Priest's Defamation Suit Dismissed on Ecclesiastical Abstention Grounds

In Catholic Diocese of Richmond v. Smalls, (VA App, Nov. 5, 2025), a Virginia state appellate court dismissed on ecclesiastical abstention grounds a defamation suit by a priest serving in the Diocese of Belize.  The Diocese of Richmond included plaintiff's name on a list of priests who had credible and substantiated allegation of sexual abuse of a minor.  The allegations against plaintiff occurred while he was a seminarian in the Richmond Diocese. The court said in part:

It is clear that the definition used to determine that there was a credible and substantiated allegation against Smalls of sexual abuse involving a minor includes references to religious precepts.  The definition discusses sexual abuse in terms of a violation of the Sixth Commandment.  It also provides that clergy who possessed, acquired, or distributed “pornographic images of minors under the age of fourteen” committed sexual abuse, but does not define “pornographic images.”  But if there is doubt as to whether such an offense has occurred, bishops are directed to reference writings of moral theologians.  Smalls’s defamation claim thus rests on the falsity of a statement that is based on the application of a specific religious definition of sexual abuse.  “[C]ivil courts cannot adjudicate defamation claims when the truth of the statements in question turns on ecclesiastical law.” ...

Because Smalls’s claim for defamation cannot be resolved on neutral secular principles, the circuit court was without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case....

Local Church's Property Held in Trust for Parent United Methodist Church

In French Broad United Methodist Church v. Holston Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, (TN App., Oct. 31, 20225), a Tennessee state appellate court affirmed a trial court's dismissal of a local church's suit against its parent body. In this portion of a broader set of claims regarding ownership of a property that had been used as a parsonage, the local church challenged a provision in the Book of Discipline of the United Methodist Church that provided all local church properties were held in trust for the benefit of the denomination. The court said in part:

The trial court determined that Bethel UMC’s claims to quiet title, for a declaration that the trust clause in The Book of Discipline was invalid, and for judicial modification of the trust ... were barred by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.  Even if the doctrine did not bar these claims, the trial court found that The Book of Discipline would require the dismissal of these claims pursuant to the hybrid neutral principles approach, “under which trust provisions in governing church documents must be enforced.”  The trial court noted that the dispute at issue “post-dated the codification of the ‘trust’ provisions of The Book of Discipline.”...

... Tennessee cases dictate that the property dispute between Bethel UMC and Holston is subject to determination in accordance with the hybrid neutral principles approach, which requires a court to defer to and enforce the trust provisions of The Book of Discipline....

Bethel UMC asserts that The Book of Discipline and the trust clause fail because Bethel UMC did not “ever intend to give centuries old properties, worth billions of dollars, away to strangers, when it violates their lives, liberties, freedom, and the pursuit of happiness to worship as they wish without harm to others or in violation of any laws.” 

We respectfully disagree with Bethel UMC’s reasoning. The trial court found that, “Bethel admits that it was an affiliate of The United Methodist Church.” The trial court also noted that the dispute at issue “post-dated the codification of the ‘trust’ provisions of The Book of Discipline.”  By its affiliation with the national church, Bethel UMC agreed to be bound by the governing documents of the United Methodist Church.... Further, ... Bethel UMC concludes that, instead of applying the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, “as the long lineage of cases clearly indicates, . . .  the legal neutral principles should have been applied to the trial court cause of action, which it was not.”  As previously discussed, however, Bethel UMC’s claims were likewise subject to dismissal under that theory, which would require application of the trust provisions.

Court Cannot Require Congregational Vote on Disaffiliation from Methodist Parent Body

In Ex parte Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc., (AL Sup. Ct., Oct. 31, 2025), the Alabama Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to dismiss a suit brought by certain members of the Auburn United Methodist Church (AUMC) who wanted to disaffiliate from its parent body, the United Methodist Church, because of disagreement with the UMC's position on human sexuality. Those members sought a court order to require a vote of all the members of AUMC on whether the congregation should disaffiliate and a declaration that the parent Conference lacked any interest in the congregation's property. The Court held in part:

Under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, Alabama courts may not adjudicate disputes that are ecclesiastical in nature, including matters of church doctrine, polity, or internal governance.... Generally, the process of disaffiliation is governed by ecclesiastical rule.... Thus, a dispute concerning disaffiliation is typically considered an ecclesiastical matter -- not a civil one.

The Court went on to hold that an Alabama statute on church control of its real property does not require a congregational vote on denominational disaffiliation. AL.com reports on the decision. [Thanks to Thomas Rutledge for the lead.]

