Homeless Shelter Can Limit Hiring to Coreligionists

In Union Gospel Mission of Yakima, Wash. v. Ferguson, (ED WA, Nov. 1, 2024), a Washington federal district court granted a preliminary injunction to a religious organization that operates a homeless shelter and thrift stores. The injunction bars the state's attorney general from enforcing the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) against plaintiff for limiting all its hiring to coreligionists who adhere to the organization's religious tenets and behavior requirements. In 2021 the Washington Supreme Court interpreted the exemption in the WLAD for non-profit religious organizations to apply only to hiring for ministerial positions. The federal district court here held that the WLAD is subject to strict scrutiny since it is not a neutral, generally applicable law. It treats religious organizations differently than secular employers who are exempt if they have fewer than eight employees. According to the court, a less restrictive way of advancing the state's interest is to exempt all employees of nonprofit religious organizations as Washington had done before the state Supreme Court decision narrowing the interpretation of the WLAD exemption. An ADF press release has additional background.

Nebraska Supreme Court Upholds Dismissal of Priest's Suit Against Archdiocese

 In Syring v. Archdiocese of Omaha, (NE Sup. Ct., July 26, 2024), the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of defamation, infliction of mental distress, interference with prospective employment and breach of fiduciary duty claims by a Catholic priest against his Archdiocese.  The priest was listed on an Archdiocese website that named those against whom there had been allegations of misconduct or abuse of a minor. He was forced to resign his ministry position and the Archdiocese refused to approve his serving as a hospital chaplain. The court held that the Archdiocese's action did not meet the standard for outrageous conduct needed to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. It went on the dismiss various of plaintiff's claims on the basis of the ministerial exception doctrine.  The court said in part:

Syring’s claims asserted that the Archdiocese “falsely impute[d] unfitness to preform [sic] duties of employment, and prejudice[d] [Syring] in his profession or trade.” The other claims were premised upon Syring’s assertion that the Archdiocese owed him fiduciary duties. For example, the complaint identified a purported breach of a fiduciary duty in the Archdiocese’s “requiring [Syring’s] resignation, and omitting to advise him of his right to counsel, both civil and canonical.”

We cannot uphold Syring’s claims without interfering with the internal governance of the church, or depriving the church of control, over the selection of its ministers. The claims— based on the conversation between officials of a Catholic archdiocese and a hospital operated by a Catholic religious order regarding permission for Syring to serve as a chaplain, Syring’s fitness to perform the duties of his employment, and the requiring of Syring’s resignation from that employment— lie at the heart of the ministerial exception articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court. The district court did not err in dismissing these claims.

Equally Divided New Jersey Supreme Court Dismisses Defamation Suit Against Jewish School

 In Hyman v. Rosenbaum Yeshiva of North Jersey, (NJ Sup. Ct., July 24, 2024), an equally divided New Jersey Supreme Court decision resulted in affirmance through a short per curiam opinion of the dismissal of defamation claims brought against an Orthodox Jewish school by a Judaic Studies teacher whose employment by the school was terminated. The Justices were equally divided on whether discovery should be permitted in the case.

The 6 justices participating in the decision unanimously agreed on the standard for applying the ministerial exception, saying that the court must analyze each element of plaintiff's claim and determine whether adjudicating it would require the court to choose between competing religious visions or would interfere with a church's administrative prerogatives including its right to select and control the duties of its ministers, whether or not the alleged misconduct is rooted in religious belief. Here plaintiff's employment was terminated for inappropriate touching of female students. Information about his termination was emailed to the school's Board of Directors, parents of current students and faculty members. The letter was subsequently disseminated on social media.

Justice Patterson's concurring opinion for 3 justices said in part:

Here, the religious employer’s allegedly defamatory statement was not a description of claimed misconduct by Hyman; no such description appears in Price’s letter to the school community.  Instead, Hyman’s defamation claims are premised on Price’s statement that “it was determined that Rabbi Hyman’s conduct had been neither acceptable nor consistent with how a rebbe in our Yeshiva should interact with students.”  In short, the statement at the heart of this case was not an assertion of fact about the former students’ allegations, but an explanation of the Yeshiva’s decision to terminate Hyman -- a determination made in consultation with halachic authorities as well as legal counsel.  With or without discovery regarding the details of the allegations, the court’s inquiry as to the merits would be the same:  the court would be required to assess the reasons for a religious institution’s decision to terminate the employment of a minister, an inquiry that would violate the First Amendment.

