EEOC Obtains Settlement for Failure to Accommodate Jewish Employee's Sabbath Observance

The EEOC today announced that two related automotive hauling and logistics companies have agreed to a $65,000 settlement (plus an injunction, reporting, monitoring and employee training requirements) to settle a Title VII suit charging them with religious and racial discrimination and retaliation.  The EEOC said in part in its press release:

According to the EEOC’s lawsuit, Wheeler subjected Charles R. Lynch, III, a Torah Observant employee at its Sheffield, Ohio, location to discrimination when they revoked his religious accommodation that would have allowed him to continue having Saturdays off to observe the Sabbath. The company also exposed Lynch, who is Israeli, to unlawful harassment that included likening him to a terrorist and mocking his religious beliefs.

Court Upholds Firing of Nurse with Religious Objections to Flu Vaccine

In French v. Albany Medical Center, (ND NY, June 12, 2024), a New York federal district court upheld a hospital's firing of a nurse who refused for religious reasons to receive the flu vaccine. Plaintiff based her religious exemption claim on teachings of the "Israelite" religion which she adopted in 2018. Rejecting plaintiff's claim that the hospital violated Title VII by refusing to accommodate her religious beliefs, the court said in part:

[T]he Court concludes that Plaintiff's requested accommodation was not reasonable as it was a blanket exemption request which would have allowed her to continue interacting with staff and vulnerable patients while unvaccinated. This exemption would have caused an undue hardship on Defendant.

The court also rejected plaintiff's claims of disparate treatment and retaliation, saying in part:

Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that her religion was a motivating factor in Defendant's decision to suspend and terminate her.

Catholic Bishops Sue EEOC Over Rules Implementing Pregnant Workers Fairness Act

Suit was filed last month in a Louisiana federal district court by the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Catholic University of America and two Louisiana Catholic dioceses challenging rules adopted in April of this year by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission implementing the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act.  The Act requires employers to provide reasonable accommodation for employees in connection with pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions. At issue in the recent lawsuit is the EEOC's inclusion of abortion as a related medical condition. The complaint (full text) in United States Conference of Catholic Bishops v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, (WD LA, filed 5/22/2024) alleges in part:

The PWFA is not an abortion accommodation mandate. Rather, it fills a gap in federal employment law by ensuring pregnant women receive workplace accommodations to protect their pregnancies and their preborn children. Plaintiff United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) enthusiastically supported the law’s bipartisan passage. That support reflected the PWFA’s uncontroversial and laudable purpose, which is fully consistent with the Catholic Church’s belief that all human life is imbued with innate dignity and its goal of ensuring a fairer workplace for women. But EEOC has now shoehorned a mandate that employers across the country knowingly support abortion into a statute explicitly designed to protect the health and safety of preborn babies and their mothers.  

Worse, at the same time that it expands federal law into fraught areas, EEOC also insists on nullifying the explicit religious exemption that Congress wrote into the PWFA. In the PWFA, Congress imported Title VII’s religious exemption, which expressly allows employers to make employment decisions based on sincere religious beliefs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000gg-5(b). Of course, since the PWFA concerns only pregnancy in the workplace, this makes clear that Congress meant to allow religious exemptions from pregnancy-accommodation claims. Yet now EEOC claims the exemption bars only religious discrimination claims—which aren’t authorized by the PWFA in the first place. That renders the exception a nullity, protecting employers from PWFA claims that don’t exist.

National Review yesterday reported on the lawsuit.

5th Circuit Stays Contempt Order Requiring 3 Attorneys Take Religious Liberty Training

In Carter v. Local 556, Transport Workers Union of America, (5th Cir., June 7, 2024), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals granted a stay pending appeal of a controversial contempt sanction imposed by a Texas federal district court against three attorneys for Southwest Airlines. (See prior posting.) Southwest had failed to adequately comply with a remedial Order imposed on it for firing a flight attendant because of her social media posts and private messaging featuring aborted fetuses to illustrate her religious objections to abortion.  The district court, among other things, ordered that the attorneys responsible for non-compliance with the prior Order attend at least 8 hours of religious liberty training conducted by the Christian legal non-profit Alliance Defending Freedom. In staying the contempt sanction, the Court of Appeals said in part:

[T]here is a strong likelihood that the contempt order exceeded the district court’s civil contempt authority....

