2nd Circuit: FBI Agents Had Qualified Immunity From RFRA Damages When Muslim Plaintiffs' Religious Objections Were Undisclosed

In Tanvir v. Tanzin, (2d Cir., Oct. 29, 2024), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed on qualified immunity grounds a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court in 2020 held (see prior posting) that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act permits suits for damages against federal officials. The 2nd Circuit said in part:

... [E]ach of the three Appellants in this case encountered various FBI agents who asked him to serve as an informant in Muslim communities, and each was illegitimately placed or retained on the No Fly List when he declined. Each Appellant possessed a belief, allegedly shared by some other Muslims, that precluded him from serving as an informant in a Muslim community. But no Appellant ever disclosed that view to any agent. Instead, each stated that he: (1) refused to work as an informant because being an informant would endanger himself or his family, or (2) would agree to work as an informant under the right circumstances....

Appellees had no reason to know that their actions encroached on the Appellants’ religious beliefs. As noted above, “[e]ven when we find a right clearly established,” officials are still immune from damages liability if “reasonable persons in their position would not have understood that their conduct was within the scope of the established prohibition.”...

We recognize the Appellants’ view that Muslims in America have been unfairly targeted. But we disagree with their conclusion that a Christian or Jewish plaintiff in like circumstances would have greater success in a RFRA damages suit. No doubt, many would find any effort to recruit informants to infiltrate religious congregations, including Muslim, as well as Christian or Jewish congregations, offensive. We have no reason to assume, however, that a reasonable government official would know that a Christian or Jew could not work with government agents to expose terrorists in her religious community without violating her religious norms. It is far from obvious – indeed, it cannot be the case – that an adherent of either of those (or any) religions could hold an undisclosed religious belief, of which an official had no other reason to know, and then successfully sue the official for monetary damages for pressuring them to act in tension with that undisclosed belief.

Nothing in this ruling should be construed as approving the conduct alleged in the complaint. At its core, the complaint alleges that government agents pressured individuals to serve as informants – at risk to their own and their families’ safety – and to report on the activities of their neighbors and community members by falsely and in bad faith accusing them of terrorism to deny them significant liberties under a program designed to protect lives from genuine terrorists. That is improper behavior, regardless of whether the agents knew of the Appellants’ particular religious beliefs. But in this case, the Appellants’ only remaining legal claim is that the Appellee agents are personally liable in damages for violating their free exercise of religion under RFRA. On the facts alleged, for the reasons discussed above, that claim fails.

Court Says Indian Penal Code Does Not Punish Insults to Religion That Do Not Outrage Targets

In Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (High Ct. Karnataka, Sept. 13, 2024), a single-judge bench of the High Court of the Indian state of Karnataka gave a narrow interpretation to Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code which prohibits the deliberate and malicious outraging of the religious feelings of any class of citizens. At issue are the acts of two individuals who barged into a mosque and shouted "Jai Sriram" (Glory to Lord Rama). While the perpetrators have not yet been identified by investigators, this suit was filed to quash the ongoing investigation of the incident. Agreeing to quash the investigation, the court said in part:

Section 295A deals with deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs.  It is ununderstandable as to how if someone shouts ‘Jai Sriram’ it would outrage the religious feeling of any class. When the complainant himself states that Hindu – Muslims are living in harmony in the area the incident by no stretch of imagination can result in antimony....

The acts that have no effect on bringing out peace or destruction of public order will not lead to an offence under Section 295A of the IPC.

Law Beat reports on the decision.

EEOC Sues Over Refusal to Accommodate Muslim Applicant's Worship Schedule

On Sept. 30 the EEOC filed a suit under Title VII charging a Washington-state based staffing and recruiting agency with religious discrimination and retaliation against a Muslim job applicant. According to an Oct. 3 EEOC Release:

Logic Staffing invited the applicant to interview ... the day after receiving his online application. On the strength of his application and interview, the staffing supervisor started to explore available openings when the applicant, who is Muslim, disclosed a possible need for a longer mid-day break to attend Friday prayer.... Logic Staffing's supervisor ended the interview and noted that the applicant was not hired due to his schedule and need to attend Friday prayer....

“Title VII requires employers, employment agencies, and unions to make adjustments to the workplace environment to allow applicants and employees to practice their faith, absent undue hardship,” said Elizabeth Cannon, director of the EEOC’s Seattle Field Office. “Instead of exploring alternatives and contacting its business clients to determine if accommodation was possible, Logic Staffing turned away a promising candidate and violated the law."

