Denial of Conditional Use Permit to Church Violated RLUIPA and 1st Amendment

In Anchor Stone Christian Church v. City of Santa Ana, (CD CA, April 7, 2025), a California federal district court issued a preliminary injunction allowing a church to operate and make renovations to an office building it had acquired. The city had denied a conditional use permit to the church. The court concluded that the denial violated RLUIPA's equal terms and substantial burden provisions, as well as the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment. The court said in part:

... [T]he City must do more than identify some similarly situated nonreligious assemblies that are treated as badly as religious assemblies—the City must show that it treats “every” similarly situated nonreligious assembly equally to religious assemblies....

In short, it appears unlikely that the City will meet its burden to establish that the Zoning Ordinance treats religious assembly on equal terms with similarly situated nonreligious assembly uses.... 

The Court concludes that, based upon the totality of the circumstances, Anchor Stone has met its burden to show that the City’s denial of its CUP application substantially burdened Anchor Stone’s religious exercise....

The City’s reasons for denying a CUP to Anchor Stone also appear particularly arbitrary in view of the City’s reasons for granting a CUP to Compass Bible Church....

The Planning Commission and the City Council refused to consider or apply RLUIPA in connection with Anchor Stone’s CUP application.  Multiple commissioners and councilmembers expressed “offense” at the mention of RLUIPA, while the City’s staff affirmed that it was the City’s “position” that RLUIPA was “outside the scope” of the CUP application process.  One councilmember regarded the mention of RLUIPA as a “smack in [his] face” and an attempt to “circumvent [Santa Ana’s] local laws.” Such comments from a government official fall far short of fulfilling the “First Amendment’s guarantee that our laws be applied in a manner that is neutral toward religion,”....

First Liberty issued a press release announcing the decision.

5th Circuit: Prison's Punishment for Inmate's Religious Observance Can Violate RLUIPA

In Johnson v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff Office, (5th Cir., March 25, 2025), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to a Louisiana federal district court a prisoner's lawsuit alleging violations of RLUIPA and the 1st Amendment. The district court had dismissed the suit at the initial screening stage. The court explained:

Pro se plaintiff and pretrial detainee Damien Johnson follows the Rastafarian religion and took a religious vow that prevents him from cutting his hair.  Adhering to that vow, Johnson refuses to cut his hair to comply with Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office’s (“JPSO”) policy.  As a consequence, he is not allowed to go into the yard, use the phone, or buy items from the commissary.  Instead, he alleges he is confined to an unsanitary unit infected with toxic mold....

Here, the district court concluded that Johnson failed to allege a substantial burden on his religious exercise because he “is in fact still exercising his vow to continue growing his hair.” But this conclusion has the problematic result of decreasing protection for the staunchest religious observers who have to face severe punishment to continue exercising their religion.  Indeed, the district court is wrong—an individual can face a “substantial burden” on religious exercise based upon limitations and punishments in the prison while continuing to exercise their religion....

Supreme Court Denies Execution Stay to Buddhist Who Says His RLUIPA Rights Will Be Violated

 In a 5-4 decision in Hoffman v. Westcott, (Sup. Ct., March 18, 2025), the U.S. Supreme Court refused to grant a stay of execution to a Buddhist inmate who contended that Louisiana's method of execution would violate his free exercise rights under RLUIPA. Justices Sotomayor, Kagan and Jackson dissented from the denial without filing opinions. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

The State of Louisiana plans to execute Jessie Hoffman tonight. Mr. Hoffman is a Buddhist. And he argues that the State’s chosen method of execution—nitrogen hypoxia—violates his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000.... Nitrogen hypoxia will, he says, substantially burden his religious exercise by interfering with his meditative breathing as he dies....  No one has questioned the sincerity of Mr. Hoffman’s religious beliefs. Yet the district court rejected his RLUIPA claim anyway based on its own “find[ing]” about the kind of breathing Mr. Hoffman’s faith requires.... That finding contravened the fundamental principle that courts have “no license to declare . . . whether an adherent has ‘correctly perceived’ the commands of his religion.” 

AP reports on the Court's action.

