Federal Court Refuses to Enjoin Distribution of Notice from Rabbinical Court

In Esses v. Rosen, (ED NY, Oct. 15, 2024), a New York federal district court refused to issue a preliminary injunction barring defendants from disseminating in plaintiff's neighborhood a rabbinical court's notice (a sieruv) that plaintiff has failed to respond to a summons from the rabbinical court. Plaintiff also asked that the seiruv be taken down or removed from places where it had been posted. Plaintiff alleged claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The court said in part:

While plaintiff does not dispute that she brought the claims in this case before a secular court rather than a religious one, she suggests that the seiruv is defamatory because it indicates that her doing so was “improper[].”  That statement is nowhere contained in the seiruv itself.  But even if the seiruv is read to convey that implication through its reference to plaintiff’s civil filing, the First Amendment would prevent this Court from second-guessing a religious court’s view of impropriety. ... 

Plaintiff next claims that the instructional document distributed with the seiruv is defamatory because it falsely conveys “that the rabbis of the beth din were encouraging social ostracism and shaming in this case.” ... In any event, the Establishment Clause would preclude this Court from finding defamation on that ground.  To decide whether the instructional document was true or false in its asserted characterization of plaintiff’s seiruv, the Court would be “called upon to inquire into the rules and customs governing rabbinical courts as they are utilized in the Orthodox Jewish religion,”

[Thanks to Volokh Conspiracy for the lead.]

PA Supreme Court: Yard Signs Responding to Neighbors' Antisemitism Protected by Pennsylvania Constitution

In a 4-2 decision in Oberholzer v. Galapo, (PA Sup. Ct., Aug. 20, 2024), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, relying on the broad free speech protections in Art. I, Sec. 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, dissolved an injunction issued by a trial court in an unusual dispute between neighbors. As described by Justice Dougherty's majority opinion:

In November 2014, a brewing feud between the neighbors over landscaping issues reached a boiling point after Dr. Galapo confronted Mr. Oberholzer about a resurveyed property line and Mrs. Oberholzer responded by calling him a “fucking Jew.”  This prompted the Galapos in June 2015 to erect the first of many signs primarily displaying anti-hate and anti-racist messages “along the back tree-line directly abutting [the Oberholzers’] property line, pointed directly at [the Oberholzers’] house, and in direct sight of [other] neighbors’ houses.” ...  All told, the Galapos posted twenty-three signs over a years-long span, during which the neighbors continued to quarrel over other minor nuisances.

Among other things, the Oberholzers sued claiming the signs placed them in a false light. The majority concluded:

We hold the Galapos engaged in protected speech when they posted in their own yard stationary signs decrying hatred and racism.  We further hold the Oberholzers failed to prove that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner by the Galapos’ pure residential speech.  As such, Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and this Court’s precedents precluded the trial court from enjoining the signs, regardless of the nature of the torts alleged.  The injunction imposed an improper prior restraint on speech in violation of Article I, Section 7.

Justice Wecht filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

The Galapos argue that the present injunction violates the no-injunction rule, that it is an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech, and that it fails strict scrutiny.  These arguments are unpersuasive.  The no-injunction rule does not exist in Pennsylvania.  Moreover, even if it did exist, it would not apply here because the equity court did not purport to enjoin defamatory speech.... The argument that the injunction constitutes a prior restraint is also mistaken because the injunction does not restrict speech in advance of its publication.  Finally, the injunction withstands application of strict scrutiny because it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.

Justice Brobson also filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

I would conclude that the trial courts of this Commonwealth have the authority to enjoin residential speech protected by Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution that rises to the level of a private nuisance and disrupts the quiet enjoyment of a neighbor’s home.  I would further find that the Injunction is content neutral, furthers the Commonwealth’s significant interest in protecting the privacy and quiet enjoyment of the Oberholzers’ home, and burdens no more of the Galapos’ speech than necessary to protect the Oberholzers’ right to residential privacy.

AP reports on the decision.

