EEOC Sues Over Denial of Dress Code Religious Accommodation for Apostolic Christian Employee

The EEOC announced this week that it has filed a Title VII lawsuit against CEMEX Construction Materials Florida, LLC, alleging that it failed to grant a religious accommodation to an Apostolic Christian employee.  The employee wanted to wear a skirt over her work pants. According to the EEOC:

The company denied the accommodation because of its policy against loose-fitting clothing. The employee only wore close-fitting skirts over her work pants and was in compliance with company policy. Ultimately, the company forced the employee to choose between wearing a skirt or losing her job. The employee chose to continue wearing a skirt, which led to her termination.

3rd Circuit: Fireman's Free Exercise and Title VII Challenge to Grooming Rules Should Move Forward

In Smith v. City of Atlantic City, (3d Cir., May 30, 2025), the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals vacated a New Jersey federal district court's grant of summary judgment for Atlantic City in a suit by a fireman claiming violation of his free exercise rights and his right to reasonable religious accommodation under Title VII. However, the court affirmed dismissal of plaintiff's equal protection and retaliation claims. In the case, plaintiff who is a Christian challenged the city's requirements that prohibit him from growing a beard of any length, contending that the requirement violates his religious beliefs. Finding free exercise and Title VII reasonable accommodation violations, the court said in part:

Firefighters engaged in fire suppression face danger from smoke and fume inhalation. The City protects its firefighters by requiring them to don air masks in “hazardous” and  “confined” spaces.... These “self-contained breathing apparatuses,” or “SCBAs,” form a seal on the firefighter’s face to keep out hazardous air and pump in clean air....

... [T]wo exceptions—one practical exception and one discretionary regime—render the City’s policy not generally applicable. First, the City has long permitted administrative staff, all of whom are firefighters subject to the SCBA rule, to forgo fit testing...

Second, the City’s grooming regime has built-in discretion. Captains may “deviate” from the SCBA policy and permit any sort of conduct as long as they “bear[] full responsibility for the results of any deviation.” ...

Strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard in all free-exercise cases failing either Smith’s neutrality requirement or its general-applicability requirement....

But the City fails narrow tailoring. “[N]arrow tailoring requires the government to show that measures less restrictive of the First Amendment activity could not address its interest.”... The City could remove Smith from fire suppression duty as it did before 2020 or reclassify him as a civilian who is not subject to the SCBA and grooming policies. It could, as a simple fix, at least try and fit test Smith with facial hair to see if his facial hair, at any length, would interfere with the SCBA to a point that creates the risk of air leakage that the City fears. 

Judge Chung dissented in part, saying she would affirm the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's free exercise claim, because "the Grooming Standards are facially neutral and were applied equally to both religiously-motivated and secularly-motivated requests for accommodation...."

Judge Porter dissented in part, saying he would have upheld plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim.

First Liberty issued a press release announcing the decision.

Court Vacates EEOC Rule Requiring Accommodation of Employees' Abortions

In State of Louisiana v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, (WD LA, May 21, 2025), a Louisiana federal district court set aside an EEOC rule that interprets the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act to require employers to provide reasonable accommodation for abortions. The court had previously issued a preliminary injunction ("PI") in the case. In setting the rule aside, the court said in part:

Given the political, social, and religious significance of the abortion issue in this country, the PI Ruling explained that EEOC must point to “clear congressional authorization” for the power it claims in the Final Rule....  And as the PI Ruling emphasized, “[n]ot only is the EEOC unable to point to any language in the PWFA empowering it to mandate the accommodation of elective abortions, but there can be little doubt in today’s political environment that any version of the PWFA that included an abortion accommodation requirement would have failed to pass Congress.”...  That finding remains true today, and the Court concludes that the EEOC has failed to point to clear congressional authorization for the inclusion of abortion protection in a statute intended only to accommodate and protect female employees during pregnancy.

The case was consolidated with U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops v. EEOC.

AP reports on the decision.

"Religious" Belief Defined Broadly in Title VII Claim

Numerous cases challenging employers' refusal to grant exemptions to Covid vaccine mandates during the height of the Covid epidemic continue to wend their way through the courts. Here is the latest.

In Huber v. TIAA, (WD VA, April 17, 2025), a Virginia federal district court refused to dismiss a former employee's Title VII failure to accommodate claim and allowed the parties to move on to discovery.  The employer had refused to grant a religious accommodation, claiming that the employee's objections were secular, not religious.  According to the court:

... [Plaintiff] subscribes to “a faith based holistic healing process” promoted by the Optimum Health Institute in Southern California....  A page from the Optimum Health Institute’s website, which Huber attaches as an exhibit to the amended complaint, describes the Institute as “a healing ministry of the Free Sacred Trinity Church, which promotes healing through the use of non-medical, all-natural, holistic healing practices.”...