RLUIPA and Free Exercise Claims Rejected in Suit by Native American Who Held Religious Objections to Blood Alcohol Test

In Shash v. City of Pueblo, (D CO, March 14, 2025), plaintiff who was a leader in the southern Colorado Native American Community Church of Aztlan brought a variety of claims against the city, state police and other state agencies growing out of his arrest and DUI charges brought against him after an auto accident. Among the claims were alleged violations of plaintiff's free exercise rights under RLUIPA and the federal and state constitutions. According to the court:

Plaintiffs allege that Trooper Chavez denied Mr. Shash the opportunity to take a breath test and effectively placed Mr. Shash in a position where he had to submit to a blood test or be charged with DUI....  Plaintiffs argue that this constitutes a substantial burden on Mr. Shash’s First Amendment right to free exercise of his religious beliefs, which prohibit blood draws outside a ceremonial context. 

The court dismissed plaintiff's RLUIPA claim, saying in part:

RLUIPA provides that “[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution.”...

Because Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Shash was never taken to jail, ... the Parties dispute whether Mr. Shash was ever “confined to an institution” for RLUIPA  purposes....  [W]hile Mr. Shash raises arguments relevant to a finding that he was in “pretrial detention,”..., he omits any discussion of whether his time in the Trooper Defendants’ custody was spent in a “facility.”  The Court thus agrees with Defendants that Mr. Shash was never “residing in or confined to” a qualifying institution.

The court dismissed plaintiff's 1st Amendment free exercise claim on qualified immunity grounds, saying in part:

While Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Shash made an “inquiry” regarding his right to decline a blood test that was “based on his right to religious exercise,” there is no allegation that Mr. Shash disclosed his religious beliefs to any Defendant, nor that Trooper Chavez was ever aware of Mr. Shash’s religious beliefs.... In other words, Plaintiffs fail to allege that Trooper Chavez purposefully imposed a substantial burden on Mr. Shash’s free-exercise rights....  Because Plaintiffs have not identified a clearly established First Amendment right implicated by Trooper Chavez’s conduct, Trooper Chavez is entitled to qualified immunity.

The court refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state free exercise claim because it poses a novel question of the degree of scienter required for a violation of the state's free exercise protections in a suit against state officials. Colorado has not adopted a qualified immunity defense.

8th Circuit: Damages Available Under RLUIPA When Defendant Received Federal Funds

In Barnett v. Short, (8th Cir., Feb. 28. 2025), the U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part the dismissal of a suit brought by a former inmate who alleges that while in administrative segregation in the Jefferson, Missouri County jail he was denied access to a Bible. The court held that damages are available in suits under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, at least where the defendant does not enjoy sovereign immunity, saying in part:

Though damages against a defendant that enjoys sovereign immunity may not be "suitable" or "proper," damages against those that don't are the norm....

We therefore conclude that the district court erred in dismissing Barnett's RLUIPA claim against the county.

The court however affirmed the dismissal of the suit against the jail administrator in her individual capacity, saying in part: 

RLUIPA permits claims against a "government," see 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–2(a), and it defines "government" to include county officials and "any other person acting under color of State law." ... That language permits suits against individual defendants in both their official and individual capacities....

But we conclude that Congress's authorization of suits against non-recipients of federal money in their individual capacities exceeds its spending power. That's because "the legitimacy of Congress' power to enact Spending Clause legislation rests not on its sovereign authority to enact binding laws, but on whether the recipient voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of that 'contract.'"...

The court also reversed the dismissal of plaintiff's free exercise claim against the jail administrator, but affirmed dismissal of that claim against the county because " Short did not possess the authority needed to render the county liable for her decision."

Judge Loken dissented in part, saying that he would affirm the decision to dismiss the free exercise claim against the jail administrator, agreeing with the trial court that the deprivation of the Bible did not impose a substantial burden on plaintiff's religious exercise.

Designation of Catholic Church as Historic Structure Is Enjoined

In Zubik v. City of Pittsburgh, (WD PA, Feb. 11, 2025), a Pennsylvania federal district court enjoined the city of Pittsburgh from designating a closed Catholic church building that is in substantial disrepair as a historic structure. When a building is nominated for historic designation, its owners are prohibited from making any exterior alterations to the building. The court held that the nomination of the building by a city resident violated the city's Historic Designation Ordinance that requires the nomination of a religious structure "only be made by the owner(s) of record of the religious structure."

