Broad Compelled Discussion of Abortion with Patients Violates Doctors' Free Speech Rights

In Schroeder v. Treto, (ND IL, April 4, 2025), an Illinois federal district court held that one amendment to the state's Health Care right of Conscience Act violates free speech protections but upheld another provision.  The provision struck down requires pregnancy care centers and doctors who have religious objections to abortions to inform pregnant patients of the risks and benefits of childbirth and abortion in order to claim a shield from liability. The court held that the provision compels speech in violation of the First Amendment. The court said in part:

Section 6.1(1) demands a wide ranging, hypothetical conversation unrelated to any procedure or other medical conduct.  Indeed, Section 6.1(1) requires a wide-ranging conversation that might be completely divorced from the reality of the situation; for example, the thrilled patient who is not reasonably likely to encounter medical difficulties because of the pregnancy.  What’s more, that compelled speech isn’t necessary to further future conduct....

... Under strict scrutiny, the State carries the burden of establishing the provision is narrowly tailored; it falls far short in this case.  So, Section 6.1(3) unconstitutionally compels speech, and therefore the State can’t demand such speech in exchange for a liability shield.

The court, however, upheld another provision that requires as a condition of claiming a shield from liability, that physicians and clinics, if requested by the patient, transfer or refer them or furnish a list of other providers to them who offer abortion services, saying in part:

This provision narrowly applies when a patient expressly asks a medical provider for information regarding potential abortion providers.  Stated differently, Section 6.1(3) contains an explicit and mandatory trigger that is directly linked to the action.  And even then, the provider need only comply if he intends to use the HCRCA as an affirmative defense.

From this narrow and purposeful drafting, the Court deduces that Section 6.1(3) doesn’t target speech...

The court found that this provision also does not violate providers' free exercise rights, saying in part: 

Two providers—one a conscientious objector and the other secular—both fail to provide a woman with requested information about abortion providers.  The conscientious objector refuses because of his sincerely held beliefs.  The secular provider doesn’t provide the requested information because he’s too busy.  Both patients sue.  Before the HCRCA, both suits could’ve gone forward, requiring the plaintiff in both cases to show that the health care providers fell below the standard of care. After the HCRCA’s enactment, the conscientious objector—but not the secular provider—is wholly protected, regardless of whether the provider’s actions fell below the standard of care.     

Along comes Public Act 99-690—partially restoring the pre-HCRCA universe. Now, as before, all health care providers are amenable to suit for failure to refer, transfer, or provide written information about potential abortion providers.  Relative to each other, the secular provider isn’t in any better position than before the HCRCA and the conscientious objector isn’t any worse for the wear.  

As this hypothetical shows, the latest Amendments to the HCRCA don’t impose additional burdens on conscientious objectors because of their beliefs....

Christian Post reports on the decision.

AG May Not Threaten Prosecution of Those Who Assist Women Seeking Out-of-State Abortions

In Yellowhammer Fund v. Attorney General of Alabama, (MD AL, March 31, 2025), an Alabama federal district court in a 131-page opinion issued a declaratory judgment holding unconstitutional the Alabama Attorney General's threat to prosecute those who assist women seeking to travel out-of-state to obtain a legal abortion.  The court found that the threat violated both the right to interstate travel and free expression rights.  The court said in part:

The right to travel includes both the right to move physically between two States and to do what is legal in the destination State.  The Supreme Court has held that States cannot punish their residents for traveling to another State and engaging in conduct that is lawful there....

This principle extends to people who enter a State to procure medical services, including abortions....

If a State cannot outright prohibit the plaintiffs’ clients from traveling to receive lawful out-of-state abortions, it cannot accomplish the same end indirectly by prosecuting those who assist them. ...

The Attorney General’s threatened enforcement of Alabama’s criminal laws imposes a content- and viewpoint-based restriction on speech.  It restricts information and discussion about a specific subject--abortion-- to forbid encouraging a specific viewpoint-- access to a legal out-of-state abortion....

... Yellowhammer Fund’s act of pledging and providing funds on behalf of pregnant Alabamians who seek a legal abortion outside Alabama is expressive conduct, and, therefore, subject to First Amendment protection....

