Wednesday, May 13, 2026

Noise Ordinance Arrest Did Not Violate First Amendment or State RFRA

In Acevedo v. Zatora,(ND IL, May 11, 2026), an Illinois federal district court dismissed plaintiff's claims that police officers violated his free speech and free exercise rights when they arrested him for violating Chicago's noise ordinance. The ordinance prohibits amplified sound on public property that is louder than average conversational level at 100 feet distance. Acevedo and six others set up a microphone on a public sidewalk across from a Planned Parenthood clinic. Acevedo contends that his amplified speech was no louder than permitted under the Ordinance. The court said in part:

Acevedo’s First Amendment grievance ... is not with the noise ordinance’s constitutionality, either facially or as applied to his circumstances. He instead challenges defendants’ decision to arrest him for violating the noise ordinance despite his compliance with it and purportedly owing to his protected speech. This claim is indistinguishable from Acevedo’s First Amendment retaliation claim ... where he alleges that he was unjustly arrested in retaliation for his protected speech, despite his compliance with the noise ordinance....

In dismissing Acevedo's retaliation claim, the court concluded that Acevedo was arrested for disobeying an officer's order to stop using the microphone, not because of the religious or political content of his speech.

The court also dismissed Acevedo's claim against the city of Chicago. Acevedo contended that the city has a policy of  "preventing Christian street preachers (and presumably others) from using voice amplification on the public way by misapplying the noise ordinance to prohibit all amplified religious speech (and possibly other speech) regardless of volume or compliance with the ordinance’s actual requirements." The court said that the complaint did not give the city fair notice of the action Acevedo was challenging. The court said in part:

Do officers involved in the allegedly problematic practice exclusively target Christian street preachers engaged in religious speech, or do the officers also target street preachers of “all” faiths and other individuals not engaged in religious speech at all? Do officers consistently invoke the noise ordinance when they encounter Christian street preachers, or do they arrest Christian street preachers for other alleged infractions and without invoking the noise ordinance at all.

Dismissing Acevedo's claim under the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the court said in part:

Acevedo has not alleged that he faced a “coercive choice” between abandoning his religious convictions or complying with a City regulation. Rather, Acevedo alleges that he did comply with the City’s ordinance while exercising his religious convictions.

The court allowed Acevedo to move ahead on his 4th Amendment false arrest claim.