Nebraska Supreme Court Upholds Dismissal of Priest's Suit Against Archdiocese

 In Syring v. Archdiocese of Omaha, (NE Sup. Ct., July 26, 2024), the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of defamation, infliction of mental distress, interference with prospective employment and breach of fiduciary duty claims by a Catholic priest against his Archdiocese.  The priest was listed on an Archdiocese website that named those against whom there had been allegations of misconduct or abuse of a minor. He was forced to resign his ministry position and the Archdiocese refused to approve his serving as a hospital chaplain. The court held that the Archdiocese's action did not meet the standard for outrageous conduct needed to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. It went on the dismiss various of plaintiff's claims on the basis of the ministerial exception doctrine.  The court said in part:

Syring’s claims asserted that the Archdiocese “falsely impute[d] unfitness to preform [sic] duties of employment, and prejudice[d] [Syring] in his profession or trade.” The other claims were premised upon Syring’s assertion that the Archdiocese owed him fiduciary duties. For example, the complaint identified a purported breach of a fiduciary duty in the Archdiocese’s “requiring [Syring’s] resignation, and omitting to advise him of his right to counsel, both civil and canonical.”

We cannot uphold Syring’s claims without interfering with the internal governance of the church, or depriving the church of control, over the selection of its ministers. The claims— based on the conversation between officials of a Catholic archdiocese and a hospital operated by a Catholic religious order regarding permission for Syring to serve as a chaplain, Syring’s fitness to perform the duties of his employment, and the requiring of Syring’s resignation from that employment— lie at the heart of the ministerial exception articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court. The district court did not err in dismissing these claims.

Equally Divided New Jersey Supreme Court Dismisses Defamation Suit Against Jewish School

 In Hyman v. Rosenbaum Yeshiva of North Jersey, (NJ Sup. Ct., July 24, 2024), an equally divided New Jersey Supreme Court decision resulted in affirmance through a short per curiam opinion of the dismissal of defamation claims brought against an Orthodox Jewish school by a Judaic Studies teacher whose employment by the school was terminated. The Justices were equally divided on whether discovery should be permitted in the case.

The 6 justices participating in the decision unanimously agreed on the standard for applying the ministerial exception, saying that the court must analyze each element of plaintiff's claim and determine whether adjudicating it would require the court to choose between competing religious visions or would interfere with a church's administrative prerogatives including its right to select and control the duties of its ministers, whether or not the alleged misconduct is rooted in religious belief. Here plaintiff's employment was terminated for inappropriate touching of female students. Information about his termination was emailed to the school's Board of Directors, parents of current students and faculty members. The letter was subsequently disseminated on social media.

Justice Patterson's concurring opinion for 3 justices said in part:

Here, the religious employer’s allegedly defamatory statement was not a description of claimed misconduct by Hyman; no such description appears in Price’s letter to the school community.  Instead, Hyman’s defamation claims are premised on Price’s statement that “it was determined that Rabbi Hyman’s conduct had been neither acceptable nor consistent with how a rebbe in our Yeshiva should interact with students.”  In short, the statement at the heart of this case was not an assertion of fact about the former students’ allegations, but an explanation of the Yeshiva’s decision to terminate Hyman -- a determination made in consultation with halachic authorities as well as legal counsel.  With or without discovery regarding the details of the allegations, the court’s inquiry as to the merits would be the same:  the court would be required to assess the reasons for a religious institution’s decision to terminate the employment of a minister, an inquiry that would violate the First Amendment.

Justice Pierre-Louis' dissenting opinion for 3 justices said in part: 

In order for a court to make [a determination that the ministerial exception applies] ... plaintiffs must be allowed discovery.... [U]nder the concurring opinion’s analysis, a religious entity can seemingly fire an employee based solely on a personal vendetta, publish a knowingly false and defamatory statement about the plaintiff, and shield itself from liability -- and even discovery -- by invoking the ministerial exception.  Such a holding slams the courthouse door shut on potentially wronged plaintiffs before they can even obtain discovery that would allow a court to determine whether adjudicating their claims actually interferes with religious autonomy....