It is one thing for Alabama to outlaw by statute what happens in its own backyard.  It is another thing for the State to enforce its values and laws, as chosen by the Attorney General, outside its boundaries by punishing its citizens and others who help individuals travel to another State to engage in conduct that is lawful there.... For example, the Alabama Attorney General would have within his reach the authority to prosecute Alabamians planning a Las Vegas bachelor party, complete with casinos and gambling, since casino-style gambling is outlawed in Alabama....  As the adage goes, be careful what you pray for. 

AP reports on the decision. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Parents Lack Standing to Challenge School District's Transgender Policy

In Short v. New Jersey Department of Education, (D NJ, March 28, 2025), a New Jersey federal district court dismissed a suit by two parents and a third parent who intervened in the lawsuit who object to the transgender policy of their children's high schools. The policy, adopted by the board of education, calls for high schools to follow students' requests regarding their names and pronouns, without necessarily notifying parents. The court concluded that the policy applied to the schools, not to students or parents, so that plaintiffs lacked standing to obtain a declaratory judgment or injunction against the policy. The Intervenor parent particularly focused on free exercise issues, as set out by the court:

Count One of the intervenor complaint asserts equal-protection violations under the Fourteenth Amendments of the United States and New Jersey Constitutions.... Maldonado alleges that the Cherry Hill policy unnecessarily seeks to prevent discrimination against transgender students at the expense of students’ religious beliefs.... Cherry Hill Defendants cannot provide an exceedingly persuasive justification for unequal treatment of students and parents whose religious beliefs are contrary to the policy’s definition of gender.... 

Counts Two, Three, and Four claim violation of free speech and freedom of religion under the First Amendments of the United States and New Jersey Constitutions.... The policy favors speech based on views and ideas, according to Maldonado, and burdens parents’ and students’ free-speech rights by requiring affirmance of its definition of gender.... The intervenor complaint adds that the policy violates students’ and parents’ freedom to hold sincerely held Christian beliefs premised on a biblical worldview by forcing them to affirm that there are more than two genders or that gender may be based on one’s identity.... The policy seeks to compel affirmation of views repugnant to Christian beliefs and its stated goals may be achieved without forcing parents and students to alter or otherwise abandon their religious beliefs.... The policy does not provide for an excusal or opt-out, stressing one moral interpretation over others, favoring a secular view over a religious one, and discarding other views on gender identity as prohibited, worthy of ridicule, bigoted, or the like.... Count Four alleges failure to accommodate religious beliefs and practices....

The Cherry Hill policy implicates complex, sensitive issues that students will no doubt take from the classroom to the dinner table. Ensuing thoughts and conversations may touch upon family, faith, sexuality, and a host of other important topics. I accept Maldonado’s stated concerns as genuine expressions of her faith and related beliefs. However, without the allegedly offending provisions applying to her or her children, her mere perception of harm is insufficient to confer standing....

Covid Era Mask Mandate Did Not Violate Free Exercise

In Robol v. City of Columbus, (OH App., March 20, 2025), an Ohio state appellate court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's claims that the city infringed his free exercise rights when during the Covid pandemic it required individuals to wear a mask in public spaces.  The court said in part:

Ordinance 1643-2020, the City’s mask ordinance, required all persons to wear a mask in public spaces.  The ordinance did not regulate, or even mention, any religious activity, religious creed, or religious affiliation.  Thus, the face mask policies Mr. Robol challenges are both neutral and generally applicable....

Despite the general applicability and neutrality of the mask ordinance, Mr. Robol nonetheless asserts the City violated his rights under the Free Exercise Clause because the ordinance violated his Christian beliefs, forced him to worship a false god, and had the effect of mocking the tenets of his faith.  Though we do not question the sincerity of Mr. Robol’s interpretation of his religion, we are mindful that a government action is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally burdens religious practices.

Mr. Robol also brought a religious exercise claim under 42 U.S.C. 2000bb, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act....

Not every imposition on religious exercise is a substantial burden....

Without doubting the sincerity of Mr. Robol’s belief that wearing a face mask violates his religious beliefs, we note that Mr. Robol does not allege, much less demonstrate through Civ.R. 56 evidence, that the face mask policies imposed any more than a mere inconvenience to his religious beliefs.....