Shortly after Huber filed her amended complaint, the Fourth Circuit clarified that courts evaluating religious discrimination claims should not rigorously examine whether a plaintiff’s beliefs are “religious in nature.”...  It confirmed that courts should limit the inquiry to “whether ‘the beliefs professed . . . are, in the claimant’s own scheme of things, religious[.]’”...  An employee’s claim that her belief “is an essential part of a religious faith must be given great weight” in this analysis....

... [T]his court finds that Huber has plausibly alleged the beliefs she communicated to TIAA were “religious in nature.” Huber’s asserted faith, which “comes from the belief in a universal force and energy” and focuses on holistic healing ... is different than the biblical Christianity employees often invoke when seeking exemptions to COVID-19 vaccine requirements....  But Title VII protects nonconventional as well as conventional religious beliefs—courts “are not free to reject beliefs because they consider them ‘incomprehensible.’...

The amended complaint does not provide a clear or complete account of Huber’s conversation with the TIAA interviewer, and it is possible that later fact development will show she did not communicate an objection that was based on a sincerely held religious belief.  But the court finds that her allegations are sufficient to allow for discovery on this issue....

EEOC Enjoined from Enforcing Pregnant Workers Fairness Act Against Christian Nonprofit Organization

In Stanley M. Herzog Foundation v. EEOC, (W.D. Mo. Oct 04, 2024), a Missouri federal district court issued a preliminary injunction barring the EEOC from enforcing the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act and rules implementing it against plaintiff, a nonprofit Christian educational organization, where enforcement would require plaintiff to accommodate abortions that are contrary to its sincere religious beliefs. The court said in part:

... [T]he EEOC has not established that it used the least restrictive means to advance its interests at this stage. The Final Rule’s approach requires employers to provide accommodations for employees who obtain abortions and permits a religious employer to assert a religious defense only after an employee brings a complaint against it for refusing to provide accommodations. There is no way for a religious employer to ensure it will not face investigation or prosecution ahead of time. The Foundation suggests a number of alternatives the EEOC could have taken, which are less restrictive of its free exercise rights....  The EEOC argues these alternatives are not feasible because the PWFA does not give it authority to predetermine religious exemptions or defenses. Ultimately, the burden is on the EEOC to “prove with evidence” that its policies are the least restrictive means “to achieve its compelling interest, including alternative forms of regulation.”

... [T]he Foundation is likely to succeed on the merits of its RFRA claim.....

The Heartlander reports on the decision.

Lifeguard Who Has Religious Objections to Pride Month Has Claim for Undermining of His Religious Accommodation

In Little v. Los Angeles County Fire Department, (CD CA, Jan. 25, 2025), a California federal district court allowed a Fire Department captain assigned to the Lifeguard Division to move ahead on certain of his Free Exercise, Title VII and state anti-discrimination law claims after the Department revoked his previous religious exemption from the County's directive to fly the Progress Pride Flag during LGBTQ+ Pride Month. The suspension of his accommodation was triggered by his removing Pride flags that had been put up in an area to which he was assigned. The court said in part:

Little is an "Evangelical Christian with traditional and orthodox beliefs on marriage, family, and sexual behavior and identity."...

[T]he Fire Department granted Little's accommodation request and agreed that, for the remainder of June, Little would be assigned to facilities that were incapable of flying the Progress Pride Flag due to insufficient flag clasps.... 

Little alleges that his request for a religious accommodation was protected activity, and that Defendants retaliated against Little for seeking that accommodation by suspending him from his role on the Background Investigation Unit....

... [T]he pleading here gives rise to a sufficient "suspicion" of religious animosity to warrant "pause" before dismissing Little's neutrality claim as implausible.... The FAC alleges that Chiefs Boiteux and Lester knew that Little had been granted a religious accommodation and conspired to undermine that accommodation by bringing additional flag poles to the Area 17 sites so that they would be required to fly Progress Pride Flags in time for ,,,Little's scheduled shift there....

However, the court rejected other claims by plaintiff, including his free speech claim, saying in part: 

Because Little has not shown that the speech at issue is anything other than government speech, he has failed to state a viable compelled-speech claim under the First Amendment....