Defendants have conflated the issues in this case, making it appear as though this defamation case is the same as an employment discrimination case.  But assessing the legality of what a religious institution says about an adverse employment action is not the same thing as determining the lawfulness of the adverse action itself.  The latter necessarily requires a court to interfere with a religious institution’s internal management, its doctrinal specificities, and its decisions regarding who preaches the faith, but the former does not.

Becket Fund issued a press release announcing the decision.

Former Priest's Defamation Claim Dismissed Under Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine

In Episcopal Diocese of Southern Virginia v. Marshall, (VA App., July 16, 2024), a Virginia state appellate court held that a defamation per se claim by a former Episcopalian priest against a bishop who removed him from the ministry should be dismissed under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. The former priest, Robert Marshall, allegedly made improper comments to a female employee. The court said in part:

We find that the defamation claim is inextricably intertwined with the disciplinary proceedings that led to the priest’s ouster.  In addition, the trier of fact would have to decide if the priest committed “sexual misconduct” within the meaning of canon law, which proscribes a broader swath of conduct than secular law....

Marshall claims that the bishop falsely stated that the investigator had “determined that the allegations had merit.” ... He says that the bishop falsely stated that Marshall had admitted to the improper conduct....  He pleads that Bishop Haynes also lied when she claimed that the church had followed the process required under ecclesiastical law....

[A]lthough Marshall denies that he wants a secular court to undo his defrocking, his defamation claim is so intertwined with the bishop’s deposing him as a priest that the defamation claim cannot be litigated without entangling the court in a religious dispute.  When a priest who has been fired sues the church and its leadership raising tort claims that cannot be unscrambled from the church’s decision to fire him, “the First Amendment has struck the balance for us.” ...  Churches have an overarching interest “in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission.” ... In order for a church to remain “free to choose those who will guide it on its way,” ... such tort claims must sometimes give way. 

... The trial court erred in concluding that Marshall’s claim for defamation per se against Bishop Haynes could be resolved on secular principles...

Louis Farrakhan's Suit Against ADL Dismissed

 In Farrakhan v. Anti-Defamation League, (SD NY, April 5, 2024), a New York federal district court dismissed defamation claims asserted by Louis Farrakhan against the Anti-Defamation League. The court describes Farrakhan's allegations:

The [complaint], which details nearly a century's worth of grievances, alleges several instances of defamation and, as against the ADL, various violations of the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. At their core, plaintiffs' claims are that by repeatedly referring to plaintiffs as antisemitic, defendants have defamed them and created a chilling effect on their religious practices. Plaintiffs seek $4.8 billion in damages as well as a declaratory judgment that the term "anti-Semite" is defamatory per se and that the ADL is a quasi-governmental actor that violated plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. Plaintiffs also seek to enjoin defendants from calling them antisemitic or taking any steps to urge third parties to disassociate with them.

A number of claims were dismissed on standing grounds, finding that Farrakhan did not allege concrete injuries traceable to ADL. Farrakhan's defamation claims were dismissed because Farrakhan, a public figure, did not plead actual malice. Others were dismissed because they were merely statements of opinion or Farrakhan had not alleged facts showing falsity.

Husband's Defamation Action Against Organization Assisting His Wife in Obtaining a Get Is Dismissed

 In Satz v. Organization for the Resolution of Agunot, Inc., (SD NY, March 28, 2024), a New York federal district court dismissed a husband's suit alleging defamation and several other torts brought against an organization that assists Jewish women who have obtained divorces in civil courts but whose husbands refuse to provide them with a Jewish bill of divorce ("Get").  According to the court:

ORA posted on its website a graphic bearing Plaintiff’s picture, labeling him a “GET-REFUSER,” and asserting that “GET REFUSAL IS DOMESTIC ABUSE”.... ORA also posted a copy of a “Psak Din,” a ruling by a rabbinical court, which states that Plaintiff’s “recalcitran[ce]” justifies doing “anything that is not a criminal offense . . . to cause him to comply” with rabbinical court proceedings....

