guards.  The Supreme Court has previously held that a damage action under RFRA can be brought against federal prison personnel, but the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals held that it would violate the Spending Clause to recognize a similar remedy under RLUIPA, which is a statute based on Congress' Spending Clause authority. (See prior related posting.) The SCOTUSblog case page has links to all the pleadings and amicus briefs in the case.

Supreme Court Upholds Tennessee's Ban on Gender Affirming Care for Minors

In United States v. Skrmetti,(Sup.Ct., June 18, 2025), the U.S. Supreme Court today by a vote of 6-3 upheld Tennessee's law that bars both hormonal and surgical gender transition procedures for minors. The case generated 5 separate opinions spanning 118 pages. Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion held that the Tennessee law does not trigger heightened scrutiny. He said in part:

This Court has not previously held that transgender individuals are a suspect or quasi-suspect class. And this case, in any event, does not raise that question because SB1 does not classify on the basis of transgender status. As we have explained, SB1 includes only two classifications: healthcare providers may not administer puberty blockers or hormones to minors (a classification based on age) to treat gender dysphoria, gender identity disorder, or gender incongruence (a classification based on medical use). The plaintiffs do not argue that the first classification turns on transgender status, and our case law forecloses any such argument as to the second....

... [T]here is a rational basis for SB1’s classifications. Tennessee concluded that there is an ongoing debate among medical experts regarding the risks and benefits associated with administering puberty blockers and hormones to treat gender dysphoria, gender identity disorder, and gender incongruence. SB1’s ban on such treatments responds directly to that uncertainty....

Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, saying in part: 

This case carries a simple lesson: In politically contentious debates over matters shrouded in scientific uncertainty, courts should not assume that self-described experts are correct.

Deference to legislatures, not experts, is particularly critical here. Many prominent medical professionals have declared a consensus around the efficacy of treating children’s gender dysphoria with puberty blockers, cross-sex hormones, and surgical interventions, despite mounting evidence to the contrary. They have dismissed grave problems undercutting the assumption that young children can consent to irreversible treatments that may deprive them of their ability to eventually produce children of their own. They have built their medical determinations on concededly weak evidence. And, they have surreptitiously compromised their medical recommendations to achieve political ends.

Justice Barrett, joined by Justice Thomas, filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

Because the Court concludes that Tennessee’s Senate Bill 1 does not classify on the basis of transgender status, it does not resolve whether transgender status constitutes a suspect class.... I write separately to explain why, in myview, it does not....

Beyond the treatment of gender dysphoria, transgender status implicates several other areas of legitimate regulatory policy—ranging from access to restrooms to eligibility for boys’ and girls’ sports teams. If laws that classify based on transgender status necessarily trigger heightened scrutiny, then the courts will inevitably be in the business of “closely scrutiniz[ing] legislative choices” in all these domains....

Justice Alito filed an opi nion concurring in part, saying in part:

I do notjoin Part II–A–2 of the opinion of the Court, which concludes that SB1 does not classify on the basis of “transgender status.” There is a strong argument that SB1does classify on that ground, but I find it unnecessary to decide that question. I would assume for the sake of argument that the law classifies based on transgender status, but I would nevertheless sustain the law because such a classification does not warrant heightened scrutiny. I also do not join Part II–A–3 of the Court’s opinion because I do not believe that the reasoning employed in Bostock v. Clayton County ... is applicable when determining whether a law classifies based on sex for Equal Protection Clause purposes.

Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Jackson and joined in part by Justice Kagan, saying in part:

Tennessee’s law expressly classifies on the basis of sex and transgender status, so the Constitution and settled precedent require the Court to subject it to intermediate scrutiny. The majority contorts logic and precedent to say otherwise, inexplicably declaring it must uphold Tennessee’s categorical ban on lifesaving medical treatment so long as “‘any reasonably conceivable state of facts’” might justify it... Thus, the majority subjects a law that plainly discriminates on the basis of sex to mere rational-basis review. By retreating from meaningful judicial review exactly where it matters most, the Court abandons transgender children and their families to political whims....

Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

I take no view on how SB1 would fare under heightened scrutiny.... So I would both start and stop at the question of what test SB1 must satisfy. As JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR shows, it is heightened scrutiny...

SCOTUSblog reports on the decision.

Supreme Court GVR's Battle Over Health Insurance Abortion Coverage

In Roman Catholic Diocese v. Harris, (Sup. Ct., June 16, 2025), the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment of New York's highest court and remanded the case for further consideration in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Commission. At issue in the case that was gvr'd today was whether the "religious employer" exemption to the state's requirement that health insurance policies cover medically necessary abortion services is too narrow.  The exemption is only available to entities whose purpose is to inculcate religious values and that primarily employ and serve persons who share their religious tenets. (See prior posting.)

Supreme Court Review Sought In High School Football Game Prayer Dispute

A petition for certiorari (full text) was filed with the U.S.Supreme Court last week in Cambridge Christian School, Inc. v. Florida High School Athletic Association, Inc., (Sup. Ct., cert. filed 6/6/2025).In th e case, the U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected free speech and free exercise claims by a Christian school that was refused the use of a stadium's public address system for a pre-game prayer at the FHSAA state championship football game in which it was playing. (See prior posting).

Supreme Court: Wisconsin's Religious Nonprofit Exemption from Unemployment Comp. Tax Must Include Catholic Charities

In Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Commission, (Sup. Ct., June 5, 2025), the U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Sotomayor, unanimously held that Wisconsin violated the First Amendment's religion clauses when it held that Catholic Charities Bureau does not qualify for the exemption from unemployment compensation tax that is granted by state statute to nonprofits "operated primarily for religious purposes". The Wisconsin Supreme Court had held that Catholic Charities' activities were no different than those offered by a secular organization; they did not involve worship services, religious outreach, ceremony, or religious education. In reversing the Wisconsin supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court said in part:

A law that differentiates between religions along theological lines is textbook denominational discrimination....

This case involves that paradigmatic form of denominational discrimination....

Put simply, petitioners could qualify for the exemption while providing their current charitable services if they engaged in proselytization or limited their services to fellow Catholics. Petitioners’ Catholic faith, however, bars them from satisfying those criteria. Catholic teaching, petitioners say, forbids “‘misus[ing] works of charity for purposes of proselytism.’” ... It also requires provision of charitable services “without making distinctions ‘by race, sex, or religion.’” ...  Many religions apparently impose similar rules.... Others seemingly have adopted a contrary approach....

Wisconsin’s exemption, as interpreted by its Supreme Court, thus grants a denominational preference by explicitly differentiating between religions based on theological practices.

Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

As a matter of church law, Catholic Charities and its sub-entities are an arm of the Diocese of Superior, and thus, for religious purposes, are not distinct organizations.  But, when determining whether Catholic Charities was a religious organization entitled to a tax exemption, the Wisconsin Supreme Court nevertheless relied on Catholic Charities’ separate corporate charter to treat it as an entity entirely distinct and separate from the Diocese. That holding contravened the church autonomy doctrine....

Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) allows a State to exempt from its unemployment-coverage mandate any “organization which is operated primarily for religious purposes and which is operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches.”... The State treats church affiliated charities that proselytize and serve co-religionists exclusively differently from those that do not.... Because I agree that this distinction violates the neutrality principle of the Constitution’s Religion Clauses, I join the Court’s opinion in full.

... [B]oth the text and legislative history of FUTA’s religious-purposes exemption confirm that Congress used the phrase “operated primarily for religious purposes” to refer to the organization’s function, not its inspiration....

Congress sought to extend to most nonprofit workers the stability that unemployment insurance offers, while exempting a narrow category of church-affiliated entities most likely to cause significant entanglement problems for the unemployment system—precisely because their work involves preparing individuals for religious life. It is perfectly consistent with the opinion the Court hands down today for States to align their §3309(b)(1)(B)-based religious-purposes exemptions with Congress’s true focus.

SCOTUSblog reports on the decision. 