Mr. Robol argues the City’s face mask requirement violated his freedom of speech and expression because the choice not to wear a face mask is a form of expressing his opposition to the City’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.  The City’s mask ordinance is content-neutral, and nothing in the terms of the ordinance suggests the purpose is to regulate speech.  And we agree with appellees the face mask policy promotes an important governmental interest in controlling the spread of COVID-19 that is unrelated to the suppression of speech.....

Most Challenges to Law Protecting Access to Abortion Clinics Are Rejected; One Section Violates 1st and 14th Amendments

In Hulinsky v. County of Westchester, (SD NY, March 14,2025), two women who have engaged in sidewalk counseling at abortion clinics challenged a Westchester County, New York, law that was designed to assure safe access to reproductive health care facilities. The court described the challenged legislation:

Sections 425.31(a) prohibits forms of “physically obstructing or blocking” that amount to interfering with and/or intimidating persons obtaining access at a reproductive health care facility. Sections 425.31(e) and (f) prohibit interfering with and/or intimidating persons obtaining access at a reproductive health care facility “[b]y force or threat of force, or by physically obstructing or blocking[.]” Section 425.31(c) prohibits “knowingly follow[ing] and harass[ing] another person within twenty-five (25) feet of” a “reproductive health care facility.” Section 425.31(h) prohibits “knowingly interfer[ing] with the operation of a reproductive health care facility.”

A New York federal district court found that Sec. 425.31(h) "burden[s] substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests." It also concluded that the section "is vague because it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct is prohibited." However, the court dismissed plaintiffs' free exercise challenge to the section as well as their free speech and free exercise challenges to other parts of the law. 

Syria Gets New Interim Constitution That Protects Freedom of Belief

AP reports that on March 13, Syria's interim president, Ahmad al-Sharaa, signed an Interim Constitutional Declaration (full text), which will be in effect until a new permanent constitution for the country is drafted and adopted and national elections are held under it. The Interim Constitutional Declaration provides in part:

Article 3 – Islam, freedom of belief, personal status

1. The religion of the President of the Republic is Islam, and Islamic jurisprudence is the principal source of legislation.

2 - Freedom of belief is protected. The State respects all divine religions and guarantees the freedom to perform all their rituals, provided that this does not disturb public order.

3. The personal status of religious sects is protected and respected in accordance with the law....

 Article 10 – Equality  

Citizens are equal before the law in rights and duties, without discrimination based on race, religion, gender or lineage....

 Article 13 – Expression, privacy, movement  

1. The State guarantees freedom of opinion, expression, information, publication and the press....

Suit Challenges NYPD's Forcible Removal of Hijabs as Crowd Control Tactic

Suit was filed this week in a New York federal district court challenging the practice of the New York Police Department of forcibly and publicly removing Muslim women's hijabs as a method of crowd control at demonstrations. The complaint (full text) in Council on American-Islamic Relations New York v. City of New York, (SD NY, filed 3/9/2025) contends that the practice violates the free exercise and free speech protections of the U.S. and New York Constitutions, as well as the 4th Amendment and other provisions of New York law. CAIR issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Supreme Court Grants Certiorari in Conversion Therapy Ban Case

The U.S. Supreme Court today granted review in Chiles v. Salazar, (Docket No. 24-539, certiorari granted 3/10/2025).  In the case, the U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision held that Colorado's Minor Conversion Therapy Law that bans mental health professionals from providing conversion therapy to minors does not violate the free speech or free exercise rights of mental health professionals. (See prior posting.) The petition for certiorari raises only the free speech issue. The SCOTUSblog case page for the case contains links to pleadings in the case. AP reports on the grant of review.

Wyoming Passes Bill Barring State from Requiring Employees to Use Preferred Pronouns of Other Employees

The Wyoming legislature this week gave final approval to SF077 (full text) which provides in part:

The state and its political subdivisions shall not compel or require an employee to refer to another employee using that employee's preferred pronouns.

The Act allows  person aggrieved by a violation to seek injunctive or declaratory relief.

Wyoming Governor Mark Gordon allowed the bill to become law without his signature. In his No Signature Letter to Senate yesterday, Governor Gordon called the law "a solution in search of a problem."

Wyoming PBS has background on the bill.

