New York Catholic Archdiocese Reaches $800 Million Settlement with Sex Abuse Survivors

In an October 24 press release, attorneys for claimants who had filed sex abuse claims against the Catholic Archdiocese of New York announced:

Survivors of clergy sexual abuse and their attorneys have agreed to an $800 million settlement with approximately 1,300 survivors of the Archdiocese of New York. All survivors who filed claims against the Archdiocese of New York have agreed to the settlement plan....

Although the settlement plan has been agreed to, additional steps must be completed before funds can be distributed to survivors....

Reporting on the agreement, EWTN News said in part:

The settlement allows the Archdiocese of New York to avoid filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Along with the Diocese of Brooklyn, it is one of only two of New York’s eight Catholic dioceses that have not sought bankruptcy protection.

The archdiocese confirmed to EWTN News that it is still engaged in litigation with its longtime insurer Chubb, which it sued in 2024, claiming the company was “attempting to evade their legal and moral contractual obligation” to pay out claims to sex-abuse victims....

No 1st Amendment Violation in Requiring Seller of Pre-Designed Wedding Outfit to Sell It for Same-Sex Wedding

In In re New York State Division of Human Rights v. D. Auxilly NYC LLC, (NY App., Oct. 22, 2026), a New York state appellate court upheld the award of $5000 compensatory damages and a $20,000 civil penalty in a suit alleging that a clothing retailer violated the New York Human Rights Law by refusing to sell a bridal jump suit to a bride for her same-sex wedding. The court said in part:

Complainant, at the time a Missouri resident, emailed D. Auxilly, a New York based business that produces and sells attire, including bridal outfits, to inquire about a bridal jumpsuit she had seen advertised on one or more of D. Auxilly's social media pages.... Complainant also informed D. Auxilly that as her fiancÉ had "fallen in love" with it after struggling to find anything she liked, complainant wanted to purchase it for their upcoming wedding. ... D. Auxilly's owner and operator, responded ... advising complainant ... that she would not be able to make the garment for a same-sex wedding because it would go against her religious beliefs. She also urged complainant and her fiancÉ to reconsider getting married....

The First Amendment does not shield D. Auxilly from liability for this discrimination. Unlike the baker in Masterpiece Cakeshop v Colorado Civil Rights Comm...., D. Auxilly was not asked to design and create customized items which might constitute an "expressive statement." Nor was it tasked with creating a customized wedding website, as in 303 Creative LLC v Elenis.... Instead, D. Auxilly refused to sell the wedding garment it had previously designed and which it had marketed to the public. While the garment likely would need to be adjusted for sizing, this potential sizing alteration would not constitute an expressive statement. Neither would D. Auxilly's "speech" be compelled here by requiring it to sell the previously designed and marketed garment...

Enforcement of the NYSHRL here also does not violate D. Auxilly's right to free exercise of religion. The statute is "neutral, both on its face and due to a lack of evidence that it targets religious conduct for a distinctive treatment"....

Backers of Hasidic School May Move Ahead with Challenges to Zoning Denials

Congregation Rabbinical Institute of Tartikov, Inc. v. Village of Pomona, NY, (SD NY, Sept.28, 2026), is the latest decision in a long-running attempt by members of the Hasidic Jewish community to build a rabbinical institute in Pamona, New York, that will provide facilities to train rabbinical judges and will include housing for its students and their families.  In an 80-page opinion, a New York federal district court allowed plaintiffs to move ahead with their as-applied federal and state equal protection, free exercise, freedom of speech and association, Fair Housing Act and RLUIPA claims. At issue are plaintiff's compliance with two local laws--one allowing only accredited educational institutions to be constructed in the village, and the second placing a number of restrictions on design of dormitories.

The court said in part:

... Plaintiffs plausibly allege that Defendants enforced the Challenged Laws with discriminatory intent.

  ... [T]he New York State Education Department no longer provides institutional accreditation....  

Plaintiffs further allege that Tartikov explained to the ZBA that it cannot obtain accreditation through private means because AARTS requires a rabbinical institute to be operational before it can obtain accreditation, leaving Tartikov unable to obtain accreditation without first operating and unable to operate in the Village without first obtaining accreditation....  Rather than address this alleged “Catch-22,” the ZBA chairperson suggested that Tartikov rent a facility outside the Village, operate there until it obtained accreditation, and then return to the Village....  

The ZBA subsequently denied Tartikov’s variance application because Tartikov had not sufficiently established that it could not become accredited.... It did so despite the Rockland County Department of Planning’s conclusion that lack of accreditation, standing alone, presented no significant land-use impacts....