7th Circuit Hears Arguments on Accommodating Teacher Who Objects to Using Students' Preferred Names and Pronouns

Yesterday the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments in Kluge v. Brownsburg Community School Corporation. (Audio of full oral arguments.) In the case, an Indiana federal district court dismissed an orchestra teacher's Title VII claim that the school had failed to reasonably accommodate his religious objections to referring to transgender students by their preferred names and pronouns. The district court agreed with the school's rejection of using only students' last names as an accommodation. (See prior posting.) ADF, the teacher's counsel, issued a press release ahead of yesterday's arguments.

Firefighters Can Move Ahead With Title VII Claims Over Forced Leave to Accommodate Religious Objections to Covid Vaccine

In Bingham v. City of San Jose, (CA App., Oct. 30, 2024), a California state appeals court held that five San Jose firefighters who were placed on unpaid leave when they asserted religious objections to the Covid vaccine may move ahead with their claims under Title VII and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act.  Reversing the trial court's dismissal of the suit, the appeals court held in part:

Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded that the extended and involuntary unpaid leave allegedly imposed on them was not a reasonable accommodation.  By not requiring plaintiffs to take the COVID-19 vaccines mandated by the County vaccination order, the City eliminated the conflict between the order and plaintiffs’ religious beliefs concerning the COVID-19 vaccines.  However, the alleged unpaid leave did not reasonably preserve plaintiffs’ employment status....

... [T]he amended complaint alleges that the City Fire Department was facing a severe staffing shortage and that a County public health order allowed employers facing such shortages to seek a waiver of the vaccination requirement.  Additionally, plaintiffs alleged that they could have been transferred to positions answering 911 calls, which presumably is not a Higher-Risk Setting and therefore would not have required vaccination under the County vaccination order.  If these allegations are accepted as true, as they must be at the demurrer stage... that would have allowed plaintiffs to work without a vaccination.  Thus, far from establishing the City’s undue hardship defense, the face of the complaint shows that the City could have reasonably accommodated plaintiffs’ beliefs without undue hardship. 

CBN reports on the decision.

EEOC Sues Over Refusal to Accommodate Muslim Applicant's Worship Schedule

On Sept. 30 the EEOC filed a suit under Title VII charging a Washington-state based staffing and recruiting agency with religious discrimination and retaliation against a Muslim job applicant. According to an Oct. 3 EEOC Release:

Logic Staffing invited the applicant to interview ... the day after receiving his online application. On the strength of his application and interview, the staffing supervisor started to explore available openings when the applicant, who is Muslim, disclosed a possible need for a longer mid-day break to attend Friday prayer.... Logic Staffing's supervisor ended the interview and noted that the applicant was not hired due to his schedule and need to attend Friday prayer....

“Title VII requires employers, employment agencies, and unions to make adjustments to the workplace environment to allow applicants and employees to practice their faith, absent undue hardship,” said Elizabeth Cannon, director of the EEOC’s Seattle Field Office. “Instead of exploring alternatives and contacting its business clients to determine if accommodation was possible, Logic Staffing turned away a promising candidate and violated the law."

Company Settles EEOC Suit for $110,000, Compensating Employee Whose Religious Objections to Vaccine Were Ignored

 A national furniture retailer, Hank's Furniture, has settled a Title VII religious discrimination lawsuit brought against it by the EEOC. Under a consent decree, Hank's will pay $110,000 in damages and will implement a written policy assuring broad accommodation of religious beliefs that do not impose an undue burden. According to the EEOC's press release:

... [A] former assistant manager at HFI’s Pensacola, Florida, location notified the company that her religious beliefs prevented her from receiving a COVID-19 vaccine. Rather than discuss the employee’s religious beliefs to determine the feasibility of an accommodation, management ignored accommodation requests then summarily denied the employee’s requests and attempted to dispute the validity of her sincerely-held religious beliefs.

EEOC Obtains Settlement for Failure to Accommodate Jewish Employee's Sabbath Observance

The EEOC today announced that two related automotive hauling and logistics companies have agreed to a $65,000 settlement (plus an injunction, reporting, monitoring and employee training requirements) to settle a Title VII suit charging them with religious and racial discrimination and retaliation.  The EEOC said in part in its press release:

According to the EEOC’s lawsuit, Wheeler subjected Charles R. Lynch, III, a Torah Observant employee at its Sheffield, Ohio, location to discrimination when they revoked his religious accommodation that would have allowed him to continue having Saturdays off to observe the Sabbath. The company also exposed Lynch, who is Israeli, to unlawful harassment that included likening him to a terrorist and mocking his religious beliefs.