Battle Over Congregations' Disaffiliations Dismissed on Ecclesiastical Abstention Grounds

 In United Methodist Rio Conference Board of Trustees v. Alice First Methodist Church, (TX App., Oct. 29, 2025), a Texas state appeals court affirmed the dismissal of a suit by the United Methodist Church parent body challenging attempts by some two dozen local Texas congregations to disaffiliate from the United Methodist Church. The disaffiliation attempts were triggered by the General Conference's decision to allow ordination of gay and lesbian pastors. Plaintiff claimed that the local congregations did not comply with the proper procedures in their attempts to disaffiliate. The court said in part:

... [T]he Conference contends the trial court has jurisdiction over this lawsuit because the questions of whether the local churches are bound by the Discipline’s disaffiliation provisions and properly disaffiliated from the UMC can be determined by interpreting the Discipline using neutral principles of law. We disagree....

... This suit does not involve a dispute over who owns the real property currently occupied by the local churches. This is a dispute over whether the local churches are bound to follow the Discipline and the specific provisions providing for disaffiliation from the UMC. Although our supreme court has held courts may apply neutral principles of law to issues “such as . . . corporate formation, governance, and dissolution” when a religious entity has chosen to establish itself under Texas corporations law, ... it has rejected parties attempts to have the courts resolve disputes under church governing documents and regulations because such an inquiry would “intrude upon internal affairs of church governance and autonomy.”...  As such, ... the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine— and broader church autonomy doctrine— precludes courts from interpreting religious documents that dictate church governance....

In its second issue, the Conference contends that even if the trial court is divested of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, the court nevertheless has jurisdiction to enforce the Conferences’ position because it is the higher ecclesiastical authority.  It appears the Conference contends we look to neutral principles of law to resolve issues involving religious entities when possible but must defer to the higher ecclesiastical authority if the court determines it does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute.

In Southern Methodist University, the supreme court recently rejected this argument from a regional conference within the UMC.  See S. Methodist Univ., 716 S.W.3d at 483.  The supreme court held that “if courts could not decide the case without resolving a religious question or impeding the church’s authority to manage its own affairs, the result would be dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, not rendition of judgment granting the Conference (or any other party) affirmative relief.”

NY Court Dismisses Suit by Parishes Challenging their Bishop's Decision to Close Them

In Rozak v Diocese of Buffalo, (NY Erie County Sup. Ct., Sept. 26, 2025), a number of Catholic parishes sued the Diocese of Buffalo in an attempt to prevent the Bishop of Buffalo from forcing the parishes to merge into other parishes. The parishes had already filed Canon Law appeals to the Vatican's Dicastery for the Clergy challenging the validity of the Bishop's merger decrees. The Dicastery issued an order suspending the merger decrees while the Canon Law appeals were proceeding. The parishes, however, also filed this suit in a New York civil court under the New York Religious Corporation Law asking for a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the Merger Decrees while the ecclesiastical appeals proceeded.

The New York trial court dismissed the suit on jurisdictional grounds, saying in part:

Central to the pending actions is the inescapable fact that while the plaintiffs make overtures and attempt to frame their complaints to include a companion reference that the "temporalities and property" of the subject parishes are contemporaneously at risk of misappropriation vis-à-vis the manner by which and the purpose for which the mergers were declared by Bishop Fisher, these are not per se typical or traditional common law property disputes under any provisions of applicable New York civil law. More compelling in these actions is the undisputed fact that the Suspension Letters have operatively controlled and stayed all aspects of the challenged Merger Decrees and more recently, the first Dicasterium Decree that has been issued makes a plain declaration of the matters raised in the complaints, to wit, formally "confirming the extinctive union, for which sufficient cause has been shown" and directing the treatment and handling of the "temporal goods of the suppressed Parish."

Though avidly and forthrightly argued by plaintiffs that the disposition rendered by the Dicastery in the Dicasterium Decree is supportive of their position for the Court to grant the relief sought in these actions, it is plain and obvious from the averments made in their supplemental papers that the plaintiffs acknowledge, accept and completely reconcile themselves to the decisional authority of the Canon Law and ecclesiastical governance of the Roman Catholic Church to be solely and ultimately responsible for the lawful disposition of all the issues raised in these actions.... 

Court Refuses to Dismiss Case on Misappropriation of Tithed Funds Under Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine

 In Leach v. Gateway Church, (ED TX, Sep. 17, 2025), a Texas federal district court refused to dismiss a class action suit on behalf of Gateway Church members and tithers alleging misappropriation of tithed funds. The court said in part:

Plaintiffs allege Defendants induced Plaintiffs to donate money to Gateway by falsely representing fifteen percent (15%) of all donations would be distributed to global missions and Jewish ministry partners... [and that] Defendants guaranteed Plaintiffs a refund of their donated funds if Plaintiffs were dissatisfied with Gateway’s use of such funds.... Plaintiffs’ efforts to seek transparency and substantiation for Gateway’s use of Plaintiffs’ donations or to otherwise recover any allegedly misappropriated tithe funds have not been successful....