Civil contempt sanctions are “remedial” and “designed to compel future compliance with a court order” by either “coerc[ing] the defendant into compliance with the court’s order” or “compensat[ing] the complainant for losses sustained” as a result of the noncompliance.... Criminal contempt sanctions, by contrast, are used to “punish defiance of the court and deter similar actions.”... Generally, “criminal [contempt] penalties may not be imposed on someone who has not been afforded the protections that the Constitution requires of such criminal proceedings.”...

At bottom, it appears that the district court sought, at least in part, to punish Southwest for what the district court viewed as conduct flouting its holding that Southwest had violated Title VII. But its punitive sanctions likely exceed the scope of the court’s civil-contempt authority.

Law dork reports on the decision.

Lifeguard Sues L.A. County Over Required Flag Raising for Pride Month

A suit was filed last week in a California federal district court by plaintiff who is employed as a lifeguard by Los Angeles County objecting to the requirement that he raise the Progress Pride Flag at his lifeguard station during June which has been designated as LGBTQ+ Pride month. The complaint (full text) in Little v. Los Angeles County Fire Department, (CD CA, filed 5/24/2024), alleges in part:

Captain Little is ... an evangelical Christian with beliefs on marriage, family, sexual behavior and identity that align with the traditional and orthodox biblical-social teachings....

... While Captain Little understands that the government can speak its own messages, and thus may promote Pride Month, he believes that he cannot personally do so by raising the Progress Pride Flag. Doing so would be to personally participate in, espouse, and promote messages contrary to his sincerely held religious beliefs, similar to how many courts have recognized that Jehovah’s Witnesses may not salute or pledge allegiance to the flag of any nation or state....

The complaint alleges that requiring him to raise the Pride Flag, refusing to provide him with a religious accommodation and taking retaliatory action against him violate Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the California Fair Employment and Housing Law, the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. and California Constitutions and the Free Speech clause of the U.S. Constitution.

Thomas More Society issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit. Los Angeles Times has additional details.

UPDATE: According to a June 5. 2024 press release from the Thomas More Society, Los Angeles County has agreed to give plaintiff a partial accommodation by not requiring him to raise the Progress Pride Flag as part of his job for the remainder of June.

8th Circuit Reverses Dismissal of Suit for Failure to Accommodate Religious Objections to Vaccine Mandate

In Ringhofer v. Mayo Clinic, Ambulance, (8th Cir., May 24, 2024), the U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a Minnesota federal district court's dismissal of suits by Mayo Clinic employees who sought accommodations because their employer's Covid vaccine mandate violated their religious beliefs. The court concluded that two of the employees did properly exhaust their administrative remedies under Title VII. It also found that all the employees had adequately pleaded a conflict between their Christian religious beliefs and the vaccine mandate. Finally, it concluded that the Minnesota Human Rights Act provides a cause of action for failure to accommodate religious beliefs.

11th Circuit: Excluding Sex Change Surgery from Health Plan Violates Title VII

 In Lange v. Houston County, Georgia, (11th Cir., May 13, 2024), the U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision held that an employer violated Title VII's ban on sex discrimination in employment when its employee health insurance plan excluded coverage for sex change surgery. The majority said in part:

The Exclusion is a blanket denial of coverage for gender-affirming surgery.  Health Plan participants who are transgender are the only participants who would seek gender-affirming surgery.  Because transgender persons are the only plan participants who qualify for gender-affirming surgery, the plan denies health care coverage based on transgender status....

 By drawing a line between gender-affirming surgery and other operations, the plan intentionally carves out an exclusion based on one’s transgender status.  Lange’s sex is inextricably tied to the denial of coverage for gender-affirming surgery.

Judge Brasher dissenting said in part:

... [T] the employer-provided health insurance plan here does not deny coverage to anyone because he or she is transgender. The alleged problem with this plan is that it excludes coverage for sex change surgeries, not that it denies coverage to transgender people. On the face of this policy, it doesn’t treat anyone differently based on sex, gender nonconformity, or transgender status....

