5th Circuit: Anti-Vax Belief in Bodily Autonomy Can Support Title VII Religious Discrimination Claim

In Wright v. Honeywell International, Inc., (5th Cir., Aug. 5, 2025), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's dismissal of a Title VII religious discrimination suit brought by a dock operator who in 2022 refused to comply with Honeywell's Covid vaccine mandate. Honeywell refused to grant plaintiff a religious exemption on the ground that he did not identify a sincerely held religious belief as the basis for his refusal. The court said in part:

Wright sought a religious exemption from the vaccination policy, citing on his exemption request form his belief that “our creator gave us this gift to choose and decide for ourselves,” and also that it is “in our constitution no man should be forced to do something he . . . is not comfortable with.”  Wright is a Baptist Christian.  He explained that his religion does not “prevent[]” him from receiving the vaccine, “but cert[ai]n passages le[ad him] to feel very strongly about” his decision.  Wright also attested on his exemption request form that he “didn[’]t like the respon[s]e [his] body had” to a tetanus vaccine in 2015.  And he stated that this was the first time that he had sought a religious exemption from a mandatory vaccine. 

Wright also submitted Honeywell’s required third-party attestation of his religious beliefs, completed by his daughter.  Citing scripture, his daughter explained, “It is in our belief that humans should only use things that are created of the earth by God.  We believe the vaccine is a claim of the mark of the beast[;] it is man made and goes against our religion.”...

“Bona fide religious beliefs include ‘moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views.’”...

Wright’s evidence demonstrates a “moral or ethical” belief in bodily autonomy and freedom to choose what to put in his body.... The fact that he gave additional reasons for his vaccine refusal does not show that his belief is “merely a preferred practice.”...  Instead, it simply shows that his vaccine refusal is grounded on both religious and non-religious reasons.  Furthermore, the inquiry on this prong is not “whether [Wright’s specific] belief is a true religious tenet” of the Baptist faith, but rather whether the belief is, “in his own scheme of things, religious.”

7th Circuit: Jury Must Decide Whether Religious Accommodation Would Create Undue Hardship

In a Title VII case that has been in litigation for six years, in Kluge v. Brownsburg Community School Corp., (7th Cir., Aug. 5, 2025), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision reversed a district court's grant of summary judgment to the Brownsburg school district and sent the case back to the trial court for a jury to determine disputed facts. At issue is a music teacher's religious objections to following school policy that requires him to refer to transgender students by the names and pronouns that the students and their parents have asked that the school use. Initially the school accommodated the teacher by permitting him to address transgender students using only their last names. However, this led to student dissatisfaction and the accommodation was rescinded. The primary disputed facts are whether the accommodation created an "undue hardship" under the standard defined by the Supreme Court in its 2023 decision in Groff v. DeJoy, and whether the teacher's religious objections were sincere.  The majority said in part:

... [T]he record contains material factual disputes about whether the accommodation disrupted Brownsburg’s learning environment, precluding summary judgment to the school....

... [T]he complaints ...  all deal with the effects on the two students from Kluge’s use of the last-name-only practice. Nowhere do these documents support an inference that the students had a problem with Kluge’s religion or “the mere fact [of] an accommodation.”...  Instead, the complaints are leveled against the impacts on students and teachers, regardless of whether the accommodation was for religious or secular reasons. 

... [T]here is still a genuine material factual dispute about whether those complaints rose to an undue hardship on the school’s educational mission....

...  [A] genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Kluge’s sincerity. Even though a claimant’s sincerity does not hinge on whether he is “scrupulous in his [religious] observance,” it would still be premature to take this issue away from the jury on this question. ...

Judge Rovner filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Until today, when confronted with a Title VII employment discrimination claim, we have deferred to an employer’s good-faith assessment of how an employee performed in the workplace..... Today the court invites a jury to do what we have always said a federal court will not do, which is to sit as a super-personnel department and second-guess the employer’s good-faith reasoning. In making employment decisions, ... employers will now have to consider not only how successfully an employee is performing his job as modified by a religious accommodation, but how a jury might second-guess its assessment in litigation years down the line. This is an untenable restraint on employers’ decision making. 