Because Gateway’s membership exceeds 100,000 members since its founding, Plaintiffs allege the proposed class will consist of “tens of thousands of persons,” including members that do not reside in Texas....

The court held that it was not required to abstain from hearing the case on the basis of the Class Action Fairness Act which directs class actions to state courts when there is minimal diversity of citizenship between members of the class and defendant.  

The court also refused to dismiss the case on ecclesiastical abstention grounds. The court said in part:

Defendants argue neutral principles of law cannot resolve Plaintiffs’ claims because “Plaintiffs’ claims necessarily touch on the religious doctrine and practice of tithing and intrude in Gateway’s internal affairs and administration”... 

At this stage ... Defendants have not established the disputed financial expenditures from Plaintiffs’ tithes were approved by a committee or governing body based on Gateway’s religious doctrine.... Second, Defendants have not pointed to any church policy outlining that its contested expenditures were justified by Gateway’s religious teachings.... Third, the Parties have not alleged they have differing definitions of “Jewish ministry partners” or any other term at issue....  

... Plaintiffs’ claims seemingly address Defendants’ non-religious conduct: acts of concealment; discrepancies in the reconciliation of donated funds balances; unaccounted for donations; financial irregularities; and lack of transparency or substantiations for Gateway’s use of Plaintiffs’ donations.... The Court acknowledges the act of tithing is a religious act, but Plaintiffs do not dispute their tithing; rather, Plaintiffs allege their tithes were fraudulently allocated and Defendants misrepresented critical facts to Plaintiffs before tithing....

Ministry Watch reports on the decision.

Pastor's Suit for Reinstatement Dismissed Under Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine

 In Kyles v. Church of God in Christ, (TX App, Aug. 21, 2025), a Texas state appellate court dismissed on ecclesiastical abstention grounds a suit seeking a declaratory judgment that plaintiff, Rufus Kyles, should be reinstated as pastor of the Evangelist Temple Church of God in Christ in Houston, Texas. The court explained in part:

Kyles alleged wrongdoings by multiple bodies of the church during investigations into complaints against him and the resolution of those investigations. The CGC filed an answer, alleging that Kyles was charged in the church with sexual misconduct in 2014, that the church conducted an internal investigation and internal judicial processes in which Kyles participated, and that the internal judicial processes resulted in Kyles being removed from the offices of bishop and pastor....

Here, Kyles’s lawsuit would require the review of the ecclesiastical judicial process, analysis of the CGC’s internal church governance and procedure, and a determination regarding the appropriateness of the CGC’s disciplinary actions against Kyles. In other words, Kyles’s lawsuit cannot be resolved by only applying neutral principles of law; instead, it would require the application of principles of church governance, procedure, and discipline... To prevent courts from impermissibly influencing church governance, courts may not second-guess the decisions reached by a church judicatory body in the application of its own rule, custom, or law....

Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine Requires Dismissal of Suit Between Unification Church Factions

In Family Federation for World Peace and Unification International v. Hyun Jin Moon, (DC Ct. App., July 3, 2025), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's final dismissal of a lawsuit surrounding a schism and succession dispute in the Unification Church.  The dispute has been in litigation for 14 years and has been before the Court of Appeals three times previously. (See prior posting.) Among the numerous issues dealt with in the Court's 59-page opinion was whether the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applies to the dispute. The Court said in part:

... [A]ppellants argue that the trial court erred by (1) finding that resolution of the contract claims required determining questions of disputed religious doctrine; and (2) after making that finding, failing to apply the fraud or collusion exception to nonetheless permit review of the contract claims....

At bottom, appellants have yet to provide a clear, spelled-out answer as to how a court or jury might parse their contract and quasi-contract claims through neutral principles of law.  Pointing us to any and all potential contract conditions in the record does not cure the underlying problem we identified in Moon III—which was reiterated by the trial court on remand—that any path of decision-making analysis would require deciding actual, disputed questions of religious doctrine or leadership.  This necessarily results from the combination of (1) the use of extraordinarily broad, religious language in the purported contract terms and (2) an intrachurch dispute about the meaning of that language.  The contract-related claims therefore must fail under the baseline religious abstention doctrine....