... [T]he majority’s reasoning effectively eliminates “disparate impact” as a separate theory of liability. For various reasons, Lange is proceeding here under a disparate treatment theory, which is why the claim requires a showing of discriminatory intent. But we have developed an entire body of law—disparate impact—to address claims about certain facially nondiscriminatory employment policies that harm members of a protected class.... That body of law requires, among other things, an evaluation of an employer’s legitimate business reasons for adopting the policy.....

TLDEF issued a press release announcing the decision.

18 States Sue EEOC Over Guidance on Transgender Sexual Harassment

Eighteen states filed suit this week in a Tennessee federal district court challenging an EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Harassment in the Workplace issued on April 29.  The lengthy Guidance includes the following:

[S]ex-based harassment includes harassment based on sexual orientation or gender identity, including how that identity is expressed. Harassing conduct based on sexual orientation or gender identity includes epithets regarding sexual orientation or gender identity; physical assault due to sexual orientation or gender identity; outing (disclosure of an individual’s sexual orientation or gender identity without permission); harassing conduct because an individual does not present in a manner that would stereotypically be associated with that person’s sex; repeated and intentional use of a name or pronoun inconsistent with the individual’s known gender identity (misgendering); or the denial of access to a bathroom or other sex-segregated facility consistent with the individual’s gender identity.

The complaint (full text) in State of Tennessee v. EEOC, (ED TN, filed 5/13/2024) among other things alleges that the Guidance violates the First Amendment, saying in part:

By purporting to require employers and their employees to convey the Administration’s preferred message on controversial gender-identity preferences— for example, requiring the use of pronouns that align with an employee’s self-professed gender identity and prohibiting the use of pronouns consistent with that employee’s biological sex—the Enforcement Document unconstitutionally compels and restrains speech, even if contrary to the regulated parties’ viewpoints....

Requiring that employers and their employees adhere to EEOC’s chosen gender ideology orthodoxy likewise treads on religious freedoms.  Because Title VII provides exemptions for small employers, it is not “generally applicable,” and the Enforcement Document triggers strict scrutiny under free-exercise caselaw.... EEOC’s gender-ideology-accommodation mandate impermissibly violates employers’ and employees’ free-exercise rights.... Thus, adopting the policies required by the Enforcement Document would cause Plaintiff States to violate their employee’s First Amendment rights.

Tennessee's Attorney General issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Religious Discrimination Claim for Denial of Personal Leave Moves Ahead

In Balchan v. New Rochelle City School District, (SD NY, May 7, 2024), a New York federal district court refused to dismiss claims of religious discrimination, retaliation for submitting claims of religious discrimination, and a due process claim for stigmatization plus loss of employment. Plaintiff is a Jewish woman who was employed as the school district's Medial Director. At issue are disciplinary charges brought against her for allegedly using personal leave days for a vacation and the stigmatizing report by a hearing officer in connection with those charges. The court details the factual background in part as follows:

Plaintiff observes Jewish holidays including, but not limited to, Yamim Nora’im (a/k/a the “Days of Awe”), Rosh Hashanah, and Yom Kippur..... Plaintiff alleges that her personal scheme of things religious evolved over the course of her life, and that marriage to her Trinidadian husband resulted in her “meld[ing] many of her Jewish religious beliefs into her new Trinidadian identity.” ...

... Specifically, Plaintiff’s “personal scheme of things religious required that she take personal leave during [the Days of Awe] to adjust, meditate, repair her connection to [God], and re-focus . . . .” Accordingly, she planned a trip with her family to Trinidad and Tobago which she alleges was “religious in nature given its relation to the Jewish high holy days” and what had been going on in her personal and professional life....

4th Circuit: Ministerial Exception Bars Suit by Catholic School Teacher Fired Over Same-Sex Marriage Plans

In Billard v. Charlotte Catholic High School, (4th Cir., May 8, 2024), the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Catholic high school teacher's suit alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title VII should be dismissed. The court's majority held that the ministerial exception doctrine defeated the suit by the teacher of English and drama who was not invited back to teach after he announced plans to marry his same-sex partner. The majority, finding that the teacher should be classified as a "minister" for purposes of the ministerial exception, said in part:

[F]aith infused CCHS’s classes – and not only the expressly religious ones.  Even as a teacher of English and drama, Billard’s duties included conforming his instruction to Christian thought and providing a classroom environment consistent with Catholicism.  Billard may have been teaching Romeo and Juliet, but he was doing so after consultation with religious teachers to ensure that he was teaching through a faith-based lens....  The record makes clear that CCHS considered it “vital” to its religious mission that its teachers bring a Catholic perspective to bear on Shakespeare as well as on the Bible.   