Supreme Court Denies Cert. In School's Ban on Anti-Transgender T-Shirt

The U.S. Supreme Court yesterday denied review in L.M. v. Town of Middleborough, Massachusetts, (Sup. Ct., certiorari denied May 27, 2025).  In the case, the U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals upheld middle school officials' decision that a student was in violation of school rules by wearing a T-shirt that proclaims: "There Are Only Two Genders." Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas filed an opinion dissenting from the denial of certiorari, saying in part:

The First Circuit held that the school did not violate L. M.’s free-speech rights. It held that the general prohibition against viewpoint-based censorship does not apply to public schools. And it employed a vague, permissive, and jargon-laden rule that departed from the standard this Court adopted in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 (1969). 

The First Circuit’s decision calls out for our review....

I would grant the petition for two reasons. First, we should reaffirm the bedrock principle that a school may not engage in viewpoint discrimination when it regulates student speech. Tinker itself made that clear.... Curiously, however, the First Circuit declined to follow Tinker in this regard, instead cherry-picking which First Amendment principles it thought worthy of allowing through the schoolhouse gates.  By limiting the application of our viewpoint-discrimination cases, the decision below robs a great many students of that core First Amendment protection.

Second, we should also grant review to determine whether the First Circuit properly understood the rule adopted in Tinker regarding the suppression of student speech on the ground that it presents a risk of material disruption.

Justice Thomas also filed a separate brief dissenting opinion.  NBC News reports on the Court's action.

Supreme Court Denies Review of Apache's Loss of Sacred Land

By a vote of 6-2, the U.S. Supreme Court today denied review in Apache Stronghold v. United States, (Sup.Ct., certiorari denied May 27, 2025). In the case, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc, by a vote of 6-5, refused to enjoin the government from transferring to a copper mining company federally-owned forest land that is of significant spiritual value to the Western Apache Indians. Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas, today filed a lengthy dissent to the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, saying in part:

Exactly nothing in the phrase “substantial burden”—or anything else in RFRA’s text—hints that a different and more demanding standard applies when (and only when) the “disposition” of the government’s property is at issue....

... [A]t bottom, it seems the Ninth Circuit was concerned that a ruling for Apache Stronghold would effectively afford tribal members a “‘religious servitude’” on federal land at Oak Flat....  And, the argument goes, those who adopted RFRA could not have intended to afford Tribes or others that kind of power over the disposition of federal property....  But unexpressed legislative intentions are not the law. And even if we were to abandon the statutory text in favor of guesswork about unenacted congressional purposes, it is far from clear why we should make the guess the Ninth Circuit did....

While this Court enjoys the power to choose which cases it will hear, its decision to shuffle this case off our docket without a full airing is a grievous mistake—one with consequences that threaten to reverberate for generations.  Just imagine if the government sought to demolish a historic cathedral on so questionable a chain of legal reasoning.  I have no doubt that we would find that case worth our time. Faced with the government’s plan to destroy an ancient site of tribal worship, we owe the Apaches no less.  They may live far from Washington, D. C., and their history and religious practices may be unfamiliar to many.  But that should make no difference. “Popular religious views are easy enough to defend. It is in protecting unpopular religious beliefs that we prove this country’s commitment to . . . religious freedom.”

AP reports on the Court's action.

Supreme Court Gives Emergency Relief to State Legislator Who Was Disenfranchised After Anti-Transgender Social Media Post

In Libby v. Fecteau, (Sup. Ct., May 20, 2025), the U.S. Supreme Court by a vote of 7-2 granted an injunction pending appeal to a member of the Maine House of Representatives.  Petitioner's Emergency Application for an Injunction describes the issue before the Court:

Maine State Representative Laurel Libby spoke out on social media about an intensely debated issue—the participation of transgender athletes in girls’ high school sports. Maine requires girls to compete alongside transgender athletes; Libby criticized that policy after a transgender athlete won the girls’ pole vault at the state track-and-field championship. Displeased with Libby’s criticism, the Maine House voted along party lines to censure her.  

The verbal censure (unwise as it may be) is not what Applicants challenge here. It’s what happened next. The Speaker declared Libby was barred from speaking or voting until she recants her view. This means her thousands of constituents in Maine House District 90 are now without a voice or vote for every bill coming to the House floor for the rest of her elected term, which runs through 2026.....