Preston has only fraudulently donated UCI’s assets if he is not the true leader of the Unification Church and he knows it.  We cannot say the first thing without running afoul of the abstention doctrine, as we made clear in Moon III, and if bare allegations of fraud or collusion could get us around that, then the courts would be thrust right back into resolving core theological disputes about religious doctrine, hierarchy, and succession.  “No thanks” to that—that runs afoul of the abstention doctrine’s central animating principles.  And it is well established that we cannot apply any fraud or collusion exception in a way that violates the existing Supreme Court precedent on religious abstention....

The trial court acted well within its discretion to put an end to this decade-old case rather than breathing new life into it on its deathbed years after appellants could have gone after the discovery they now belatedly seek.

Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine Leads to Dismissal of Church Property Dispute

In Atlantic Korean American Presbytery v. Shalom Presbyterian Church of Washington, Inc., (VA App., March 11, 2025), a Virginia state appellate court held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine barred civil courts from hearing a church property dispute where the church involved had previously invoked jurisdiction of the Presbyterian Church Synod in the church's controversy with the Korean American Presbytery. The church went to a civil court only when it was unhappy with the Synod's ruling. At issue was whether the church's property was held in trust for either of the church's parent bodies-- the Atlantic Korean American Presbytery or the Presbyterian Church, U.S.A.  The court said in part:

AKAP asserts that because the PCUSA Synod previously adjudicated part of this dispute after Shalom invoked the Synod’s authority to prevent AKAP from assuming control of its assets, Shalom’s decision to seek a decision from the PCUSA Synod deprived the circuit court (and by extension, this Court) of jurisdiction to hear the matter.  Since we find the Synod’s decision deprives the circuit court of jurisdiction to hear this matter under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, we agree that the circuit court could not reach this matter because it lacked jurisdiction even to hear Shalom’s claim as pleaded. ...

By filing the instant complaint in the circuit court, Shalom is collaterally attacking the decision of the PCUSA’s Synod, whose jurisdiction Shalom had previously submitted to before ever initiating the current civil litigation.  Moreover, when initiating its opposition to AKAP’s attempt to seize control over its assets and operations by an Administrative Commission, Shalom filed an ecclesiastical complaint before the Synod while asserting standing to do so as a member of PCUSA and, thus, per PCUSA’s Book of Order, stating it was also a member of AKAP.  When the Synod subsequently denied their ecclesiastical complaint, instead of appealing that decision to the PCUSA General Assembly, Shalom “terminated [its] connection” with AKAP, and filed a civil complaint in the circuit court that sought a declaration that Shalom was not a member of AKAP.  And this complaint did not assert that the Synod’s decision was fraught with fraud or collusion.  Hence, by filing this civil complaint, Shalom effectively collaterally attacked the Synod’s decision (instead of appealing it) and entirely reversed the position it took on its PCUSA membership status before the ecclesiastical tribunal....  For us to find it permissible for Shalom to undertake a litigation strategy of first filing an ecclesiastical complaint in the ecclesiastical bodies of the Presbyterian Church USA, and then, instead of appealing an adverse judgment within that forum—immediately filing a civil complaint in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County to attack the judgment of the Synod—would violate both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the United States Constitution.

The court's 43-page opinion includes a lengthy review of the development of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine in Virginia.

Civil Courts Can Decide Dispute Over Catholic Organization's Bylaws

In Foundation for the Advancement of Catholic Schools, Inc. v. Blair, (CT App., Feb. 25, 2025), a Connecticut state appellate court held that a controversy over interpretation of the Foundation's bylaws can be adjudicated by civil courts.  At issue is whether under the Foundation's bylaws, the archbishop can appoint Board members who are not nominated by the Foundation's Governance Committee. The court said in part:

We need not decide whether FACS is a religious organization because, even if we assume, without deciding, that it qualifies as such, we conclude that the claims raised in the plaintiffs’ action can be resolved by applying neutral principles of law.....

We ...must review the plaintiffs’ requested relief and the relevant language of FACS’ bylaws to determine whether resolving this dispute requires an inquiry into purely ecclesiastical questions of religious doctrine or practice or the governance, administration or policies of a church....

Read plainly, the relevant language in the bylaws concerning the procedure for appointments to the board is entirely secular and cannot reasonably be interpreted as implicating issues of religious doctrine or practice or of church government, policy or administration. Put another way, nothing in the pertinent bylaw provision indicates that an analysis of the claims raised by the plaintiffs would require a court to go beyond the secular legal principles governing corporations and the interpretation of bylaws and to resolve impermissible ecclesiastical issues....