Today’s decision also burdens employers in a second important respect. Brownsburg successfully argued below that Kluge’s accommodation proved inconsistent with its mission, which is to provide a supportive learning environment for all of its students. Although the majority accepts this mission for present purposes, it also suggests that evidence of an employer’s mission must be limited to policies that are formally documented and adopted prior to any litigation. I think many employers will be surprised to learn that their ability to define their own missions is restricted to formal policies prepared long before an employment dispute arrives in court....

See prior related posting. ADF issued a press release announcing the decision.

9th Circuit: Ministerial Exception Requires Dismissal of Customer Service Representative's Title VII Suit

In McMahon v. World Vision, Inc., (9th Cir., Aug. 5, 2025), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the ministerial exception doctrine requires dismissal of a Title VII employment discrimination suit brought by a World Vision customer service representative ("CSR") whose job offer was revoked when the organization learned that she was in a same-sex marriage. World Vision is a Christian ministry which shares the gospel through outreach to poor and underserved children and families. The court said in part: 

We hold that the ministerial exception applies to a CSR not merely because they interface with the public, pray with their colleagues, or abide by World Vision’s requirements to embody Christian values.  Rather, CSRs qualify for the exception because (1) they are World Vision’s “voice,” responsible for “effectively communicat[ing] World Vision’s involvement in ministries and projects around the world”; (2) their engagement with donors is a form of ministry itself; and (3) they “give people an opportunity to join [World Vision] in the mission of God.”  Each of these religious responsibilities is “vital” to World Vision’s particular religious mission. 

[Corrected] 

Columbia and UCLA Settle Antisemitism Charges

Last week (July 23), Columbia University announced that it had reached a settlement with the federal government to restore its research funding and federal grants that had been frozen. The University entered a Resolution Agreement (full text) with the Justice Department, Department of Education and HHS. It also entered a separate EEOC Agreement settling Title VII discrimination claims charging antisemitism suffered by Columbia employees.  According to the EEOC's press release:

Columbia University will pay $21 million for a class settlement fund to resolve alleged civil rights violations against Columbia employees occurring on its campus following the Oct. 7 Hamas terror attacks.... This settlement resolves EEOC charges, including a Commissioner’s Charge brought ... on behalf of a class of all Jewish employees, alleging that since at least Oct. 7, 2023, Columbia engaged in a pattern or practice of harassment based on national origin, religion, and/or race, in violation of Title VII....

The full text of the EEOC Agreement does not appear to have been publicly released even though it is incorporated by reference in the Resolution Agreement. 

The broader Resolution Agreement provides in part that Columbia will appoint new faculty members with joint appointments in the Institute for Israel and Jewish Studies and economics, political science or public affairs. It also calls for the appointment of a new administrator who will act as a liaison on antisemitism issues.

A statement by Columbia's president says in part:

The agreement builds on Columbia’s broader commitment to combating antisemitism, reflected most recently in a set of additional institutional actions announced on July 15, 2025, including the incorporation of the IHRA definition of antisemitism into the work of the University’s Office of Institutional Equity (OIE), the appointment of Title VI and Title VII coordinators in OIE, and the expansion of university-wide education and training initiatives.

On July 29, the University of California announced that it had reached a settlement in Frankel v. Regents of the University of California. In the case, a California federal district court previously issued a preliminary injunction sought by Jewish students at UCLA who were blocked from accessing portions of the campus by pro-Palestinian encampments protesting Israel's retaliation in Gaza. (See prior posting.) The Settlement Agreement (full text) (fact sheet) provides for a permanent injunction barring defendants from allowing the exclusion of Jewish students, faculty or staff from programs, activities or campus areas. It also provides for payment of $320,000 to UCLA's Initiative to Combat Antisemitism, $50,000 to each of the four student plaintiffs, $2,300,000 in contributions to eight Jewish non-profit organizations, and $3,600,000 for plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs.