Expressions of opinion are not actionable....  Taken in context, ORA’s statement on the flyer posted on its website that “GET-REFUSAL IS DOMESTIC ABUSE” is not a statement of fact....  In this context, the statement that Get-refusal is domestic abuse clearly is an expression of opinion by an advocacy organization....

Finally, Plaintiff takes issue with the flyer’s statement that “Jewish law forbids” various forms of association with Plaintiff....  [A]djudicating the truth or falsity of ORA’s statement about what “Jewish law forbids,” would impermissibly entangle the Court in an “inquiry . . . into religious law.”...

New York courts also apply a qualified privilege to statements “fairly made by a person in the discharge of some public or private duty, legal or moral.” ... [T]here is a colorable argument that rabbis presiding over Get proceedings are engaged in the discharge of a moral duty and, therefore, the statements in the Psak Din, which ORA republished, are privileged.....

For this Court to adjudicate whether ORA defamed Plaintiff by republishing the Psak Din, the Court would have to determine the truth of the challenged statements in the Psak Din, which would impermissibly entangle the Court in questions of Jewish law.

Right Wing Catholic Website Will Close Down After Settling Defamation Lawsuit

 AP reports on the imminent closing of the Church Militant website following the website's settlement of a defamation lawsuit.  According to AP:

A far-right, unofficial Catholic media website has agreed to pay $500,000 to a New Hampshire priest who sued for defamation over a 2019 article that it now disavows. The website also is planning to shut down soon, the priest’s attorney says.

The apology by Church Militant [full text] came after the organization agreed last week to a federal court judgment in favor of the Rev. Georges de Laire, an official with the Diocese of Manchester. This legal setback comes just months after its founder’s resignation over a breach of its morality clause.

“As part of the parties’ resolution, Church Militant has represented that it will be shutting down at the end of April,” attorney Howard Cooper of the Boston law firm Todd & Weld, which represented de Laire, said via email....

Church Militant and its sleek newscasts drew a loyal following for years with a mix of fiercely right-wing politics and radically conservative Catholicism in which many of America’s bishops were viewed with suspicion and disgust. It “is not recognized as a Church apostolate” and lacks authorization to promote itself as Catholic, according to the Archdiocese of Detroit, in whose territory it is based....

The full AP article has additional details.

UPDATE: On March 7, AP reports that in the settlement of a lawsuit the city of Baltimore has agreed to pay $275,000 toward the legal fees incurred by St. Michael's Media, the parent of Church Militant.  The suit successfully prevented the city from cancelling a protest rally against Catholic Bishops. (See prior posting.)

Defamation Claim Not Subject to Ministerial Exception Doctrine; Discrimination and Contract Claims Are

In Uzomechina v. Episcopal Diocese of New Jersey, (D NJ, Jan. 18, 2024), a New Jersey federal district court held that the ministerial exception doctrine requires the court to dismiss racial discrimination and wrongful discharge claims brought by an African-American Episcopal priest who was dismissed from his position after allegedly false charges of financial and sexual misconduct. The court dismissed the claims saying that they "directly implicate the employment relationship between the religious institution and its ministerial employee." It dismissed breach of contract claims for similar reasons.

Plaintiff also brought a defamation claim against the Diocese for passing on false information about him to his subsequent employer-- a drug abuse rehabilitation center. The court concluded that this claim was not barred by the ministerial exception doctrine, saying in part:

... [B]y sharing its internal disciplinary procedures and beliefs with a secular third-party, ... the Diocese Defendants subjected itself to the laws that govern the public realm. In other words, exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim will not second-guess or threaten the Diocese Defendants' decisions to investigate its clergy, find misconduct by a clergy member, or impose internal disciplinary measures against a member of the church. What it will threaten is a religious organization's ability to make false and defamatory statements about its clergy or members to the general public, outside of the organization's internal operations. The ministerial exception, therefore, is not applicable to Plaintiff's defamation claims.