Indeed, the defendants concede that the plaintiffs’ claims do not require resolution of doctrinal issues but argue, nonetheless, that because of the archbishop’s status in the [Archdiocese of Hartford], he exercises his ‘‘religious discretion’’ when making decisions as to board appointments, which constitutes a matter of church governance and the governance of a presumably religious organization that a civil court cannot review. This argument fails because the dispositive question is whether the bylaws authorize the board to limit the universe of individuals who may be appointed to the board by the archbishop to only those individuals submitted for nomination by the committee. That question can be determined by applying secular legal principles.

Title VII Applies to Liberty University's Firing of Transgender Employee

In Zinski v. Liberty University, Inc., (WD VA, Feb. 21, 2025), a Virginia federal district court refused to dismiss a Title VII sex discrimination lawsuit against Liberty University brought by a former employee whose employment as an IT Apprentice was terminated because she underwent a male to female sex transition. In an extensively reasoned 70-page opinion, the court rejected several defenses asserted by the University. First the University contended that §§702 and 703 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act allow a religious employer to discriminate on the basis of transgender status when that is consistent with the employer’s religious belief. Those section allow a religious employer to discriminate "with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion." The court said in part:

Having determined that no source of law—from statutory text to legislative history to precedent—answers the question before us, the Court is left to weigh the imperfect arguments above, alongside the potential legal and social consequences of our decision. Drawing upon all of these considerations, we conclude that Sections 702 and 703 must be narrowly construed so as to permit discrimination only on the basis of an employee’s espoused religious belief or practice, such that religious employers have no license to discriminate on the basis of any other protected class. Where a religious employer discriminates on the basis of any other protected class in a but-for fashion, a statutory violation occurs, even if the decision was religiously motivated....

To decide that sex discrimination is acceptable so long as it is religiously motivated would allow employers to achieve all manner of discrimination under the banner of religion. So long as the religious institution can show that its view—despite directly implicating sex, race, or national origin—is a sincerely held religious belief, the religious institution would have free license to discriminate at will and evade the scrutiny of civil law. Not only would this subject potentially thousands of people to discrimination..., but it would supply religious institutions with a power not afforded to secular institutions, thereby generating favorites under the law and raising Establishment Clause questions....

The court also rejected the University's RFRA defense, concluding first that RFRA applies only to suits in which the government is a party. It added:

And even if Liberty were entitled to raise RFRA as a defense, we find that Title VII likely passes strict scrutiny....

On the record before us, enforcing this statute in Zinksi’s case merely requires Liberty to maintain an employee who has not followed the university’s Doctrinal Statement to the letter, i.e., an employee who has sinned. It does not require Liberty to change its belief, to endorse Zinksi’s behavior, or to allow Zinksi to spread a new message within the organization.... The minimal inroad on religious liberty here is easily justified by the exceedingly compelling governmental interest in eradicating sex discrimination in employment. Accordingly, we find that Liberty’s brief argument as to burden is insufficient to show substantial burden at this stage of litigation. Thus, strict scrutiny does not apply, and our analysis can come to an end.....

The court rejected the ministerial exception defense, saying in part that "nothing in the record suggests that Zinski was a minister." The court also rejected the University's freedom of expressive association claim, saying in part:

... [W]e must defer Liberty’s claim that it opposes transgender identification and seeks to avoid any promotion of transgender status as an appropriate form of behavior. However,... we cannot conclude that Zinksi’s presence at Liberty would “force the organization to send a message” that Liberty accepts transgender conduct as a “legitimate form of behavior.”... Zinksi is an IT employee who has limited to no interactions with students, has no role in influencing or promoting Liberty’s value system, and has no role in Liberty’s religious curriculum or programming. The only inference that we can draw for Liberty is that Liberty may be seen as a hypocrite for employing a transgender person when it opposes transgender identity; but the same could be said for Liberty’s employment of any other type of person who “sins” despite Liberty’s opposition to sin in general....

Finally, the court rejected the University's ecclesiastical abstention defense, saying in part:

Zinski’s complaint asks the Court to determine whether Title VII prohibits a religious institution from firing a transgender person, not whether a religious institution, like Liberty, has properly interpreted its religious doctrine when determining that a transgender person violates religious law and must be fired.

9th Circuit En Banc Affirms Dismissal of James Huntsman's Fraud Claims Against LDS Church

In Huntsman v. Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, (9th Cir., Jan. 31, 2025), the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed a trial court's dismissal of a fraud claim brought by James Huntsman, a prominent former member of and large contributor to the LDS Church.  Huntsman charged the Church with fraudulently misrepresenting the manner in which funds from tithes would be used, saying that that the Church falsely represented that the funds would not be used for commercial projects. The en banc court said in part:

No reasonable juror could conclude that the Church misrepresented the source of funds for the City Creek project.  Although the Church stated that no tithing funds would be used to fund City Creek, it also clarified that earnings on invested reserve funds would be used....