Office of Personnel Management Issues Memo On Religious Accommodations

Yesterday, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management released a Memorandum on Reasonable Accommodations for Religious Purposes (full text) instructing executive branch agencies and departments to "adopt a generous approach to approving religious accommodations." The Memorandum in particular discusses Telework, compensatory time off and Maxiflex work schedules as methods of accommodating religious practices. The Memorandum reads in part:

Upon receiving a request for a religious accommodation, agencies must engage in a good-faith interactive process with the employee to explore reasonable accommodations. Agencies should further assess whether an accommodation imposes a substantial burden on operations. Agencies should document their analyses to ensure compliance with Title VII and applicable law. Agencies are also reminded that religious accommodations may involve multiple, complementary or hybrid approaches to fully address an employee’s religious needs. For example, combining telework and a maxiflex work schedule could be particularly effective for practices such as Sabbath observance, where religious obligations may span only part of a workday. Agencies should consider tailored solutions in ensuring compliance with Title VII.

Fox News reports on the Memorandum.

Ministerial Exception Doctrine Applies to Title VII Claim of Business Prof at Christian University

In Schmidt v. University of Northwestern- St. Paul, (D MN, June 5, 2025), a Minnesota federal district court held that the ministerial exception doctrine bars the court from deciding plaintiff's Title VII claim but sought further briefing on whether it also bars plaintiff's negligent supervision claim. At issue was the hostile environment experienced by plaintiff who had been hired as an Assistant Professor of Business and Program Manager at a Christian university. Plaintiff claims she was subjected to racial discrimination, intimidation and retaliation, and when she reported it, the University took no action. The court said in part:

... Schmidt’s primary argument is that the University is not a religious institution because it did not exercise ecclesiastical decision-making authority over Schmidt.  Schmidt argues that an entity should not qualify as a religious institution for the ministerial exception unless it employs a form of ecclesiastical governance within its structure—in other words, unless an affiliated church is vested with authority to make decisions within the entity. 

The Court finds that the University is a religious institution for the ministerial exception....

Everything considered, and though a close call, the Court finds that Schmidt was a minister for the ministerial exception.  Though Schmidt did not have “minister” in her title, and her position did not require significant formal religious training, the record indicates that the University entrusted her directly “with the responsibility of educating [her] students in the faith” and “expected [her] to guide [her] students, by word and deed, toward the goal of living their lives in accordance with the faith.”...

The above caselaw emphasizes the importance of keeping courts out of religious institution’s internal governance decisions, even if the claims arise under state law.  But it is unclear at this juncture whether the negligent supervision claim here would implicate ecclesiastical matters, and thus whether the ministerial exception applies to Schmidt’s negligent supervision claim....

3rd Circuit: Fireman's Free Exercise and Title VII Challenge to Grooming Rules Should Move Forward

In Smith v. City of Atlantic City, (3d Cir., May 30, 2025), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals vacated a New Jersey federal district court's grant of summary judgment for Atlantic City in a suit by a fireman claiming violation of his free exercise rights and his right to reasonable religious accommodation under Title VII. However, the court affirmed dismissal of plaintiff's equal protection and retaliation claims. In the case, plaintiff who is a Christian challenged the city's requirements that prohibit him from growing a beard of any length, contending that the requirement violates his religious beliefs. Finding free exercise and Title VII reasonable accommodation violations, the court said in part:

Firefighters engaged in fire suppression face danger from smoke and fume inhalation. The City protects its firefighters by requiring them to don air masks in “hazardous” and  “confined” spaces.... These “self-contained breathing apparatuses,” or “SCBAs,” form a seal on the firefighter’s face to keep out hazardous air and pump in clean air....

... [T]wo exceptions—one practical exception and one discretionary regime—render the City’s policy not generally applicable. First, the City has long permitted administrative staff, all of whom are firefighters subject to the SCBA rule, to forgo fit testing...

Second, the City’s grooming regime has built-in discretion. Captains may “deviate” from the SCBA policy and permit any sort of conduct as long as they “bear[] full responsibility for the results of any deviation.” ...

Strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard in all free-exercise cases failing either Smith’s neutrality requirement or its general-applicability requirement....

But the City fails narrow tailoring. “[N]arrow tailoring requires the government to show that measures less restrictive of the First Amendment activity could not address its interest.”... The City could remove Smith from fire suppression duty as it did before 2020 or reclassify him as a civilian who is not subject to the SCBA and grooming policies. It could, as a simple fix, at least try and fit test Smith with facial hair to see if his facial hair, at any length, would interfere with the SCBA to a point that creates the risk of air leakage that the City fears. 