The court also concluded that the city's actions substantially burdened use of the church property for religious exercise in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. The court said in part:

The City effectively supplanted the Diocese’s control over the external religious ornamentation and symbols affixed to the Church Building.  By doing so, the City hindered, restricted, or encumbered the Diocese’s religious use of its stained-glass windows and other sacred fixtures of the Church Building.  Contrary to the City’s argument, these encumbrances impose more than a “minimal effect of limiting how the Diocese could alter the street facing façade” of the Church Building....

...[O]n this record there is no compelling government interest in the City’s exercise of control over the Church Building, nor is the City’s pursuit of historic designation of the Church Building the least restrictive means of achieving its stated interests.

Requirement for Church to Obtain Permit Before Hosting Homeless Encampment Is Upheld

In Miller v. City of Burien, (WD WA, Feb. 3, 2025), a Washington federal district court dismissed a suit brought by a Methodist church challenging the city's requirement that the church apply for and obtain a temporary use permit before it could host a homeless encampment on its property. The court rejected plaintiffs' claims that requiring a permit violated its rights under RLUIPA as well as its free speech and free exercise rights under the 1st Amendment. The court said in part:

The parties concede that caring for unhoused individuals is an “exercise of religion” for purposes of RLUIPA. However, the parties dispute whether requiring the Church to apply for a temporary use permit before it is allowed to host a homeless encampment constitutes “imposing a ‘substantial burden’ on religious exercise” under the statute. It is important to note that this is not a denial of application case; rather, the question here is whether the City can require the Church to submit a permit application.... 

Here, the Church did not apply for a permit, the City did not deny the permit application, and the City did not deny the Church’s the right to host a homeless encampment—indeed, the City supported the Church’s endeavor. However, the City did require that the Church fill out a simple two-page application so that the City could ensure that the health and safety of the neighborhood residents, as well as the encampment occupants, was accounted for. Such minimum inconvenience does not constitute a substantial burden on the Church for purposes of RLUIPA. ...

 ... [T]he Church has failed to plausibly allege that the challenged regulation impacts speech. As such, its prior restraint facial challenge fails as a matter of law and must be dismissed....

... [Z]oning laws that permit some individualized assessment for variances remain “generally applicable” so long as the laws are motivated by secular purposes and impact equally all landowners seeking the variances. That, of course, is the case here. No landowner—secular or religious—is permitted to host a homeless encampment within a multi-family zone without a permit.... Nor has the Church alleged that Burien’s regulatory scheme is religiously motivated.... Therefore, because the Church has failed to plausibly allege that the challenged regulatory scheme was not neutral and not generally applicable, it has failed to state a free exercise claim under the First Amendment.

Justice Department Reaches Settlement with Township Over Sewage Restrictions on Amish Residents

 In a press release yesterday the Justice Department announced that it has reached a settlement agreement (full text of proposed Consent Order) with Sugar Grove, Pennsylvania Township and its Sewage Authority in a RLUIPA lawsuit. The suit claims that defendants have burdened the religious exercise of Old Order Amish residents by requiring that they connect to the municipal sewage system and by barring privies on private property intended for permanent residences. According to the press release:

As part of the consent order, the Township and SUGASA will exempt certain Old Order Amish households from mandatory connection to the municipal sewage system, permit Old Order Amish residents to use privies on their private properties, and forgive any outstanding liens, fines, or other monetary penalties against Old Order Amish households for prior noncompliance with the two ordinances. The consent order also requires the Township and SUGASA to train its officials and employees on RLUIPA’s provisions, establish a procedure for receiving and resolving RLUIPA complaints, and provide reports to the United States.

The consent order must still be approved by the court.