Thus, despite Tartikov’s repeated efforts to obtain permission for student-family housing, Defendants effectively conditioned consideration of that request on Tartikov first overcoming the Accreditation Law—the same requirement that Plaintiffs allege Tartikov cannot satisfy without first operating its rabbinical institute....  These procedural irregularities and alleged delays further support an inference that Defendants acted with discriminatory intent....

At this early stage, Plaintiffs’ allegations of repeated procedural irregularities, the circumstances surrounding Defendants’ application of the Challenged Laws, and alleged anti-Hasidic animus among Village officials and community members plausibly support an inference that Defendants applied the Challenged Laws in a discriminatory manner. ...

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Defendants’ application of the Challenged Laws imposes a substantial burden on their religious exercise. 

... Plaintiffs allege that the Institute requires a Torah community, which in turn requires prospective students to reside with their families....  Yet the Dormitory Law prohibits the very housing necessary to accommodate Tartikov’s Torah community by excluding single-family, two-family, and multifamily dwelling units from the definition of a dormitory and prohibiting separate cooking, dining, or housekeeping facilities.... These allegations plausibly establish more than a “minimal impact on religious exercise”.... 

These allegations plausibly allege that the Institute would foster protected expression and that Defendants burdened that expression through their application of the Accreditation Law....

Plaintiffs have also plausibly alleged that the Accreditation Law burdens their ability to associate for the purpose of engaging in that protected activity...

Although Plaintiffs will ultimately bear the burden of demonstrating that the Dormitory Law has a significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on Hasidic Jews, they need not make that evidentiary showing at this stage in the litigation....

Dispute Over Access to A Rabbinical Court Lands on Supreme Court's Shadow Docket

Last week, an Emergency Application (full text) was filed with the U.S. Supreme Court seeking a stay pending appellate review in Strulovich v. Bain, (Sup. Ct., filed 9/17/2026). The case involves a dispute between business associates over whether their business issues should be decided by a rabbinical court or a civil court, and if the former, which rabbinical court. (See prior posting and decisions below).  The Emergency Application filed with Justice Sotomayor says in part:

A New York trial court has directly intruded on the free exercise of religion by ordering Applicant Samuel Strulovitch, who is a religious Jew, to refrain from trying to resolve a monetary dispute in a rabbinical court (Hebrew: “beis din”), as he sincerely believes he must. That alone would be extraordinary. But the trial court went further still by ordering Strulovitch to attempt to convince that same rabbinical court to reverse a religious determination that he agrees with.  

In this case, Strulovitch brought an underlying commercial dispute between two Jewish parties to a beis din, attempting to have the parties voluntarily agree to resolve it under Jewish law—as he sincerely believes he must. The beis din then issued a seruv (a religious censure of recalcitrance, with no civil consequences) against Respondent Moshe Bain for having previously sought and obtained an order enjoining Strulovitch from fulfilling his obligation under Jewish law to pursue his case in Jewish court. Strulovitch believes the beis din was right, as a matter of Jewish law, to issue the seruv.... The trial court nonetheless ordered him to cease his efforts before the beis din and “take all steps necessary” to undo the seruv, including withdrawing the proceeding altogether....  

That unconstitutional order squarely violates the First Amendment....

Justice Sotomayor ordered Bain to file a response to the petition by Sept. 23.

National Review reports on the case.

UPDATE: On Sept. 29, Justice Sotomayor denied the application for a stay, "without prejudice to applicants again seeking relief, if necessary, once state court remedies are exhausted."

InterVarsity Christian Fellowship Sues for Recognition as Student Organization

Suit was filed last week in a New York federal district court by a Christian student organization at Broome Community College that is part of the State University of New York system. The group was denied recognition as an official student organization because its proposed constitution requires all student leaders of the organization to affirm its Statement of Faith. The school says that this religious leadership requirement violates the school's non-discrimination policy. The complaint (full text) in Intervarsity Christian Fellowship/USA v. SUNY Broome Community College, (ND NY, filed 8/21/2026), alleges in part:

... [I]n over 150 years of precedent, the Supreme Court has emphasized that religious organizations have the right “to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.”... SUNY Broome’s actions here not only interfere but also seek to control a core component of InterVarsity’s governance, faith, and doctrine....

... [I]n the past decade, the Supreme Court has warned governments three times that they cannot deny religious organizations access to benefits because of their religious beliefs....

In 14 counts, the complaint alleges violation of the free exercise, free speech and equal protection provisions of the U.S. and New York constitutions as well as violation of New York's Human Rights Law. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship also filed an emergency motion for a preliminary injunction and a Memorandum of Law supporting that motion.