Justice Pierre-Louis' dissenting opinion for 3 justices said in part: 

In order for a court to make [a determination that the ministerial exception applies] ... plaintiffs must be allowed discovery.... [U]nder the concurring opinion’s analysis, a religious entity can seemingly fire an employee based solely on a personal vendetta, publish a knowingly false and defamatory statement about the plaintiff, and shield itself from liability -- and even discovery -- by invoking the ministerial exception.  Such a holding slams the courthouse door shut on potentially wronged plaintiffs before they can even obtain discovery that would allow a court to determine whether adjudicating their claims actually interferes with religious autonomy....

Defendants have conflated the issues in this case, making it appear as though this defamation case is the same as an employment discrimination case.  But assessing the legality of what a religious institution says about an adverse employment action is not the same thing as determining the lawfulness of the adverse action itself.  The latter necessarily requires a court to interfere with a religious institution’s internal management, its doctrinal specificities, and its decisions regarding who preaches the faith, but the former does not.

Becket Fund issued a press release announcing the decision.

9th Circuit: Zen Apprentice's Suit Dismissed Under Ministerial Exception Doctrine

In Behrend v. San Francisco Zen Center, Inc., (9th Cir., July 17, 2024), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal under the ministerial exception doctrine of a disability discrimination suit brought by plaintiff who worked at the Zen Center as a Work Practice Apprentice.  The court said in part:

Behrend ... appeals, arguing that he was not a minister because he performed mostly menial work and did not have a “key role in making internal church decisions and transmitting the faith to others.”...

Behrend was tasked with performing maintenance, kitchen, and guest services. But he was also responsible for assisting with rituals, participating in meditations and services, cleaning the temple, attending talks and classes, and performing doan ryo ceremonial tasks like ringing bells and cleaning altars. He lived and worked full time at the temple as a monk. While Behrend may not have taught and was not a part of the hierarchical leadership structure, he “performed vital religious duties” as part of the Center’s WPA program.... In short, were the court to adopt a rule like the one Behrend suggests, we would be “interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select” who may or may not serve as a live-in monk.

4th Circuit: Ministerial Exception Bars Suit by Catholic School Teacher Fired Over Same-Sex Marriage Plans

In Billard v. Charlotte Catholic High School, (4th Cir., May 8, 2024), the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Catholic high school teacher's suit alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title VII should be dismissed. The court's majority held that the ministerial exception doctrine defeated the suit by the teacher of English and drama who was not invited back to teach after he announced plans to marry his same-sex partner. The majority, finding that the teacher should be classified as a "minister" for purposes of the ministerial exception, said in part:

[F]aith infused CCHS’s classes – and not only the expressly religious ones.  Even as a teacher of English and drama, Billard’s duties included conforming his instruction to Christian thought and providing a classroom environment consistent with Catholicism.  Billard may have been teaching Romeo and Juliet, but he was doing so after consultation with religious teachers to ensure that he was teaching through a faith-based lens....  The record makes clear that CCHS considered it “vital” to its religious mission that its teachers bring a Catholic perspective to bear on Shakespeare as well as on the Bible.   

Moreover, we note that Billard did – on rare occasions – fill in for teachers of religion classes.... CCHS’s apparent expectation that Billard be ready to instruct in religion as needed is another “relevant circumstance” indicating the importance of Billard’s role to the school’s religious mission.   

Our court has recognized before that seemingly secular tasks like the teaching of English and drama may be so imbued with religious significance that they implicate the ministerial exception.

The majority rejected the school's argument for broadening statutory defenses to the Title VII claim.

Judge King filed an opinion concurring in the result but differing as to rationale. He said in part:

... I would neither reach nor resolve the First Amendment ministerial exception issue on which the majority relies.  I would decide this appeal solely on Title VII statutory grounds, that is, § 702 of Title VII.... [M]y good friends of the panel majority have unnecessarily resolved the appeal on the First Amendment constitutional issue.  In so ruling, they have strayed from settled principles of the constitutional avoidance doctrine and our Court’s precedent.