In this application, Petitioners seek an injunction pending appeal requiring the Clerk to count Libby’s votes. That interim relief simply restores the status quo of equal representation, bringing the Maine House back into conformity with every other State and Congress. 

The Supreme Court granted the injunction in a one-paragraph order that did not give reasons for the decision. Justices Sotomayor and Jackson voted to deny the injunction. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Not very long ago, this Court treaded carefully with respect to exercising its equitable power to issue injunctive relief at the request of a party claiming an emergency.  The opinions are legion in which individual Justices, reviewing such requests in chambers, declined to intervene—reiterating that “such power should be used sparingly and only in the most critical and exigent circumstances.” ...

Those days are no more. Today’s Court barely pauses to acknowledge these important threshold limitations on the exercise of its own authority.  It opts instead to dole out error correction as it sees fit, regardless of the lack of any exigency and even when the applicants’ claims raise significant legal issues that warrant thorough evaluation by the lower courts that are dutifully considering them....

SCOTUSblog and The Washington Stand report on the decision.

Supreme Court Splits 4-4 In Oklahoma Charter School Case

In Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board v. Drummond and the companion case of St. Isidore of Seville Catholic Virtual School v. Drummond, (Sup. Ct. May 22, 2025), the U.S. Supreme court today in a brief order affirmed by an equally divided court the judgment of the Oklahoma Supreme Court. At issue in the cases was whether Oklahoma can authorize and fund a religiously-sponsored charter school. In the cases, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the state Charter School Board's authorization of a Catholic-sponsored publicly-funded charter school violates Oklahoma statutes, the Oklahoma Constitution and the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. The U.S. Supreme Court's Order indicates that today's tie vote, which comes only three weeks after oral arguments in the case, resulted from Justice Barrett's recusing herself from the case. While Justice Barrett gave no reason for recusing herself, earlier media reports suggest it was because of her close friendship with Notre Dame law professor Nicole Stelle Garnett who was an early legal adviser to the school and is a faculty fellow with Notre Dame's Religious Liberty Clinic which represents St. Isidore. Bloomberg reports on today's Supreme Court decision.

Former Justice David Souter Dies; Described As Champion of Church-State Separation

The U.S. Supreme Court announced yesterday that former Justice David Souter died on May 8 at his home in New Hampshire. Souter served on the Court from 1990 until his retirement in 2009. In a press release mourning his death, Americans United described Souter as a champion of church-state separation. The press release summarizes eight Supreme Court cases involving church-state issues in which Souter wrote dissenting, concurring or majority opinions.

Supreme Court Allows Ban on Transgender Individuals Serving in Military to Remain in Effect While Appeals Move Forward

In United States v. Shilling, (Sup. Ct., May 6, 2025), the U.S. Supreme Court by a vote of 6-3 granted a stay while appeals to the 9th Circuit and the Supreme Court move forward of a preliminary injunction that, had it remained in effect, would have disqualified transgender individuals from serving in the military.  The Supreme Court's one-paragraph order stays the preliminary injunction granted in Shilling v. United States, (WD WA, March 27, 2025). The district court in granting the injunction had said:

The government’s unrelenting reliance on deference to military judgment is unjustified in the absence of any evidence supporting “the military’s” new judgment reflected in the Military Ban—in its equally considered and unquestionable judgment, that very same military had only the week before permitted active-duty plaintiffs (and some thousands of others) to serve openly. Any evidence that such service over the past four years harmed any of the military’s inarguably critical aims would be front and center. But there is none.

In its Application for a Stay of the Injunction, the military had argued in part:

Absent a stay, the district court’s universal injunction will remain in place for the duration of further review in the Ninth Circuit and in this Court—a period far too long for the military to be forced to maintain a policy that it has determined, in its professional judgment, to be contrary to military readiness and the Nation’s interests.

NBC News reports on the Supreme Court's order.

