[R]egardless of whether the Church is congregational or hierarchical, its decision to terminate Cage-Barile's membership is binding on us. That decision was based on religious doctrine and, as a matter of constitutional law, is not subject to review by civil courts. Nor is there any suggestion in the record that the Church failed to follow the proper procedures in making its decision. The Church held a noticed meeting, invited the congregation, allowed Cage-Barile to speak to the assembly, and, thereafter, the board and membership expelled her.... Under the First Amendment, the courts must accept the Church's decision. The question before us is whether, having expelled Cage-Barile, the Church can prevent her from entering its property. The answer is yes....
Objective coverage of church-state and religious liberty developments, with extensive links to primary sources.
Friday, April 30, 2010
Court Can Enjoin Expelled Member From Entering Church Property
British Appeals Court Rejects Plea For Special Panel To Adjudicate Religious Rights Cases
The London Daily Express , The Independent and the Daily Mail all report on the decision.The general law may of course protect a particular social or moral position which is espoused by Christianity, not because of its religious imprimatur, but on the footing that in reason its merits commend themselves.... But the conferment of any legal protection or preference upon a particular substantive moral position on the ground only that it is espoused by the adherents of a particular faith, however long its tradition, however rich its culture, is deeply unprincipled.
... We do not live in a society where all the people share uniform religious beliefs. The precepts of any one religion – any belief system – cannot, by force of their religious origins, sound any louder in the general law than the precepts of any other. If they did, those out in the cold would be less than citizens; and our constitution would be on the way to a theocracy, which is of necessity autocratic. The law of a theocracy is dictated without option to the people, not made by their judges and governments. The individual conscience is free to accept such dictated law; but the State, if its people are to be free, has the burdensome duty of thinking for itself.
So it is that the law must firmly safeguard the right to hold and express religious belief; equally firmly, it must eschew any protection of such a belief's content in the name only of its religious credentials.
Head of Egypt's Al-Azhar Cuts Political Ties
Thursday, April 29, 2010
USCIRF Releases 2010 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom
USCIRF's 382-page report documents religious freedom issues in both CPC and watch list countries, as well as in three others that are being closely monitored: Bangladesh, Kazakhstan and Sri Lanka. Under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, USCIRF's report is to be considered by the State Department in preparing its Annual Report to Congress on International Religious Freedom. Also each year, the President is to revise the list of CPCs. The most recent list (see prior posting) is comprised of 8 of the 13 countries recommended this year by USCIRF: Burma, China, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia (with a waiver), Sudan, and Uzbekistan. An AP article discusses the USCIRF Report.
Court Says Juror's Discussion With Pastor On Capital Punishment Was Harmless Error
5th Circuit Hears Oral Arguments In Challenge To Texas Pledge of Allegiance
Retired Chaplains Urge President To Retain Don't Ask, Don't Tell
The letter says: "if the government normalizes homosexual behavior in the armed forces, many (if not most) chaplains will confront a profoundly difficult moral choice: whether they are to obey God, or to obey men." The letter contends that chaplains will be pressured into watering down their religious teachings and may have their ability to share their religious beliefs challenged. It goes on to argue:
Marginalizing a large group of chaplains ... will unavoidably harm readiness by diminishing morale. Similarly, making orthodox Christians-- both chaplains and servicemen-- into second-class Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen or Marines whose sincerely-held religious beliefs are comparable to racism cannot help recruitment or retention.According to Congress.org, to counter the letter, six gay rights activists delivered toy soldiers to their lawmakers yesterday to represent the 13,500 service personnel who have been discharged under "don't ask, don't tell." Also, the Interfaith Alliance released a statement (full text) criticizing the chaplains' letter, saying in part: "Repealing 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' is a step forward in equality and justice for all citizens. When chaplains find the government's pursuit of these goals to be a threat to their values, we must ask whether something is askew with their values."
