In United States v. Lindor, (ACCA, June 14, 2023), the Army Court of Criminal Appeals rejected appellant's claim that his murder sentence violated his free exercise rights under the 1st Amendment and RFRA. The case involves a Staff Sergeant who, after multiple attempts, succeeded in murdering his wife through the use of rituals and poisons recommended by a Vodou practitioner in Haiti. The court said in part:
[A]ppellant's actions to summon Vodou rituals ... were consistent with his First Amendment right to freely exercise his religious beliefs.... [T]he record contains no indication that they called for any illegal activity or result.... The stipulation's derogatory references to these Vodou rituals—after all, they were categorized as "aggravation" evidence—violated the First Amendment's free exercise clause. The government, consistent with the Constitution's guarantee of free exercise, "cannot act in a manner that passes judgment upon or presupposes the illegitimacy of religious beliefs and practices."...
However, our analysis does not end there,.... [Appellant] waived his objection to evidence of these particular spells in two ways.... First, the military judge directly advised appellant and his counsel that, if he admitted it, he would consider the stipulation of fact to decide whether appellant was guilty, and, if so, an appropriate sentence; appellant and his counsel agreed. Second, the military judge specifically asked appellant's counsel whether he had any objections to the stipulation; counsel responded, "No, Your Honor."...
Turning to appellant's violence toward RL, we view this as substantially different from the rituals about AD and government officials. We have searched for, but cannot find, any authority to support appellant's tacit argument that the First Amendment's "free exercise" clause can broadly shield one from government action to describe, prosecute, and punish conduct that unlawfully endangers another person's life...
Put plainly, we decline to characterize appellant's violent misconduct toward RL as the free exercise of religious belief.... [A]ctivities that harm others are not protected by the free exercise clause. To characterize appellant's chosen techniques to plan, express, and actuate his intent to murder RL as the free exercise of his religious beliefs would expropriate the free exercise clause of any principled, reasonable meaning. The United States Constitution's framers and the various ratifying conventions plainly and deliberately did not contemplate that one could seek protection in the clause for an act that violated another's right to be free from malicious violence.
