Hoch v. Hoch, (CA App., Feb. 17, 2026) (certified for publication 3/12/2026), is an appeal from family court orders relating to sanctions and domestic violence restraining orders (DVRO) issued in marriage dissolution proceedings involving a Jehovah's Witness couple. Among other holdings, the California state appellate court reversed the DVRO issued against the wife and affirmed the DVRO against the husband. The court also reversed monetary sanctions issued against the husband under Section 271 of the Family Code, but affirmed other monetary sanctions issued against him. The court said in part:
Michael contends that imposition of sanctions against him under section 271 violated his rights under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. He claims that as a practicing and devout member of the Jehovah’s Witness faith, he could not stipulate to allowing Marcie to amend her petition for legal separation to allege dissolution instead without violating his religious beliefs.
We need not address whether the sanctions against Michael under section 271 violated his constitutional right of free exercise of religion. The trial court abused its discretion under section 271 by imposing monetary sanctions against Michael for not stipulating to permit Marcie to amend her petition for legal separation by converting it into one for marital dissolution. Stipulating by its nature is not obligatory. Michael expressed what he believed to be a “conscientious” reason for declining to stipulate: Due to his religious beliefs, he was not comfortable with “facilitating” a divorce. Whether or not that reason amounts to a legitimate claim under the federal constitution’s free exercise of religion clause is a question we need not decide. Michael’s concern was reasonable and, it appears to us, held in good faith. No evidence was presented that would lead us to conclude to the contrary....
Among the actions which the family court cited as giving rise to a restraining order [against the husband] was Michael’s “inappropriate use of religion to control [Marcie], including, but not limited to, in the instant marital dissolution action.”... The only such instance of inappropriate use of religion expressly identified by the family court was “compelling [Marcie]’s filing of a dissolution action because [Michael] wanted to control whether or not [Marcie] could seek a legal separation and, later, a dissolution of marriage.” We need not decide whether the court infringed Michael’s right of free exercise in order to conclude this was an erroneous ground for a restraining order. Michael had a statutory right not to agree to a legal separation if he did not want one. The other grounds cited by the trial court are, however, sufficient in themselves to support the DVRO against Michael.