Judge Chung dissented in part, saying she would affirm the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's free exercise claim, because "the Grooming Standards are facially neutral and were applied equally to both religiously-motivated and secularly-motivated requests for accommodation...."

Judge Porter dissented in part, saying he would have upheld plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim.

First Liberty issued a press release announcing the decision.

Court Invalidates EEOC Guidance on Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation Discrimination

In State of Texas v. EEOC, (ND TX, May 15, 2025), a Texas federal district judge held that portions of the EEOC's 2024 Enforcement Guidance on Harassment in the Workplace are contrary to law.  The court held that Guidance requiring bathroom, dress and pronoun accommodations for transgender employees are inconsistent with the text, history and tradition of Title VII. The court said in part:

First, the Enforcement Guidance contravenes Title VII's plain text by expanding the scope of "sex" beyond the biological binary: male and female....

The court invalidated the portions of the Enforcement Guidance which define "sex" in Title VII to include "sexual orientation" and "gender identity" and which define sexual orientation and gender identity as protected classes. The court also specifically invalidated an Example of a Hostile Work Environment that focused on regular and intentional misgendering (using pronoun that does not match gender identity) of a transgender employee by supervisors, coworkers, and customers. AP reports on the decision.

Employees' Suit Against School Board for Denying Religious Exemption from Covid Vaccine Moves Ahead

Decisions in suits by former employees who were denied religious exemptions from employer Covid vaccine mandates continue to be handed down by the courts.  Here is a recent example:

In Brandon v. Board of Education of the City of St. Louis, (ED MO, May 8, 2025), a Missouri federal district court in a 76-page opinion refused to dismiss 16 employees' free exercise, equal protection, Title VII and state human rights act claims against the St. Louis school board. However, damage claims against the superintendent and the chief human resource officer were dismissed on qualified immunity grounds. Plaintiffs all had requested religious exemptions from the Board's Covid vaccine mandate. The Board received 189 requests for religious exemptions from its 3500 employees. None of the requests were granted. The board granted between 40 and 50 disability and medical exemptions. The court said in part:

Defendants have failed to meet their initial summary-judgment burden of showing that no genuine dispute of material fact exists as to Plaintiffs’ sincere religious beliefs....

... [T]he very providing of exemptions rendered the contract not generally applicable because it “‘invite[d]’ the government to decide which reasons for not complying with the policy [were] worthy of solicitude.”...  For these reasons, the Court holds that the strict-scrutiny standard governs here....

Defendants point to three interests that Policy 4624 purportedly served: (1) education, (2) stemming the spread of COVID-19, and (3) promoting “the health, safety, and general welfare of students.”...

Defendants argue that Policy 4624 was necessary to providing “children of any and all backgrounds safe access to education, social mobility, and athletic, cultural[,] and social development.”...  The Court agrees that these interests are compelling. ...

But the Court disagrees that  Defendants have satisfied their summary-judgment burden and proven that Policy 4624 was narrowly tailored to serve those interests....

... [T]he Board could have granted every request for religious exemption, while still granting all the disability and medical exemptions that it granted, and achieved a total employee vaccination rate of between 93.1%  ... and 93.4%.....

In sum, the record at a minimum strongly indicates that the Board denied all religious-exemption requests wholesale, and Plaintiffs thus received vastly different treatment than their comparators did....

Plaintiffs marshal evidence that the Board denied Plaintiffs’ religious-exemption requests because the Board thought that the religious-exemption requests were less important than other exemption requests. With this evidence, Plaintiffs more than show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether Defendants unlawfully intended to discriminate against Plaintiffs based on Plaintiffs’ protected religious beliefs....

5th Circuit: Religious Liberty Training Order Against Attorneys in Title VII Case Was Improperly Punitive

In Carter v. Local 556, Transport Workers Union of America, (5th Cir., May 8, 2025), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed portions of a Texas federal district court's judgment against Southwest Airlines and its employee union that found violations of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. At issue was the airline's firing of a flight attendant for posting on Facebook and privately sending to the president of the flight attendants’ union images and videos of aborted fetuses. The flight attendant opposed the union's support for abortion rights. The appellate court held that a judgement in favor of Southwest should have been entered on the flight attendant's claim that she was fired because of her religious beliefs. It concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support a judgment against Southwest on belief-based intentional discrimination. The court however affirmed the jury's verdict that found Southwest had violated Title VII by firing the employee for her religious practices. Southwest failed to convince the jury that accommodating the flight attendant by granting an exception to its social media, bullying and harassment policies would create an undue hardship for Southwest.

