WV Supreme Court Construes Fraud Exception to Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine

In State of West Virginia  ex rel. Trustees of the West Virginia Conference of the United Methodist Church v. Wills, (WV Sup. Ct. App., Nov. 4, 2026), the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that the fraud exception to the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine was not applicable to statements that merely misinterpreted Church law. In 2019, amidst objections from numerous local churches to the increasing acceptance of same sex marriage and ordination of homosexual clergy, the United Methodist Church set up a procedure by which local congregations could disaffiliate and retain their church property. However, congregations had only until December 31, 2023, to disaffiliate under this provision. In West Virginia, local churches postponed disaffiliating until after that date in reliance on incorrect information given to them by representatives of the parent General Conference. The Supreme Court said in part:

The Local Churches’ claims arise from the Church’s rules governing disaffiliation and the disposition of church property. Adjudicating those claims would require the circuit court to determine what the Discipline permitted, what procedures it made available to congregations seeking to disaffiliate, and whether the Conference properly interpreted and applied the Church’s governing law. Those are questions of ecclesiastical law committed exclusively to the Church’s own governing structure....

... The Local Churches alleged that in 2022, Conference representatives advised them that ¶ 2553 did not permit disaffiliation because the General Conference had not made any changes necessary to trigger the provision.... [T]hey contend that it constitutes a false statement that induced them to delay disaffiliation. However, whether that interpretation was correct or not is a question of Church law beyond the review of the civil courts. 

Characterizing a difference of opinion over the meaning of the Discipline’s provisions as a false statement does not confer jurisdiction upon a secular court to decide the underlying ecclesiastical question.

The same is true of the Local Churches’ allegations concerning ¶ 2549. They allege that Conference representatives promised that they could use that provision’s closure procedure to disaffiliate after the 2024 General Conference despite knowing when they made the representation that it was false... [In 2024, the] Judicial Council ... [held] that ¶ 2549 did not provide a means of disaffiliation. The Local Churches do not allege that this decision was procured by fraud, nor do they allege that Conference representatives colluded with the Judicial Council.... To adjudicate their claims ... the circuit court would necessarily have to determine whether the Conference’s interpretation of the Discipline was correct. That question implicates the Church’s interpretation and application of its own ecclesiastical law and therefore cannot be independently determined by the Circuit Court of Mercer County.

The Local Churches contend that their allegations of fraud and collusion act as an exception to the constitutional constraint on civil courts’ authority to adjudicate ecclesiastical matters and require the court to consider their claims. We decline to apply the exception so broadly. ...

... [T]he exception does not encompass alleged misconduct that did not procure the final decision; accompanied an interpretation of church law by a church authority not empowered to issue binding interpretations; or otherwise contributed to the underlying dispute....

Court Refuses to Dismiss Ohio AG's Suit Challenging Closing of Hebrew Union College

In Wilson v. Hebrew Union College Jewish Institute of Religion, (OH Com. Pl., Oct. 30, 2026), an Ohio state trial court refused to dismiss a suit by Ohio's Attorney General that seeks to prevent Hebrew Union College (HUC) from closing its 150-year-old Cincinnati rabbinical school. (See prior posting.) The court said in part:

Defendant HUC argued that the Complaint fails on three independent constitutional grounds: (l ) the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine divests this Court of subject-matter jurisdiction because the Complaint centers on purely ecclesiastical issues about where and how to train rabbinical candidates; (2) the Complaint violates the Free Exercise Clause by coercing a religious institution' s exercise of a central tenet of its faith; and (3) the Complaint violates the Establishment Clause by excessively entangling the government and HUC's religious affairs....

At this early stage of litigation, the Court finds that dismissal on constitutional grounds is premature.... The AG challenges HUC's actions as an Ohio charitable trust and nonprofit corporation. Although HUC argued that the decision to close the rabbinical school was "purely ecclesiastical," the allegations of the Complaint do not indicate that the Attorney General brought this case purely because of the decision to close the rabbinical school.

The Attorney General alleged (1) that HUC's 1950 Consolidation Agreement required HUC to permanently maintain a rabbinical school in Cincinnati, Ohio; (2) that Ohio donors have HUC millions of dollars in reliance on the commitment to maintaining a permanent rabbinical school in Cincinnati, Ohio; (3) that HUC then voted to delete to permanence requirement and close the rabbinical school; and (4) that HIC redistributed the Ohio charitable assets to New York, Los Angeles, and Jerusalem.

... [T]he central issue that appears at this time is not Jewish theology, religious doctrine, or ecclesiastical governance. Same issue could arise whether or not the defendant was a religious institution. Further, certain remedies sought by the Attorney General appear facially neutral....

The Attorney General alleged that HUC owes specific fiduciary duties to donors and beneficiaries, and that HUC breached those duties....

... [T]the burden is on the Attorney General to support the assertion that many of the donations to HUC would not have been given without the assurance of a "permanent" rabbinical school in Cincinnati. But HUC presumably keeps records of donations as the recipient of such donations, not the Attorney General....

