Ministerial Exception Bars Student Chaplain's Title IX and FLSA Claims

In Davenport v. Episcopal Health Services, Inc., (ED NY, Feb. 5, 2026), a New York federal district court held that the ministerial exception doctrine bars Title IX and Fair Labor Standards Act claims by a student chaplain in an Episcopal hospital. The court said in part:

Plaintiff Archbishop Russell Davenport served as a chaplain at St. John’s Episcopal Hospital South Shore [EHS]... as part of the hospital’s clinical pastoral education program.  But he claims the hospital never paid him for spiritual and clinical counseling that he performed for patients after his shift ended.  He separately claims that the hospital improperly rejected his sexual harassment complaint against a fellow chaplain but suspended him when another employee filed a complaint against him....

Plaintiff contends that EHS is not a religious group because the complaint “makes no allegations about the religious origins or continuing religious purpose of the hospital.” ...

Like the Department of Pastoral Care, the CPE program offers “pastoral services to patients and community members.” ...  Its chaplains perform religious rituals and rites, worship with patients, and offer spiritual counsel....  The CPE’s work therefore also vests in Defendants a critical aspect of its religious entity—even if its services are not strictly Episcopalian.  That indisputably religious service renders St. John’s and EHS religious groups....

Plaintiff insists that the ministerial exception does not apply to students.  But he adduces no authority why the exception excludes those who administer religious services simply because they obtain “professional training and education for ministry” part-time....

The ministerial exception applies to Plaintiff’s wage-and-hour claims.  Just “as the initial function of selecting a minister is a matter of church administration and government, so are the functions which accompany such a selection,” including “determination of a minister’s salary.”...

Islamic Terrorism Unit In Course Does Not Violate 1st Amendment

In Sabra v. Maricopa County Community College District, (D AZ, Aug. 18, 2020), an Arizona federal district court dismissed a suit challenging the manner in which a community college faculty member taught a portion of a World Politics course. Plaintiffs contend that the instructor's primary message in teaching the Islamic Terrorism module of the course was disapproval of Islam.The court rejected both Establishment Clause and Free exercise challenges, saying in part:

Examining the course as a whole, a reasonable, objective observer would conclude that the teaching’s primary purpose was not the inhibition of religion. The offending component was only a part of one-sixth of the course and taught in the context of explaining terrorism. One aspect of terrorism is Islamic terrorism. Only in picking select quotes from the course can one describe the module as anti-Islam.... [T]he primary effect of Dr. Damask’s course is not the inhibition of the practice of Islam. Therefore, the Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claims must be dismissed....

Mr. Sabra was not required to adopt the views expressed by Dr. Damask or the authors Dr. Damask cited to in his course, but only to demonstrate an understanding of the material taught. Dr. Damask’s course did not inhibit Mr. Sabra’s personal worship in any way. Instead, Mr. Sabra was simply exposed to “attitudes and outlooks at odds” with his own religious perspective.... Therefore, as a matter of law, the Court finds that the Plaintiff’s allegations do not amount to a violation of the Free Exercise Clause by the Defendants....

[Thanks to Volokh Conspiracy for the lead.]

Appeals Court Reverses Dismissal of Negligence Suit Against Hospital Chaplain

In Lefkowitz v. Skokie Hospital, (IL App., July 25, 2014), an Illinois appellate court reversed a trial court's dismissal of a suit by an Orthodox Jewish man, Moshe Lefkowitz, who alleges that Skokie Hospital's Jewish chaplain was negligent in failing to prevent his amputated leg from being incinerated. Orthodox Jewish beliefs require amputated body parts to be  preserved or buried so that they can eventually be buried with the individual from whom they came. The appeals court said that there was a question of whether the forms Lefkowitz signed consenting to the hospital's disposal of his amputated leg were effective since Lefkowitz was blind and did not read them. The Chicago Tribune, in an article appearing in tomorrow's edition, discusses the case and also points out that Lefkowitz is a defendant in an unrelated criminal case charging him, his father (a rabbi), and his brother with stealing $10,000 in donations from a North Shore synagogue.