The court, nevertheless, dismissed this claim without prejudice for failing to adequately set out facts supporting the claim.

Louis Farrakhan Sues Anti-Defamation League for $4.8 Billion

Suit was filed earlier this month in a New York federal district court by Nation of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan against the Anti-Defamation League and the Simon Wiesenthal Center seeking $4.8 billion in damages. The suit alleges that defendants are interfering with Farrakhan's activities through labeling him as an antisemite. The complaint (full text) in Farrakhan v. Anti-Defamation League, (SD NY, filed 10/16/2023), alleges violations of the First Amendment's protections for freedom of association and free exercise of religion, as well as alleging causes of action for defamation. The complaint contends that the Anti-Defamation Leage is a "de facto, quasi-governmental actor", alleging in part:

 344.... [O]n or about December 20, 2022, the Defendant ADL submitted a demand letter directly to the Office of Management and Budget ... for funds it desired to be redirected from programs and services that benefit the average American citizen to its own coffers to be used as it sees fit....

345.Extraordinarily, that same demand letter brazenly commanded the OMB to allocate funds to other agencies and departments of the U.S. government that it, and/or its functionaries, would directly benefit from....

348.Based upon the regulations of the U.S. government, Defendant ADL’s fiscal appropriations demand made directly to the OMB incontrovertibly establishes it as a quasi-governmental agency....

More generally, the complaint says in part:

2. For nearly forty (40) years, the Anti-Defamation League ..., later joined by the Simon Wiesenthal Center ..., in violation of the rights and protections guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, have engaged in actions to hinder Minister Farrakhan and the Nation of Islam from continuing the Mission that Allah (God) gave to the Most Honorable Elijah Muhammad. 

3. That Mission, accepted by Minister Farrakhan, is to deliver the Truth that will correct the condition of spiritual, mental and moral death of the black man and woman of America that came as a result of the 310 years of chattel slavery and over 150 years of oppression and suppression, thereafter....

6. This lawsuit is to ensure that the abuse, misuse, and false use of the terms “anti-Semite,” “anti-Semitic,” and “antisemitism,” as falsely charged by the Defendants is permanently barred from being a tool to defame Plaintiffs and stifle the exercise of constitutional rights.

The Forward reports on the lawsuit.

Former Israeli Prime Minister Wins Defamation Action

Times of Israel reports that a Tel Aviv Magistrate's Court yesterday ruled in favor of former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett in his defamation action against Rabbi Yosef Mizrachi.  Mizrachi had falsely claimed that Bennett's mother is not Jewish. The court ordered Mizrachi to pay damages and to post an apology on his YouTube channel. The suit is part of a series of defamation actions that Bennett has filed since he left office seeking to “clean the internet” of "poison and fake news" in Israel.

Church Member's Defamation Suit Dismissed on Church Autonomy Grounds

In David v. South Congregational Church, (MA Super. Ct., Sept. 1, 2023), a Massachusetts trial court dismissed on church autonomy grounds a defamation suit against a Church, its Pastor and its Moderator brought by a Church member who was removed from the Church's Leadership, Finance and Investment Committees.  Plaintiff, a financial advisor, claims that he was inaccurately charged with unethical conduct in handling the funds of another church member. He seeks damages and other remedial action, including reinstatement on church committees. The court said in part:

... [T]here is no evidence that the defendant Moderator Figueroa's email to six Church leaders advising of the plaintiff's removal from the three Church leadership committees was ever communicated or published by the defendant Church officials beyond those leadership officials.... The sole disciplinary action taken by the church defendants was the plaintiff's removal from Church committees and positions of [Church] leadership.... Plaintiff's claimed defamation damages ... are necessarily limited exclusively to his reputation amongst the internal Church leadership.

But even limiting the scope of plaintiff's tort damage claim will not save his cause of action against the defendant Church, its Pastor and Moderator. A jury ... may not be permitted to second-guess church officials' and require them to pay damages because the jury disagrees with internal church discipline decisions...

