Imam's Contract and Defamation Claims Dismissed on Ecclesiastical Abstention Grounds

In Ahmed v. American Muslim Diversity Association, (MI App., Sept. 11, 2026), a Michigan state appellate court upheld the dismissal on ecclesiastical abstention grounds of defamation, breach of contract and related claims filed by an assistant Imam against his mosque and its board of trustees. The court said in part:

According to Ahmed, beginning in 2021 the individual defendants engaged in a “smear campaign” against him by falsely accusing him of lying while performing his duties as a religious leader and refusing to lead certain prayers.  He also alleged that defendants disparaged his character by discussing his recent divorce and the allegations of domestic violence that had been made against him....

The trial court correctly determined that resolution of Ahmed’s breach-of-contract claim would require the court to delve into ecclesiastical matters.  The contract stated that the board of trustees reserved the right to cancel the contract “if there are any violation [sic] in contractual agreement, any activities against principles of Islam, or any activity subversive to the mission and objective of AMDA by the Qa’ari Imam as determined by the Board of Trustees.”  Although the board of trustees determined the domestic-violence allegations could not be substantiated, it may have also determined that Ahmed violated the contract or engaged in activity contrary to the principles of Islam or subversive to AMDA’s mission and objective.  The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine precluded the trial court from examining and second-guessing the decision of the board of trustees that it would be best for AMDA if Ahmed no longer served as an assistant Imam....

... Ahmed alleged that defendants falsely stated he was not so qualified and lacked the character required and expected of an assistant Imam.  ... [T]his Court will not second-guess a religious entity’s investigation and evaluation of allegations involving its leaders or its method of communicating matters relevant to such allegations.  Because Ahmed’s intentional infliction of emotional distress and concert of action claims also involve evaluating defendants’ decisions and method of reaching their decisions, those claims fail for the same reasons.  Accordingly, the trial court did not err by granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition with respect to Ahmed’s tort claims.

Defamation Action Should Be Dismissed on Ecclesiastical Abstention Grounds

In In re Gateway Church, (TX App., Aug. 19, 2026), a Texas state appellate court held that a state trial court should have dismissed on ecclesiastical abstention grounds. a defamation suit that was brought against a church and church leadership. At issue are statements that church leaders made about its investigation into charges that its then-pastor sexually abused a 12-year-old girl 30 years previously while he was pastor at another church. According to the court:

Gateway’s leadership issued a communication to church staff addressing the allegations and providing information about Morris’ past misconduct and the church’s understanding of events. The statement ... was intended to “empower” staff concerning a response should they receive any inquiries....

Although the communication was directed to staff, portions of it were later circulated on social media and reported in the news media. The mandamus record does not establish how the communication became public....

.... The [ecclesiastical abstention] doctrine prohibits civil courts from delving into ecclesiastical matters or a plaintiff’s claims that are inextricably intertwined with matters of doctrine or church governance.... Because we find that real parties’ claims are inextricably intertwined with the church’s investigation of Morris’ misconduct, the doctrine deprives the trial court of jurisdiction....

Gateway’s investigation into Morris (or, for that matter, lack of investigation if none was done prior to the communication) is inherently ecclesiastical. Gateway, through its leadership, was communicating with staff about what the church and elders knew about their senior executive pastor and events that transpired some three decades ago. As relators note in their petition, the challenged statements were made for a religious purpose, “shepherding the Gateway congregation in accordance with the dictates of Scripture.”...

... Claims related to a church’s publication or communication of the results of its own investigation cannot be severed from the church’s policy to investigate its clergy....

...  Although real parties argue that establishing knowledge can be a secular fact question in a defamation case, determining what Gateway and its leaders knew, and how they arrived at that understanding, would necessarily involve probing internal church deliberations and processes. That inquiry is inextricably intertwined with ecclesiastical matters and is therefore prohibited....

KERA News reports on the decision.

Exorcist Priest's Defamation Suit May Move Ahead

In Martins v. Romero, (ED MI, Aug. 21, 2026), a Michigan federal district court refused to dismiss a suit by a Catholic priest against a podcaster and a frequent guest on the podcast, alleging that their podcasts defamed him and cast his exorcism ministry in a false light by falsely claiming that Martins was not an exorcist. On one episode, defendant made the claim by reading only part of an email from Fr. Martins religious order, giving the false impression that Martins had not been authorized to perform exorcisms.

Defendants argue that the issue of whether Plaintiff is an exorcist raises a “substantial danger that the State will become entangled in essentially religious controversies....

Plaintiff contends, on the other hand, that this case does not involve church doctrine and merely involves false statements of fact, made with actual malice....