JNS reports on the decision.

1st Amendment Challenges to Actor's Rape Convictions Are Rejected

In The People v. Masterson, (CA App., Oct. 27, 2026), a California state appellate court, in an 89-page opinion, affirmed the forcible rape convictions of actor Danny Masterson. In 2024, Masterson, the star of That '70's Show, was sentenced to 30 years to life in prison for the forcible rape of two women. Both Masterson and his victims were members of the Church of Scientology. On appeal, Masterson argued in part that the trial court's admission of evidence about Scientology's teachings violated the First Amendment. The court said in part:

The trial court ruled that defendant lacked standing to assert a First Amendment violation on behalf of Scientology; but even if he had standing, admission of Scientology evidence would not violate the First Amendment, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, or Evidence Code section 789.  The trial court found the Scientology evidence relevant to provide context for the victims’ delayed reporting of the crimes and to understand the victims’ meetings and relationships with defendant; defendant’s actions toward the victims; the victims’ actions before, during, and after the incidents; the victims’ initial acceptance of defendant’s behavior and the families’ subsequent reactions....

The trial court permitted Headley to testify as an expert “on the subjects of 1) Scientology teachings that a person in an intimate relationship cannot be raped; 2) that Scientologists cannot use the word rape and 3) that Scientologists are prohibited or discouraged from reporting other Scientologists in good standing to outside law enforcement or face repercussions for doing so....

J.B. and N.T. both testified that Scientology tenets prohibited them from reporting defendant to the police, a police report would constitute a suppressive act, and Scientology policy required them to use Scientology’s internal justice system instead.  J.B. testified that on pain of expulsion from Scientology, family members who are Scientologists must dissociate from any family member labeled as a suppressive person....

Defendant’s criminal trial did not involve adjudication of an internal church dispute over church property, church discipline, religious authority, or dogma....  The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine accordingly did not apply....

The jury in this case was not asked to determine the truth or falsity of Scientology doctrine or beliefs.  The jury instructions clearly limited the purposes for which the jury was to consider Scientology evidence—to explain the victims’ delay in reporting defendant’s actions; to explain the victims’ behavior before, during, and after the charged crimes; to explain the witnesses’ ties to Scientology....  Admission of Scientology evidence for those purposes did not contravene the First Amendment....

Defendant cites several statements by the trial court that he claims demonstrate a lack of neutrality and even hostility toward Scientology.  Those statements, viewed in context, evidence no animus or departure from neutrality regarding Scientology.....

Courthouse News Service reports on the decision.

Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine Leads to Dismissal of Complaint By 37 Churches Over Disaffiliation Rules

In Methodist Church of Cape St. Claire v. Baltimore Washington Conference of the United Methodist Church, (MD App., Oct. 5, 2026), a Maryland state appellate court held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine prevents civil courts from adjudicating the claim of 37 local churches that their parent body wrongly imposed a charge of 50% of the value of a church's property on local congregations that wished to disaffiliate and retain their property. The General Conference had created a procedure for local congregations that objected to the church's policy on human sexuality to disaffiliate, with regional Conferences being able to add conditions. The 50% payment requirement was added by the BW Conference. The appeals court said in part:

The Local Churches argue first that the circuit court ignored viable exceptions to the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine and dismissed their constructive fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract claims incorrectly....

Resolving the claims alleged in this case would require a trial court to examine the UMC’s religious doctrine and the Conference’s management of church resources in a manner prohibited by the First Amendment. We look first at the Local Churches’ allegation that the Conference engaged in constructive fraud and breached its fiduciary duty by failing to act in their best interest and in accordance with the UMC’s doctrine, custom, and practices....

We reach the same conclusions with respect to the Local Churches’ claims that the Conference committed constructive fraud and breached its fiduciary duty by mismanaging church funds or by making misrepresentations about its use and management of those funds....

In this case, the circuit court properly declined to enforce the Book of Discipline against the Conference as the Local Churches requested because it couldn’t interpret the Book of Discipline “under ‘neutral principles of [contract] law,’ without court involvement ‘in any theological or doctrinal matter.’” ...

Whether the General Conference’s amendment of the Book of Discipline to include Paragraph 2553 contradicted longstanding church practices and existing provisions of the Book of Discipline allegedly allowing local churches to disaffiliate without forfeiting their real property is a question for the UMC’s Judicial Council to answer. And according to the Conference, the Judicial Council has, in fact, answered it.

Finally, the court held that the trial judge who is a Methodist did not need to recuse himself, saying in part:

Ultimately, the judge’s sole connection to the controversy in this case is that he is a parishioner of a church that falls under the regional purview of a party to the case, the BW Conference. His religious affiliation and status as a parishioner, without more, do not qualify as grounds to question his impartiality and do not, on their own, suggest that the judge had an interest in the outcome of the case one way or the other....