Court Denies Preliminary Injunction Against Moratorium Delaying Building of Mosque

In Zikar Holdings, LLC v. Ruhland, (D MN, Dec. 26, 2024), a Minnesota federal district court refused to issue a preliminary injunction to enjoin the city of Lino Lakes from enforcing a one-year moratorium on development of an area of the city where plaintiffs had proposed to build a housing development that included a mosque. Plaintiffs contended that the moratorium was motivated by discriminatory intent in violation of the free exercise clause, RLUIPA and the Fair Housing Act. The court said in part:

Here, Plaintiffs are likely to show that the Moratorium might have delayed Plaintiffs’ ability to build a place of worship and potential future residences near it in the northwest corner of Lino Lakes.  The language of the Moratorium, however, places no permanent restrictions on Plaintiff’s ability to build anything and, perhaps more importantly, it places no restriction on Plaintiff’s ability to seek development of a mosque elsewhere in the City or to worship elsewhere in the City.  Plaintiffs have therefore not shown that they are likely to prove the Moratorium was a “substantial burden” on their ability to practice Islam....

On this evidence, the Court believes a reasonable juror could infer that the Moratorium was pretextual.  However, the evidence presented at this stage, prior to discovery, is not so strong that it satisfies the heightened Rounds standard.  The motives and beliefs of the council members, as well as the basis for the timing of the Moratorium decision remain unknown at this stage, and absent additional circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent, a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that supporting the Moratorium reflected the importance of complying with the 2040 Plan and prudent infrastructure and resource planning.  Thus, the Court concludes that this factor is neutral, weighing neither in favor of nor against granting Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion.....

Yeshiva Denied Preliminary Injunction Against Zoning Enforcement

In Anash, Inc., d/b/a Wyoming Valley Yeshiva v. Borough of Kingston, (MD PA, Dec. 19, 2024), a Pennsylvania federal district court refused to grant a preliminary injunction to an Orthodox Jewish Yeshiva whose property was condemned because it was being used for a school and dormitory in violation of zoning ordinances. The court concluded that plaintiff was not suffering irreparable harm, and that it was not likely that plaintiff would succeed on the merits of its challenge to the relevant zoning ordinance. The court said in part:

Plaintiffs also provide no support for their assertion that Rabbi Hellinger’s inability to access the Properties impairs his religious freedom, ability to act as a religious leader to others, or others’ freedoms. Defendants are not refusing to allow Rabbi Hellinger to practice his religion in any manner or gather with members of his congregation in any location other than the Properties.... Plaintiffs concede that they have been able to secure temporary alternative locations to gather to study Torah and engage in religious activities.... While Plaintiffs testified that the temporary or alternative locations do not allow for the same level of participation or consistency, the Court does not find that such imperfections show “irreparable harm.”...

Importantly, Plaintiffs have refused to engage in any sort of efforts to compromise or come to a resolution with the Borough....

The parties agree that the seminal issue for Plaintiffs’ religious discrimination claims, asserted under RLUIPA, the First Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause, all require this Court to determine if Plaintiffs can show evidence that the Zoning Ordinance restricts their freedom of religion in some way, that Defendants’ actions were somehow motivated by animus, or that Plaintiffs were treated differently than similarly situated individuals based upon their religion.... Plaintiffs have not established any of these scenarios....

Plaintiffs can and have practiced their religion in alternative locations and may, but have not, apply for a variance to use the Properties as a school, dormitory, or house of worship.... There is no convincing evidence that Plaintiffs’ freedom of religion is legitimately burdened. Further, even if they had shown such evidence, the Zoning Ordinance is the least restrictive manner of furthering a compelling government regulatory interest in health and safety,... 

Justice Department Sues Georgia City for Violating RLUIPA

On Monday, the Justice Department filed a lawsuit in a Georgia federal district court against the city of Brunswick, Georgia, alleging that the city violated RLUIPA by attempting to shut down The Well, a hospitality and religious resource center for homeless individuals. The complaint (full text) in United States v. City of Brunswick, Georgia, (SD GA, filed 12/16/2024), alleges in part:

2. Through its campaign to shut down The Well, including a mandatory closure order and a nuisance lawsuit, Brunswick imposed a substantial burden on the religious exercise of FaithWorks, and of The Well’s staff and leadership, without a compelling interest and without using the least restrictive means of achieving that interest, in violation of RLUIPA....