The 5th Circuit held that the district court's injunction entered in the case was overbroad and vague. The court also vacated a contempt order that had been issued against Southwest, and which subsequently became the center of much press attention. (See prior posting.) As explained in part by the 5th Circuit:

... [A]s part of its judgment, the district court ordered Southwest to “inform Southwest flight attendants that, under Title VII, [Southwest] may not discriminate against Southwest flight attendants for their religious practices and beliefs, including—but not limited to—those expressed on social media and those concerning abortion.” The notice that Southwest distributed to its flight attendants, however, stated a court “ordered us to inform you that Southwest does not discriminate against our Employees for their religious practices and beliefs.”...

Carter moved the district court to hold Southwest in contempt, arguing the email merely stated that Southwest “does not discriminate,” rather than “may not discriminate,” a material deviation from the court’s language... The district court agreed with Carter and held Southwest in contempt. As a sanction, the district court ordered Southwest to circulate a statement—verbatim—to its flight attendants “to set the record straight,” and ordered three of Southwest’s in-house attorneys to attend religious-liberty training with the Alliance Defending Freedom....

... We ... cannot say the district court abused its discretion in holding the airline in contempt....

... [B]ut religious-liberty training would do little to compel compliance with the order or to compensate Carter. The attorneys ordered to attend training were not involved in the decision to terminate Carter, and no evidence offered at trial suggests they demonstrated animus against Carter or her religious beliefs.... Additionally, the training would not be limited to Title VII training but instead was to encompass topics irrelevant to securing compliance with a Title VII judgment. It was plainly not the least-restrictive means of remedying Southwest’s non-compliance....

Punitive sanctions exceed the scope of a federal court’s civil contempt authority.

Reuters reports on the decision.

EEOC Sues Marriott Over Refusal to Accommodate Seventh Day Adventist

On Wednesday, the EEOC announced that it had filed a Title VII religious discrimination suit against two Marriott corporate entities that sell vacation timeshare programs for hotels and vacation clubs, saying in part:

According to the EEOC’s lawsuit, management at Marriott Vacations Worldwide and Marriott Ownership Resorts initially allowed an employee, who is a Seventh-Day Adventist, a religious accommodation that allowed her to avoid Saturday shifts. After a change in management, the companies began scheduling her for Saturday shifts. After the employee made repeated complaints, they changed her schedule, negatively impacting her sales and commissions, and continued to schedule her for Saturdays, forcing her to choose between showing up to work and her religious practice. This led her to resign, the EEOC said.

Student's Suit Against University President for Antisemitism Needs Additional Allegations

In Gerwaski v. State of Nevada ex rel. Board of Regents of the Nevada System of Higher Education, (D NV, May 5, 2025), a Jewish student at University of Nevada Las Vegas sued the university and its president over antisemitic treatment.  The court dismissed all claims against the University on 11th Amendment grounds except those under Title VI and Title VII. Several claims, including plaintiff's free exercise claim, against University President Whitfield were dismissed, but without prejudice so that plaintiff could refile them alleging additional facts.  According to the court:

Gerwaski is a Jewish student at UNLV who wears the Jewish skullcap, or kippah, at all times.  Gerwaski serves in the UNLV student government and was hired as an employee at the UNLV Lied Library in June 2023.  Gerwaski alleges that he was asked inappropriate questions about his Jewish heritage and sexual orientation during the library’s onboarding process and that he was “unjustly terminated” from that job in August 2023, “as a result of the blatant disparate treatment and antisemitism that was exhibited by supervisors.”...  Gerwaski has also been exposed to verbal assaults by protesting members of [Nevadans for Palestinian Liberation] who made hateful antisemitic comments to him.  Gerwaski has chosen to cover his kippah with a baseball cap or other head covering due to the antisemitic chants and chaos on the UNLV campus....