Imam's Contract and Defamation Claims Dismissed on Ecclesiastical Abstention Grounds

In Ahmed v. American Muslim Diversity Association, (MI App., Sept. 11, 2026), a Michigan state appellate court upheld the dismissal on ecclesiastical abstention grounds of defamation, breach of contract and related claims filed by an assistant Imam against his mosque and its board of trustees. The court said in part:

According to Ahmed, beginning in 2021 the individual defendants engaged in a “smear campaign” against him by falsely accusing him of lying while performing his duties as a religious leader and refusing to lead certain prayers.  He also alleged that defendants disparaged his character by discussing his recent divorce and the allegations of domestic violence that had been made against him....

The trial court correctly determined that resolution of Ahmed’s breach-of-contract claim would require the court to delve into ecclesiastical matters.  The contract stated that the board of trustees reserved the right to cancel the contract “if there are any violation [sic] in contractual agreement, any activities against principles of Islam, or any activity subversive to the mission and objective of AMDA by the Qa’ari Imam as determined by the Board of Trustees.”  Although the board of trustees determined the domestic-violence allegations could not be substantiated, it may have also determined that Ahmed violated the contract or engaged in activity contrary to the principles of Islam or subversive to AMDA’s mission and objective.  The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine precluded the trial court from examining and second-guessing the decision of the board of trustees that it would be best for AMDA if Ahmed no longer served as an assistant Imam....

... Ahmed alleged that defendants falsely stated he was not so qualified and lacked the character required and expected of an assistant Imam.  ... [T]his Court will not second-guess a religious entity’s investigation and evaluation of allegations involving its leaders or its method of communicating matters relevant to such allegations.  Because Ahmed’s intentional infliction of emotional distress and concert of action claims also involve evaluating defendants’ decisions and method of reaching their decisions, those claims fail for the same reasons.  Accordingly, the trial court did not err by granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition with respect to Ahmed’s tort claims.

Defamation Action Should Be Dismissed on Ecclesiastical Abstention Grounds

In In re Gateway Church, (TX App., Aug. 19, 2026), a Texas state appellate court held that a state trial court should have dismissed on ecclesiastical abstention grounds. a defamation suit that was brought against a church and church leadership. At issue are statements that church leaders made about its investigation into charges that its then-pastor sexually abused a 12-year-old girl 30 years previously while he was pastor at another church. According to the court:

Gateway’s leadership issued a communication to church staff addressing the allegations and providing information about Morris’ past misconduct and the church’s understanding of events. The statement ... was intended to “empower” staff concerning a response should they receive any inquiries....

Although the communication was directed to staff, portions of it were later circulated on social media and reported in the news media. The mandamus record does not establish how the communication became public....

.... The [ecclesiastical abstention] doctrine prohibits civil courts from delving into ecclesiastical matters or a plaintiff’s claims that are inextricably intertwined with matters of doctrine or church governance.... Because we find that real parties’ claims are inextricably intertwined with the church’s investigation of Morris’ misconduct, the doctrine deprives the trial court of jurisdiction....

Gateway’s investigation into Morris (or, for that matter, lack of investigation if none was done prior to the communication) is inherently ecclesiastical. Gateway, through its leadership, was communicating with staff about what the church and elders knew about their senior executive pastor and events that transpired some three decades ago. As relators note in their petition, the challenged statements were made for a religious purpose, “shepherding the Gateway congregation in accordance with the dictates of Scripture.”...

... Claims related to a church’s publication or communication of the results of its own investigation cannot be severed from the church’s policy to investigate its clergy....

...  Although real parties argue that establishing knowledge can be a secular fact question in a defamation case, determining what Gateway and its leaders knew, and how they arrived at that understanding, would necessarily involve probing internal church deliberations and processes. That inquiry is inextricably intertwined with ecclesiastical matters and is therefore prohibited....

KERA News reports on the decision.

Exorcist Priest's Defamation Suit May Move Ahead

In Martins v. Romero, (ED MI, Aug. 21, 2026), a Michigan federal district court refused to dismiss a suit by a Catholic priest against a podcaster and a frequent guest on the podcast, alleging that their podcasts defamed him and cast his exorcism ministry in a false light by falsely claiming that Martins was not an exorcist. On one episode, defendant made the claim by reading only part of an email from Fr. Martins religious order, giving the false impression that Martins had not been authorized to perform exorcisms.

Defendants argue that the issue of whether Plaintiff is an exorcist raises a “substantial danger that the State will become entangled in essentially religious controversies....

Plaintiff contends, on the other hand, that this case does not involve church doctrine and merely involves false statements of fact, made with actual malice....

... [T]he court need only resolve whether Defendants’ statements that Plaintiff’s Order said he was not an exorcist were untrue and thus defamatory.  Whether Fr. Martins is qualified under Catholic doctrine as an exorcist is irrelevant to this inquiry.  Thus, the court finds that at this stage of the proceeding, the affirmative defense of the ecclesiastical [abstention] doctrine does not bar Plaintiff’s claims....