Muslim Woman Can Move Ahead on Some Challenges to Sheriff's Booking Photo Policy

In Hague v. Kent County, (WD MI, Sept. 9, 2024), plaintiff, a Muslim woman, challenged the Kent County, Michigan, Sheriff Office's policy on booking photos for detainees wearing a religious head covering. Two photos were taken, one with the head covering and one without.  Only the one with the head covering is released to the public. The other was uploaded to the Michigan State Police data base. Multiple officers could be present when the photos were taken. The court held that the photo policy imposed a substantial burden on plaintiff's religious exercise in violation of RLUPA. but that money damages are not available for RLUIPA violations. Declaratory or injunctive relief is available. It also allowed plaintiff to move forward with her 1st Amendment free exercise claim, including for damages, against the county and the sheriff's office. The sheriff, though, has qualified immunity as to damage claims under the 1st Amendment.

6th Circuit Reverses Dismissal of Muslim Inmate's Religious Accommodation Complaints

 In Mustin v. Wainwright, (6th Cir., Aug. 27, 2024), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of free exercise, RLUIPA, equal protection and certain retaliation claims brought by a Muslim inmate who objected to the manner in which space was made for religious services and objected to inadequate Ramadan meals.  The court said in part:

Mustin contends that defendants ... substantially burdened his ability to attend Jummah and Taleem by (1) “constantly” moving Jummah and Taleem to small rooms that could safely accommodate only half of the attendees, and (2) inconsistently allowing inmates to attend Taleem services and sending inmates back to their cells to accommodate other religious events.... Mustin properly alleged that defendants ... substantially burdened Mustin’s ability to safely attend Jummah and Taleem by forcing him to put his personal safety at risk in order to fulfill his religious obligations by attending services in a room packed with roughly twice the number of people it can safely house....

At this early stage, Mustin has alleged facts sufficient to support an inference that defendants’ provision of expired, offending, and otherwise nutritionally insufficient meals during Ramadan pressured him to violate his religious beliefs or face potential malnutrition.  Mustin alleges that he was served raw food and expired drinks in his breakfast bags, and that his dinner bags often contained pork-based main courses, which Muslims are forbidden from eating.... Mustin plausibly alleged that the non-expired and non-pork-based foods he received during Ramadan were insufficient in quantity and nutrition quality to meet his nutritional needs.

3rd Circuit: District Court Did Not Show Compelling Interest in Denying Muslim Inmate Religious Accommodations

In Nunez v. Wolf, (3d Cir., Aug. 27, 2024), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals, in a suit under RLUIPA, held that the district court had not established that the Department of Corrections had a compelling interest in denying a Muslim inmate religious accommodations so that he could consummate his marriage, have ongoing conjugal visits with his wife, engage in congregate prayer with visitors and be circumcised. The court said in part:

To be clear, we are not holding that the DOC’s denials of Nunez’s requests cannot satisfy strict scrutiny if properly supported on remand.  What we do hold is that this determination cannot be made on the current record and that, as we have now clarified the nature of its burden, the DOC should have the opportunity to supplement the record before renewing its motion for summary judgment.

India's Supreme Court Says Muslim Women Can Invoke Secular Law for Maintenance Award After a Religious Divorce

In Mohd v. State of Telangana, (India Sup. Ct., July 10, 2024), a 2-judge panel of India's Supreme Court held that a Muslim woman who has been divorced under Muslim law, has a choice of seeking maintenance under the secular provisions of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in addition to remedies available under the 1986 Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act. Each of the two justices wrote an opinion. Justices Nagarathna in his opinion said in part:

... [A] technical or pedantic interpretation of the 1986 Act would stultify not merely gender justice but also the constitutional right of access to justice for the aggrieved Muslim divorced women who are in dire need of maintenance. This Court would not countenance unjust or Faustian bargains being imposed on women. The emphasis is on sufficient maintenance, not minimal amount. After all, maintenance is a facet of gender parity and enabler of equality, not charity. It follows that a destitute Muslim woman has the right to seek maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC despite the enactment of the 1986 Act. Thus, an application for maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC would not prejudice another application under Section 3 of the 1986 Act insofar as the latter is additional in nature and does not pertain to the same requirements sought to be provided for by Section 125 of the CrPC. One cannot be a substitute for or supplant another; rather it is in addition to and not in derogation of the other.

The Independent reports on the decision.