Huntsman’s claim with respect to the $600 million allegedly transferred to Beneficial Life also fails.  Huntsman does not identify any specific statements made by the Church about the source of funds for Beneficial Life....

Because nothing in our analysis of Huntsman’s fraud claims delves into matters of Church doctrine or policy, our decision in this case does not run afoul of the church autonomy doctrine.

Judge Bress, joined by Judges Smith and Nguyen and in part by Judge Vandyke, concurred in the judgment saying in part:

... [W]e should not indulge in the illusion that this is merely a secular lawsuit about civil fraud.  Under the First Amendment, the plaintiff’s challenge to the Church’s understanding of tithing is not susceptible to resolution in a court of law, lest the judiciary wrest control from religious authorities over matters of theological concern.  

It would have been straightforward and preferable for the court to recognize that plaintiff’s unprecedented theory encounters overwhelming First Amendment impediments.  While every judge on this panel agrees that the plaintiff’s claims fail, I write separately to explain why a suit like this could never succeed under the First Amendment’s church autonomy doctrine. 

Judge Bumatay filed an opinion concurring in the judgement, saying in part:

In deciding religious matters, the Constitution strictly limits our authority.  Simply put, the church autonomy doctrine bars federal courts from resolving matters of faith, doctrine, and church governance.  So we can’t just sidestep the doctrine and jump straight to the merits.  Nor can the doctrine be assumed away, considered an afterthought, or serve as a convenient alternative ruling.  Rather, it’s a threshold structural bar that must be reckoned with.  Otherwise, we violate the restraints the Constitution places on our power.

Negligence Claim Against Army Chaplain Barred by Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine

In Winder v. United States, (ND TX, Jan. 17, 2025), a Texas federal district court held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine requires dismissal of a negligence lawsuit filed under the Federal Tort Claims Act growing out of advice given by an Army Chaplain.  The Chaplain was consulted by Latrisha Winder, an Army National Guard member, about her husband's suicide threat which her husband conveyed by phone to her from Texas while she was in Virginia. The Chaplain advised Winder to have local law enforcement conduct a welfare check. When Ms. Winder objected, the Chaplain threatened to call local law enforcement himself if she did not.  This led Ms. Winder to call law enforcement. The welfare check led to a confrontation and to the fatal shooting of Winder's husband by a sheriff's deputy conducting the check. The court said in part:

Contrary to Plaintiffs' argument, this action is not "simply a civil dispute in which a religious official happens to be involved." Based on the Complaint's allegations and its reference to Army regulations and training materials, Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts showing that this action "entails[] no inquiry into [the Chaplain's] religious doctrine."...

Plaintiffs argue the Chaplain threatened to breach his duty of confidentiality by telling Latrisha "he would call law enforcement if she did not call," which they contend "is wholly secular and a neutral principle that the Court can apply without inquiring into and applying [the Chaplain's] religious training, faith, and beliefs."...

The existence of this tension—whether the Chaplain's duty of confidentiality is religious or secular in nature—is precisely why free exercise principles mandate the Court abstain from adjudication here. Indeed, "[i]t is a core tenet of First Amendment jurisprudence that, in resolving civil claims, courts must be careful not to intrude upon internal matters of" religious doctrine.... It is not for the Court to adjudicate, or even question, the Chaplain's duty of confidentiality, given that Plaintiffs have admitted, and Army regulations make clear, there is a religious component to this inquiry.

Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine Does Not Apply To Pastor's Defamation Suit

In Garner v. Southern Baptist Convention, (TN App., Jan. 8. 2025), a Tennessee state appellate court held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not apply to a defamation suit brought by a Baptist pastor against the Southern Baptist Convention and various of its officials and staff. At issue are oral conversations and a letter from an SBC staff member suggesting that allegations of sexual misconduct had been made against Preston Garner, a pastor at Everett Hills Baptist Church. The court said in part:

The conduct at issue is the Appellants’ purported publication of written and oral statements that Mr. Garner was “an individual with an alleged history of abuse” and that the allegation was credible, while failing to also state that “the allegation[ was] made through an anonymous online portal” and that the Appellants “had not made any inquiry into the veracity of the anonymous report, or that no evidence supported the anonymous report.”  ... [T]he Appellants in this case have not raised any argument that their conduct resulted from the application or interpretation of any religious canon.  Moreover, any argument by the Appellants that the Letter was sent as part of a pastoral disciplinary process is undercut by the concession of the SBC and the Credentials Committee that “[t]he Credentials Committee does not ‘investigate what occurred or judge the culpability of an accused individual,’ but rather only reviews ‘how the SBC church responded to sexual abuse allegations and make[s] recommendations as to whether those actions or inactions are consistent with the SBC’s beliefs regarding sexual abuse.’”