... [T]he court need only resolve whether Defendants’ statements that Plaintiff’s Order said he was not an exorcist were untrue and thus defamatory.  Whether Fr. Martins is qualified under Catholic doctrine as an exorcist is irrelevant to this inquiry.  Thus, the court finds that at this stage of the proceeding, the affirmative defense of the ecclesiastical [abstention] doctrine does not bar Plaintiff’s claims....

Defendants argue that they had no obligation to read a sentence in an email to which they objected.  However, Defendants’ affirmative statements appear to have crossed the line between an opinion that Fr. Martins is not an exorcist to statements of fact that the email from his own Order says that he is not an exorcist.  And according to the Complaint, such statements are demonstrably false based on the email itself, which does not say that Fr. Martins is not an exorcist.  

For these reasons, the court concludes that the alleged defamatory statements at issue are not opinions protected by the First Amendment.  Accordingly, dismissal on this basis is not appropriate....

(See prior related posting.)

[Thanks to Eugene Volokh via Religionlaw for the lead.] 

2nd Circuit: Church Autonomy Doctrine Bars Defamation Suit Against Church Leaders by Former Priest

In Belya v. Kapral, (2d Cir., Aug. 18, 2026), a defrocked priest in the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR) sued church leaders and church entities for defamation. He claimed that defendants wrongly accused him of forging three letters from church leaders. The letters stated that Belya had been elected Bishop of Miami. Defendants say that no such election took place. The court said in part:

 The church autonomy doctrine bars Belya’s claims in at least two respects. First, Belya’s claims interfere with ROCOR’s autonomy in selecting, supervising, and terminating its clergy. Second, evaluating the merits of Belya’s claims would impermissibly require a jury to address numerous questions regarding ROCOR’s governance and protocols for selecting its bishops....

Suit Claims Head of Georgian Orthodox Church in North America Is Attempting To Wrongfully Take Property of 3 Monasteries

Suit was filed last week in a New York federal district court against the presiding bishop of the Georgian Orthodox Church in North America by three Georgian Orthodox monasteries-- two in Maryland and one in Oklahoma. The abbots who head the monasteries are also plaintiffs. They contend that the bishop (Bishop Saba) engaged in a series of actions, including defamation of two abbots, designed to take for himself the properties of the three monasteries. The complaint (full text) in Hanson v. Intskirveli, (SD NY, filed 8/14/2026), alleges in part:

4. The Defendants began their public campaign to discredit and besmirch the Monastic Plaintiffs immediately after the Monastic Plaintiffs voiced conscientious objections to certain actions that Bishop Saba had taken, including his proposal to enact a church constitution that would facilitate seizing for himself any and all monastic property.  

5. The campaign against Monastic Plaintiffs featured the Defendants falsely declaring that the Monastic Plaintiffs had been deposed and laicized (i.e., ... that Abbot Christophoros and Abbot Athanasios were to be stripped of their priestly and monastic status). Such sanctions are among the most severe and stigmatizing in the Orthodox community. 

6. The Defendants knew their declarations were false because they knew such declarations were baseless....

8....   Bishop Saba never suspended either abbot from conducting their clerical duties; nor did he appoint substitutes for them. Yet, despite knowing that the process was unsound, Bishop Saba ...purported, through broadly publicized declarations, to laicize Abbot Christophoros and Abbot Athanasios....

10. The Defendants’ defamatory acts are part of a larger course of conduct involving Bishop Saba’s attempts to control and claim title to the Monastery Plaintiffs’ property. Before the defamatory campaign, Bishop Saba drafted and advocated for language that would ultimately form Article 21.7 of GAOCNA’s constitution. Article 21.7 provides that, upon an alleged “heresy, schism, or defection, . . . title, management, administration and control” of the property of an affected monastery “shall immediately revert to the Diocesan Bishop.”....

12. The Plaintiffs dispute that Article 21.7 gives Bishop Saba any right to claim title over the Monastery Plaintiffs’ property...  A declaration is necessary to resolve that present property dispute and prevent Bishop Saba from unlawfully seizing the Monastery Plaintiffs’ property. 

13. Through this action, the Plaintiffs seek redress for the Defendants’ false, defamatory, and misleading statements, a declaration that Bishop Saba has no right to claim title to their property under Article 21.7 of GAOCNA’s constitution, and justice for the profound injuries the Defendants have inflicted upon them....

[Thanks to Eugene Volokh via Reigionlaw for the lead.]