Defendants argue that they had no obligation to read a sentence in an email to which they objected.  However, Defendants’ affirmative statements appear to have crossed the line between an opinion that Fr. Martins is not an exorcist to statements of fact that the email from his own Order says that he is not an exorcist.  And according to the Complaint, such statements are demonstrably false based on the email itself, which does not say that Fr. Martins is not an exorcist.  

For these reasons, the court concludes that the alleged defamatory statements at issue are not opinions protected by the First Amendment.  Accordingly, dismissal on this basis is not appropriate....

(See prior related posting.)

[Thanks to Eugene Volokh via Religionlaw for the lead.] 

Maryland Supreme Court: Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine Does Not Apply to Eviction of Defrocked Bishop From Parsonage

In Eritrean Orthodox Tweahdo Diocese of USA and Canada v. Sinoda, (MD Sup. Ct., July 23, 2026), the Maryland Supreme Court held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not apply to a wrongful detainer action by a church seeking to evict a defrocked bishop from a church parsonage. The court said in part:

Respondent contends that the removal of Patriarch Antonios by the Eritrean government was invalid. As a result, Respondent argues, the existing “government-controlled” Synod was organized in violation of the Bylaws. Due to its illegitimacy, Respondent claims, the Synod lacked proper authority to defrock him as Bishop. Consequently, he was not properly removed from the Board, and the Board’s subsequent decision to remove him from the Property – made without him present – was illegitimate. According to Respondent, he remains the true Bishop in control of the Corporation, with a possessory right to occupy the Property that serves as a parsonage for the current bishop. Respondent contends that, in order to decide whether or not he has a right to possess the Property, a Maryland court would need to decide a question of religious doctrine....

To resolve this case, it is not necessary to decide whether the Synod is legitimate or whether the decisions to defrock Respondent and to remove him from the Corporation’s Board are doctrinally proper. The crux of Respondent’s argument for his possessory interest in the Property is his position as Bishop....  

However, the record lacks any evidence that there is any legal right for the Bishop of the United States and Canada to possess the Property. The Church’s Bylaws are silent concerning the provision of a parsonage to any bishop. The deed to the Property mentions nothing about who will occupy the premises. It is undisputed that no lease provides for Respondent to occupy the Property for as long as he serves as Bishop (or for any other period of time). There is no evidence of any other contract – such as an employment agreement – under which the Church or the Corporation agrees to provide the Property for use as a parsonage to the Bishop of the United States and Canada. Lastly, the Maryland Religious Corporation Law is silent on any such property right conditioned on the employment of a clergyperson....

The lower courts erred in invoking the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. That doctrine has no application to this case because Respondent’s right to possess the Property does not turn on whether he is the Church’s rightful Bishop of the United States and Canada. Applying neutral principles of Maryland property law to the undisputed facts of this case, we conclude that Respondent was a licensee with respect to the Property and that the Corporation has revoked Respondent’s license to reside at the Property....

Texas Court Holds That Hindu Temple's Bylaws Are Invalid

In Sri Shirdi Sai Baba Temple of Austin v. Lam, (TX Bus. Ct., July 14, 2026), the Texas Business Court's holding that a non-profit corporation's Certificate of Formation controls over by-laws that conflict with the Certificate of Formation settled a complex battle over control of a Hindu Temple. The Temple's Certificate of Formation placed management of the Temple in a board of directors and stated that the Temple "will have no members." In 2024, the Temple's Board resigned in the wake of a fraudulent donation-matching scheme that was discovered at the Temple. The new Board adopted Bylaws that purported to vest control of the Temple in a General Body of Trustees, defined as devotees who contribute a one-time membership fee of $20,000. An attorney advised the Board that the bylaws were invalid. Nevertheless, one faction went ahead and held an election of a new Board by the Trustees. The court refused to issue a declaratory judgment that would have validated the election, saying in part:

Texas courts apply a “neutral principles methodology,” under which they lack jurisdiction to decide, and “must defer to the decisions of appropriate ecclesiastical decision makers” with respect to, “questions of an ecclesiastical or inherently religious nature,” but “apply neutral principles of law to non-ecclesiastical issues involving religious entities,” including issues of corporate formation and governance, “in the same manner as they apply those principles to other entities and issues.” This case presents a non-ecclesiastical issue of corporate governance that can be decided by neutral application of Texas corporate law, such that the Court has jurisdiction.

Pastor's Suit for Breach of Contract and Defamation Is Dismissed Under Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine

 In Lovelace v. Mt. Zion Baptist Church, (MI App., July 15, 2026), a Michigan state appellate court, invoking the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, affirmed a trial court's dismissal of contract and defamation claims by a pastor whose employment contract was cancelled by a vote of church members. The court said in part:

We first address plaintiff’s ... theory ... that the church breached the agreement by terminating him for actions he was contractually permitted to take.  This theory would require a civil court to decide whether church leadership correctly concluded that plaintiff had “abused his authority”....  That inquiry would require the court to decide questions of church governance and authority.  “Under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, apparently derived from both First Amendment religion clauses, civil courts may not redetermine the correctness of ... some decision relating to government of the religious polity.”...