Certiorari Denied in Ministerial Exception Case

Yesterday the U.S. Supreme Court denied review in two companion appeals, Bowes v. Liberty University, Inc. (Docket No. 23-550) and Liberty University, Inc. v. Bowes (Docket No. 23-703, certiorari denied 3/4/2024) (Order List.).  The three judges on the 4th Circuit panel deciding the case below each had a different view on application of the ministerial exception doctrine in this age discrimination case brought by a Liberty University art professor. (See prior posting.) The case also posed other interpretive questions under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

Defamation Claim Not Subject to Ministerial Exception Doctrine; Discrimination and Contract Claims Are

In Uzomechina v. Episcopal Diocese of New Jersey, (D NJ, Jan. 18, 2024), a New Jersey federal district court held that the ministerial exception doctrine requires the court to dismiss racial discrimination and wrongful discharge claims brought by an African-American Episcopal priest who was dismissed from his position after allegedly false charges of financial and sexual misconduct. The court dismissed the claims saying that they "directly implicate the employment relationship between the religious institution and its ministerial employee." It dismissed breach of contract claims for similar reasons.

Plaintiff also brought a defamation claim against the Diocese for passing on false information about him to his subsequent employer-- a drug abuse rehabilitation center. The court concluded that this claim was not barred by the ministerial exception doctrine, saying in part:

... [B]y sharing its internal disciplinary procedures and beliefs with a secular third-party, ... the Diocese Defendants subjected itself to the laws that govern the public realm. In other words, exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim will not second-guess or threaten the Diocese Defendants' decisions to investigate its clergy, find misconduct by a clergy member, or impose internal disciplinary measures against a member of the church. What it will threaten is a religious organization's ability to make false and defamatory statements about its clergy or members to the general public, outside of the organization's internal operations. The ministerial exception, therefore, is not applicable to Plaintiff's defamation claims.

The court, nevertheless, dismissed this claim without prejudice for failing to adequately set out facts supporting the claim.

Ministerial Exception Does Not Bar Whistleblower Suit by Liberty University Dean

 In Markley v. Liberty University, Inc., (VA Cir. Ct., Dec. 8, 2023), a Virginia state trial court held that the ministerial exception doctrine does not prevent a former Administrative Dean for Acedemic Operations from suing Liberty University, a Christian University, for unlawfully terminating his employment because he engaged in whistleblower activities. According to the court:

Markley, who holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Speech Communications, a Master of Divinity degree in Biblical Studies, a Master of Arts degree in Biblical Exegesis, and a Doctor of Philosophy degree in New Testament and Christian Origins, was employed by Liberty University from 2008 to 2022. During his employment, he held various positions. Though Markley never held a position that carried a religious title, such as minister, pastor, or deacon, Dr. Scott Hicks, Liberty University's Provost and Chief Academic Officer, testified that Liberty University considers all of its faculty to be ministers in the sense that they are ministering and spreading the university's religious doctrine to its students.

From 2008 until 2017, Markley taught Biblical Studies courses....

In 2018, Markley transitioned from being a full-time professor to being a full-time administrator.....

While Markley's administrative job carried no teaching responsibilities or requirements, he nonetheless did continue to teach online courses....

After considering Markley's job description and ...after taking all relevant circumstances into account, the Court finds that Markley's position as Administrative Dean for Academic Operations did not implicate the fundamental purpose of the ministerial exception. None of the essential functions or responsibilities of that administrative position involved Markley leading a religious organization, conducting worship services or important religious ceremonies or rituals, or serving as a messenger or teacher of the faith.... For purposes of the ministerial exception, the Court finds that Markley, as Administrative Dean for Academic Operations, was not a "minister."

The complaint in the case (full text) provides details of Markley's whistleblowing.