The plaintiff is improperly asking this court to interject itself into-- and moreover reverse-- the internal disciplinary action imposed by the Church Pastor and Moderator upon another Chruch member.

[Thanks to John Egan for the lead.]

Injuring Police Chief's Reputation At His Church Was Not Free Exercise Violation

In Chesley v. City of Mesquite,(D NV, Aug. 14, 2023), a Nevada federal district court dismissed a suit brought by Joseph Chesley, Mesquite's former police chief, against the city, its former city manager and others for spreading rumors that Chesley had inappropriate sexual relations with women (including underage women), that he had embezzled money from a local business and improperly approved police overtime. Among others, the rumors were spread to members of Chesley's church.  As one of his claims, Chesley alleged that his free exercise rights were violated because the rumors and the city's inaction in stopping the rumors from spreading destroyed his reputation at his place of worship and impaired his ability to take part in worship at his church. In dismissing this claim, the court said in part:

Under circumstances such as these, where “the government action is neither regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory” the question is whether the challenged government action “substantially burdens a religious practice and either is not justified by a substantial state interest or is not narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” ... Chesley has not pled any substantial burdening of his Free Exercise Rights. The harms he alleges—a “destroyed” reputation at his church, and consummate discomfort worshipping there—are subjective, and the Ninth Circuit is clear that “a subjective chilling effect on free exercise rights is not sufficient to constitute a substantial burden.”...

Two Justices Say Iowa Should Adopt Ministerial Exception Doctrine

In Konchar v. Pins, (IA Sup. Ct., April 14, 2023), the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's dismissal of fraud, defamation and breach of contract claims by the former long-time principal of a Catholic school.  The court said in part:

Ultimately ... Konchar’s defamation claim is about whether a Catholic priest was justified in deciding that Konchar should no longer serve as principal at a Catholic school. But the district court believed that this kind of inquiry would run afoul of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.... In fact, the district court specifically found that the First Amendment precludes inquiries by “a civil court” into “the decision of whether Konchar was suitable for the role of Principal at St. Joseph’s.” And Konchar’s briefs do not challenge this conclusion. So we presume without deciding that the district court was correct, and we decline to reverse.

Justice Waterman, joined by Justice McDermott, filed a concurring opinion saying in part:

I write separately to confirm the majority opinion leaves the door open to formally apply the ministerial exception in our state. I would apply that exception in this case as an alternative ground to affirm dismissal of all tort claims asserted by Phyllis Konchar related to her termination as principal and “spiritual leader” of this church-operated private school. The ministerial exception better protects the autonomy of religious organizations guaranteed under the First Amendment to choose who ministers their faith and spares churches, dioceses, priests, and bishops the entanglement with costly civil litigation this case exemplifies. The extensive discovery, depositions, and trial spanning two weeks that these church defendants endured could have been avoided by a prompt dispositive motion under the ministerial exception long recognized by the United States Supreme Court, federal circuit courts, and other state courts.

Satanic Temple Is Not Limited Purpose Public Figure for Defamation Law Purposes

In The Satanic Temple, Inc. v. Newsweek Magazine LLC, (SD NY, March 8, 2023), a defamation suit by The Satanic Temple (TST) over a Newsweek article about it, a New York federal district court concluded that TST is not a limited purpose public figure for purposes of defamation law.  The court said in part:

,,, Plaintiff “advocates for the religious rights of its membership, and must sometimes take legal action to protect those rights.... Defendants contend that this activity is sufficient to make Plaintiff a limited purpose public figure because the “advocacy tends to attract attention.”...

But attention alone is not enough. Plaintiff must have “invited public attention to [its] views in an effort to influence others.” ... Defendants offer no evidence to show that Plaintiff “openly invited media attention,” by “issuing press releases, making public statements [or] addressing ‘open letters.’”... Plaintiff initiated lawsuits for the sole purpose of protecting the religious rights of its members, not to influence the minds of others. One does not voluntarily inject itself into a public controversy simply by filing a lawsuit to vindicate its rights, even if doing so incidentally attracts public attention.