Becket Fund has issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Dance Company's "Ministerial Exception" Defense to Trafficking Claims Rejected at Pleading Stage

Chun-Ko Chang v. Shen Yun Performing Arts, Inc., (SD NY, Aug. 18, 2026), is a class action suit brought by students who also are performers in a Chinese dance company based in New York. Plaintiffs allege violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act as well as New York's Labor Law. The court dismissed certain claims but allowed plaintiffs to move ahead with others. One defense raised but not accepted at this stage of the proceedings was the ministerial exception defense. According to the court:

Shen Yun identifies itself as a nonprofit dance company devoted to highlighting Chinese culture and morality while exposing the “cruelty of the Chinese Communist Party.” .... Shen Yun recruits children as students to work as dancers and musicians for Shen Yun (“Performers”), many of which are recruited from abroad.... From the start of their time at Shen Yun as students, many Performers are recruited to attend the Fei Tian Academy of the Arts or Fei Tian College, which Plaintiffs allege “operate[s] as a cover for the forced labor scheme.”... This alleged “forced labor scheme,” is used to achieve the overarching goal of the Shen Yun Defendants, i.e., “performing uncompensated or undercompensated labor as Performers in Shen Yun performances, so that Defendants may reap massive financial benefits.”...

Hongzhi Li founded and leads Falun Gong, which is a “practice that combines teachings for self-improvement and mediation exercises,” though he has asserted that Falung Gong is not a religion.... Rui Lee is Hongzhi Li’s wife, and together, the Lis are alleged to “effectively control Shen Yun’s considerable assets, and personally and secretly benefit from that control....”

SYZ Defendants argue that the ministerial exception applies to this matter and accordingly bars Plaintiffs’ claims in their entirety, as Plaintiffs are “ministers” of the “religious organization” of Shen Yun.... 

... Defendants attempt to argue that these “Performers” are “ministers” because that term “includes anyone who communicates a religious message on behalf of a faith-based organization.” ... However, the Court may not, at the motion to dismiss stage, engage in such a factual analysis where, as here, it is not clear from the four corners of the [complaint] that Plaintiffs “clearly” fall into the category of “ministers,” or for that matter, whether Shen Yun “clearly” qualifies as a “religious organization.”...

Suit Seeks Religious Accommodation to Obtain Environmentally Friendly 401(k) Option

 A suit was filed this week in a New York federal district court by an employee of Thermo Fisher Scientific alleging that the company is required under Title VII and the New York State Human Rights Law to provide plaintiff an investment option in the company's 401(k) plan that is consistent with plaintiff's religious beliefs. The complaint (full text) in Hartley v. Thermo Fisher Scientific, Inc., (WD NY, filed 8/4/2026) alleges in part:

4. Dr. Hartley sincerely holds the belief that investing his money in fossil fuels is morally wrong and in violation of his religious convictions.

5. Dr. Hartley believes his Christian faith commands him to care for and steward the earth, and that actively investing in and profiting from fossil fuel companies whose work directly harms the earth and its inhabitants violates his religious obligations. 

6. Because each of Thermo Fisher’s current equity-based retirement plan options maintains significant investments in fossil-fuel companies, Dr. Hartley is forced to either compromise his religious beliefs or forego a significant component of his employer-provided benefit. 

7. To remedy this conflict, Dr. Hartley requested that his employer provide him with an accommodation that would allow him to partake of the benefits of his 401(k) plan in a manner consistent with his faith....

44. Defendant Thermo Fisher’s failure to provide the accommodation sought (a retirement fund option that allows Dr. Hartley to invest in a manner consistent with his religious beliefs) violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended....

The complaint also contends that the company's refusal to provide the investment option sought by plaintiff amounts to religious discrimination.

ClientEarth announced the filing of the lawsuit. HR Dive reports on the lawsuit.

Suit Challenges Town's Refusal to Permit Nativity Display on Town Square

Suit was filed last week in a New York federal district court challenging an upstate New York town's refusal to permit placing of a privately-sponsored nativity display in the town square during the Christmas season. The complaint (full text) in Polverino v. Town of Brighton, New York, (WD NY, filed 7/21/2026), alleges that the town every year permits a Menorah display sponsored by Chabad Lubavitch, while Brighton town officials have ignored, evaded and effectively denied plaintiff's Nativity display requests for more than two years. Plaintiff alleges that this violates his free speech and free exercise rights, as well as the 1st Amendment's Establishment Clause and the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection clause. ACLJ issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

2nd Circuit: Supreme Court's Title VII Test Was Not Applied by Trial Court in Religious Accommodation Case