Moreover, we note that Billard did – on rare occasions – fill in for teachers of religion classes.... CCHS’s apparent expectation that Billard be ready to instruct in religion as needed is another “relevant circumstance” indicating the importance of Billard’s role to the school’s religious mission.   

Our court has recognized before that seemingly secular tasks like the teaching of English and drama may be so imbued with religious significance that they implicate the ministerial exception.

The majority rejected the school's argument for broadening statutory defenses to the Title VII claim.

Judge King filed an opinion concurring in the result but differing as to rationale. He said in part:

... I would neither reach nor resolve the First Amendment ministerial exception issue on which the majority relies.  I would decide this appeal solely on Title VII statutory grounds, that is, § 702 of Title VII.... [M]y good friends of the panel majority have unnecessarily resolved the appeal on the First Amendment constitutional issue.  In so ruling, they have strayed from settled principles of the constitutional avoidance doctrine and our Court’s precedent.

Feds Sue Texas Correctional Authorities for Failing to Accommodate Employee's Religious Head Covering

The Justice Department today filed suit against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice alleging that it violated Title VII by failing to accommodate a clerical employee's religious practice of wearing a head covering pursuant to her Ifa faith. The complaint (full text) in United States v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, (SD TX, filed 5/3/2024), alleges in part:

34. Though Spears identified her belief in the Ifa faith and her religious practice of wearing a head covering, TDCJ was not satisfied that her religious beliefs were sincere or should be accommodated. 

35. Instead, when Spears turned in her accommodation form, Fisk informed her that TDCJ would further research her religion and its practices. Spears questioned whether it was a normal practice to research religions. Specifically, she asked whether research would be done for more mainstream religions. Fisk indicated that it was not TDCJ’s normal practice.

 36. On October 15, 2019, Fisk conducted an internet search of the Ifa religion and practices and faxed the search results along with Spears’s accommodation request to Terry Bailey for her consideration. 

37. Then, on October 16, 2019, TDCJ further questioned the sincerity of Spears’s faith when Bailey mailed a letter demanding documentation or a statement from a religious institution pointing to the specific Ifa belief or doctrine that supported the necessity of Spears’s head covering. The letter also stated that TDCJ would not take any further action to review Spears’s accommodation request until the additional information was submitted.

The Department of Justice issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit.

Accommodating Teacher's Anti-Transgender Beliefs Created Undue Hardship for School Under Title VII

In Kluge v. Brownsburg Community School Corporation, (SD IN, April 30, 2024), an Indiana federal district court in a 46-page opinion that sets out extensive factual background information, dismissed an orchestra teacher's Title VII claim that the school had failed to reasonably accommodate his religious objections to referring to transgender students by their preferred names and pronouns. The school had initially permitted the teacher to refer to students by their last names only, but later withdrew that accommodation and forced the teacher's resignation. A primary issue in the case was whether continuing to allow a last-names-only accommodation would create an "undue hardship" for the school under the Supreme Court's definition of that term in its 2023 decision in Groff v. DeJoy. Finding that it would, the court said in part:

BCSC's business is "educating all students," which it achieves by "fostering a learning environment of respect and affirmation."...  Part of that is BCSC's mission to "afford[] dignity and empathy toward transgender students."...  Parents, medical professionals, administrators, and many students all agree that pursuing that mission would require transgender students to be addressed by their preferred names and pronouns....

Lest there be any doubt about disruption, Mr. Kluge himself believed that the Last Names Only Accommodation would result in disruption and indeed was encouraged by it.  He explained to Dr. Daghe that far from resigning, he was "encouraged all the more to stay." ...  After all, he believed, his "persecution" was "a sign that [his] faith as witnessed by using last-names-only . . . was being effective."...  Faced with Mr. Kluge's own statements—"pleading" with the school to avoid going down the "transgender path," seeking to discuss with students their "eternal destination," and hoping to stay because his "persecution" surrounding the Last Names Only Accommodation was being "effective"—complaints from others were hardly necessary.  While the Last Names Only Accommodation might have been intended as neutral, it ultimately was perceived as intentional....