Certiorari Denied in Abortion Buffer Zone Challenge

Yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court denied review in Coalition Life v. City of Carbondale, Illinois, (Docket No. 24-57, certiorari denied 2/24/2025) (Order List.) In the case, the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a city ordinance creating a buffer zone around abortion clinics in which sidewalk counselors may not approach closer than 8 feet to those accessing the clinic. The 7th Circuit said it was bound by the Supreme Court's 2000 decision in Hill v. Colorado.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion saying in part:

Following our repudiation in Dobbs, I do not see what is left of Hill. Yet, lower courts continue to feel bound by it.  The Court today declines an invitation to set the record straight on Hill’s defunct status.  I respectfully dissent.

Foster Parent Requirements for Affirming Transgender Children Are Upheld

Last week, a Vermont federal district court in a series of opinions in two cases focused on challenges to the state's rules on licensing of foster parents. The suits were brought by couples who objected on religious grounds to the state's requirement that they be willing to accept any child regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity.

In Antonucci v. Winters I, (D VT, Feb. 20, 2025), the foster care license of plaintiffs was withdrawn because of their inability to comply with the state's non-discrimination requirement that included a commitment to facilitate the social and medical transition of a hypothetical future foster child. Plaintiffs asserted that complying with the requirement would violate their Christian religious beliefs about gender and sexuality. They sued seeking a preliminary injunction, contending that the requirement violated their free speech and free exercise rights. The court denied the preliminary injunction, saying in part:

Plaintiffs argue that, in this case, the state’s interest is not compelling because there is national, and even global, disagreement about the propriety of medical transitioning....

Evaluating the efficacy or safety of a particular procedure is not within this Court’s purview.  The Court’s role is to determine whether the Rules and Policies enforced here, which pertain to medical and social transitioning as well as the use of gender-appropriate pronouns, serve a compelling state interest.  At this stage in the case, Defendants have submitted sufficient evidence of the benefits of those policies to satisfy that portion of the strict scrutiny test....

The Court ... finds, based upon the current record, that the Rules and Policies established and implemented by DCF and Defendants serve the compelling interest of protecting the health and welfare of LGBTQ youth, and are narrowly-tailored to necessarily address that interest....

In Antonucci v. Winters II, (D VT, Feb. 20, 2025), the court on qualified immunity grounds dismissed plaintiffs' claim for damages for free exercise and free speech violations. It allowed plaintiffs to proceed on claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. The court did not dismiss plaintiffs' retaliation or equal protection claims because defendants had not offered specific arguments that they were covered by qualified immunity.

In Wuoti v. Winters, (D VT, Feb. 20, 2025), two couples whose foster parent licenses were not renewed challenged the state's foster parent policy on free speech, freedom of association and free exercise grounds. The court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction, saying in part:

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants are compelling them to “speak the State’s views while prohibiting them from expressing their religious views.”...  Compliance with DCF Rules and Policies, however, is different from speech.  Defendants did not compel Plaintiffs to change their beliefs, or to make any statements that disavowed those beliefs.  Instead, Defendants were pursuing their mission of ensuring a welcoming, affirming, and safe home for each child....

Plaintiffs further argue that Defendants were compelling them to use preferred pronouns and to otherwise speak in ways that are contrary to their religious beliefs about gender and sexuality, while at the same time restricting them from expressing their own views on those issues.  The DCF Rules and Policies at issue, however, are based upon research and feedback regarding outcomes for LGBTQ youth.  The record does not establish that they are targeted at any religious viewpoint.  Indeed, the alleged restrictions are at most incidental to rules of conduct designed to promote healthy and affirming homes....

Nothing in the record indicates that Defendants are compelling Plaintiffs to associate with any specific person or group.  Plaintiffs protest that their license denials were based in part on their professed inability to associate with certain events, as in a pride parade.  When DCF raised the possibility of attending a gay pride parade, however, the suggestion was merely hypothetical.  Indeed, while Policy 76 suggests that staff “encourage” such activities, there is no requirement that foster families engage in them.  Nor are Defendants preventing Plaintiffs from associating with others who share their beliefs, as in attending church.  What foster parents may not do is require children in their care to engage in activities that are non-affirming....

Here, nothing on the face of DCF’s Rules and Policies targets religious practices or religious applicants....

... [T]he Court finds that Rules and Policies at issue are generally applicable, and that Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on their free exercise claim....

Plaintiffs are concerned about foster families whose religious beliefs are not consistent with DCF policies, DCF does not compel such families to change or reject their beliefs.  What it does require is the provision of an affirming environment for children who are, or who come to identify as, LGBTQ.  