52. Operating The Well is an expression of faith that is substantially burdened by the City’s efforts to permanently close The Well. FaithWorks, which runs The Well, is an extension of the Methodist Church, and providing basic services to the poor and unhoused individuals are cornerstones of FaithWorks’ religious practice. FaithWorks and The Well are led by Reverend Culpepper and his staff of Christian ministers. And at The Well, staff members offer the opportunity for prayer and religious study to those who are interested....

57. Even if a compelling interest was implicated, the City cannot show that shutting down The Well or forcing FaithWorks to adopt new religious leadership is the least restrictive means of achieving the City’s purported interest. The City cannot show that shutting down The Well is necessary to protect safety, particularly when The Well has already adopted procedures that have addressed the City’s purported safety concerns, and has successfully operated under those procedures for over a year.

The Department of Justice issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Food Ministry Can Move Ahead with RLUIPA and Free Exercise Claims Against City

In Gethsemani Baptist Church v. City of San Luis, (D AZ, Nov. 22, 2024), an Arizona federal district court refused to dismiss RLUIPA, 1st Amendment and state law claims brought against the city by a church that operates a Food Ministry. When the city adopted its current zoning code in 2012, it considered the Ministry a permitted pre-existing non-conforming use. In 2023, however, the city alleged that the nature of the Ministry's activities had changed so that it could no longer be considered a legal pre-existing non-conforming use in a residential zone. The Church sued claiming enforcement placed a substantial burden on its exercise of religion. The city argued in part that the Church needed to apply for a conditional use permit and could sue only if and when that was denied.  The court rejected the city's motion to dismiss for lack of ripeness. It also concluded that the Church had adequately stated a claim that RLUIPA applies because the city made an individualized assessment of the use of the property. The court refused to dismiss the Church's 1st Amendment claim, finding that it had pled sufficient facts to establish a plausible entitlement to relief. Finally, it refused to dismiss plaintiff's claims brought under the Arizona Free Exercise of Religion Act.

9th Circuit Reinstates Claim of Christian-Israelite Inmate Who Was Refused Passover Diet

In Fuqua v. Raak, (9th Cir., Nov. 1, 2024), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals partially reversed an Arizona federal district court's dismissal of a suit by Michael Fuqua, a Christian-Israelite (Christian Identity) state prison inmate who was refused Passover dietary meals. The prison chaplain and other prison officials denied Fuqua's request for a Kosher for Passover diet on the ground that Fuqua's belief that Christian-Israelites were descended from the Tribes of Israel was wrong.  Officials said that supporting materials furnished by Fuqua suggested that he only needed to observe Passover with a memorial service using flatbread and grape juice. In reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on Fuqua's free exercise and equal protection claims, the court said in part:

... [W]e conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could find that Fuqua was denied his requested dietary accommodation, not based on his failure to follow a neutral and valid procedural rule for requesting accommodations, but rather based on [Chaplain] Lind’s own theological assessment of the correctness and internal doctrinal consistency of Fuqua’s belief system.

The court however affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for defendants on Fuqua's RLUIPA claim, saying in part:

that the Spending Clause does not allow Congress to impose individual damages liability on state or local officials who are not themselves the recipients of federal funds.

In Fuqua v. Ryan, (9th Cir., Nov. 1, 2024) (unpublished), the 9th Circuit upheld the dismissal of Fuqua's free exercise claims against two correctional officers because there was no evidence that they were personally involved in the challenged actions. It upheld dismissal of claims against the kitchen manager on qualified immunity grounds. It also upheld the trial court's refusal to allow Fuqua to read from his Bible on the witness stand, saying in part:

The district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that, while Fuqua could explain the sincerity of his religious beliefs by reference to relevant scriptural passages, he did not need to have a physical Bible with him on the stand or to read the relevant passages verbatim.

Tennesse County Sued by Woman Who Was Required to Remove Hijab for Booking Photo

Suit was filed this week in a Tennessee federal district court by a Muslim woman who was required by Knox County, Tennessee Sheriff's Office employees to remove her hijab for a booking photo. Plaintiff was arrested along with others who were participating in a pro-Palestinian demonstration on the University of Tennessee campus. The photo was subsequently posted on the Sheriff Office's public website in violation of Sheriff's Office policy. The complaint (full text) in Solliz v. Knox County, Tennessee, (ED TN, filed 10/7/2024), alleges in part:

The Defendants’ mistreatment of Mrs. Soliz and their disrespect for her religious rights has scarred her.  The Defendants’ misbehavior was also illegal.  The federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ... and... Tennessee’s Preservation of Religious Freedom Act—flatly prohibited the Defendants from burdening Mrs. Soliz’s free exercise of her religion in the manner they did.

