In Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, (Sup. Ct., April 17, 2024), the U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Kagan, clarified the extent to which harm must be shown in a Title VII employment discrimination case in which plaintiff alleges a discriminatory job transfer. The court said in part:
The courts below rejected the claim on the ground that the transfer did not cause Muldrow a “significant” employment disadvantage. Other courts have used similar standards in addressing Title VII suits arising from job transfers.
Today, we disapprove that approach. Although an employee must show some harm from a forced transfer to prevail in a Title VII suit, she need not show that the injury satisfies a significance test. Title VII’s text nowhere establishes that high bar....
To make out a Title VII discrimination claim, a transferee must show some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.
What the transferee does not have to show, according to the relevant text, is that the harm incurred was “significant.” ... Or serious, or substantial, or any similar adjective suggesting that the disadvantage to the employee must exceed a heightened bar.
Justices Thomas, Alito and Kavanaugh each filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, but differing to some extent with the majority's reasoning.
Although this case involved sex discrimination, the test would apply equally to religiously discriminatory job transfers. Wisconsin Public Radio reports on the decision.