White House Statements Extend Greetings On Eid al-Adha

Today is Eid al-Adha.  Yesterday the White House posted a message from President Biden (full text) and a separate message from Vice-President Harris (full text) conveying holiday wishes to American Muslims and Muslims around the world.  President Biden said in part:

This year, Eid al-Adha comes at a difficult time for many Muslims around the world. In Gaza, innocent civilians are suffering the horrors of the war between Hamas and Israel. Too many innocent people have been killed, including thousands of children. Families have fled their homes and seen their communities destroyed. Their pain is immense. My Administration is doing everything we can to bring an end to the war, free all hostages, deliver humanitarian relief, and work toward a future two-state solution, which I continue to believe is the only way to achieve a lasting peace for Palestinians and Israelis. And I strongly believe that the three-phase ceasefire proposal Israel has made to Hamas and that the U.N. Security Council has endorsed is the best way to end the violence in Gaza and ultimately end the war.

We’re also working to bring a peaceful resolution to the horrific conflict in Sudan. And we continue to advocate for the rights of other Muslim communities – including the Rohingya in Burma and the Uyghurs in the People’s Republic of China – facing persecution around the world. They, like all people, deserve to live free from violence and fear....

In the spirit of Eid al-Adha, let us all renew our commitment to values that unite us – compassion, empathy, and mutual respect – which are both American and Islamic. We look forward to welcoming home our American Muslim pilgrims who have earned the title “Al-Hajj.” To them and all Muslims across the globe, we wish you a blessed and meaningful holiday. Eid Mubarak!

The White House also posted a Fact Sheet (full text) setting out a lengthy list of steps it has taken this year to support the Muslim community.

Medicaid Limit on Reimbursing for Family Care Did Not Violate Muslim Family's Free Exercise Rights

In Alsyrawan v. Department of Human Services, (PA Commonwealth Ct., May 20, 2024), a Pennsylvania state appellate court held that Medicaid rules limiting reimbursement of family members providing in-home and companion services to a total of 60 hours per week did not violate a Muslim family's rights under Pennsylvania's Religious Freedom Protection Act. The Medicaid recipient was a non-verbal adult male with Down syndrome and several other disabilities who was being cared for by his mother and sister. According to the court:

... [The] family, including Petitioner, follows Islamic law set forth in the Quran, which forbids ... unrelated males and females from being alone together, and unrelated males from providing personal care involving nudity or exposed private areas....  Therefore, to protect Petitioner from sin, only Mother, Sister, or other closely related female relatives may be alone with Petitioner, and only a father, brother, uncle, or grandfather could provide his more intimate bathroom and shower care....  Mother added that the prohibition of unrelated males and females being alone together likewise prohibits her from being alone with an unrelated male caretaker while he is tending to Petitioner....

... Petitioner also asserts that the Department’s refusal to grant him an exception to the 40/60 Rule violates the RFPA, where he has shown by clear and convincing evidence that placement of an unrelated caregiver in his home would burden his and his family’s religious exercise, and the Department cannot show that its denial of an exception is the least burdensome way to serve a compelling interest....

... [S]substantial record evidence supports that Islamic law allows an unrelated, non-Islamic male aide to assist Petitioner outside Mother’s presence (i.e., either outside the home or when Mother leaves the home to attend to personal business), before and after which Mother could provide Petitioner’s necessary intimate personal care.... 

... Because Petitioner has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the 40/60 Rule “[s]ignificantly constrains or inhibits conduct or expression mandated by [his] sincerely held religious beliefs[,]” “[s]ignificantly curtails [his] ability to express adherence to [his] faith[,]” “[d]en[ies] [him] reasonable opportunity to engage in activities . . . fundamental to [his] religion[,]” nor “[c]ompels conduct or expression which violates a specific tenet of [his] religious faith[,]” 71 P.S. § 2403, he has failed to meet his initial burden of proving that the application of the 40/60 Rule substantially burdens his free exercise of religion under the Free Exercise Clause or the RFPA.