Longview News-Journal reports on the lawsuit.

Muslim Woman Can Move Ahead on Some Challenges to Sheriff's Booking Photo Policy

In Hague v. Kent County, (WD MI, Sept. 9, 2024), plaintiff, a Muslim woman, challenged the Kent County, Michigan, Sheriff Office's policy on booking photos for detainees wearing a religious head covering. Two photos were taken, one with the head covering and one without.  Only the one with the head covering is released to the public. The other was uploaded to the Michigan State Police data base. Multiple officers could be present when the photos were taken. The court held that the photo policy imposed a substantial burden on plaintiff's religious exercise in violation of RLUPA. but that money damages are not available for RLUIPA violations. Declaratory or injunctive relief is available. It also allowed plaintiff to move forward with her 1st Amendment free exercise claim, including for damages, against the county and the sheriff's office. The sheriff, though, has qualified immunity as to damage claims under the 1st Amendment.

6th Circuit: Permit Requirement Did Not Substantially Burden Church

 In Dad's Place of Bryan, Ohio v. City of Bryan, Ohio, (6th Cir., Sept. 5, 2024), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals refused to enter a preliminary injunction pending appeal to prevent the city from enforcing requirements that the church obtain a permit or variance before people may sleep on the first floor of the church building. Rejecting plaintiff's RLUIPA argument, the court said in part:

Dad's Place fails to show that it will likely succeed on establishing that the City's zoning laws substantially burden its religious exercise.... [T]he burdens alleged by Dad's Place are self-imposed.... The City provides a process by which entities in the commercial district can seek a variance or conditional use permit ("CUP") allowing them to operate as residential facilities.... Yet, despite being opened in 2018, Dad's Place has never applied to the City for a CUP or variance.... RLUIPA does not entitle Dad's Place to engage in unauthorized uses without ever seeking a permit or variance to do so....

Additionally, Dad's Place has not shown that it lacks adequate alternatives. For example, it can use a second floor as a residential facility or open a second facility. It asserts that such alternatives "transform the nature of the Church's ministry," but it gives no explanation as to why its ministry requires people to sleep on the ground floor of the building as opposed to the second floor, or why its ministry would be less effective if people slept in a different building that was properly zoned for residential use....

The court also rejected plaintiff's free exercise claim.

RLUIPA Success Unlikely on Challenge to Denial of Special Use Permit for Jewish Retreat Center

In Fresh Start Center v. Township of Grosse Ile, (ED MI, Sept. 5, 2024), a Michigan federal district court refused to grant a preliminary injunction in a RLUIPA lawsuit challenging the denial of a variance and a special land use permit to the Fresh Start Center to operate a religious retreat center in an area zoned residential. The Center holds retreats twice a month for Orthodox Jews who have experienced a loss of faith because of trauma. Each retreat involves 4 to 5 participants from all over the world and up to 4 other staff. The court said in part:

Because Plaintiff has not demonstrated a strong likelihood of establishing a substantial burden on the Center’s religious exercise, the Court need not determine whether that substantial burden was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest....  Here, the Center has not shown there are no feasible alternate locations within the Township and outside the Township where the Center can conduct its retreats.  The only burden the Center has demonstrated is disappointment that it cannot conduct its retreats at the Property.  The present record reveals that being unable to conduct its retreats at a desired location does not rise to the level of a substantial burden.  While the Center may ultimately succeed on the merits once the record is more fully developed, at this juncture it has not shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits of its substantial burden RLUIPA claim....

The court also concluded that plaintiff is unlikely to prevail on a claim that the denial violated the equal terms provision of RLUIPA.