In Bergin v. New York State Unified Court System, (2d Cir., July 15, 2026), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals vacated a York federal district court's ruling in favor of a court officer who was denied a religious exemption from the New York State Court System's Covid vaccine mandate. The 2nd Circuit held that the district court had applied an old Title VII test developed by the 2nd Circuit instead of the test developed by the Supreme Court in its 2015 Abercrombie & Fitch case. It remanded the case for the district court to apply the correct test.  The court said in part:

In Abercrombie, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff need not inform her employer of the need for accommodation in order to state a Title VII claim, but that she must demonstrate that the employer acted out of a desire to avoid offering an accommodation.  Our prior rule—which did include an employer-knowledge requirement and did not expressly require a showing of motive—was abrogated by Abercrombie.

The Western New York Daily Record reports on the decision.

2nd Circuit Reaffirms Permissibility of NY Repeal of Religious Exemptions from School Vaccination Requirements

In Miller v. McDonald, (2d Cir., June 30, 2026), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed its earlier decision that New York's repeal of its religious belief exemption from required school immunizations, while keeping medical exemptions, does not violate either Amish parents' free exercise rights or their parental rights to control their children's religious upbringing.  Last year, the Supreme Court had remanded the case to the Second Circuit for reconsideration in light of Mahmoud v. Taylor. In reaffirming its earlier decision, the Second Circuit said in part:

New York Public Health Law § 2164 is neutral on its face.  It does not target or affirmatively prohibit religious practices....  Moreover, the act of repealing the religious exemption did not “in and of itself transmute” this otherwise neutral law into one “that targets religious beliefs.”...

Nor does the legislative history reveal an anti-religious bias....

... [T]he motives of a small number of legislators cannot be attributed to the legislative body as a whole.

Plaintiffs contend that exempting students for medical reasons treats comparable secular conduct more favorably than religious beliefs....

Repealing the religious exemption decreases “to the greatest extent medically possible” the number of unvaccinated students and thus the risk of disease; maintaining the medical exemption allows “the small proportion of students” who medically “cannot be vaccinated” to avoid the health consequences that “taking a particular vaccine would inflict.” ... Exempting religious objectors, however, detracts from that interest.  Religious exemptions increase “the risk of transmission of vaccine-preventable diseases among vaccinated and unvaccinated students alike.”...

New York passed § 2164 in response to the 2018 to 2019 measles outbreak.  Legislators felt particularly concerned about the concentration of unvaccinated children with religious exemptions in the same schools....

Plaintiffs’ remaining argument is that, even if § 2164 is neutral and generally applicable, it burdens the parental free-exercise right recognized in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and clarified in Mahmoud v. Taylor.  We conclude that it does not....

Section 2164 does not regulate what children are taught, does not require them to affirm any belief, does not expose them to state-selected instruction contrary to their parents’ faith, and does not enlist school officials to displace parental religious formation.  It imposes a health-and-safety condition on in-person school attendance to reduce the spread of communicable disease....  The burden may be serious, but it is not the kind of state interference with a child’s religious development that triggered strict scrutiny in Yoder or Mahmoud....

Mahmoud asks whether a burden is “of the same character” as the burden in Yoder, not whether it is more or less serious....  A greater burden in degree is not necessarily the same burden in kind....

Cert. Denied Over Dissent of 3 Justices in Covid Vaccine Mandate Controversy

The U.S. Supreme Court yesterday denied review in Doe v. Hochul , (Docket No. 24-1015, certiorari denied 6/29/2026) over a dissenting opinion by Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito. At issue in the case was New York's refusal to grant state healthcare workers a religious exemption from the state's Covid vaccine mandate. Justice Gorsuch dissenting said in part:

... [T]he Court of Appeals did not assess the reasonableness of the plaintiffs’ requested accommodations.  In fact, the court took as given that the plaintiffs had “plausibly alleged a prima facie case of Title VII religious discrimination.” ... Still, the court held, the defendants had presented a successful “undue hardship” defense as a matter of law....  More specifically, the court reasoned that granting the plaintiffs’ requested religious accommodations would have imposed an “undue hardship” on their employers because it “would have required the [employers] to violate the state [vaccine] regulation” and “subjected the [employers] to financial penalties or a suspension or revocation of their operating licenses.”... 

Soon after it decided this case, the Second Circuit reiterated its understanding of Title VII’s undue hardship defense, holding that “an accommodation that would require an employer to violate” a state law necessarily “imposes an undue hardship”—and does so even when the state law is “unconstitutional as applied” to the plaintiff....