2nd Circuit Reverses Dismissal of Muslim Inmate's Complaint About Eid Meal

In Brandon v. Royce, (2d Cir., May 15, 2024), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment dismissing a Muslim inmate's free exercise of religion claim against three Sing Sing prison officials. At issue was plaintiff's participation in a special meal for Muslim inmates and their guests around Eid al-Adha. Because the event was overbooked, prison officials offered inmates the special meal in their cells if they withdrew from attending the group event. Plaintiff withdrew but did not receive a meal.  On appeal, defendants argued, among other things, that they had a legitimate penological interest in not delivering the meal to plaintiff's cell-- a concern that civilian and inmate cooks who prepared meals for the event might place contraband in the meal trays. The court concluded:

In granting summary judgment to the defendants, the district court did not resolve the parties’ dispute as to whether the September 26 event was a religious event related to Eid al-Adha or an unrelated “family event.”  Rather, the district court relied on the defendants’ asserted penological interests and their view that there was an alternative means of Brandon exercising his First Amendment right: by attending the September 26 event and receiving the special meal there.  Neither ground supports granting judgment as a matter of law to the defendants at the summary judgment stage....

To be sure, we do not dispute that an increased possibility that a visitor would introduce contraband into a prison is a legitimate penological concern ....  We simply conclude that there is no unambiguous record support for the defendants’ claim that they denied Brandon a meal tray on September 26 because “the presence of outside guests increased the risk that contraband could be hidden in the food.”...  And we further conclude, based on the evidence before the district court, that the penological concerns relied on by the district court and raised on appeal cannot at this juncture support summary judgment in favor of the defendants....

5th Circuit Remands Muslim Inmate's RLUIPA and Establishment Clause Claims

 In Lozano v. Collier, (5th Cir., April 11, 2024), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a portion of the district court's decision and vacated another portion of it in a challenge by a Muslim inmate to practices that allegedly burdened plaintiff's ability to exercise his religion. The court said in part:

In his first RLUIPA claim, Lozano alleges that the [Texas Department of Criminal Justice] Defendants burdened his religious exercise by denying him the opportunity to shower privately with other Muslim inmates for Jumah.  He alleges that the shower conditions—which include inmates who are “naked, cussing, speaking idol talk” and inmates who are “homosexuals and predators”—make it impossible for him to meet his “holy obligation for cleanliness in prayer for Jumah”...   

Lozano’s second RLUIPA claim, alleges that the TDCJ defendants burdened his religious liberty by denying him a private cell to pray..... Lozano alleges... that other inmates in his cell intruded into his prayer space and tried to provoke him to fight them during his attempts to pray....

Lozano’s third RLUIPA claim involves an alleged lack of access to religious programming and instruction, namely, Taleem and Quranic studies. ...

In his § 1983 claim, Lozano contends that the existence of Jewish- and Native-American-designated units, and the absence of a Muslim-designated unit, constitutes a neutrality problem and violates the Establishment Clause.  

Lozano also alleges that the TDCJ’s faith-based dormitories have a curriculum that requires inmates to attend Christian-based classes, despite the faith-based dorms being nominally open to inmates of all religions. ...

... [W]e reverse the district court’s order granting summary judgment on Lozano’s RLUIPA claims... and vacate and remand for further consideration....

The district court held that Lozano failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact on whether the absence of a Muslim-designated unit or dorm violates the Establishment Clause.... We vacate and remand this claim to the district court to reconsider, in a manner consistent with applicable precedent and this opinion....

British Court Upholds School's Ban on Student Prayer

In The King (On the application of TTT) v. Michaela Community Schools Trust, (High Ct., Kings Bench, April 16, 2024), a British trial court in an 83-page opinion rejected a Muslim student's challenge to a secular secondary school's Prayer Ritual Policy (PRP) that prevented the student from using part of her lunch break to perform her Duhr prayer. The policy was adopted by the high-performing school, in which half of the students were Muslim, after prayer by some students led to divisions within the student body and to threatening social media posts.

The court said in part:

It seems to me that this is a case ... where the Claimant at the very least impliedly accepted, when she enrolled at the School, that she would be subject to restrictions on her ability to manifest her religion. She knew that the School is secular and her own evidence is that her mother wished her to go there because it was known to be strict....

... [W]hilst accepting that her belief is that she should perform Duhr during the relevant 25 minutes of the lunch break in the winter months, and that this belief falls within Article 9 [of the European Convention on Human Rights], the evidence indicates that the effect of the PRP is that Qada is available to mitigate the failure to pray within the allotted window....

... [B]alancing the adverse effects of the PRP on the rights of Muslim pupils at the School with the aims of the PRP and the extent to which it is likely to achieve those aims, I have concluded that the latter outweighs the former and that the PRP is proportionate....

The court also rejected the claim that the prayer policy violated Britain's Equality Act. The court also issued a press release summarizing the decision. The Guardian reports on the decision. [Thanks to Scott Mange for the lead.]