ED's Title IX Rule Violates 1st Amendment

 In Carroll Independent School District v. U.S. Department of Education, (ND TX, Feb. 19, 2025), a Texas federal district court invalidated the Department of Education’s rule that interprets Title IX as prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. The court had previously issued a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the rule against plaintiff school district.  The court now permanently vacates the Rule, finding, among other things, that it violates the First Amendment. The court said in part:

Because “misgendering” could, under this broad standard, constitute hostile environment harassment, teachers will “assume they should use subjective gender terms to avoid discipline under the Final Rule.”

As a consequence, recipients of Title IX funds, including teachers, are forced “to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view [they] find[] unacceptable.”... The Final Rule functionally turns recipients of federal funds into federally commandeered censors of speech, forcing schools to require engagement in or, at a minimum, to prohibit certain kinds of speech, which in turn represses what has long been regarded as protected forms of expression and religious exercise.

ADF issued a press release announcing the decision.

Anti-Abortion Pregnancy Centers Sue Challenging Delaware Disclaimer Requirements

Suit was filed this week in a Delaware federal district court challenging a new Delaware law that requires pro-life pregnancy centers to include in all advertising and to disseminate to clients onsite a disclaimer stating:  "This facility is not licensed as a medical facility by the state of Delaware and has no licensed medical provider who provides or directly supervises the provision of services." The complaint (full text) in National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Jennings, (D DE, filed 2/12/2025) alleges that this requirement violates the free speech and free exercise rights of pregnancy care centers. The complaint alleges in part:

13. ... [The law] is a classic example of compelled speech in violation of the Free Speech Clause. The law is expressly content-based both because it compels the content of speech and because it regulates only speakers who wish to discuss the subject of pregnancy from a pro-life perspective rather than any other health topic.

14. The law is also viewpoint based, because it is designed to target pro-life pregnancy care centers and burdens, restricts, chills, or in some circumstances legally prohibits their message. It does not similarly impact pro-abortion advocacy groups, individuals, or facilities. 

15. The law also infringes upon the free exercise rights of the pregnancy care centers which are founded with a religious mission to engage and support women, but will be forced to drown out their religiously motivated messages (including ones with primarily or exclusively religious content) and present misleading information to undercut the opportunities the pregnancy care centers have to engage pregnant women in unplanned or unsupported pregnancies.

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Refusal To Sell Generic Cake for Same-Sex Wedding Reception Violates California Anti-Discrimination Law

In Civil Rights Department v. Cathy's Creations, Inc., (CA App., Feb. 11, 2025), a California state appellate court in a 74-page opinion held that a bakery violated the anti-discrimination provisions of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (UCRA) when it refused to sell a predesigned white cake to a customer because the cake would be used at the customer's same-sex wedding reception. The bakery had a policy of refusing customer requests that violate fundamental Christian principles. The court rejected defendant's free exercise and free speech defenses and concluded that the bakery's referral of the customer to another bakery did not eliminate the violation. The court said in part:

Here, the policy’s application hinges not on the act of marriage, but on the same sex status of the couple to be married.  Thus, the policy’s purposeful exclusion of same sex couples is facial discrimination because of sexual orientation....

... [T]he fact that Miller’s adoption of the discriminatory policy was driven by her sincerely held religious beliefs rather than malice or ill will is irrelevant to the issue of intentional discrimination....

Discriminatorily denying service and then telling would-be customers they may take their business down the street (or farther) to a separate, unassociated establishment where they may be served by way of referral in no way ensures full and equal access to the product or service at the same price and under the same conditions.... [A] referral to a separate and independent business subjects the customer to “‘the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments’” that public accommodation laws like the UCRA are generally designed to address.....

Focusing on the bakery's free speech and free exercise defenses, the court said in part: 

The act of providing a product to a wedding reception with the intent to send a message does not transform that product into pure speech if the product itself is not the self-expression of the vendor.  If this were the case, a host of nonexpressive products or services provided for a same-sex wedding reception could be deemed to convey a message merely because they were provided for the event—e.g., flatware, chairs and linens, etc.  Moreover, many standard products provided to a wedding reception are equally as visible as the cake and used by the couple in a symbolic manner....  The mere fact these products are prepared for and provided to a same-sex wedding in a routine economic transaction does not transform them into the self-expression of the vendor....