... [I]t seems to me that state law cannot control whether an employer faces an “undue hardship” for purposes of federal antidiscrimination laws, just like it cannot conclusively resolve what constitutes a “reasonable accommodation”.... To hold otherwise would appear to leave States free to strip individuals of the protections guaranteed by so many federal civil rights statutes....

Nassau County Buffer and Bubble Zones Around Houses of Worship Violate Free-Speech Rights

In Borecky v. County of Nassau, (ED NY, June 18, 2026), a New York federal district court issued a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the Nassau County Religious Safety Act. The law prohibits picketing, literature distribution or oral advocacy within 35 feet of a place of religious worship (Buffer Provision). It also creates a bubble zone of 100 feet around a place of religious worship in which an advocate may not, without a person's consent, approach within 10 feet of a person to engage in oral advocacy, deliver literature or carry signs (Bubble Provision). Plaintiffs were advocates for immigrant rights. The court (in its 63-page opinion) said in part:

If the goal is to avoid harassment, intimidation, violence, or threatening speech, the County could have drafted a law that criminalized such conduct.  It need not have also banned peaceful conversation, polite exchange, and information distribution on public streets—what amounts to the “extreme step of closing a substantial portion of a traditional public forum to all speakers.”... There is no evidence in this record that Nassau County considered any alternative laws or seriously engaged in any exercise of limiting the First Amendment damage inflicted by the RSA on individuals like Plaintiffs....

There might have been a record that justified the impositions on protected speech from the Buffer Provision.  But it is not here....

Defendants have failed to articulate any rationale for having both a buffer and bubble provision to advance their interests in protecting religious liberty and public safety.  The combined effect of the two exacts a chilling of free expression that neither does alone....

The Buffer Provision makes no attempt to accommodate the diversity and types of institutions around which the restriction operates.  There are nearly 1000 such places, some are in storefronts, some which abut private business, others on detached pieces of property, others abutting sidewalks and public thoroughfares.... And as a result, the 35-foot radius around a driveway or entrance prohibits activity in all manner of places—including core public forums like sidewalks and streets—without regard to the particular site or location of any individual place of worship....

The differences between the Buffer and Bubble Provisions do not save the latter from facial invalidity....

Given the breadth of the expressive conduct and speech implicated by the law, an officer is left with the discretion to determine whether the individual standing in silence wearing a t-shirt with a political message is violating the statute or not engaging in expressive conduct at all.  “Because of its overbreadth, the statute vests local law enforcement officers with too much arbitrary discretion in determining whether or not a certain emblem is grounds for prosecution.  It permits only that expression which local officials will tolerate[.]” ...

amNY reports on the decision.

St. John's Challenges Jurisdiction of NY PERB Over Its Relations with Its Faculty Union

St. John's University filed suit this week in a New York federal district court challenging on 1st Amendment grounds jurisdiction of the New York State Public Employment Relations Board over the University's relations with it faculty's union. The complaint (full text) in St. John's University v. Connick, (ED NY, filed 6/1/2026), alleges in part:

1. For over 150 years, St. John’s University operated as an institution of Catholic and Vincentian higher education—a Mission-driven religious institution founded by the Congregation of the Mission of St. Vincent de Paul to provide the youth of New York with intellectual and moral formation rooted in the Gospel and the teachings of St. Vincent de Paul....

5. New York’s Public Employment Relations Board (“PERB”), however, seeks to subject St. John’s to a regime of mandatory collective bargaining that impermissibly entangles the government (and the faculty Union) in its internal governance of religion- and Mission-related matters....

6. Under St. John’s expired collective bargaining agreement with the faculty Union, faculty committees controlled significant aspects of hiring, tenure, promotion, discipline, and curricular decisions—the very decisions that define how St. John’s carries out its Mission.  

7. When St. John’s sought to reassert its First Amendment right to govern itself in accordance with its Catholic and Vincentian identity by withdrawing recognition from the faculty Union, the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge with PERB—asking the state agency to force this religious institution back to the bargaining table under New York’s State Employment Relations Act (“SERA”). ...

10. The First Amendment, the church autonomy doctrine, the prohibition against excessive government entanglement with religion, the ministerial exception, and the Free Exercise Clause all forbid precisely what PERB seeks to do here: transfer St. John’s authority to govern its religious affairs and to fulfill its sacred educational Mission from its religious leaders to PERB and the faculty Union.

EWTN News reports on the lawsuit.