Here, plaintiff asks us to determine that the church and its leadership exceeded their authority when they called the April 2022 meetings to discuss his future as senior pastor and invited guest pastors to oversee those meeting....

Under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, a civil court may not decide those questions because it would generally be inconsistent with religious liberty for civil courts to “inquire into the regularity of the proceedings of church tribunals having cognizance of such matters.... 

... [E]ven the seemingly straightforward question whether the termination process in plaintiff’s employment agreement was followed cannot be answered here through neutral legal principles without infringing on the religious liberty of the church and its members....

... [P]laintiff’s tortious-interference claim fails because he cannot establish that the individual defendants were third parties to the employment agreement.  And even if plaintiff could satisfy that threshold requirement, adjudicating the breach and justification elements of his claim would require the resolution of ecclesiastical questions...

Plaintiff’s defamation theory is that the individual defendants stated that he lacked authority to access the church’s bank accounts, and that this statement was false because his employment agreement gave him broad authority over the church’s spiritual and secular affairs....

For the statement to be actionable, however, a civil court would have to determine that it was false.... The statement ... would be provable as false only if the trial court parsed the agreement and determined which powers belonged to the senior pastor.

Suit Charging Misrepresentation of Use of Tithed Funds Dismissed on Ecclesiastical Abstention Grounds

In Leach v. Gateway Church, (ED TX, June 23, 2026), a Texas federal district court dismissed on ecclesiastical abstention grounds a class action suit brought by donors to the church who claim that the church misrepresented the charities to which tithed funds would be distributed. The court said in part:

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants represented or promised that “15% of all tithe dollars would be distributed to global missions and Jewish ministry partners,” inducing Plaintiffs to give generously toward these ends.... Plaintiffs contend that Defendants made these representations through various mediums, including during sermons, in the “Members’ Handbook,” at conferences, and on Gateway’s website..... Plaintiffs assert that Defendants did not allocate these funds as they represented that they would.... Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ reallocation of their tithe dollars from “global missions” and “Jewish ministries” to “secret organizations” or to other “charitable purposes,” ... was an improper transfer....

The claims at issue will implicitly require the Court to determine the meaning of Plaintiff’s references to “global missions,” “Jewish ministry partners,” “local, national, and international outreach efforts,” and other terms that implicate religious beliefs.... 

... [W]hile both parties acknowledge Plaintiffs’ claims are grounded in traditional civil law, resolving the claims would require the court to examine the management of Gateway’s donated funds, which will “necessarily implicate[] questions of faith, scripture, and religious doctrine.”...

Further, resolving Plaintiffs’ claims would require the Court to “evaluat[e] the truth of [a] sermon.”... Plaintiffs specifically alleged that two senior pastors promised to give the congregation their money back if they were dissatisfied with how the church used it.... These promises were purportedly made during sermons....

... [T]his analysis may have been different if Plaintiffs had alleged that Morris, Dulin, or any other Gateway leader reallocated their tithe dollars for personal gain....

Fort Worth Report reports on the decision.

Some Claims for Football Injuries at Catholic School Are Barred by Ecclesiastical Abstenition Doctrine

In In re Fort Bend Christian Academy, (TX App., June 23, 2026), a Texas state appellate court held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine bars some of the claims brought by parents of a high school student who suffered traumatic brain injury during football practice at the Christian college preparatory high school. The court said in part:

... [T]he Hagans alleged that the Academy breached its obligation to make academic accommodations for B.H. after he suffered the brain injury. The Academy, however, is a college preparatory school committed to offering “a superior academic experience integrated with a consistent, Christian worldview and biblical perspective.” Accordingly, the Hagans’s claims alleging the Academy failed to accommodate B.H. do not turn on neutral principles of law but on the Academy’s application of its policy governing when — and to what extent — it modifies its biblically-based curriculum for students....

Additionally, the Hagans alleged that, before B.H.’s enrollment, Academy officials made specific promises that he would not be subjected to bullying and harassment....

We conclude these claims too concern ecclesiastical matters over which the trial court lacks jurisdiction because they arise from the Academy’s application of internal policies grounded in religious doctrine. These claims are premised on the Academy’s alleged failure to enforce its anti-bullying policy and prevent students from bullying B.H. But the policy states the Academy will provide “discipline that [is] Bibliocentric,” and that its approach to discipline is for students “to grow in self-discipline according to God’s Word so that external discipline measures become less needed.”... Consequently, the trial court cannot adjudicate these claims without deciding questions of religious doctrine and interfering with the Academy’s internal governance....

[The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine] does not bar the Hagans’s negligence claim, brought on B.H.’s behalf for personal-injury damages, because that claim arises from duties imposed by law — independent of any agreement between the Academy and the Hagans — and may be adjudicated under neutral tort principles without imposing liability on the Academy for complying with its religious-based policies.... 