Christian Non-Profit Cannot Rescind Job Offer Because of Same-Sex Marriage

In McMahon v. World Vision, Inc., (WD WA, Nov. 28, 2023), a Washington federal district court held that a Christian non-profit organization violated Title VII and the Washington Law Against Discrimination when it rescinded a job offer originally made to plaintiff after it learned that she was in a same-sex marriage. Plaintiff had been offered the position of customer service representative which involved telephone cultivation of donor relationships. The court held that the religious employer exemption in Title VII only immunizes religious discrimination by such organizations; it does not immunize them from sex discrimination claims. It also held that the ministerial exception doctrine does not apply to the position offered to plaintiff.

Similarly, the rejected the bona fide occupational qualification defense, saying in part:

Nothing in the record indicates that being in a same-sex marriage affects one’s ability to place and field donor calls, converse with donors, pray with donors, update donor information, upsell World Vision programs, or participate in devotions and chapel.

The court went on to find that both Title VII and the WLAD are neutral laws of general applicability so that only rational basis review is required. Finally the court rejected defendants' free speech and expressive association claims.

Christian Pre-School May Get State Aid Without Complying With Non-Discrimination Rules Which Violate Its Beliefs

In Darren Patterson Christian Academy v. Roy, (D CO, Oct. 20, 2023), a Colorado federal district court issued a preliminary injunction barring Colorado from excluding a private Christian pre-school from its Univeral Pre-School Program. The state requires participating schools to agree that they will not discriminate on the basis of gender, race, ethnicity, religion, national origin, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, citizenship status, education, disability, socio-economic status, or any other identity.” The court said in part:

... [T]he Department’s non-discrimination policy likely violates Plaintiff’s rights by interfering with the school’s selection of key employees in accordance with its religious convictions under the “ministerial exception.” ...

Second, Plaintiff has the right to expressive association which the State’s hiring rules likely violate.... The freedom to associate with others also includes the freedom not to associate with others if doing so would compromise the associating group’s expression of beliefs....

Third, the Department’s rules also force Plaintiff to choose between adhering to religious beliefs and risking exclusion from the program or complying with the Department’s rules. In the specific context of excluding religious schools from participation in educational benefits programs, the Supreme Court has thrice held that a state may not exclude religious observers from receiving otherwise available educational funding because of a school’s religious status or practice....

Plaintiff seeks to hire only coreligionists, and to continue internal policies related to gender distinctions rooted in religious beliefs. These polices violate the Department’s non-discrimination standards for participating preschools.... The First Amendment forbids imposing such a choice.

Fourth, the State’s rules are likely not neutral and generally applicable..... They allow both categorical and individualized exemptions that would undermine the government asserted interests, and thereby trigger strict scrutiny.... See Fulton v. City ...

Plaintiff is also likely to succeed on the merits of its Free Speech claim, at least to the extent that the state would require Plaintiff and its staff to use a student’s or employee’s preferred pronouns as a condition of participating in the program.

[Thanks to Eugene Volokh via Religionlaw for the lead.]

4th Circuit Hears Oral Arguments on Catholic School's Firing of Teacher Who Entered Same-Sex Marriage

The U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals on Wednesday heard oral arguments (audio of full oral arguments) in Billard v. Charlotte Catholic High School.  In the case, a North Carolina federal district court held that a Catholic high school is liable under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act for firing a substitute drama teacher after he entered a same-sex marriage and stated on Facebook his disagreement with Catholic teaching on marriage. (See prior posting.) As reported by Reuters, during oral argument the judges pressed the parties on the applicability of the ministerial exception doctrine, even though the school had stipulated that it would not raise the doctrine as a defense in order to avoid protracted discovery on the teacher's job duties.

Religious Organization Lacks Standing to Challenge Interpretation of State Anti-Discrimination law

In Union Gospel Mission of Yakima, Wash. v. Ferguson, (ED WA, Sept. 1, 2023), a Washington federal district court dismissed for lack of standing a suit challenging the constitutionality of the Washington Supreme Court's interpretation of the state's anti-discrimination law. The state Supreme Court in a prior case interpreted the statute's exemption for non-profit religious organizations to be limited to situations covered by the ministerial exemption doctrine.  In this case, plaintiff that operates a homeless shelter and thrift store and also provides social services sought a declaration that religious organizations have a constitutional right to hire, even in non-ministerial positions, only those who agree with its religious beliefs and who will comply with its religious tenets and behavior requirements. In dismissing the lawsuit, the court found that there was no credible threat of enforcement against plaintiff, and that this suit was a disguised attempt to appeal a Washington Supreme Court decision in violation of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine.