Ministerial Exception Is No Defense to Child Labor Trafficking Claims

In Zan Sun v. Shen Yun Performing Arts, Inc., (SD NY, May 18, 2026), a New York federal district court held that the ministerial exception doctrine is not a basis for dismissing claims by two Falun Gong practitioners who allege that they were held in forced child labor by a classical Chinese dance and musical company based in New York. Plaintiffs allege that their treatment violated the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act. The court said in part:

... Defendants argue that because Falun Gong is a “religion,” Dragon Springs is a “church,” Shen Yun is Falun Gong’s “evangelistic ministry,” and Plaintiffs were its “ministers” who used “performance art to share religious principles and the prospect of salvation with the world,” the ministerial exception bars all of Plaintiffs’ claims.... Plaintiffs counter that none of the Defendants are religious institutions and that Falun Gong is not a religion.... The Court, however, need not decide this dispute—even if it could on a motion to dismiss....

The ministerial exception “does not mean that religious institutions enjoy a general immunity from secular laws,”... Instead, the exception is limited: It “protect[s]” religious institutions’ “autonomy with respect to internal management decisions that are essential to [their] central mission.” ...  A “church’s independence on matters ‘of faith and doctrine’ requires the authority to select, supervise, and if necessary, remove a minister without interference by secular authorities”.... 

Plaintiffs’ allegations of abuse, forced labor, and human trafficking do not implicate “matters of faith and doctrine” or “matters of internal government.” Plaintiffs claim they were subject to grueling training and work schedules with little pay, denied medical care when injured, prevented from leaving Dragon Springs, and subjected to other forms of psychological abuse that began when they were children. Accepting these allegations as true ... Defendants still retain the authority and independence to “select, supervise, and . . . remove [their] minister[s].” ... Matters of “faith,” religious “doctrine,” and ecclesiastical “government” have no bearing on alleged abuse, control, and confinement in between employment decisions....

... Defendants ... claim that, at most, what Plaintiffs allege they experienced is what one might expect at an elite dance academy or a boarding school.... [T]o the extent Defendants intend to prove that Plaintiffs were treated in the way they characterize, the resolution of this factual dispute does not implicate matters of faith and doctrine. It does not require interference with Defendants’ internal governance or even their right to choose ministers....

Court Orders Action to Protect Reputation of Party Sanctioned by Rabbinical Court

In  In re Bain v. Strulovitch, (Westchester Cty. NY Sup. Ct., April 29, 2026), a New York state trial court found itself in the middle of a dispute between business associates over whether their business issues should be decided by a rabbinical court or a civil court, and if the former, which rabbinical court.

Samuel Strulovitch began an arbitration proceeding against Jonathan Bleier before a rabbinical court in Rockland County. At issue was ownership interests in a nursing home. Moshe Bain then filed an arbitration action in a different rabbinical court in Brooklyn claiming that he had a right of first refusal as to the nursing home. That rabbinical court issued an order restraining Strulovitch from taking any action to enforce the arbitration award issued by the Rockland rabbinical court until the Brooklyn rabbinical court issued a decision. Bain also filed suit in a New York civil court, and the court issued an injunction barring Strulovitch from taking any action to confirm the disputed Rockland County rabbinical court decision.

Despite that injunction, Strulovitch instituted another arbitration proceeding in a different Brooklyn rabbinical court, contending that the civil court's injunction did not prohibit a new suit. That rabbinical court issued a summons to Bain. According to the New York trial court:

When Bain asked Strulovitch to withdraw the proceeding, he asserted that Bain was free to ignore the summons.  According to Bain, this is simply impossible; one of the rabbis on the panel told Bain’s counsel that ignoring it may result in a “seruv,” a “letter of recalcitrance.  He may be subject to all forms of communal sanctions and societal pressures due his flagrant violation of Jewish law.”  Strulovitch’s representative reiterated the seriousness of ignoring the summons, stating to Bain that “This is serious and the lawyer cannot protect you from your hashem and your religious obligations.  If you get a siruv [sic] everyone will know that you do not listen to Beis din.”

When the parties appeared in Court on the Order to Show Cause ..  Strulovitch argued that the Court had no jurisdiction over the arbitration because it is a religious matter....

The matters that Strulovitch has raised with the Beis Din, however, are not religious, as clearly stated in the summons (hazmana)....

In this matter, the Court will only need to apply neutral principles of secular law to the issues raised herein.  There is, thus, no First Amendment reason to deny the motion....

With respect to Bain’s contention that Strulovitch violated the stay imposed by the Court because the arbitral panel issued a seruv to Bain ...,  the Beis Din replied that “‘We want to make it very clear that neither Strulowitz nor his agents requested the seruv after the TRO was issued.  The BD issued it of its own volition as a response to the chutzpah of enjoining a litigant from pursuing his Halachic rights to a Din Torah.’”  

Given this letter, ...  the Court denies the request to sanction Strulovitch.  There is no evidence that Strulovitch or any of his representatives, secular or religious, have violated the Court’s rulings. ...