There is also little likelihood a viewer would understand the cake’s sale and provision to a same-sex wedding conveyed any message about marriage generally or an endorsement and celebration of same-sex marriage in particular....

Here, the UCRA does not draw any distinctions between secular and religious activities, and there is no evidence the UCRA was enacted as a means to discriminate against religion.  Moreover, defendants’ argument the statutory provisions relating to the preservation of housing for senior citizens ... are contradictory secular exemptions under the UCRA, rendering it not generally applicable, is unpersuasive.

Missouri and Christian Counselors Sue Localities Over Conversion Therapy Bans

Suit was filed last week in a Missouri federal district court against Kansas City and Jackson County, Missouri by the state of Missouri and Christian licensed counselors challenging ordinances passed by those jurisdictions which broadly ban licensed counselors from engaging in counseling directed at changing a minor's sexual orientation or gender identity. The complaint (full text) in Wyatt Bury, LLC v. City of Kansas City, Missouri, (WD MO, filed 2/7/2025), alleges in part:

Kansas City and Jackson County recently passed ordinances that ban purely consensual conversations—pure speech—about gender identity and sexual orientation. These ordinances not only require counselors to parrot these governments’ preferred views on sexual ethics; they also ban different views. That violates the First Amendment. 

340. The Counseling Ordinances facially and as-applied restrict speech based on content and viewpoint by prohibiting the Counselors and other licensed professionals who are Missouri citizens from proclaiming only certain content and viewpoints; by applying to speech based solely on its content; by authorizing counseling that supports only one viewpoint of gender identity and sexual orientation....  

353. The Public Accommodation Ordinance forces the Counselors to speak messages they object to by requiring them to offer and provide same-sex marital and relationship counseling because the Counselors offer and provide counseling about marriages and relationships between one man and one woman.... and to refer to clients and prospective clients by using those persons’ self-selected pronouns....

376. The City’s Public Accommodation Ordinance substantially burdens the Counselors’ sincerely held religious beliefs by requiring them either to operate their counseling practices in ways that violate their religious beliefs or to close their practices....

Plaintiffs also challenge the ordinances on vagueness grounds. 

ADF issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuits.

Evangelist Can Move Ahead with Free Speech Claim Against Officer Who Arrested Him at Pride Festival

In Cocchini v. City of Franklin, Tennessee, (MD TN, Feb. 6, 2025), a Tennessee federal district court held that plaintiff, a Christian evangelist, had successfully stated a claim for violation of his 1st Amendment free speech rights. Plaintiff was asked by a police officer to leave a Pride Festival after he began to share his Christian testimony with two women at a church booth.  When he refused to leave, he was arrested. He sued, contending that the police officer discriminated against him by impermissibly regulating his speech conducted in a public forum. The police office asserted a defense of qualified immunity. The court said in part:

Here, Cocchini has alleged facts plausibly demonstrating that the Park remained a public forum throughout Franklin Pride....

There are two competing stories for Cocchini’s exclusion from the Park.  Officer Spry says he removed Cocchini from the public forum, causing him to cease his peaceful invited religious speech, apparently for violating Tennessee’s criminal trespass law....  However, the Complaint alleges that Officer Spry told Cocchini on the day of his arrest, and under oath, that he arrested Cocchini because a Franklin Pride TN security event coordinator wanted him removed.....  Taking the allegations in the Complaint as true, Cocchini sufficiently asserts that the justification for his exclusion from the Park, and arrest, was based on the content of his speech....

If the arrest was to “avoid offense to gay, lesbian, or transgender individuals,” as the Complaint alleges, such an interest (compelling or not) is not narrowly tailored by arresting individuals like Cocchini who express religious views....

... [I]if as Cocchini alleges, Officer Spry arrested him “because of the content of his speech,” then he “acted in violation of the First Amendment in ways that should have been clear to a reasonable officer.” ... This is a disputed issue of fact such that “development of the factual record is [] necessary to decide whether [Officer Spry’s] actions violated clearly established law.” ...

The court however dismissed plaintiff's equal protection claim which was based only on the alleged violation of his 1st Amendment rights.