As the Supreme Court held in Groff, undue hardship is to be viewed within the context of a particular business, not a particular employee.  The Court compares the cost to BCSC's mission, not Mr. Kluge's.  BCSC could either support its transgender students in pursuit of its mission and comply with the law, or accede to Mr. Kluge's accommodation and risk harm to students and the learning environment and/or substantial and disruptive litigation.... The law of Title VII does not require BCSC to continue an accommodation that actually resulted in substantial student harm, and an unreasonable risk of liability, each sharply contradicting the school's legally entitled mission to foster a supportive environment for all.  The Last Names Only Accommodation was an undue burden to BCSC as a matter of law.....

Supreme Court Clarifies Harm Requirement in Title VII Job Transfer Claims

 In Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, (Sup. Ct., April 17, 2024), the U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Kagan, clarified the extent to which harm must be shown in a Title VII employment discrimination case in which plaintiff alleges a discriminatory job transfer. The court said in part:

The courts below rejected the claim on the ground that the transfer did not cause Muldrow a “significant” employment disadvantage.  Other courts have used similar standards in addressing Title VII suits arising from job transfers. 

Today, we disapprove that approach. Although an employee must show some harm from a forced transfer to prevail in a Title VII suit, she need not show that the injury satisfies a significance test.  Title VII’s text nowhere establishes that high bar....

To make out a Title VII discrimination claim, a transferee must show some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.

What the transferee does not have to show, according to the relevant text, is that the harm incurred was “significant.” ... Or serious, or substantial, or any similar adjective suggesting that the disadvantage to the employee must exceed a heightened bar.

Justices Thomas, Alito and Kavanaugh each filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, but differing to some extent with the majority's reasoning. 

Although this case involved sex discrimination, the test would apply equally to religiously discriminatory job transfers. Wisconsin Public Radio reports on the decision.

8th Circuit Hears Oral Arguments on Employee's Religious Discrimination Claim Over Objection To LGBTQ+ Display Online

The U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals on Tuesday heard oral arguments in Snyder v. Arconic Corp. (Audio of full oral arguments.) In the case, an Iowa federal district court in Snyder v. Arconic Corp., (SD IA, Aug. 31, 2023), dismissed a Title VII religious discrimination claim brought by an employee who was fired for placing a post on the company's intranet objecting to a rainbow-colored heart on the company's intranet publicizing a support group for LGBTQ+ employees. The employee's post read:  "Its a (sic.) abomination to God. Rainbow is not meant to be displayed as a sign for sexual gender." He contended that the post was religiously motivated. The district court held that the employee had not shown a conflict between his religious practices and the company's diversity policy. Thomas More Society issued a press release announcing the oral arguments.

DOJ Sues California Prisons for Failing to Accommodate Officers' Religious Beard Requirements

The Department of Justice this week filed suit in a California federal district court seeking to enjoin the California correctional system from requiring its peace officers to be clean shaven in contravention of their sincerely held religious beliefs.  The problem arose for Muslim and Sikh correctional employees when they were required to meet the conditions for wearing tight-fitting respirators.  The complaint (full text) in United States v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, (ED CA, filed 3/25/2024), contends that the Department of Corrections has not attempted to accommodate the peace officers' concerns by offering them positions in the Department that do not require wearing of respirators or by offering alternative respirators that could be worn with beards.  The complaint alleges in part:

The Charging Parties allege that CDCR has discriminated against them on the basis of religion in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)(2), by: a. Failing to provide a religious accommodation;  b. failing to adequately engage in the interactive process with the Charging Parties, including by failing to make good faith efforts to consider whether alternative accommodations will eliminate the conflict between the Charging Parties’ religious beliefs and CDCR’s clean  shaven policy; and c. failing to demonstrate that implementing the alternative accommodations proposed by the Charging Parties would pose an undue hardship.

The Department of Justice issued a press release announcing the filing of the lawsuit. AP reports on the lawsuit.