Iran Limits Rights of Sunnis To Conduct Prayers
Virginia Governor Restores Police Chaplains' Right To Deliver Sectarian Prayers
Supreme Court Hears Arguments On Release of Names of Petition Signers
Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Decision Not To Circulate Minister's Resume
Wednesday, April 28, 2010
Supreme Court Reverses Order Barring Display of Cross At World War I Memorial
Justice Kennedy concluded that the government's objections to plaintiff's standing could not be raised at this stage of the litigation because the government had not properly sought Supreme Court review of the issue when it was initially decided. He then focused on the complex procedural history of the case. The district court enjoined the government from permitting display of the Cross on Sunrise Rock before Congress passed the statute transferring the land to a private party. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that a reasonable observer would see the cross as an endorsement of religion. Plaintiff's challenge to the land transfer was brought in the form of seeking to apply or extend the original injunction to it. The district court enjoined the transfer on the basis of an improper Congressional purpose. Justice Kennedy objected:
The District Court thus used an injunction granted for one reason as the basis for enjoining conduct that was alleged to be objectionable for a different reason.... [It] failed to consider whether, in light of the change in law and circumstances effected by the land-transfer statute, the "reasonable observer" standard continued to be the appropriate framework through which to consider the Establishment Clause concerns invoked to justify the requested relief. As a general matter, courts considering Establishment Clause challenges do not inquire into "reasonable observer" perceptions with respect to objects on private land....In a one-paragraph concurring opinion, Chief Justice Roberts said that the land transfer was no different that tearing down the cross, selling the land to the VFW, and having the VFW reconstruct the cross.
.... [T]he District Court concentrated solely on the religious aspects of the cross, divorced from its background and context. But a Latin cross is not merely a reaffirmation of Christian beliefs. It is a symbol often used to honor and respect those whose heroic acts, noble contributions, and patient striving help secure an honored place in history for this Nation and its people. Here, one Latin cross in the desert evokes far more than religion. It evokes thousands of small crosses in foreign fields marking the graves of Americans who fell in battles, battles whose tragedies are compounded if the fallen are forgotten.
Justice Alito, writing separately, said he agreed with Justice Kennedy, except he did not see any need to remand the case for further proceedings. He would reverse the decision and instruct the district court to vacate its order prohibiting implementation of the land-transfer statute. He said:
Congress chose an ... approach that was designed to eliminate any perception of religious sponsorship stemming from the location of the cross on federally owned land, while at the same time avoiding the disturbing symbolism associated with the destruction of the historic monument. The mechanism that Congress selected is one that is quite common in the West, a "land exchange."Justice Scalia wrote an opinion joined by Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment but arguing that plaintiff lacks Article III standing to pursue what Scalia characterized as new relief, not an appliation of the original injunction. Plaintiff failed to allege any actual or imminent injury from the land transfer, since the only injury plaintiff claimed was his concern with seeing the cross on federal land.
Justice Stevens, in an opininon joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, dissented. Stevens argued that it was proper for the district court to find that the land transfer statute violated its original injunction. He concluded that the land transfer statute did not end government endorsement of the cross:
First, after the transfer it would continue to appear to any reasonable observer that the Government has endorsed the cross, notwithstanding that the name has changed on the title to a small patch of underlying land. This is particularly true because the Government has designated the cross as a national memorial, and that endorsement continues regardless of whether the cross sits on public or private land. Second, the transfer continues the existing government endorsement of the cross because the purpose of the transfer is to preserve its display.Stevens goes on to assert that the plurality is attempting to reopen a settled issue-- whether the government can endorse the cross because of its dual symbolism. In concluding, he emphasized that because Congress has created no other memorial to the veterans of World War I, this sectarian symbol is the only monument to all the soldiers who died in that war.
Finally Justice Breyer wrote a separate dissent arguing that the Court should have dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted since the case turns on fairly clear principles of the law of injunctions and presents no federal questions of general significance. A district court has considerable leeway to interpret the meaning of its own injunctions, and should interpret the scope of an injunction in light of the injunction's purpose and history. The district court did that here. The Washington Post reports on the decision.
Creator Of "Draw Mohammed" Campaign Backs Off, As Others Continue It
Dispute Continues Over Nepal As Secular State In Proposed Constitution
9th Circuit: Appeal To Religion Did Not Void Miranda Waiver
Recommended Life Sentence For Rubashkin Questioned
Interpretation of Florida "No-Aid" Provision Certified To State High Court
As the panel had done in its original decision (see prior posting), the revised decision struck down the state payments to these religious organizations, but held that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the contracts that were entered into with these organizations and required them to provide faith-based transitional housing. Finally the court rejected a challenge to provisions requiring consultation with a chaplain before an inmate is placed in a faith-based substance-abuse transitional housing program.
Justice Thomas (joined by 4 others) wrote a dissenting opinion to the denial of en banc review urging the court to use this case as an opportunity to reverse earlier precedent and hold that paying a religious institution to provide a public benefit does not amount to "aid" to the institution. Yesterday's Miami Herald reported on the decision.