Catholic School's Non-Renewal of Counsellor Who Entered Same-Sex Marriage Upheld

In Fitzgerald v. Roncalli High School, Inc., (7th Cir., July 13, 2023), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the ministerial exception doctrine requires dismissal of a suit which was brought by a Catholic high school guidance counselor whose contract was not renewed because her same-sex marriage was inconsistent with the Catholic school's religious mission. The court found this to be an easy case because last year in a different decision the 7th Circuit held that a suit by plaintiff's Co-Director of Guidance was barred by the ministerial exception doctrine. (See prior posting.) The court said in part:

Our precedent makes clear that Fitzgerald was a minister at Roncalli and that the ministerial exception bars this suit. But cases like today’s—involving two plaintiffs with the same title, at the same school, performing the same duties, and bringing the same claims in our court—are rare. A fact-specific inquiry remains necessary in cases where the ministerial exception is asserted as a defense to balance the enforcement of our laws against the protections of our Constitution.

Judge Brennan filed a concurring opinion pointing out that the case could also have been resolved by relying on the statutory religious employer exemption in Title VII which would have avoided the constitutional question. Becket issued a press release announcing the decision.

Ministerial Exception Applies to Slander, But Not Contract Claims

In Gackenheimer v. Southern New England Conference of the United Church of Christ, Inc., (CT Super., June 29, 2023), a minister who was fired from his position as executive director of a church's conference center sued the church and its senior leaders for defamation, infliction of emotional distress and breaches of express and implied contract.  Plaintiff alleged that the leaders misrepresented the reasons for his firing in communications to community religious leaders and church volunteers. A Connecticut trial court applied the ministerial exception doctrine to dismiss defamation related claims, but permitted plaintiff to move ahead with his contract claims. The court said in part:

The ministerial exception ... does not categorically preclude all claims brought against a religious institution. ..."...[E]ven if it is established that the plaintiff's primary duties render him a ministerial employee ... Connecticut courts must consider whether adjudicating the particular claims and defenses in the case would require the court to intrude into a religious institution's exclusive right to decide matters pertaining to doctrine or its internal governance or organization."... Therefore, the court will separately examine each of the plaintiff's causes of action in order to determine whether they are barred by the ministerial exception.

In counts one and two, the plaintiff alleges slander and slander per se causes of action based on two statements allegedly made by SNE's senior leaders to members of the community.... Therefore, to adjudicate the plaintiff's slander claims, the court would necessarily have to delve into the veracity of comments made by SNE's leaders regarding its decision to terminate the plaintiff's employment.... Such an examination into the decision-making process of church leadership is exactly what the ministerial exception prohibits. Accordingly, the court strikes counts one and two.

Counts three and four state claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress... based on SNE's decision to terminate his employment and the immediate aftermath of the process... . "[T]hese claims arise directly from, and in furtherance of, the defendants' decision to terminate the employment of the plaintiff...." On that basis, the court grants the motion to strike counts three and four....

Unlike the claims brought by the plaintiff in counts one through four, counts five through eight do not involve the plaintiff's termination process and the reasons behind it. Rather, in these counts, the plaintiff asks the court to determine if SNE breached its employment contract with him or, alternatively, ... the plaintiff is entitled to relief under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Importantly, the plaintiff alleges that he earned this claimed compensation years before he was fired. Therefore, when deciding this dispute, the court will not be excessively entangled in SNE's decision about whether to retain the plaintiff as its minister.... The court ... therefore denies the motion to strike counts five, six, seven and eight.

4th Circuit Panel Members Disagree on Use of Ministerial Exception Doctrine in Suit Against Liberty University

 In Palmer v. Liberty University, Inc., (4th Cir., June 30, 2023), the three judges on the panel of the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed on whether they should consider the ministerial exception doctrine in deciding an age discrimination case brought by a Liberty University art professor.  In 2018, the University notified plaintiff who was then 79 years old that her teaching contract would not be renewed for the following year. Judge King's majority opinion held that the professor had not produced evidence of age discrimination. Instead, the university dismissed her because she was not meeting its expectations regarding digital art skills. 