Denial of Religious Exemption from Vaccine Mandate Did Not Violate Title VII or Constitution

In White v. University of Washington, (WD WA, March 22, 2024), a Washington federal district court rejected Title VII as well as constitutional challenges brought by a healthcare worker who was denied a religious exemption from Washington's Covid vaccine mandate. In discussing Plaintiff's Title VII claim of failure to reasonably accommodate, the court said in part:

With respect to COVID-19 in particular, guidance from the EEOC indicates that “increasing ‘the risk of the spread of COVID-19 to other employees or to the public’” is a ground for finding undue hardship on employers asked to grant religious exemptions to COVID-19 vaccination mandates....

 The Ninth Circuit also has found on a motion to dismiss that undue hardship is established as a matter of law where a religious accommodation would require an employer to violate state or federal law.

The court also rejected plaintiff's due process, equal protection and free exercise claims, saying in part:

Plaintiff has made no allegations regarding what her religious beliefs are, let alone how they were burdened by Defendants’ adherence to Proclamation 21-14.

7th Circuit: Refusal to Dismiss Under Church Autonomy Doctrine Is Not Appealable Interlocutory Order

 In Garrick v. Moody Bible Institute, (7th Cir., March 18, 2024), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, held that that an order refusing to dismiss a Title VII employment discrimination case under the church autonomy doctrine is not an appealable interlocutory order. The suit was brought by a former communications instructor who claimed sex discrimination.  According to the Bible Institute, the instructor's firing resulted from her disagreement with the Institute's doctrine that only men should serve as clergy. Plaintiff contended that this was merely a pretext for sex discrimination. In denying appealability, the court said in part:

... Moody’s argument that it will experience irreparable harm without immediate review and reversal of the district court’s order is unavailing. Religious autonomy to shape and control doctrine will not be threatened. Within its discretion to manage discovery, the district court should limit discovery to instances of discriminatory treatment in situations not implicated by Moody’s complementarian beliefs.

Judge Brennan dissented, arguing that the interlocutory dismissal order should be appealable. Americans United issued a press release announcing the decision.

Christian Employers Protected from Requirement to Provide Insurance for Gender Transition Procedures

 In Christian Employers Alliance v. U.S. EEOC, (D ND, March 4, 2024), a North Dakota federal district court enjoined the Department of Health and Human Services from enforcing the Affordable Care Act, and the EEOC from enforcing Title  to require the Christian Employers Alliance or its present or future members to provide their employees insurance coverage for gender transition procedures. The court said in part:

... [I]f CEA had to comply with these mandates, its members would have to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs which is an impermissible exercise under the First Amendment and RFRA. ...

While protecting the right of transgender patients to access crucial healthcare and protecting workers from sex discrimination is certainly a compelling interest, the Defendants here have done nothing more than identify a broadly formulated interest in an attempt to justify the general applicability of the government mandates....  Even if the Court were to accept the Defendants’ purpose for the mandates as a compelling interest, the Defendants failed to provide any evidence showing this policy was the only feasible means to achieve its compelling interest....

Just The News reports on the decision.

Certiorari Denied in Ministerial Exception Case

Yesterday the U.S. Supreme Court denied review in two companion appeals, Bowes v. Liberty University, Inc. (Docket No. 23-550) and Liberty University, Inc. v. Bowes (Docket No. 23-703, certiorari denied 3/4/2024) (Order List.).  The three judges on the 4th Circuit panel deciding the case below each had a different view on application of the ministerial exception doctrine in this age discrimination case brought by a Liberty University art professor. (See prior posting.) The case also posed other interpretive questions under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

Title VII Challenge to Denial of Vaccine Exemption Survives Motion to Dismiss

In Prodan v. Legacy Health, (D OR, Feb. 12, 2024), an Oregon federal district court refused to dismiss a Title VII religious discrimination claim brought by two former employees of Legacy Health who were denied religious exemptions from the Covid vaccine mandate for healthcare workers. The court said in part:

... [C]ourts appear to be in agreement that a general allegation of religious conflict without identifying a conflicting belief is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss....

... [However] allegations of an allegedly religious belief coupled with an assertion that the COVID-19 vaccine conflicts with that belief is enough to plead a prima facie case of religious discrimination.

 In the case, one plaintiff alleged that her body is a temple of God and taking the Covid vaccine violates her conscience. The second defendant alleged that her body is a Temple of the Holy Spirit and refraining from injecting it with harmful chemicals and unknown substances honors the Temple.