... [C]onsidering the Garners’ claims will not require the trial court to resolve any religious disputes or to rely on religious doctrine. 

The court also concluded that the Tennessee Public Participation Act applies to the lawsuit, but that plaintiffs had carried their burden of proof needed to avoid early dismissal of the case.

Church's Claims Against Parent Body Can Largely Be Decided on Neutral Principles of Secular Law

 In Fifth Avenue United Methodist Church of Wilmington v. North Carolina Conference, Southeastern Jurisdiction, of the United Methodist Church, Inc., (NC App., Dec. 31, 2024), a North Carolina appellate court, in a 2-1 decision, held that the trial court had improperly dismissed a number of claims by a church whose parent body closed its down and seized its property while the church was seeking to disaffiliate from the parent body. The majority said in part:

... Fifth Avenue contends that the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider its property and trust claims because there remains a genuine, secular question of whether it was in a connectional relationship with the UMC concerning the Property.  Fifth Avenue maintains as such because none of the deeds pertaining to the Property refer to the trust clauses contained in the BOD [Book of Discipline], “save one green space parcel conveyed in 1986.”  After carefully considering our precedents resolving similar disputes, we agree....

Fifth Avenue next argues that even if the Property is subject to a trust under the BOD, the trial court erred in dismissing its claim arising from its right to disaffiliate and retain the Property free of the trust clause under paragraph 2553.  Fifth Avenue contends that its breach of contract claim survives dismissal at this stage because it does not require a determination of ecclesiastical issues and can be settled by neutral principles of contract law.  Fifth Avenue maintains that Defendants failed to follow the disaffiliation procedures set out in paragraph 2553 by not allowing a church conference vote within 120 days...  [W]e agree and hold that the trial court committed error by dismissing Fifth Avenue’s breach of contract claim because determining whether Defendants “acted within the scope of their authority” and “observed the organization’s own organic forms and rules is founded in neutral principles of secular law.” ...

Fifth Avenue next submits that the trial court committed error by dismissing its claims for fraud and constructive fraud because they do not require the court to examine or determine ecclesiastical issues.  More precisely, Fifth Avenue contends that whether Defendants colluded to take the Property “under the guise of legitimate action can be determined without delving into the validity of the reasons” provided for closure.  After scrutinizing the record and applicable law, we agree....

 Judge Arrowood filed an opinion dissenting from much of the majority's holdings, saying in part:

I believe the trial court is permitted to assess whether Fifth Avenue is contractually entitled to disaffiliate following closure, as this can be decided under neutral principles of law.  However, I respectfully dissent from the remainder of the majority opinion.  I believe the First Amendment church doctrine warrants dismissal of Fifth Avenue’s claims apart from the breach of contract claim and would affirm the trial court’s judgment in those respects.

Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine Requires Dismissal of Pastor's Allegations of Sham Investigation to Oust Him

 In Weems v. Association of Related Churches, (MD FL, Dec. 19, 2024), a Florida federal district court dismissed on ecclesiastical abstention grounds a suit alleging tortious interference and conspiracy brought by Charles Weems, the former senior pastor and co-founder of Celebration Church and by his wife, the other co-founder. Plaintiffs allege that defendants hatched a plan to oust him as senior pastor because his vision for the church would lead to reduced financial contributions to defendant's church planting activities. Weems alleged that, based on manufactured evidence, the church initiated a sham investigation of him to determine if he had engaged in improper financial practices and had failed to fulfill his duties as Senior Pastor. Targeting of Weems eventually led to his resigning. The court said in part:

... [W]hile Plaintiffs frame their claims as tortious interference and conspiracy, these claims cannot be decided without resolving whether Celebration Church investigated Pastor Weems for legitimate religious reasons, or because of the tortious conduct of Defendants.... Such an inquiry would result in the Court entangling itself in matters of “theological controversy, church discipline, [and] ecclesiastical government,” which the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine squarely prohibits....

Suit Against Church for Negligent Retention of Pastor Can Move Ahead

 In Exum v. St. Andrews-Covenant Presbyterian Church, Inc., (NC App, Nov. 19, 2024), a North Carolina state appellate court held that claims for negligent retention, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and breach of fiduciary duty brought against a church do not need to be dismissed under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine because they can be decided using neutral principles of law. Plaintiff and his wife attended St. Andrews-Covenant Church.  The church's pastor, Derek Macleod, entered a romantic relationship with plaintiff's wife. After plaintiff and his wife were divorced, Plaintiff sued the church and its parent bodies. The court said in part:

Exum alleges that St. Andrews-Covenant was negligent in allowing Macleod’s tortious conduct to occur because St. Andrews-Covenant knew or should have known that Macleod had engaged in similar misconduct in his capacity as a church leader in prior roles. ...