6th Circuit Reverses Dismissal of Muslim Inmate's Religious Accommodation Complaints

 In Mustin v. Wainwright, (6th Cir., Aug. 27, 2024), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of free exercise, RLUIPA, equal protection and certain retaliation claims brought by a Muslim inmate who objected to the manner in which space was made for religious services and objected to inadequate Ramadan meals.  The court said in part:

Mustin contends that defendants ... substantially burdened his ability to attend Jummah and Taleem by (1) “constantly” moving Jummah and Taleem to small rooms that could safely accommodate only half of the attendees, and (2) inconsistently allowing inmates to attend Taleem services and sending inmates back to their cells to accommodate other religious events.... Mustin properly alleged that defendants ... substantially burdened Mustin’s ability to safely attend Jummah and Taleem by forcing him to put his personal safety at risk in order to fulfill his religious obligations by attending services in a room packed with roughly twice the number of people it can safely house....

At this early stage, Mustin has alleged facts sufficient to support an inference that defendants’ provision of expired, offending, and otherwise nutritionally insufficient meals during Ramadan pressured him to violate his religious beliefs or face potential malnutrition.  Mustin alleges that he was served raw food and expired drinks in his breakfast bags, and that his dinner bags often contained pork-based main courses, which Muslims are forbidden from eating.... Mustin plausibly alleged that the non-expired and non-pork-based foods he received during Ramadan were insufficient in quantity and nutrition quality to meet his nutritional needs.

Anti-Injunction Act Precludes RLUIPA Claim, But Church's Constitutional Claims Move Ahead

 In Resurrection House Ministries, Inc. v. City of Brunswick, (SD GA, Aug. 23, 2024), a Georgia federal district court held that the federal Anti-Injunction Act required dismissal of a RLUIPA lawsuit brought by a Ministry against which the city had filed a nuisance action.  The ministry had attempted to open a shelter for the homeless, to which the city objected. However, the court permitted the Ministry to move ahead with its 1st, 4th, 5th and 14th Amendment claims against the city, concluding that the Younger abstention doctrine did not apply. It concluded that plaintiff had adequately alleged that the nuisance action had been brought against it in bad faith, saying in part:

RHM alleges providing a shelter to needy individuals is a tenet of its Christian religion and, therefore, institution of the temporary emergency shelter is a practice of such religion. And practice of RHM’s religion is constitutionally protected by the Free Exercise Clause.... Therefore, RHM has satisfied its burden under the first prong of the Court’s analysis because it has sufficiently alleged that “the conduct allegedly retaliated against or sought to be deterred was constitutionally protected.”...  

The Court also finds that RHM’s allegations are sufficient to set forth that Defendants’ institution of the Nuisance Proceedings “was motivated at least in part by a purpose to retaliate for or to deter that conduct.”

Requiring Conditional Use Permit Is Not Substantial Burden Under RLUIPA

In Athey Creek Christian Fellowship v. Clackamas County, (D OR, July 30, 2024), an Oregon federal district court dismissed a RLUIPA challenge to the denial of a Conditional Use Permit for construction of the second phase of a church building. The court said in part: 

... [P]laintiff filed this suit in November of 2022, alleging that the zoning ordinance that required churches to apply for a conditional use permit and did not allow churches as a primary use is facially invalid under the RLUIPA, and that the County violated plaintiff’s rights under the RLUIPA, the First Amendment, and the Oregon Constitution by not allowing plaintiff to build phase 2 of the project and forcing plaintiff to re-apply for a new or modified conditional use permit. 

The purported burden here then includes the County’s conclusion that the 2006 CUP has expired, and the County’s resulting insistence that plaintiff must now apply to build phase 2 under the new “primary use” .... Neither one of these carries the traditional hallmarks of a substantial burden under the RLUIPA....

Notably, the record in case is missing a common, even pervasive, attribute in those cases where the plaintiffs succeeded on a substantial burden claim, namely that the relevant zoning authority displayed some outward hostility toward or pretextual decision-making about the plaintiffs’ proposed religious use....

... [P]laintiff has not shown why seeking an extension of the 2006 CUP or timely obtaining the relevant building permits for phase 2 were a substantial burden to its religious exercise....

The same reasoning applies to the alleged burden that resulted from the County’s insistence now that plaintiff must now re-apply as a primary use. It is not a substantial burden to file an application for a proposed land use.