Finally, we consider the doctrine’s application to the Hagans’s breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and DTPA claims to the extent those claims allege that the Academy breached concussion-management obligations arising from its TAPPS [Texas Association of Private and Parochial Schools] membership....

We conclude that the claims seeking to hold the Academy liable for breaching alleged concussion-management obligations arising from its TAPPS membership present secular, non-ecclesiastical issues over which the trial court may exercise jurisdiction....

Limited Discovery Allowed to Determine If Case Turns on a Religious Question

In Gaskins v. McLean Bible Church, (VA Ct. App., May 19, 2026), a Virginia state appellate court allowed dissident members of a non-denominational congregational church to engage in limited discovery in connection with their challenge to the election of the church's Board of Elders. The Church's constitution provides that members who have not attended church services for eight consecutive weeks “without reasonable excuse” become inactive members who may not vote or hold office in the church. Plaintiffs claim that the Board designated a number of members as "inactive" on an arbitrary basis. The court remanded the case for the trial court to first determine whether disclosure of information sought by plaintiffs would violate association rights of church members, officers or employees. If it would not, the appellate court held that limited discovery on reclassification of members may proceed, saying in part:

The number eight is neutral.  That is the number of consecutive weeks of worship services a member must miss before the Board may deem them inactive.  If a member who has not missed eight consecutive weeks is declared inactive, the Board has violated the MBC constitution.  And that is exactly what the dissenters allege happened here.  This Court, and all other courts in Virginia, are surely able to count to eight without entering a “religious thicket.”... 

MBC counters that the eight-weeks inquiry is not, in fact, neutral because the eight weeks must be missed “without reasonable excuse.”  It argues that what constitutes a reasonable excuse is a purely ecclesiastical question, and thus one outside this Court’s bailiwick (and its jurisdiction).  It may be, of course, that the documents the dissenters seek in discovery reflect that all disenfranchised members missed eight consecutive weeks of worship services and that the Board determined that they did so “without reasonable excuse.”  In that case, this dispute would be at an end; no secular court could second-guess the Board’s earnest opinion as to what constitutes a reasonable excuse.  But until that happens, our courts retain jurisdiction.  And it may also develop that no “reasonable excuses” were sought or tendered and that certain members of the congregation were simply trimmed from the voting lists to influence the outcome of elections.  In sum, an assertion that a dispute might involve a purely religious question is quite different from an assertion that the dispute will turn on such a question.  The latter is a good reason to apply the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine and short-circuit the litigation; the former is not....

We ... find nothing objectionable about allowing limited discovery to determine whether the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applies....

In ruling against MBC on this point, we embrace the perhaps subtle—but meaningful— distinction between a religious institution being “above the law” and being subject to the law while still wielding significant privileges and protections....

Christian Post reports on the decision.

Florida Appellate Court Questions Hierarchical Deference Approach to Church Property Disputes

 In First United Methodist Church of Hobe Sound, Florida v. Board of Trustees of the Florida Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc., (FL App., April 8, 2026), a group of Methodist churches which are seeking to disaffiliate from their parent body sue seeking to invalidate a portion of the United Methodist Church's Book of Discipline. Under Church rules, property of local congregations is held in trust for the entire denomination. The Church's highest ecclesiastical court held that under a provision in the Book of Discipline, the parent body requires large payments in order for these plaintiff congregations to disaffiliate and keep their real property. Florida courts have traditionally required civil courts to defer to decisions of a denomination's highest ecclesiastical tribunal in the case of hierarchical churches. The court said in part:

Appellants contend that their case is not precluded by the hierarchical deference doctrine. Because they raise state-law claims against the Discipline’s Trust Clause, in Appellants’ view, it is appropriate for a state court to wade into the dispute and resolve the matter on neutral state-law principles. But that view ignores the backdrop of the hotly contested internal church dispute that led to the filing of the complaint. It also disregards the significant implications of a state court considering claims that seek to undo the internal adjudication of the property dispute by the church’s highest judicial council. ...

... We acknowledge that Appellants are dissatisfied that UMC chose one paragraph in the Discipline to resolve their internal dispute, rather than another. But this Court is jurisdictionally incapable of forcing UMC to apply one provision of its governing document over another..... As a way around that conclusion, though, Appellants make the following two arguments. 

First, Appellants argue that whether the Trust Clause in the Discipline creates a valid trust is a legal question that can be resolved via the application of neutral principles of law....

In the alternative, Appellants allege that the doctrine violates the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause because it favors hierarchically structured churches over congregational denominations....

Because the hierarchical deference approach remains the applicable standard governing Florida courts’ consideration of property disputes arising from within hierarchical churches, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Appellants’ claims.... 

That said, given the significance of the First Amendment questions presented here, we certify the following question of great public importance to the Florida Supreme Court:

1) When asked to adjudicate state-law claims to resolve intra-church property disputes involving hierarchical churches, are Florida courts still governed by the hierarchical deference approach or may such disputes be resolved under the neutral principles of law approach?