 “[T]here is no necessity for th[is] [C]ourt to interpret or weigh church doctrine in its adjudication of” Exum’s claims premised on alleged negligence in placing and retaining Macleod at St. Andrews-Covenant....  “It follows that the First Amendment is not implicated and does not bar” Exum’s claims against St. Andrews-Covenant....  As the Court in Smith [v. Privette] explained, a contrary holding “would go beyond First Amendment protection and cloak such [religious] bodies with an exclusive immunity greater than that required for the preservation of the principles constitutionally safeguarded.”....

9th Circuit En Banc Hears Fraud Claim Against LDS Church

On Tuesday, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit sitting en banc heard oral arguments in Huntsman v. Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. (Video of full oral arguments.) In the case, James Huntsman, a prominent former member of the LDS Church who had contributed over $2.6 million to it, charged the Church with fraudulently misrepresenting the manner in which funds from tithes would be used. Huntsman says that the Church used tithed funds to finance a shopping mall and bail out of for-profit life insurance company after representing that the funds would not be used for commercial projects. A 3-judge panel of the 9th Circuit rejected the Church's claim that the suit was barred by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. (See prior posting.) Deseret News reports in detail on the oral arguments.

Missouri Appeals Court Refers Question of Church's Duty of Supervision to State Supreme Court

 In Doe v. First Baptist Church of Pierce City, Missouri, (MO App., Sept. 2, 2023), a Missouri appellate court described plaintiff's claim:

Plaintiff asserts that FBC, a Southern Baptist religious institution, had a duty to supervise the youth ministries program members, including herself, while they were transported on a church van as part of that program, that FBC breached this duty by failing to either have or follow a policy to protect minors from sexual abuse, and that Plaintiff was injured as a result by the actions of a fellow youth ministries program member....

The court said that a prior state Supreme Court opinion, Gibson v Brewer, would call for dismissal of the case, saying in part:

Returning to the negligence claims at issue in Gibson, we must first address the negligent hiring/ordination/retention and negligent failure to supervise claims.  Our high court observed that “[q]uestions of hiring, ordaining, and retaining clergy . . . necessarily involve interpretation of religious doctrine, policy, and administration.”...  “Such excessive entanglement between church and state has the effect of inhibiting religion, in violation of the First Amendment” and “would result in an endorsement of religion, by approving one model for church hiring, ordination, and retention of clergy.”... Similarly ... “[a]djudicating the reasonableness of a church’s supervision of a cleric—what the church ‘should know’—requires inquiry into religious doctrine” and, as with the negligent hiring/ordination/retention claim, “would create an excessive entanglement, inhibit religion, and result in the endorsement of one model of supervision.” 

The court concluded, however:

We would affirm the summary judgment of the circuit court, but due to the general interest and importance of the issues on appeal, we transfer the case to the Supreme Court of Missouri pursuant to Rule 83.02.

Former Priest's Defamation Claim Dismissed Under Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine

In Episcopal Diocese of Southern Virginia v. Marshall, (VA App., July 16, 2024), a Virginia state appellate court held that a defamation per se claim by a former Episcopalian priest against a bishop who removed him from the ministry should be dismissed under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. The former priest, Robert Marshall, allegedly made improper comments to a female employee. The court said in part:

We find that the defamation claim is inextricably intertwined with the disciplinary proceedings that led to the priest’s ouster.  In addition, the trier of fact would have to decide if the priest committed “sexual misconduct” within the meaning of canon law, which proscribes a broader swath of conduct than secular law....

Marshall claims that the bishop falsely stated that the investigator had “determined that the allegations had merit.” ... He says that the bishop falsely stated that Marshall had admitted to the improper conduct....  He pleads that Bishop Haynes also lied when she claimed that the church had followed the process required under ecclesiastical law....

[A]lthough Marshall denies that he wants a secular court to undo his defrocking, his defamation claim is so intertwined with the bishop’s deposing him as a priest that the defamation claim cannot be litigated without entangling the court in a religious dispute.  When a priest who has been fired sues the church and its leadership raising tort claims that cannot be unscrambled from the church’s decision to fire him, “the First Amendment has struck the balance for us.” ...  Churches have an overarching interest “in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission.” ... In order for a church to remain “free to choose those who will guide it on its way,” ... such tort claims must sometimes give way. 

... The trial court erred in concluding that Marshall’s claim for defamation per se against Bishop Haynes could be resolved on secular principles...