Nevertheless, the court found that most of the statements cited by TST were not defamatory. Only a statement claiming that TST covered up sexual abuse survived the motion to dismiss. Volokh Conspiracy reports on the decision.

Texas Supreme Court Dismisses Defamation Actions Brought Against Anti-Abortion Proponents

In Lilith Fund for Reproductive Equity v. Dickson, (TX Sup. Ct., Feb. 24, 2023), the Texas Supreme Court in two companion cases ordered trial courts to dismiss defamation actions brought against Mark Lee Dickson and Right to Life East Texas.  At issue were statements Dickson made on his own and on Right to Life's Facebook pages describing plaintiffs, two pro-choice organizations, as "criminal organizations" and saying that the organizations "exist to help pregnant Mothers murder their babies." The postings were part of a campaign to convince other Texas cities to enact anti-abortion ordinances similar to one enacted in 2019 by Waskom, Texas. The court, concluding that defendants' postings were expressions of opinion rather than fact, and that the suits should be dismissed under the Texas Citizens Participation Act, said in part:

A reasonable person, equipped with the national, historical, and temporal context, and informed by the overall exhortative nature of his posts, could not understand Dickson as conveying false information about the plaintiffs’ underlying conduct, as opposed to his opinion about the legality and morality of that conduct. A reasonable person would understand that Dickson is advancing longstanding arguments against legalized abortion, in the context of an ongoing campaign to criminalize abortion, on public-discourse sites regularly used for such advocacy. 

The plaintiffs argue that opinion based on a false assertion of fact can be actionable defamation. In other words, they argue that Dickson’s advocacy declaring them to be “criminal” goes beyond mere opinion....

Notable is what Dickson does not say in his statements. He does not refer to the Penal Code nor to any Texas criminal law. He does not falsely claim that the plaintiffs have been arrested or prosecuted, or otherwise indicate to the reasonable person that the plaintiffs have been convicted of crimes based on specific conduct. To the contrary, Dickson invokes a moral premise, calling for his readers to change existing law to match that moral premise....

A subjective belief, even when sincerely held by a speaker, is not the standard for determining whether a statement of opinion is defamatory. The touchstone is the reasonable reader’s reception, not the speaker’s self-serving statements of intent or interpretation.

Justice Devine, joined by Justice Blacklock, filed a concurring opinion saying in part:

I join in full the Court’s well-reasoned and thorough opinion. But it is regrettable that it took the courts of our State so long to dismiss the Funds’ obviously meritless lawsuits that were filed to silence their political adversaries. Defamation law must never become a weapon of intimidation against opponents, no matter the party or the side of a political issue.

The Texas Supreme Court has links to the briefs and oral arguments in the case.  Jonathan Turley discusses the decision.

Ministerial Exception Doctrine Requires Dismissal of Jewish Teacher's Defamation Suit

In Hyman v. Rosenbaum Yeshiva of North Jersey, (NJ Super., Feb. 8, 2023), a New Jersey state appellate court held that the ministerial exception doctrine required dismissal of a defamation suit brought by a rabbi who was an elementary school Judaic studies teacher at an Orthodox Jewish school. An investigation by an outside law firm employed by the school concluded that the rabbi had inappropriately touched 5th and 6th grade female students in his classes. The school terminated the rabbi's employment and, after consulting halachic authorities, e-mailed a letter to school parents informing them that the rabbi was terminated because his conduct violated the Orthodox Jewish standards of conduct set out in the school's Staff Handbook. According to the court:

The letter was spread throughout the entire school community and similar Jewish communities. Additionally, plaintiff's picture appeared on Jewish websites such as "Frums Follies" and "Lost Messiah," and the allegations were disseminated by bloggers. As a result, plaintiff was allegedly branded as a pedophile among the Jewish community, which affected any possibility of him obtaining future employment in education.