Nevada Supreme Court Interprets Scope of Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine

In Singh v. Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, (NV Sup. Ct., April 2, 2026), a 3-judge panel of the Nevada Supreme Court held that the neutral principles exception to the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applies beyond disputes over ownership of church property. At issue was whether the Management Committee of the Northern Nevada Sikh Society, without approval of the general membership, had authority form a subcommittee to transfer the Sikh Temple building into a trust. The court said in part:

[A]bsent [U.S.] Supreme Court authority holding otherwise, we now clarify that the neutral-principles exception to the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine may apply beyond real property disputes among church members. Rather, the relevant inquiry for courts to resolve is whether the court is able to apply neutral principles of law to resolve the issues at hand without consideration of ecclesiastical or doctrinal matters.... In other words, when neutral principles of law can resolve the underlying dispute, then the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not apply....

... [T]he issues raised in the complaint do not require the district court to resolve ecclesiastical questions or consider Sikh doctrine, practice or texts.... [T]hese claims ...arise from NNSS's Management's purported failure to follow NNSS's bylaws in forming two committees, attempting to place the Temple in trust, in not maintaining adequate membership records, and in restricting members from inspecting NNSS's books and records.

Pastors' Defamation Suit Barred by Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine

In Nieto v. Great Bridge Presbyterian Church, Inc., (VA App., March 31, 2026), a Virginia state appellate court held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine required dismissal of a defamation suit brought by two pastors against the church that they formerly led. The complaint also alleged tortious interference with plaintiffs' pastoral relationship with the congregation. The claims grew out of a letter that was emailed to 750 persons after plaintiffs were dismissed from their pastoral relationship with their congregation.

The court said in part:

Here, the appellants base their defamation claims on a list of statements that can be categorized as either 1) purported mismanagement of funds or 2) the intimidation and shunning of “dissenters” or other members of the congregation.  All statements in each category are barred from civil-court review because of the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine....

Each of these statements would require us to evaluate and determine the appropriate financial management standard for pastors serving as leaders in the Presbyterian denomination and whether and to what extent the appellants may have breached that standard as determined by the denomination.... Great Bridge is a religious institution established as a local church by the Presbyterian denomination and therefore is subject to the religious denomination’s doctrinal and organizational documents, including certain policies and beliefs that pertain to proper church order, practices, governance, and leadership. ...

Without first determining the proper method that a pastor serving a Presbyterian church should responsibly exercise when administering the finances of a Presbyterian church, we cannot determine whether the statements regarding how the appellants allegedly misused that authority are actionable.  And a secular judicial body determining the fitness and qualifications of the office of a pastor who governs a church would violate that church’s “autonomy with respect to internal management decisions that are essential to the institution’s central mission.”...

Similarly, we cannot use neutral principles of law to discern whether the statements about the intimidation and shunning of “dissenters” or other members of the congregation are actionable....

Certiorari Denied in Unification Church Dispute

Yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court denied review in Family Federation for World Peace and Unification International v. Moon, (Docket No. 25-634, certiorari denied 3/9/2026) (Order List). In the case, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's final dismissal of a lawsuit surrounding a long-running schism and succession dispute in the Unification Church. (See prior posting.) The Petition for Certiorari identified the Question Presented as:

Where necessary to resolve a church-property dispute, does the First Amendment prohibit courts from examining church-related facts to determine who leads the church?

Alabama Supreme Court Orders Trial Courts to Hear Claims of United Methodist Conference In Deciding Church Property Ownership

In Ex parte Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc., (AL Sup. Ct., March 6, 2026), the Alabama Supreme Court by a vote of 5-2 granted writs of mandamus in 15 cases involving disputes between break-away Methodist congregations and their parent body. In the cases, the local churches filed quiet title actions in trial courts to clarify that they owned their church buildings after their disaffiliations. The parent body (the Conference and its Board of Trustees) filed counterclaims contending that the church properties belong to, or are held in trust for, the Conference. The trial courts dismissed the counterclaims for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine precluded civil courts from adjudicating the disputes. The Conference appealed by filing petitions for writs of mandamus, asking the Alabama Supreme Court to order the trial courts to vacate the orders that dismissed their counterclaims. The local churches contended that writs of mandamus were not the proper vehicle for reviewing the trial courts' decisions. The Supreme Court disagreed.

Justice Sellers, joined by Justice Cook, wrote in part:

If mandamus relief is not available in these cases, the question of subject-matter jurisdiction over the petitioners' counterclaims, which appear for the most part to be allegedly supported by the same sort of secular materials upon which the local churches rely in support of their quiet-title actions, will not be considered until after the parties and the trial courts in each action are, respectively, required to litigate and to preside over the local churches' claims to their final resolution. 

At play here is the substantial possibility of significantly wasting the litigants' and the trial courts' time and resources....