Whitfield argues that Gerwaski does not plausibly allege a free exercise claim because he alleges only that verbal harassment by non-parties caused him to choose to cover his kippah, not that Whitfield acted to burden his rights.  Gerwaski responds that Whitfield fomented and encouraged antisemitic behavior on campus and ignored Gerwaski’s complaints, leading Gerwaski to begin covering his kippah....  

... Gerwaski attempts to tie Whitfield’s toleration of protestors on campus to Gerwaski’s feeling that it was necessary to cover his kippah with a baseball cap to avoid conflict with those protestors.  However, Gerwaski’s free exercise claim must be based on government action that substantially burdens his religion, not the actions of non-parties.... I grant Gerwaski leave to amend this claim against Whitfield if he can plausibly allege additional facts to support the claim and tie those facts to an ongoing constitutional violation for which he seeks injunctive relief. 

"Religious" Belief Defined Broadly in Title VII Claim

Numerous cases challenging employers' refusal to grant exemptions to Covid vaccine mandates during the height of the Covid epidemic continue to wend their way through the courts. Here is the latest.

In Huber v. TIAA, (WD VA, April 17, 2025), a Virginia federal district court refused to dismiss a former employee's Title VII failure to accommodate claim and allowed the parties to move on to discovery.  The employer had refused to grant a religious accommodation, claiming that the employee's objections were secular, not religious.  According to the court:

... [Plaintiff] subscribes to “a faith based holistic healing process” promoted by the Optimum Health Institute in Southern California....  A page from the Optimum Health Institute’s website, which Huber attaches as an exhibit to the amended complaint, describes the Institute as “a healing ministry of the Free Sacred Trinity Church, which promotes healing through the use of non-medical, all-natural, holistic healing practices.”...

Shortly after Huber filed her amended complaint, the Fourth Circuit clarified that courts evaluating religious discrimination claims should not rigorously examine whether a plaintiff’s beliefs are “religious in nature.”...  It confirmed that courts should limit the inquiry to “whether ‘the beliefs professed . . . are, in the claimant’s own scheme of things, religious[.]’”...  An employee’s claim that her belief “is an essential part of a religious faith must be given great weight” in this analysis....

... [T]his court finds that Huber has plausibly alleged the beliefs she communicated to TIAA were “religious in nature.” Huber’s asserted faith, which “comes from the belief in a universal force and energy” and focuses on holistic healing ... is different than the biblical Christianity employees often invoke when seeking exemptions to COVID-19 vaccine requirements....  But Title VII protects nonconventional as well as conventional religious beliefs—courts “are not free to reject beliefs because they consider them ‘incomprehensible.’...

The amended complaint does not provide a clear or complete account of Huber’s conversation with the TIAA interviewer, and it is possible that later fact development will show she did not communicate an objection that was based on a sincerely held religious belief.  But the court finds that her allegations are sufficient to allow for discovery on this issue....

Catholic Employers Get Permanent Injunction Against EEOC

In Catholic Benefits Association v. Lucas, (D ND, April 25, 2025), a North Dakota federal district court converted a preliminary injunction granted last September to a Catholic diocese and a Catholic employers' organization (see prior posting) into a permanent injunction. At issue are rules and guidance documents issued under the Pregnant Workers' Fairness Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.  The permanent injunction provides in part:

(1) The EEOC and its agents are permanently enjoined from interpreting or enforcing the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act and any implementing regulations ... against the Diocese of Bismarck and the CBA, including present and future members, in a manner that would require them to accommodate abortion or infertility treatments that are contrary to the Catholic faith, speak in favor of the same or refrain from speaking against the same.  

(2) The EEOC and its agents are permanently enjoined from interpreting or enforcing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, any implementing regulations or guidances, including the Enforcement Guidance on Harassment in the Workplace, against the Diocese of Bismarck and the CBA, including present and future members, in a manner that would require them to speak or communicate in favor of abortion, fertility treatments, or gender transition when such is contrary to the Catholic faith; refrain from speaking or communicating against the same when such is contrary to the Catholic faith, use pronouns inconsistent with a person’s biological sex; or allow persons to use private spaces reserved for the opposite sex.

ABC News reports on the decision.