Despite that favorable ruling, the University, in a cross-appeal, asked the court to also rule that the ministerial exception doctrine applied. Judge King held that the court need not reach that issue.

Judge Richarson filed a concurring opinion contending that dismissal of the professor's claim should be based on the ministerial exception doctrine, saying in part:

Though Palmer did not perform formal religious instruction, her job description required her to integrate a “Biblical worldview” into her teaching. And Palmer admits to regularly praying with students, indeed starting her classes with a psalm or a prayer. Accordingly, Liberty viewed her as an official “messenger” of its faith...

If a court imposes a minister on a congregation that doesn’t want her—even if the court does so based on employment-law principles—it nonetheless impinges on the church’s religious interest in choosing who speaks for it....

Skirting the ministerial exception by dismissing an employment-discrimination claim on its merits forces us to inquire into the church’s motives for firing its minister. But, as discussed already, the church’s decision is intrinsically bound up in religious doctrine. To subject such a decision to the scrutiny of temporal courts threatens the church’s “power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of . . . faith.”...

Because Palmer—like every professor at Liberty—served as the school’s religious “messenger” to its students, she was its “minister” for First Amendment purposes. The ministerial exception thus bars her employment-discrimination claim.

Judge Motz filed a concurring opinion responding to Judge Richardson's opinion.  Judge Motz said in part:

Make no mistake: the conception of the ministerial exception advanced by my concurring colleague is no mere application of existing precedent. It is a dramatic broadening of the ministerial exception that would swallow the rule.... 

The ministerial exception effectively “gives an employer free rein to discriminate because of race, sex, pregnancy, age, disability, or other traits protected by law when selecting or firing their ‘ministers,’ even when the discrimination is wholly unrelated to the employer’s religious beliefs or practices.”... It is no exaggeration to say that the ministerial exception “condones animus.”...  Thus, the necessary implication of greatly expanding the ministerial exception is that far fewer employees would be protected from employment discrimination.

When it comes to key religious figures, this is a necessary tradeoff.... 

But Palmer was not a key religious figure or a minister. She was an art professor. Indeed, if basic acts like praying with one’s students and referencing God in the classroom are enough to transform an art professor into the type of key faith messenger who qualifies for the ministerial exception, one can only speculate as to who else might qualify for the exception...

An employee does not shed her right to be free from workplace discrimination simply because she believes in God, prays at work, and is employed by a religious entity.

Church Autonomy Doctrine Requires Dismissal of Title VII Claim By Non-Ministerial Employee

In McMahon v. World Vision Inc., (WD WA, June 12, 2023), a Washington federal district court dismissed a Title VII sex discrimination suit, finding it is barred by the Church Autonomy Doctrine.  A Christian ministry's job offer to plaintiff for the full-time position of Donor/Customer Service Representative Trainee was rescinded when defendant learned that plaintiff was in a same-sex marriage. The court discussed the relationship between the Church Autonomy Doctrine and the Ministerial Exception, concluding that the Church Autonomy Doctrine may be invoked when a non-ministerial employee brings a Title VII action.  The court said in part:

... [T]he Church Autonomy Doctrine requires the court to abstain from resolving employment discrimination claims where a religious institution takes an adverse action pursuant to a religious belief or policy—regardless of whether the employer allegedly discriminated on religious or other protected grounds—unless it is possible for the court resolve the claims without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine or calling into question the reasonableness, validity, or truth of a religious doctrine or practice....

The court joins other courts ... in cautioning religious employers against over-reading the impact of the court’s holding. It is by no means the case that all claims of discrimination against religious employers are barred....  [I]f a religious employer does not offer a religious justification for an adverse employment action against a non-ministerial employee or if the plaintiff presents sufficient secular evidence that would allow a factfinder to conclude that the religious justification was pretext without wading into the plausibility of the asserted religious doctrine, it is unlikely that serious constitutional questions will be raised by applying Title VII.