Title VI Does Not Cover Protected Speech, But Antisemitic Actions at Cooper Union Went Beyond Speech

In Gartenberg v. The Cooper Union for the Advancement of Science and Art, (SD NY, Feb. 5, 2025), a New York federal district court held that Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act must be applied consistent with the 1st Amendment, even as to private schools. In the case, a group of Jewish students asserted a claim for deliberate indifference to national-origin harassment under Title VI growing out of on-campus incidents after the Gaza-Israel conflict began. The court said in part:

First, speech “on a matter of public concern, directed to the college community,” will generally fail to “constitute unlawful harassment.” ...

[C]onstruing Title VI not to reach instances of pure speech on matters of public concern, or an institution’s failure to censor or punish the same, does not mean that such expression is irrelevant to determining whether actionable harassment occurred.  To make out a hostile environment claim, a plaintiff must plead (and then prove) not only that they suffered objectively severe or pervasive harassment, but that the harassment was motivated, at least in part, by a protected characteristic....

Cooper Union’s first line of defense is that none of the speech or conduct identified in Gartenberg’s Complaint was motivated by animus towards Jews, but was instead mere “criticism[] of Israel and/or its policies” and a “show[] of solidarity for the Palestinian cause.”... Gartenberg, by contrast, maintains that Zionism and support for Israel are “an integral part of the national origin and identity of many Jews,” and that Jews’ “belief in Israel as their ancestral national homeland is fundamental to their Jewish identity.” ...

... [T]his case can be resolved without opining on whether conduct or speech hostile to Zionism, itself a term subject to a considerable variety of interpretations, is necessarily antisemitic....

... That the demonstrators at Cooper Union generally avoided the use of overtly antisemitic language and symbols is ... not dispositive. Here, Gartenberg’s Complaint is replete with words and phrases that she alleges are thinly veiled “code words” designed to “activate conscious or subconscious [antisemitic] concepts and frames.”...  On October 25, 2023, for instance, pro-Palestinian students at Cooper Union chanted slogans like “[l]ong live the intifada,” “[r]esistance is justified,” and “[i]t is right to rebel.” ...  Although the parties offer competing interpretations of these slogans, when uttered just two weeks after the deadliest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust in a manner that reasonably appears to celebrate and glorify that same violence, the Court agrees that such phrases support at least a plausible inference of animus towards Jews....

Regardless of whether this expression is better characterized as righteous protest in support of a noble cause, as the vulgar celebration of terrorism and antisemitism, or as something in between, it is not a proper basis on which to impose civil liability on Cooper Union....

Gartenberg’s allegations, however, go beyond identifying instances of pure political speech.  Although the October 25 demonstration began as a peaceful, public protest concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Gartenberg alleges that after a couple hours a mob of protestors forced their way past campus security guards and into the Foundation Building....  

Once inside, the protestors obstructed the hallway and disrupted classes while apparently attempting to locate President Sparks.,,, Unable to find her, the protesters then “descended on the hallway surrounding the library” while continuing to chant their slogans...

It is plausible that this incident was physically threatening or humiliating to the Jewish students huddled inside the library.  The demonstrators “attempted to enter the library, banging on and rattling the locked library doors and shouting ‘let us in!’”...

The Court is dismayed by Cooper Union’s suggestion that the Jewish students should have hidden upstairs or left the building, or that locking the library doors was enough to discharge its obligations under Title VI.  These events took place in 2023—not 1943—and Title VI places responsibility on colleges and universities to protect their Jewish students from harassment, not on those students to hide themselves away in a proverbial attic or attempt to escape from a place they have a right to be.  In sum, the physically threatening or humiliating conduct that the Complaint alleges Jewish students in the library experienced “is entirely outside the ambit of the free speech clause,....

JNS reports on the court's decision.

Teacher Sues After Suspension for Hanging Crucifix in Her Classroom Workspace

Suit was filed last week in a Connecticut federal district court by a public-school teacher who was placed on administrative leave after she refused to remove a crucifix that she had hung among other personal items in personal workspace near her classroom desk. The complaint (full text) in Arroyo-Castro v. Gasper, (D CT, filed 1/30/2025) alleges in part:

Federal and state law prohibit government officials from using the Establishment Clause as an excuse to abridge the free speech and religious free exercise rights of their employees.... Other teachers, meanwhile, display in their classroom workspaces Wonder Woman action figures, images of Baby Yoda and Santa Claus, and other personal expressive items.  Yet only Ms. Castro has been suspended and threatened with termination.  The disparity of treatment here against religious expression makes this an easy case...: if Defendants permit teachers to display personal expressive items like family photos and inspirational quotes in their classrooms, they may not punish Ms. Castro for doing the same by hanging a crucifix in the personal workspace aside her desk.