Class Action By Muslim Women Against NYPD Settled for $17.5M

 AP reports that New York City has agreed to settle the class action damage claim in Clark v. City of New York for $17.5 million. The suit brought in a New York federal district court under RLUIPA challenged the NYPD's former policy of requiring Muslim women to remove their hijabs when sitting for arrest photos. (See prior posting.) Under the settlement, which still must obtain judicial approval, the $17.5 million will be shared equally by all class members who file a claim, with each getting a minimum of $7,824.  Previously, settling the claims for an injunction and declaratory judgment, the police department agreed to change its arrest photo policy. (See prior posting).

Church of England Faces Controversy Over Insincere Conversions to Gain Asylum

 The Telegraph reports on the controversy in Britain over whether the Church of England has been misled into converting Muslim migrants whose only motivation is to claim asylum on the basis of a threat of persecution if they return to their home countries as Christians. The paper reported in part:

The Rt Revd Dr Guli Francis-Dehqani, the Bishop of Chelmsford, conceded it was “very difficult” to look into the hearts of converts and be 100 per cent certain that they were genuine.

She acknowledged there had been a “small number” of alleged abuses but said the clergy “do the best they can” and it was “ultimately” the job of immigration tribunals and the Home Office to assess and vet the validity of asylum claims.

Her comments come after robust denials by the Church of England of claims by senior MPs and whistleblowers that clergy have been routinely supporting “bogus” asylum claims and enabled a “conveyor belt” of thousands of asylum seekers to convert.

As reported by Law & Religion UK, questions about this issue were raised in Parliament last week, which in turn led the Archbishop of Canterbury last week to issue a statement (full text) in response, saying in part:

For refugees and those seeking asylum, we simply follow the teaching of the Bible which is to care for the stranger.

It is the job of the Government to protect our borders and of the courts to judge asylum cases. The Church is called to love mercy and do justice....

2nd Circuit: Delivering Inmate's Ramadan Meals Too Early Burdened His Free Exercise Rights

In Long v. Sugai, (2d Cir., Feb. 5, 2024), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Hawaii prison sergeant may have violated plaintiff inmate's free exercise rights by delivering his Ramadan meals 4 hours before sundown.  The court said in part:

The question in the case before us is not whether serving cold, unappetizing, and possibly unsafe food is cruel and unusual punishment.  Rather, it is whether serving such food unconstitutionally burdened Long’s free exercise of his religion....

... [B]y the time Long could eat his evening meal at about 7:30 p.m., the food was often inedible and potentially unsafe, and, if eaten, exacerbated his stomach ulcers.  We take judicial notice of the fact that some food cannot safely sit at room temperature for four hours....

... [D]elivery of Long’s evening meal at 3:30 p.m. during Ramadan substantially burdened his free exercise of religion.  The district court should have evaluated the four Turner factors to determine whether the burden was justified.  Because the court did not conduct that analysis, we remand to allow it to do so.  The district court also did not conduct a qualified immunity analysis.  If the court concludes, after conducting the Turner analysis, that the burden was not justified, our remand allows the court to conduct a qualified immunity analysis. ...

The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of free exercise claims against another sergeant.

Questions of Fact Remain in Challenge to Application Process for Prison Chaplaincy Supervisor

 In Bridges v. Prince Georges County, Maryland, (D MD, Feb. 1, 2024), a Maryland federal district court refused to grant summary judgment for either plaintiff or the defendants in a suit by a Muslim chaplain alleging that his 1st Amendment rights were violated by the application process for a paid supervisory position at the county detention center.  At issue was a "Statement of Applicant's Christian Faith" that was part of the application form created by Prison Ministry of America (PMA) which, under contract with the county, was to provide a non-denominational chaplain supervisor for the jail.  After finding that plaintiff had standing and that PMA was a state actor during the hiring process, the court said in part:

Because a reasonable jury could find the Statement of Christian Faith to be “a religious test” ..., summary judgment cannot be granted in favor of Defendants on this count.  However, Defendants’ assertion that the Statement was optional creates a sufficient dispute of material fact as to render summary judgment inappropriate in Plaintiff’s favor, as well....