Supreme Court Denies Cert. In Two Ministerial Exception Cases

The U.S. Supreme Court yesterday denied review in two cases which held that interlocutory appeals from denial of a ministerial exception defense are not allowed. (Order List).

Faith Bible Chapel International v. Tucker, (Docket No. 22-741, certiorari denied 6/12/2023), involves a former high school teacher and administrator/ chaplain who contends that he was fired for opposing alleged racial discrimination by a Christian school. In the case, the 10th Circuit denied en banc review. (See prior posting).

Synod of Bishops v. Belya, (Docket No. 22-824, certiorari denied 6/12/2023) involves a suit in which plaintiff contends that he was defamed when defendants publicly accused him of forging a series of letters regarding his appointment as Bishop of Miami in the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia. In the case, the 2nd Circuit denied en banc review. (See prior posting).

Ministerial Exception and RFRA Defenses Rejected in Suit Over Firing of Bible Translation Company IT Employee

In Ratlliff v. Wycliffe Associates, Inc., (MD FL, May 26, 2023), a Florida federal district court refused to dismiss a Title VII employment discrimination suit brought against a Bible translation company by a software developer who was fired after the company learned that he had entered a same-sex marriage. The court rejected defendant's reliance on RFRA, concluding that "s RFRA does not apply to lawsuits in which the government is not a party."  It rejected defendant's "ministerial exception" defense, saying in part:

... Plaintiff does not qualify as a minister.

... Plaintiff was seemingly hired for his technological aptitude.... Accordingly, Plaintiff’s role was to employ his knowledge to develop software, not to act as a source of religious conveyance.... While the software’s purpose may have been to translate the Bible, Plaintiff himself was not doing so.... Further, Plaintiff’s direct interactions involved other software and database developers—not the individuals seeking out Defendant’s mission....

... [A]t bottom here, Plaintiff is a software developer, with no idiosyncratic religious title, background, education, or function.....

Triable Issues of Fact Remain on Ministerial Exception in Age Discrimination Suit Against Catholic School

 In Atkins v. St. Cecelia Catholic School, (CA App., April 28, 2023), a California state appellate court held that there are triable issues of material fact as to whether the ministerial exception applies in the age discrimination case brought against a Los Angeles Catholic elementary school by plaintiff who was employed for 40 years as a part-time office administrator and for the last 19 years also as a part-time art teacher. Reversing the trial court's granting of summary judgment dismissing the lawsuit, the court said in part:

While St. Cecilia presented evidence that Atkins prayed with the students in her art class and promoted the ADLA’s six tasks of catechesis by encouraging “Christ-like” behavior in her class, there was no evidence that she ever taught, or was expected to teach, any type of religious curriculum. There was also no evidence that Atkins ever led any religious services, accompanied the students toreligious services, or prepared the students to participate in religious services or activities. Given that Atkins held dual roles at St. Cecilia as an art teacher and an office administrator, we cannot conclude on this record that educating students in the Catholic faith lay at the core of her job responsibilities. Considering the totality of these circumstances, St. Cecilia was not entitled to summary judgment based on the ministerial exception.

Former Cantor's Claims Against Synagogue Are Dismissed

In Sklar v. Temple Israel, Westport Inc., (CT Super., April 21, 2023), a Connecticut state trial court dismissed breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims asserted by the former Cantor of defendant synagogue, Temple Israel.  Plaintiff contended that the Temple failed to provide him the procedural protections to which he was entitled under his contract before it fired him for three incidents of unsatisfactory performance of duties. The court held that the ministerial exception doctrine precludes plaintiff's contract claims, saying in part:

[T]he manner in which the defendant Temple Israel discharged or disciplined the plaintiff would constitute government interference with an internal decision that affects the faith and mission of the synagogue, thereby violating the Free Exercise Clause. The Court also finds that it would also violate the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement in ecclesiastical decisions because it concerns internal management decisions of the synagogue as to its employment relationship with its clergy.

The court concluded that plaintiff's other allegations, while serious, are legally insufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff had complained of lapses in COVID protocols and lack of enhanced security which exacerbated his post-traumatic stress disorder.