3rd Circuit Rejects Title VII Claim by ER Doctor Who Was Denied Religious Exemption from Covid Vaccine Mandate

In Bushra v. Main Line Health, Inc., (3d Cir., April 10, 2025), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a Title VII suit brought by an emergency room physician who was denied a religious exemption from his hospital's Covid vaccine mandate. The court said in part:

Dr. Bushra’s arguments on appeal largely challenge the District Court’s determination that MLH established the undue hardship defense to his religious discrimination claims. ...

MLH provided unrebutted expert testimony that unvaccinated healthcare workers, like Dr. Bushra, presented an increased risk of transmitting COVID-19 to others, particularly when they interacted with vulnerable groups.... [P]atients and employees at MLH died from COVID-19, and the on-site spread of this serious infectious disease compromised MLH’s mission and ability to care for sick patients, and it jeopardized the health and efficacy of its employees and staff.  MLH’s expert additionally testified, contrary to Dr. Bushra’s assertion, that alternative infection control strategies, such as frequent testing and masking, were not sufficient to prevent transmission....

As MLH has presented substantial evidence of undue hardship, and Dr. Bushra has not provided any “actual evidence in the record on which a jury could decide an issue of fact [his] way,” we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.

Supreme Court Denies Cert. In Title VII Religioius Discrimination Case

The U.S. Supreme Court today denied review in Hittle v. City of Stockton, California, (Docket No. 24-427, certiorari denied 3/10/2025). Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, filed an opinion dissenting from the denial of cert. In the case, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court's dismissal of a religious discrimination suit under Title VII and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act brought by the city's former Fire Chief.  Among the several reasons given to plaintiff by the city for his dismissal was his attendance at a Christian religious leadership event on city time and with use of a city vehicle, and his approval for three other Department employees to also attend. (See prior posting.) In his dissent, Justice Thomas said in part:

I would have taken this opportunity to revisit McDonnell Douglas and decide whether its burden-shifting framework remains a workable and useful evidentiary tool.

CNN reports on the denial of review.

DOJ Starts Title VII "Pattern or Practice" Investigation of Antisemitism at University of California

The Department of Justice has launched an employment discrimination investigation of the University of California. A DOJ press release this week says in part:

The Federal Task Force to Combat Anti-Semitism announced that the Justice Department has opened a civil pattern or practice investigation into the University of California (UC) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The investigation will assess whether UC has engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination based on race, religion and national origin against its professors, staff and other employees by allowing an Antisemitic hostile work environment to exist on its campuses....

Under Title VII, the Justice Department has the authority to initiate investigations against state and local government employers where it has reason to believe that a “pattern or practice” of employment discrimination exists....

CBS News reports on the investigation.

Title VII Applies to Liberty University's Firing of Transgender Employee

In Zinski v. Liberty University, Inc., (WD VA, Feb. 21, 2025), a Virginia federal district court refused to dismiss a Title VII sex discrimination lawsuit against Liberty University brought by a former employee whose employment as an IT Apprentice was terminated because she underwent a male to female sex transition. In an extensively reasoned 70-page opinion, the court rejected several defenses asserted by the University. First the University contended that §§702 and 703 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act allow a religious employer to discriminate on the basis of transgender status when that is consistent with the employer’s religious belief. Those section allow a religious employer to discriminate "with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion." The court said in part:

Having determined that no source of law—from statutory text to legislative history to precedent—answers the question before us, the Court is left to weigh the imperfect arguments above, alongside the potential legal and social consequences of our decision. Drawing upon all of these considerations, we conclude that Sections 702 and 703 must be narrowly construed so as to permit discrimination only on the basis of an employee’s espoused religious belief or practice, such that religious employers have no license to discriminate on the basis of any other protected class. Where a religious employer discriminates on the basis of any other protected class in a but-for fashion, a statutory violation occurs, even if the decision was religiously motivated....

To decide that sex discrimination is acceptable so long as it is religiously motivated would allow employers to achieve all manner of discrimination under the banner of religion. So long as the religious institution can show that its view—despite directly implicating sex, race, or national origin—is a sincerely held religious belief, the religious institution would have free license to discriminate at will and evade the scrutiny of civil law. Not only would this subject potentially thousands of people to discrimination..., but it would supply religious institutions with a power not afforded to secular institutions, thereby generating favorites under the law and raising Establishment Clause questions....