Court Says States Lack Standing to Challenge EEOC's New PWFA Abortion-Accommodation Rule [CORRECTED]

In States of Tennessee et. al. v. EEOC, (ED AR, June 17, 2024), an Arkansas federal district court held that 17 states that are plaintiffs in the case lack standing to challenge an EEOC Final Rule implementing the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act.  At issue is the Rule's requirement that employers provide reasonable accommodation for employees' elective abortions. The court said in part:

[The states] press dual theories of injury -- sovereign harms and economic harms. The sovereign harms, the States say, are twofold: the rule will abridge their ability to regulate abortions and their interests in maintaining a pro-life message in dealing with state employees. The economic harms are the rule-related compliance costs the States say they will incur in response to potential enforcement....

The sovereign harms are not imminent because there is no credible threat of enforcement. ...

Even assuming an injury in fact, though, the States' sovereign-injury theory still fails for lack of causation and redressability. ...

Unlike in situations involving private employers, the EEOC cannot bring enforcement actions against state employers....  If an agreement isn't reached within thirty days after a charge is filed, the EEOC "shall take no further action and shall refer the case to" the Department of Justice"....

That leaves the alleged economic harms. The States don't claim any sunk costs. They only say that their compliance costs are imminent.. This economic-harm theory fails for two reasons.

First, the challenged costs-- those resulting only from rule-related compliance activities associated with illegal, elective abortions are neither concrete nor particularized. ...

Second, even assuming some concrete and particularized compliance costs related to illegal, elective abortions, these costs are not fairly traceable to any threat of enforcement....

Beyond the intense controversy surrounding abortion, there are no signs that this is a major questions case. Chevron's general rule applies.

CORRECTION: An earlier version of this post incorrectly said this was decided by a Tennessee federal district court. 

A Louisiana federal district court has just reached the opposite conclusion (see prior posting.) [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Court Upholds Firing of Nurse with Religious Objections to Flu Vaccine

In French v. Albany Medical Center, (ND NY, June 12, 2024), a New York federal district court upheld a hospital's firing of a nurse who refused for religious reasons to receive the flu vaccine. Plaintiff based her religious exemption claim on teachings of the "Israelite" religion which she adopted in 2018. Rejecting plaintiff's claim that the hospital violated Title VII by refusing to accommodate her religious beliefs, the court said in part:

[T]he Court concludes that Plaintiff's requested accommodation was not reasonable as it was a blanket exemption request which would have allowed her to continue interacting with staff and vulnerable patients while unvaccinated. This exemption would have caused an undue hardship on Defendant.

The court also rejected plaintiff's claims of disparate treatment and retaliation, saying in part:

Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that her religion was a motivating factor in Defendant's decision to suspend and terminate her.

Feds Sue Texas Correctional Authorities for Failing to Accommodate Employee's Religious Head Covering

The Justice Department today filed suit against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice alleging that it violated Title VII by failing to accommodate a clerical employee's religious practice of wearing a head covering pursuant to her Ifa faith. The complaint (full text) in United States v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, (SD TX, filed 5/3/2024), alleges in part:

34. Though Spears identified her belief in the Ifa faith and her religious practice of wearing a head covering, TDCJ was not satisfied that her religious beliefs were sincere or should be accommodated. 

35. Instead, when Spears turned in her accommodation form, Fisk informed her that TDCJ would further research her religion and its practices. Spears questioned whether it was a normal practice to research religions. Specifically, she asked whether research would be done for more mainstream religions. Fisk indicated that it was not TDCJ’s normal practice.

 36. On October 15, 2019, Fisk conducted an internet search of the Ifa religion and practices and faxed the search results along with Spears’s accommodation request to Terry Bailey for her consideration. 

37. Then, on October 16, 2019, TDCJ further questioned the sincerity of Spears’s faith when Bailey mailed a letter demanding documentation or a statement from a religious institution pointing to the specific Ifa belief or doctrine that supported the necessity of Spears’s head covering. The letter also stated that TDCJ would not take any further action to review Spears’s accommodation request until the additional information was submitted.