To rectify the potential damage to Bain's reputation in the religious community resulting from the issuance of the seruv by the Beis Din, Strulovitch must take all steps necessary to have the Beis Din withdraw it, including withdrawing the entire proceeding.

Catholic Hospice Sues Over NY Standards for Care of Transgender Patients

Last week, Dominican Sisters who operate a home that provides palliative care for indigent, terminally ill cancer patients filed suit in a New York federal district court challenging New York's requirements for care of transgender patients. The complaint (full text) in Dominican Sisters of Hawthorne v. Hochul, filed 4/6/2026) alleges in part:

New York’s LGBTQ Long-Term Care Facility Residents’ Bill of Rights ...  require long-term care facilities to assign patients to rooms based on stated “gender identity” rather than biological sex even over the opposition of the roommate, to permit residents and their visitors of one sex to access bathrooms set aside for those of the opposite sex, to use patients’ “preferred pronouns” even when the patient is not present, to use language and to “create communities” affirming patients’ sexual preferences, to accommodate patients’ desire for extramarital relations, and to post notices affirming compliance with these requirements....

... The Dominican Sisters of Hawthorne and Rosary Hill Home operate in accordance with the Ethical and Religious Directives and the teachings of the Catholic Church. They cannot comply with the Mandate without violating these sincerely held religious beliefs.....

Requiring a person to identify another by a sex other than his or her God-gifted sex would therefore require such a person to act against central, unchangeable and architectural teachings of the Catholic faith. It would contradict the teachings of the Bible concerning God’s creative sovereignty, contradict reason and truth, and betray our sacred obligation not to knowingly harm other persons, particularly the most vulnerable. The implications are so much greater than whether to utter the words “he” or “she.” Indeed, to demand that a Catholic deny another’s sex is to require him or her to affirm another religious worldview....

The complaint alleges 7 counts: Free Exercise; Religious Autonomy Doctrine; Ministerial Exception; Establishment Clause; Equal Protection; Free Speech; and Expressive Association.

NewsNation reports on the lawsuit.

NY Judge Censured for Refusing to Perform Same-Sex Wedding

In In re. Pitts-Davis, (NY Comm. Jud. Conduct, March 16, 2026), the New York Commission on Judicial Conduct censured a Syracuse City Court judge for her refusal to officiate at a same-sex wedding. According to the Opinion:

Charge I, filed subsequent to a thorough investigation by the Commission, alleged that in November 2024, respondent created the appearance of impropriety and bias against same-sex couples in that on the day before it was scheduled to occur, she asked court staff to reschedule the marriage of a same-sex couple to a different day so that she would not have to officiate, notwithstanding that she officiated the marriage of an opposite-sex couple scheduled for the same day.

The 18-page opinion describes the complicated factual situation in the case. It said in part:

Respondent engaged in serious misconduct and severely undermined public confidence in her impartiality.  However, we find on the specific facts here, that respondent’s conduct, which was influenced by being informed that day that one of her brothers was near death and was also occasioned by her “profound reevaluation” of her sincerely held religious beliefs, does not warrant removal.   We note that respondent’s misconduct involved one incident – albeit a very serious one – over the course of two days and that respondent attempted to obtain an opinion from the Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics.

Syracuse.com reports on the decision.

2nd Circuit: Claims by Judge Who Was Denied Covid Vaccine Exemption Are Dismissed

In Mora v. New York State Unified Court System, (2nd Circuit, March 30, 2026), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a Poughkeepsie, New York, City Court Judge who in 2021 was denied a religious exemption from the New York courts' Covid vaccine mandate. This led to his being excluded from the city courthouse where he usually presided. Each of his five causes of action was dismissed on a different ground. His claim against the court system was dismissed on 11th Amendment and mootness grounds. His Title VII claim was dismissed because of the exclusion in Title VII for policymaking appointees of elected officials.

Plaintiff's Equal Protection claim against members of the Vaccine Exemption Committee was dismissed because the Committee routinely granted religious exemptions to other Catholics and people of different faiths who opposed the COVID vaccines. So Mora's religion does not seem to be the basis for the denial, and Mora did not allege facts suggesting some other discriminatory motive.

Denying Mora's Free Exercise claim, the Court said in part:

Mora’s own pleadings reflect that more than 500 other judges and employees – including Catholics with beliefs identical to Mora’s – received exemptions from the vaccine mandate.... Those allegations belie Mora’s assertion that the Individual Defendants’ denial of his exemption request was based on hostility to his religious beliefs, as opposed to his failure to follow the procedures established for religious exemptions.