In affirming the dismissal of the rabbi's defamation suit, the court concluded that the ministerial exception doctrine applies to more than just employment discrimination lawsuits.  It said in part:

We ... conclude that the ministerial exception applies to bar tort claims, provided (1) the injured party is a minister formerly employed by a religious institution and (2) the claims are related to the religious institution's employment decision.

Prof Sues Hamline University in Dispute Over Muslim Art Slides Shown in Art History Course

A great deal of national attention has been focused on the dispute at Hamline University over the school's refusal to renew the contract of adjunct Art History faculty member Erika Lopez Prater. A Muslim student (who was also president of the Muslim Student Association) complained to University administrators that in an online class on Islamic art Prater displayed slides of two classic paintings of the Prophet Muhammad. Because of the complaint, the University informed Prater that the class she had been scheduled to teach the following semester has been cancelled. Last week, Prater filed suit against the University in a Minnesota trial court.  The complaint (full text) in Prater v. Trustees of Hamline University of Minnesota, (MN Dist. Ct., filed 1/17/2023) alleges religious discrimination, defamation, breach of contract as well as several other causes of action.  It alleges in part:

Instead of recognizing that López Prater had displayed the images of the Prophet Muhammad for a proper academic purpose, Hamline decided to impose [the Muslim student's] interpretation of Islam on all Hamline employees and students....

[University Vice President]  Everett engaged in libel on Hamline’s behalf, publicly defaming López Prater via email to all Hamline employees and students. The email ... states in relevant part:

Several weeks ago, Hamline administration was made aware of an incident that occurred in an online class. Certain actions taken in that class were undeniably inconsiderate, disrespectful and Islamophobic....

In a January 13 statement, the University released a statement saying in part:

In the interest of hearing from and supporting our Muslim students, language was used that does not reflect our sentiments on academic freedom. Based on all that we have learned, we have determined that our usage of the term “Islamophobic” was therefore flawed. We strongly support academic freedom for all members of the Hamline community. We also believe that academic freedom and support for students can and should co-exist. How this duality is exemplified on our campuses, especially in the current multicultural environment in which we live, is an exciting, robust, and honest conversation for academics, intellectuals, students, and the public to have.

[Thanks to Eugene Volokh via Religionlaw for the lead.]

Court Dismisses Hindu Organization's Defamation Suit

In Hindu American Foundation v. Viswanath, (D DC, Dec. 20, 2022), the D.C. federal district court dismissed a defamation suit brought by a Hindu advocacy organization against five individuals who are critics of the current Indian government's alleged treatment of Muslims and other religious minorities. In the case, Hindu American Foundation alleged that its reputation was damaged, and it lost donations, after the publication of articles in Al Jazeera in which defendants described HAF as being sympathetic to Hindu supremacist ideology.  Defendants also criticized HAF's receipt of federal COVID relief funds. The court held that it lacks jurisdiction over four of the defendants because they failed to have sufficient connections to meet the jurisdictional requirements of the D.C. long-arm statute. As to the fifth defendant, the court held that as a limited purpose public figure, HAF needed to plead actual malice. It failed to do so.  It also concluded that defendant's statements were expressions of opinion or rhetorical hyperbole, not verifiably false statements of fact. American Bazaar reports on the decision.

Pastor's Defamation Suit Dismissed On Ecclesiastical Abstention Grounds

In Weems v. Celebration Church of Jacksonville, Inc., (FL Cir. Ct., Sept. 28, 2022), a Florida state trial court dismissed on ecclesiastical abstention grounds a defamation lawsuit by the former pastor of Celebration Church. At issue is a report growing out of an internal investigation of the pastor commissioned by church trustees.

Plaintiffs’ current pleading invites this Court’s entanglement into Celebration Church’s internal matters....

In order to determine whether Celebration Church defamed Pastor Weems as currently alleged, this Court would need look to the time Pastor Weems was employed by the Church to see whether he did or did not partake in the actions as alleged by the Church and whether those actions were forbidden by the Church's bylaws and other internal policies.

Florida Times-Union reports on the decision.