The Department of Justice issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Accommodating Teacher's Anti-Transgender Beliefs Created Undue Hardship for School Under Title VII

In Kluge v. Brownsburg Community School Corporation, (SD IN, April 30, 2024), an Indiana federal district court in a 46-page opinion that sets out extensive factual background information, dismissed an orchestra teacher's Title VII claim that the school had failed to reasonably accommodate his religious objections to referring to transgender students by their preferred names and pronouns. The school had initially permitted the teacher to refer to students by their last names only, but later withdrew that accommodation and forced the teacher's resignation. A primary issue in the case was whether continuing to allow a last-names-only accommodation would create an "undue hardship" for the school under the Supreme Court's definition of that term in its 2023 decision in Groff v. DeJoy. Finding that it would, the court said in part:

BCSC's business is "educating all students," which it achieves by "fostering a learning environment of respect and affirmation."...  Part of that is BCSC's mission to "afford[] dignity and empathy toward transgender students."...  Parents, medical professionals, administrators, and many students all agree that pursuing that mission would require transgender students to be addressed by their preferred names and pronouns....

Lest there be any doubt about disruption, Mr. Kluge himself believed that the Last Names Only Accommodation would result in disruption and indeed was encouraged by it.  He explained to Dr. Daghe that far from resigning, he was "encouraged all the more to stay." ...  After all, he believed, his "persecution" was "a sign that [his] faith as witnessed by using last-names-only . . . was being effective."...  Faced with Mr. Kluge's own statements—"pleading" with the school to avoid going down the "transgender path," seeking to discuss with students their "eternal destination," and hoping to stay because his "persecution" surrounding the Last Names Only Accommodation was being "effective"—complaints from others were hardly necessary.  While the Last Names Only Accommodation might have been intended as neutral, it ultimately was perceived as intentional....

As the Supreme Court held in Groff, undue hardship is to be viewed within the context of a particular business, not a particular employee.  The Court compares the cost to BCSC's mission, not Mr. Kluge's.  BCSC could either support its transgender students in pursuit of its mission and comply with the law, or accede to Mr. Kluge's accommodation and risk harm to students and the learning environment and/or substantial and disruptive litigation.... The law of Title VII does not require BCSC to continue an accommodation that actually resulted in substantial student harm, and an unreasonable risk of liability, each sharply contradicting the school's legally entitled mission to foster a supportive environment for all.  The Last Names Only Accommodation was an undue burden to BCSC as a matter of law.....

Arizona Governor Vetoes Bill That Would Have Required Transgender Individuals to Use Alternate Single Occupancy Showers in Public Schools

On April 23, Arizona Governor Katie Hobbs vetoed Arizona Senate bill 1182. (Full text of veto letter.) The bill, titled the "Arizona Accommodations for All Children Act" (full text) would have required public schools to provide single occupancy showers to transgender individuals who are unwilling to use multi-occupancy showers that correspond to their biological sex as determined at birth. In order to obtain the accommodation of a single occupancy shower, the individual would have been required to make a written request and to furnish satisfactory evidence of the person's sex. If that accommodation is refused, the person would have a cause of action against the public school. Conversely, any person who encounters a person of the opposite sex in a multi-occupancy shower room also has a cause of action against the school if a school employee or administrator gave the person permission to use the shower. In either case, the plaintiff could recover for psychological, emotional and physical harm.

Denial of Religious Exemption from Vaccine Mandate Did Not Violate Title VII or Constitution

In White v. University of Washington, (WD WA, March 22, 2024), a Washington federal district court rejected Title VII as well as constitutional challenges brought by a healthcare worker who was denied a religious exemption from Washington's Covid vaccine mandate. In discussing Plaintiff's Title VII claim of failure to reasonably accommodate, the court said in part:

With respect to COVID-19 in particular, guidance from the EEOC indicates that “increasing ‘the risk of the spread of COVID-19 to other employees or to the public’” is a ground for finding undue hardship on employers asked to grant religious exemptions to COVID-19 vaccination mandates....

 The Ninth Circuit also has found on a motion to dismiss that undue hardship is established as a matter of law where a religious accommodation would require an employer to violate state or federal law.

The court also rejected plaintiff's due process, equal protection and free exercise claims, saying in part:

Plaintiff has made no allegations regarding what her religious beliefs are, let alone how they were burdened by Defendants’ adherence to Proclamation 21-14.

4th Circuit: Inmate's Claim for Religious Diet Should Move Forward

In Pendleton v. Jividen, (4th Cir., March 20, 2024), the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals held that a West Virginia federal district court should not have dismissed a RLUIPA religious diet claim brought by an inmate who follows the Sufi Original Traditions of Islam. Those Traditions allow him to only eat fruit, vegetables and certain fish. The court said in part:

In 2014 ... prison officials introduced a new diet program for those with religious dietary restrictions. Under that program, a single “religious special diet” is served—one designed to meet the needs of all faiths by following the rules of the most diet-restrictive ones. With all forms of meat off the table, the diet uses soy as its primary protein source....