Finally, the Court rejected Mora's retaliation claim, saying in part:

Mora contends that the chief administrative judge, Lawrence Marks, retaliated against him on the basis of his “religiously based refusal to vaccinate,” ... when he referred Mora to a disciplinary body....  [T]he disciplinary referral was made only after (1) Mora failed to follow the procedures required to obtain a vaccine exemption,.. and after (2) he refused to comply with the then operative vaccine mandate following the denial of his request for a religious exemption....

Child Abuse Claim Against Archdiocese Moves Ahead

In Doe XXV v. Archdiocese of New York, (NY Sup.Ct. NY Cty., Jan. 21, 2026), a New York state trial court denied a motion to dismiss a suit under the Child Victims Act in which plaintiff alleged that he was sexually abused as a child by a janitor at a Catholic school operated by the Archdiocese. The court rejected defendant's free exercise defense, saying in part:

Plaintiff’s cause of action asserts liability against the Archdiocese for the negligent hiring, retention and supervision of Tremaroli, a janitor. The Archdiocese fails to demonstrate why the present dispute cannot be adjudicated “solely upon the application of neutral principles of law, without reference to religious principles”....

The court also rejected other defenses raised by the Archdiocese, saying in part: 

The Archdiocese further argues that it owed Plaintiff no duty under theories of negligent hiring, retention and supervision because the Archdiocese did not directly hire, retain or supervise Tremaroli. The Court disagrees.  

Generally, an element of negligent hiring, retention and supervision is that the defendant was the employer of the alleged tortfeasor. However ... agency relationships between a junior organization and a senior organization may impute liability onto a senior organization when the senior organization could also have been responsible for the hiring, retention or supervision of an employee....

Tremaroli was ... employed as a janitor at the Church; however, his employment as conditional upon the authority of the pastor, who was appointed to the Church by the Archdiocese. The Archdiocese has thus failed to eliminate triable issues of fact that it lacked an employer/employee-like relationship with Tremaroli....

In any event, issues of fact also exist as to the Archdiocese’s notice of Tremaroli’s propensity for abuse or actual abuse of children....

Thus, if certain employees at the Church or School were “acting on the . . . Archdiocese defendants’ behalf” when they learned of the subject abuse, their knowledge would be imputed to the Archdiocese....

Divorce Action Should Be Dismissed Because Couple Were Never Validly Married in the Coptic Church

In Funti v. Andrews, (NY App., Jan. 6, 2026), a New York state appellate court held that a divorce action should be dismissed because the parties, who had not taken out a marriage license, were never validly married in the first place. New York Domestic Relations Law provides parties are validly married even when they did not take out a marriage license if the marriage has been "solemnized in the manner heretofore used and practiced in their respective societies or denominations...." The trial court had concluded that the parties were married after analyzing the Coptic ceremony they were part of on the day their child was baptized. (See prior posting.) The appeals court held, however, that the court instead should have relied upon the undisputed testimony of a Coptic bishop that detailed the requirements for a valid Coptic wedding. The appellate court said in part:

We find that this case falls squarely in the ... category of cases where the court can make a determination about what is required for a ceremony to be solemnized in the manner used and practiced in a given religious denomination without becoming entangled in a religious dispute. There is no dispute in this case about what the requirements are for a marriage to be solemnized in the Coptic Church. Bishop David laid out what the requirements are for solemnization, which were affirmed by defendant’s expert....

Since the record in the present case contains undisputed evidence of what the Coptic Church requires for a valid marriage, a determination of whether the ceremony was properly solemnized does not require inquiry into religious doctrine, but only into the requirements of Domestic Relations Law § 12.... 

... [W]e now apply the facts to the neutral standard provided by the Bishop’s undisputed testimony about what is required for a ceremony to be properly solemnized in the Coptic Church. 

Based on the neutral standard provided by the Bishop’s undisputed testimony, we find as a matter of law that the parties’ ceremony was not solemnized under the Domestic Relations Law....

Finally, even assuming that the parties’ alleged marriage could not be evaluated using neutral principles of secular law because plaintiff disputed what is required for a marriage to be properly solemnized in the Coptic Church, defendant’s motion should still have been granted. In this alternative scenario ...  a determination as to whether the parties were married in a religious ceremony could only be made by “analyzing the various and customary rites, customs, and practices of the [Coptic] religion,” and thus would improperly involve the court in a religious matter.... Any finding as to whether there was a solemnized marriage sufficient to meet the requirements of Domestic Relations Law §§ 12 and 25 could thus offend the First Amendment, which ... prevents civil courts from engaging in an analysis of religious doctrine...

ADF issued a press release announcing the decision.