Supreme Court Today Hears Arguments on Funding of Religious Charter Schools

The Supreme Court will hear oral arguments this morning in Oklahoma Charter School Board v. Drummond, consolidated for oral argument with St. Isidore of Seville Catholic Virtual School v. Drummond which stemmed from a separate petition for review filed by an intervenor in the same case. In the cases, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the state Charter School Board's authorization of a Catholic-sponsored publicly-funded charter school violates Oklahoma statutes, the Oklahoma Constitution and the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. The petitions for review contend that exclusion of religious schools from the state's charter school program violates the 1st Amendment's free exercise clause despite Establishment Clause concerns, and that religious instruction by a state-funded charter school does not constitute state action. The SCOTUSblog case pages for the two cases, with links to the petitions, briefs, amicus briefs and commentary are here and here.

Oral arguments, which begin at 10:00 AM will be live-streamed at this page. A transcript and audio recording of the arguments will become available later today here.  NEA Today reports on the upcoming oral arguments.

UPDATE: A transcript and audio of today's oral arguments are now available here. The Hill has a lengthy report on the arguments.

Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Mandated Insurance Coverage for Anti-HIV Drugs Over Religious Objections

The U.S. Supreme Court hears oral arguments this morning in Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc. Plaintiffs in the case objected on religious grounds to providing their employees the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force's mandated insurance coverage for pre-exposure drugs that prevent the transmission of HIV. Plaintiffs contended that this coverage makes them complicit in facilitating homosexual behavior, drug use and sexual activity outside of marriage. In the case, the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the structure of the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force violates the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution. That is the issue before the Court today. Oral arguments will be streamed here at 10:00 AM. A transcript and audio recording of the arguments will be posted later today at this web page. See prior related posting.

UPDATE: Here is a link to the transcript and audio of the oral arguments. Vox reports on the oral arguments.

Supreme Court Will Hear Oral Arguments Today on Challenge to Planned Parenthood Funding Cutoff

The U.S. Supreme Court today will hear oral arguments in Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic. In the case, the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals held that Congress conferred an individually enforceable right for Medicaid beneficiaries to freely choose their healthcare provider. It thus affirmed the district court's enjoining of South Carolina's attempted cutoff of Medicaid funds to Planned Parenthood. Links to pleadings and briefs in the case are available on the Supreme Court's docket for the case. Background on the case is discussed by SCOTUSblog. Today's oral arguments will be broadcast live at 10:00 AM at this link. A transcript and audio of the arguments will be posted here by the Supreme court later today.

Media Say Justices Seemed to Favor Catholic Charities Position in Yesterday's SCOTUS Arguments

News media reporting on yesterday's Supreme Court arguments in Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Commission indicate that the Justices seemed to favor Catholic Charities position that it is unconstitutional to deny it the religious organization exemption in Wisconsin's unemployment compensation law. NPR reported in part:

The U.S. Supreme Court appeared openly doubtful on Monday about Wisconsin's refusal to exempt Catholic Charities from making payments into the state's mandatory unemployment system....

Monday morning's argument started out with some hard questions for Catholic Charities. Justice Elena Kagan asked, "Are you saying … that a group that comes in and says, 'We are a religious group doing religious activities for religious purposes,' qualifies no matter what? That there's no looking behind that at all?"...

If the justices seemed skeptical of the charity's opt-out position, both liberal and conservative justices seemed downright hostile to the state's assertion that Catholic Charities, which serves and employs people of all faiths, and doesn't allow proselytizing, is just like any other non-profit employer and is thus required to pay into the state's unemployment tax system.

Wisconsin assistant solicitor general Colin Roth faced constant interruptions from the bench, but managed to say that the standard imposed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court is that charities may be exempt from paying taxes if their activities involve worship, or religious proselytizing, or religious education. Catholic Charities fulfills none of those functions, he said....