Although Pendleton’s religious beliefs do not forbid consumption of soy as such, the complaint alleges that Pendleton experiences vomiting, abdominal pain, constipation, and other digestive issues when he does so. And this, the complaint asserts, is of “religious significance” to Pendleton because his inability to properly digest soy renders such foods "Haram" for him....

Defendants insist that Pendleton could obtain a meat-free and soy-free diet by obtaining test results showing he has a medically significant allergy to soy. And, the defendants continue, because Pendleton has refused to submit to allergy testing ... he has not plausibly alleged a substantial burden on his religious practice. That argument fails too. Pendleton need not produce documentation of his alleged soy allergy to survive a motion to dismiss.... Even if Pendleton took an allergy test and that test was negative, it would not eliminate his religiously based objections to eating soy.  For that reason, Pendleton has plausibly alleged a substantial burden on his religious practices, and the district court erred in concluding otherwise.

Muslim Employee Recovers $70,000 From Employer Who Refused Grooming Rule Accommodation

The EEOC announced on Wednesday that it has entered a consent decree in its lawsuit against Blackwell Security Services, Inc.  The EEOC's lawsuit charged that the company violated Title VII by failing to give an exemption from its no-beard policy to a Muslim employee who worked as a concierge in Chicago, even though granting the accommodation would have imposed no cost and not created an operating burden on Blackwell.  According to the EEOC:

To avoid losing his job, the employee complied and shaved his beard, causing him significant distress....

Under the consent decree resolving the lawsuit, Blackwell will pay $70,000 in compensation to the now-former employee. Blackwell will also provide training to relevant management employees on federal laws prohibiting religious discrimination and will report any additional complaints of religious discrimination to the EEOC for the decree’s duration.

Court Rules On Class Action Certification of Claims by Religious Objectors to Covid Vaccine

 In Chavez v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District, (ND CA, Jan. 28,2024), a California federal district court refused to certify as a class action a suit on behalf of employees of the Transit District (BART) who were denied a religious exemption or accommodation from BART's Covid vaccine mandate. The court concluded that the disparate factual issues underlying the claims under Title VII and California's Fair Employment and Housing Act means that common issues of law or fact do not predominate. The court said in part:

Plaintiffs submitted nearly as many systems of belief and grounds for objection as they did applications. Whether or not any one request rests on a bona fide religious belief presents an individual inquiry that requires the consideration of evidence pertaining only to the response in question....

BART’s undue hardship showing—likely to be the dispositive issue in this action—also rests on individual factual issues....

It similarly concluded that common issues did not predominate in plaintiffs' First Amendment Free Exercise Claim, saying in part:

Plaintiffs cite myriad scripture and personal experiences, CDC VARS data and concerns regarding health consequences ... among others, as grounds for objection. Many identify non-vaccination as a core religious tenant, some characterize their decision as a “personal choice,” a number discuss medical concerns.... [T]he need to determine whether plaintiffs have met the bona fide religious belief threshold generates “an unmanageable variety of individual . . . factual issues,” and forecloses on class certification....

Finally, the court concluded that plaintiffs also failed to meet the requirement that a class action is the superior way to adjudicate the claims.

In UnifySCC v. Cody, (ND CA, Jan. 29, 2024), a different Northern District of California judge certified a class action (except as to damages) on behalf of 463 individuals who obtained a religious exemption from the Covid vaccine mandate of San Jose County but who, because they were in high risk roles, were placed on administrative leave until reassignments or transfers to lower risk positions became available.  The court ruled:

This Class is certified with respect to the following common questions regarding Defendants’ liability: 

1. Whether Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ right to free exercise and equal protection of the law by prioritizing medical exemptions over religious exemptions in high-risk settings; 

2. Whether Defendants’ Risk Tier System violated the Free Exercise Clause and Equal Protection Clause because it relegated Plaintiffs and the Class members to unpaid leave but allowed some unvaccinated or non-boosted employees to continue to work; 

3. Whether the County’s religious exemption and/or accommodation procedure was either non-neutral or not generally applicable such that it constitutes an individualized assessment ... and is thereby subject to strict scrutiny; 

4. Whether Defendants provided Individual Plaintiffs and the Class members with reasonable accommodation as required under FEHA and Title VII; and 

5. Whether Defendants violated the Establishment Clause by demonstrating hostility towards religion. 

The Class is NOT certified with respect to questions of damages.