Regardless of whether the Statement of Christian Faith was mandatory or not, the inclusion of such a statement, especially given that it appeared on its face to be required, clearly employed a non-neutral policy as it specifically allowed for participation by Christians and no others.  This non-neutral practice, then, could be viewed by a reasonable jury as placing a burden on Plaintiff’s religious expression by denying him the ability to apply for a job that he otherwise would have been able to seek, due to his religion....  As such, a reasonable jury could find that this burdened Plaintiff’s freedom of expression and that the policy was not narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government interest, and thus summary judgment cannot be granted in favor of Defendants.  However, the question of whether the inclusion of the Statement of Christian Faith in the application burdened Plaintiff’s religious exercise, given Defendants’ assertion that the Statement of Christian Faith was not actually required, creates a genuine dispute of material fact, and, therefore, summary judgment cannot be granted in favor of Plaintiff, either.

Muslim Employee Recovers $70,000 From Employer Who Refused Grooming Rule Accommodation

The EEOC announced on Wednesday that it has entered a consent decree in its lawsuit against Blackwell Security Services, Inc.  The EEOC's lawsuit charged that the company violated Title VII by failing to give an exemption from its no-beard policy to a Muslim employee who worked as a concierge in Chicago, even though granting the accommodation would have imposed no cost and not created an operating burden on Blackwell.  According to the EEOC:

To avoid losing his job, the employee complied and shaved his beard, causing him significant distress....

Under the consent decree resolving the lawsuit, Blackwell will pay $70,000 in compensation to the now-former employee. Blackwell will also provide training to relevant management employees on federal laws prohibiting religious discrimination and will report any additional complaints of religious discrimination to the EEOC for the decree’s duration.

County Revises Policy on Religious Head Coverings in Booking Photos in Settlement of Suit by Muslim Woman

In a Settlement Agreement (full text) in Johnston v. Rutherford County, Tennessee, (MD TN, 1/18/2024), the county has agreed to pay $100,000 in damages to a Muslim woman who authorities required to remove her hijab for a booking photo. Sophia Johnston was stopped by police for having a taillight out and was arrested when it turned out she had a 6-year-old outstanding warrant for failing to appear on charges of driving with a suspended license. (Background.) In the Settlement Agreement, the county also agreed to delete from its records photos and video of Johnston without her hijab. Johnston will have a booking photo wearing her hijab retaken. Under the Agreement, the county has also adopted a new policy on Religious Accommodations for Head Coverings During Booking Process (full text) and has updated its Detention Center Protocols (full text) to allow booking photos to be taken with religious head coverings so long as the head covering is first removed for a search.  WZTV News reports on the settlement.

Controversial Hindu Temple Dedication Takes Place In India

In the Indian holy city of Ayodhya, the politically and religiously controversial dedication of the Ram Mandir, a Hindu Temple, took place this morning. An article last week in Time explains the significance of the event. Here are excerpts:

A decades-long flashpoint in India’s sectarian politics is poised to reach a climax next week. The Ram Mandir, a Hindu temple, will be consecrated Jan 22. on a contested holy site once home to a mosque in India’s northern city of Ayodhya. The special ceremony for the temple, which is still in construction, has been a decades-long effort in the making.

For Hindus, site marks the birthplace of Lord Ram, one of the most revered deities in the Hindu faith. But the site is also revered by Muslims for having once housed the 16th century Babri Mosque, a monument of faith for Indian Muslims that stood on the site for centuries before it was razed by a Hindu nationalist mob in 1992. Sectarian riots ensued, killing thousands of people....

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, whose Hindu-nationalist government has overseen a steady rise in violence against Muslims and other religious minorities, will play a key role in the ceremony—one observers say will mark the unofficial start of his campaign to win a third consecutive term when Indians go to the polls in the spring....

In 2019, India's Supreme Court awarded the site to the Hindu community. (See prior posting.).

School Board Not Liable for Teacher's Proselytization of Muslim Student

In Chaudhry v. Community Unit School District 300 Board of Education, (ND IL, Dec. 29, 2023), an Illinois federal district court dismissed Establishment Clause, Due Process and Equal Protection claims by Muslim parents against an Illinois school board that employed teacher Pierre Thorsen who convinced their daughter to convert to Christianity.  The court said in part:

[T]he complaint continues to state an implausible theory of Monell liability because it does not plead enough factual matter to raise the inference that any assertedly unconstitutional practice had become so widespread that the Board was bound to have noticed it. It likewise continues to fail to plausibly allege that anyone other than Thorsen was the moving force behind any of the Parents’ asserted injuries.... At best, the Parents have alleged facts consistent only with the “isolated wrongdoing of one . . . rogue employee[].”... Because Monell does not allow for respondeat superior liability, these claims are not plausibly pleaded, and they therefore fail.