National Review reports on the lawsuit.

Requirement for Church to Obtain Permit Before Hosting Homeless Encampment Is Upheld

In Miller v. City of Burien, (WD WA, Feb. 3, 2025), a Washington federal district court dismissed a suit brought by a Methodist church challenging the city's requirement that the church apply for and obtain a temporary use permit before it could host a homeless encampment on its property. The court rejected plaintiffs' claims that requiring a permit violated its rights under RLUIPA as well as its free speech and free exercise rights under the 1st Amendment. The court said in part:

The parties concede that caring for unhoused individuals is an “exercise of religion” for purposes of RLUIPA. However, the parties dispute whether requiring the Church to apply for a temporary use permit before it is allowed to host a homeless encampment constitutes “imposing a ‘substantial burden’ on religious exercise” under the statute. It is important to note that this is not a denial of application case; rather, the question here is whether the City can require the Church to submit a permit application.... 

Here, the Church did not apply for a permit, the City did not deny the permit application, and the City did not deny the Church’s the right to host a homeless encampment—indeed, the City supported the Church’s endeavor. However, the City did require that the Church fill out a simple two-page application so that the City could ensure that the health and safety of the neighborhood residents, as well as the encampment occupants, was accounted for. Such minimum inconvenience does not constitute a substantial burden on the Church for purposes of RLUIPA. ...

 ... [T]he Church has failed to plausibly allege that the challenged regulation impacts speech. As such, its prior restraint facial challenge fails as a matter of law and must be dismissed....

... [Z]oning laws that permit some individualized assessment for variances remain “generally applicable” so long as the laws are motivated by secular purposes and impact equally all landowners seeking the variances. That, of course, is the case here. No landowner—secular or religious—is permitted to host a homeless encampment within a multi-family zone without a permit.... Nor has the Church alleged that Burien’s regulatory scheme is religiously motivated.... Therefore, because the Church has failed to plausibly allege that the challenged regulatory scheme was not neutral and not generally applicable, it has failed to state a free exercise claim under the First Amendment.

Michigan's Ban on Conversion Therapy for Minors Is Upheld

In Catholic Charities of Jackson, Lenawee and Hillsdale Counties v. Whitmer, (WD MI, Jan. 28, 2025), a Michigan federal district court refused to issue a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement against counselors employed by Catholic Charities of Michigan's ban on conversion therapy for minors. The court concluded that plaintiffs were not likely to prove that the ban violates their free speech or free exercise rights, or that is void for vagueness.  The court said in part:

Here, Plaintiffs allege that they believe that “when a client comes to them and seeks to change her gender identity or gender expression to align with her biological sex, or seeks to change her behavior to refrain from acting on same-sex attraction, it is their ethical and religious duty to help that client live the life she desires to live” ...

The law is not subject to any form of heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment because the conduct regulated by the law is not merely “tied to a [medical] procedure,” ..., but consists solely of the administration of the procedure or treatment itself.... 

... In passing the new law, Michigan legislators found that treating children with conversion therapy fell below prevailing standards of care, and Michigan legislators targeted the specific and devastating harms to children that result from conversion therapy, including dramatically increased risks of depression and suicide....

Plaintiffs are not likely to establish the Free Speech violations alleged in Counts I through III....

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Plaintiffs have plausibly demonstrated that Michigan’s law burdens the free exercise of religion, a law that burdens religious exercise is presumptively unconstitutional unless it is both neutral and generally applicable....

Michigan’s new law readily passes this test of facial neutrality.... There is no reference to religion nor any use of words with religious connotations. Michigan’s law prohibits all conversion therapy on minors, regardless of whether the minor’s (or the minor’s parent’s) motivation for seeking such therapy is religious or secular, or some variation....

Here, Plaintiffs contend that Michigan’s law was enacted with “official expressions of hostility to this well-known religious practice” ....  However, ... the comments Plaintiffs highlight do not necessarily demonstrate hostility to religion, only criticisms of conversion therapy.

News from the States reports on the decision.