Supreme Court Will Hear Oral Arguments Today on Tax Exemption for Catholic Charities

The U.S. Supreme Court this morning will hear oral arguments in Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Commission.  In the case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court by a vote of 4-3 held that Catholic Charities Bureau and four of its sub-entities are not entitled to an exemption from the state's unemployment compensation law. (See prior posting.) Catholic Charities' petition for certiorari asks the Supreme Court to decide if Wisconsin violated the 1st Amendment's religion clauses when it held that Catholic Charities activities are primarily charitable and secular so that the statutory religious organization exemption is not available to it. The SCOTUSblog case page has links to the pleadings and briefs filed in the case. The oral arguments will be broadcast live by the Court at 10:00 AM at this page. An audio recording and a written transcript of the oral arguments will be posted later today by the Court on this page.

UPDATE: Here are links to the transcript and audio recording of arguments in the case.

Justice Department in Policy Change Files Amicus Brief Supporting Religious Charter School

 As previously reported, the U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Oklahoma Virtual Charter School Board v. Drummond and the related case of St. Isidore of Seville Virtual Charter School v. Drummond. In the cases, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the state Charter School Board's authorization of a Catholic-sponsored publicly-funded charter school violates Oklahoma statutes, the Oklahoma Constitution and the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. Last week (March 12), the U.S. Acting Solicitor General filed an amicus brief (full text) urging reversal of the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The brief says in part:

... [T]he Free Exercise Clause applies and prohibits Oklahoma from excluding St. Isidore based on its religious observance. 

The United States previously advanced a different view of a charter school’s relationship with a State in Charter Day School, Inc. v. Peltier, 143 S. Ct. 2657 (2023), after this Court called for the views of the Solicitor General regarding whether a charter school’s adoption and enforcement of a student dress code was state action that could potentially violate the Constitution.  The United States contended (Br. 9-14) that the charter school was engaged in state action because it performed an educational function that was traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.  

After the recent change in Administration, the United States has concluded that charter schools do not perform functions exclusively reserved to the State.  More broadly, the state-action inquiry on which the United States focused in Peltier has obvious application to cases asking whether a school violates the Constitution in taking a specific action.  Where, as here, the question is whether a school lacks constitutional protections due to its governmental character, the key consideration is whether the school is itself a governmental entity, created and controlled by the State.  A charter school like St. Isidore does not meet those criteria.

Supreme Court Denies Cert. In Title VII Religioius Discrimination Case

The U.S. Supreme Court today denied review in Hittle v. City of Stockton, California, (Docket No. 24-427, certiorari denied 3/10/2025). Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, filed an opinion dissenting from the denial of cert. In the case, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court's dismissal of a religious discrimination suit under Title VII and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act brought by the city's former Fire Chief.  Among the several reasons given to plaintiff by the city for his dismissal was his attendance at a Christian religious leadership event on city time and with use of a city vehicle, and his approval for three other Department employees to also attend. (See prior posting.) In his dissent, Justice Thomas said in part:

I would have taken this opportunity to revisit McDonnell Douglas and decide whether its burden-shifting framework remains a workable and useful evidentiary tool.

CNN reports on the denial of review.

Supreme Court Grants Certiorari in Conversion Therapy Ban Case

The U.S. Supreme Court today granted review in Chiles v. Salazar, (Docket No. 24-539, certiorari granted 3/10/2025).  In the case, the U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision held that Colorado's Minor Conversion Therapy Law that bans mental health professionals from providing conversion therapy to minors does not violate the free speech or free exercise rights of mental health professionals. (See prior posting.) The petition for certiorari raises only the free speech issue. The SCOTUSblog case page for the case contains links to pleadings in the case. AP reports on the grant of review.

Certiorari Denied in Abortion Buffer Zone Challenge

Yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court denied review in Coalition Life v. City of Carbondale, Illinois, (Docket No. 24-57, certiorari denied 2/24/2025) (Order List.) In the case, the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a city ordinance creating a buffer zone around abortion clinics in which sidewalk counselors may not approach closer than 8 feet to those accessing the clinic. The 7th Circuit said it was bound by the Supreme Court's 2000 decision in Hill v. Colorado.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion saying in part:

Following our repudiation in Dobbs, I do not see what is left of Hill. Yet, lower courts continue to feel bound by it.  The Court today declines an invitation to set the record straight on Hill’s defunct status.  I respectfully dissent.