It is true that the petitioners also point to trust provisions set out in the United Methodist Church's Book of Discipline, which is the governing document of the United Methodist Church.  But that does not transform these actions from standard real-property disputes to ecclesiastical disputes. ...The petitioners' counterclaims, to the extent that they rely on the Book of Discipline, do not appear to require resolution of a dispute over doctrinal or ecclesiastical matters.  Instead, the petitioners rely on provisions of the Book of Discipline that, they say, call for the real property at issue to be held in trust and that are referenced or implicated by deeds and other secular legal documents....

Justice McCool and Special Justices Edwards and Minor concurred in the result.

Acting Chief Justice Bryan dissented, saying in part:

Rather than identify an appropriate use of the writ of mandamus established by this Court, the petitioners have inconsistently argued that these cases present an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction, but not really.  I do not regard that argument as sufficient to meet their burden under these circumstances.... 

Justice Mendheim dissented, saying in part:

I understand the main opinion's desire to be helpful in resolving these disputes, but we cannot do so without entangling the courts in matters that are best left to the moral judgments of the parties involved....

... [A] proper understanding "of the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine should come from a desire to protect religious freedom rather than an unfounded fear that religious ideas might taint our civil jurisprudence."... The neutral-principles-of-law approach ...  asks courts to do the impossible: interpret church practices and guidelines through a "secular" lens. ...

If the courts elect to enter this fray between local churches and a church denomination's organizing bodies, they should do so absent any reference to the Book of Discipline and its trust clause because there is no way to read that document or that paragraph "in purely secular terms." Courts should not determine whether ecclesiastical abstention applies in a case based on the false notion that there is a distinct bright line between what is "secular" and what is "religious."

Four Justices recused themselves. 

AL.com reported on the decision.

Priest's Defamation Suit Dismissed on Ecclesiastical Abstention Grounds

In Catholic Diocese of Richmond v. Smalls, (VA App, Nov. 5, 2025), a Virginia state appellate court dismissed on ecclesiastical abstention grounds a defamation suit by a priest serving in the Diocese of Belize.  The Diocese of Richmond included plaintiff's name on a list of priests who had credible and substantiated allegation of sexual abuse of a minor.  The allegations against plaintiff occurred while he was a seminarian in the Richmond Diocese. The court said in part:

It is clear that the definition used to determine that there was a credible and substantiated allegation against Smalls of sexual abuse involving a minor includes references to religious precepts.  The definition discusses sexual abuse in terms of a violation of the Sixth Commandment.  It also provides that clergy who possessed, acquired, or distributed “pornographic images of minors under the age of fourteen” committed sexual abuse, but does not define “pornographic images.”  But if there is doubt as to whether such an offense has occurred, bishops are directed to reference writings of moral theologians.  Smalls’s defamation claim thus rests on the falsity of a statement that is based on the application of a specific religious definition of sexual abuse.  “[C]ivil courts cannot adjudicate defamation claims when the truth of the statements in question turns on ecclesiastical law.” ...

Because Smalls’s claim for defamation cannot be resolved on neutral secular principles, the circuit court was without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case....

Local Church's Property Held in Trust for Parent United Methodist Church

In French Broad United Methodist Church v. Holston Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, (TN App., Oct. 31, 2025), a Tennessee state appellate court affirmed a trial court's dismissal of a local church's suit against its parent body. In this portion of a broader set of claims regarding ownership of a property that had been used as a parsonage, the local church challenged a provision in the Book of Discipline of the United Methodist Church that provided all local church properties were held in trust for the benefit of the denomination. The court said in part:

The trial court determined that Bethel UMC’s claims to quiet title, for a declaration that the trust clause in The Book of Discipline was invalid, and for judicial modification of the trust ... were barred by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.  Even if the doctrine did not bar these claims, the trial court found that The Book of Discipline would require the dismissal of these claims pursuant to the hybrid neutral principles approach, “under which trust provisions in governing church documents must be enforced.”  The trial court noted that the dispute at issue “post-dated the codification of the ‘trust’ provisions of The Book of Discipline.”...

... Tennessee cases dictate that the property dispute between Bethel UMC and Holston is subject to determination in accordance with the hybrid neutral principles approach, which requires a court to defer to and enforce the trust provisions of The Book of Discipline....

Bethel UMC asserts that The Book of Discipline and the trust clause fail because Bethel UMC did not “ever intend to give centuries old properties, worth billions of dollars, away to strangers, when it violates their lives, liberties, freedom, and the pursuit of happiness to worship as they wish without harm to others or in violation of any laws.” 

We respectfully disagree with Bethel UMC’s reasoning. The trial court found that, “Bethel admits that it was an affiliate of The United Methodist Church.” The trial court also noted that the dispute at issue “post-dated the codification of the ‘trust’ provisions of The Book of Discipline.”  By its affiliation with the national church, Bethel UMC agreed to be bound by the governing documents of the United Methodist Church.... Further, ... Bethel UMC concludes that, instead of applying the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, “as the long lineage of cases clearly indicates, . . .  the legal neutral principles should have been applied to the trial court cause of action, which it was not.”  As previously discussed, however, Bethel UMC’s claims were likewise subject to dismissal under that theory, which would require application of the trust provisions.