The court also rejected the University's RFRA defense, concluding first that RFRA applies only to suits in which the government is a party. It added:

And even if Liberty were entitled to raise RFRA as a defense, we find that Title VII likely passes strict scrutiny....

On the record before us, enforcing this statute in Zinksi’s case merely requires Liberty to maintain an employee who has not followed the university’s Doctrinal Statement to the letter, i.e., an employee who has sinned. It does not require Liberty to change its belief, to endorse Zinksi’s behavior, or to allow Zinksi to spread a new message within the organization.... The minimal inroad on religious liberty here is easily justified by the exceedingly compelling governmental interest in eradicating sex discrimination in employment. Accordingly, we find that Liberty’s brief argument as to burden is insufficient to show substantial burden at this stage of litigation. Thus, strict scrutiny does not apply, and our analysis can come to an end.....

The court rejected the ministerial exception defense, saying in part that "nothing in the record suggests that Zinski was a minister." The court also rejected the University's freedom of expressive association claim, saying in part:

... [W]e must defer Liberty’s claim that it opposes transgender identification and seeks to avoid any promotion of transgender status as an appropriate form of behavior. However,... we cannot conclude that Zinksi’s presence at Liberty would “force the organization to send a message” that Liberty accepts transgender conduct as a “legitimate form of behavior.”... Zinksi is an IT employee who has limited to no interactions with students, has no role in influencing or promoting Liberty’s value system, and has no role in Liberty’s religious curriculum or programming. The only inference that we can draw for Liberty is that Liberty may be seen as a hypocrite for employing a transgender person when it opposes transgender identity; but the same could be said for Liberty’s employment of any other type of person who “sins” despite Liberty’s opposition to sin in general....

Finally, the court rejected the University's ecclesiastical abstention defense, saying in part:

Zinski’s complaint asks the Court to determine whether Title VII prohibits a religious institution from firing a transgender person, not whether a religious institution, like Liberty, has properly interpreted its religious doctrine when determining that a transgender person violates religious law and must be fired.

7th Circuit Hears Arguments on Accommodating Teacher Who Objects to Using Students' Preferred Names and Pronouns

Yesterday the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments in Kluge v. Brownsburg Community School Corporation. (Audio of full oral arguments.) In the case, an Indiana federal district court dismissed an orchestra teacher's Title VII claim that the school had failed to reasonably accommodate his religious objections to referring to transgender students by their preferred names and pronouns. The district court agreed with the school's rejection of using only students' last names as an accommodation. (See prior posting.) ADF, the teacher's counsel, issued a press release ahead of yesterday's arguments.

1st Circuit Accepts Employer's Undue Hardship Defense for Denying Religious Exemption from Covid Vaccination

In Rodrique v. Hearst Communications, Inc., (1st Cir., Jan. 17, 2025), the U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of a Title VII lawsuit brought by a TV news photographer who asserted religious objections to his employer's Covid vaccine mandate. The employer refused to provide an accommodation, asserting that it would impose an undue hardship. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claim on the ground that his objection was not religious but instead reflected "a personal medical judgment about the necessity of COVID-19 vaccination" expressed in religious language. On appeal, the 1st Circuit held that it did not have to reach the issue of whether plaintiff's objections were religious because defendant had adequately carried its undue hardship defense. The court said in part:

Rodrique contends that Hearst has not proffered admissible evidence showing that the vaccine actually protects against the transmission of COVID-19.  As Rodrique frames the issue, if the vaccine does not reduce the likelihood of COVID-19 transmission -- as opposed to merely mitigating symptoms, for example -- then Hearst suffers no undue hardship by granting him an exemption.  And in Rodrique's view, only expert testimony can support this conclusion.,,,  

,,, [W]e disagree with Rodrique that Hearst did not provide legally sufficient evidence....  Because ... Hearst relied "on the objective, scientific information available to [it]," with particular attention to "the views of public health authorities," we hold that it acted reasonably when it determined that vaccinated employees are less likely to transmit COVID-19 than unvaccinated employees.

Business Insurance reports on the decision.