Pastor's Suit for Breach of Contract and Defamation Is Dismissed Under Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine

 In Lovelace v. Mt. Zion Baptist Church, (MI App., July 15, 2026), a Michigan state appellate court, invoking the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, affirmed a trial court's dismissal of contract and defamation claims by a pastor whose employment contract was cancelled by a vote of church members. The court said in part:

We first address plaintiff’s ... theory ... that the church breached the agreement by terminating him for actions he was contractually permitted to take.  This theory would require a civil court to decide whether church leadership correctly concluded that plaintiff had “abused his authority”....  That inquiry would require the court to decide questions of church governance and authority.  “Under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, apparently derived from both First Amendment religion clauses, civil courts may not redetermine the correctness of ... some decision relating to government of the religious polity.”...

Here, plaintiff asks us to determine that the church and its leadership exceeded their authority when they called the April 2022 meetings to discuss his future as senior pastor and invited guest pastors to oversee those meeting....

Under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, a civil court may not decide those questions because it would generally be inconsistent with religious liberty for civil courts to “inquire into the regularity of the proceedings of church tribunals having cognizance of such matters.... 

... [E]ven the seemingly straightforward question whether the termination process in plaintiff’s employment agreement was followed cannot be answered here through neutral legal principles without infringing on the religious liberty of the church and its members....

... [P]laintiff’s tortious-interference claim fails because he cannot establish that the individual defendants were third parties to the employment agreement.  And even if plaintiff could satisfy that threshold requirement, adjudicating the breach and justification elements of his claim would require the resolution of ecclesiastical questions...

Plaintiff’s defamation theory is that the individual defendants stated that he lacked authority to access the church’s bank accounts, and that this statement was false because his employment agreement gave him broad authority over the church’s spiritual and secular affairs....

For the statement to be actionable, however, a civil court would have to determine that it was false.... The statement ... would be provable as false only if the trial court parsed the agreement and determined which powers belonged to the senior pastor.

Jews for Jesus' Anti-SLAPP Motion in Defamation Case Fails

 In Amitay v. Jews for Jesus, (CA App., May 28, 2026), a California state appellate court held that a defamation claims against Jews for Jesus should not be dismissed under California's anti-SLAPP law because the claim at least has minimal merit. The court describes plaintiff's claims in part:

In December 2023, JFJ posted on its social media pages, including on Facebook and Instagram, a blurred photograph of an Israeli soldier wearing a yarmulke.  Above the photograph was the following text attributed to “Nachman”: “ ‘Thank you for leaving at my home a copy of the New Testament.  I look forward to reading it when I return home from the war’ -- Nachman, a young Haredi soldier.”

Amitay filed a complaint against JFJ....  He alleged that the photographs posted by JFJ were photographs of him, that they had been posted without his consent, and that defendant had defamed him, put him in a false light, and inflicted emotional distress.  Amitay alleged that he was a Jewish Orthodox rabbi who had “dedicated his life to the study of the Jewish Orthodox faith and committed many years studying to become a rabbi”....  He had finally gotten a job teaching at an institution in Israel where he had worked for two years, a position he described as his “dream job.”  His job “suddenly came to an end as he was terminated . . . due to an egregious act by JFJ,”.... 

Amitay alleged that when his employer “saw the pictures posted online,” they “expressly stated that his termination was due to the posts online of him supporting JFJ, and that they could not condone or be associated with someone involved with JFJ or their views.” ...

See prior related posting.  [Thanks to Eugene Volokh via Religionlaw for the lead.]

California Court Hears Arguments in Defamation Suit Against Jews for Jesus

On May 15, the California state Court of Appeals, First Appellate District heard oral arguments in Amitay v. Jews for Jesus (video of full oral arguments). Liberty Counsel, which represents Jews for Jesus, describes the case:

Following the attacks on October 7, 2023, Jews for Jesus distributed Bibles to Israeli soldiers to provide comfort and support. On its Facebook page, Jews for Jesus used a stock photo of an Israeli soldier from a popular website that provides millions of stock photographs under a worldwide copyright license to download, modify, and use for free. Jews for Jesus blurred the face, never used Amitay’s name, and even used the pseudonymous name “Nachman” in the photo’s caption. Jews for Jesus had no prior knowledge of Amitay.

Amitay now says that person in the blurred photo was him, although he has presented no proof of where he saw the photo. Despite the blurred face and never being named, Amitay maintains that the photo created such a false impression of him that it caused his employer to terminate him from his “dream” teaching job.

Liberty Counsel argues in its reply brief that holding Jews for Jesus liable for a religious community’s misunderstanding of the facts, and for its “overreaction” and “theological hostility” to a Christian ministry would be an improper remedy for a “regrettable” situation. 

 Amitay filed the lawsuit on Christmas Eve 2024 seeking no less than $5 million in punitive damages.... 

At issue in this appeal is whether the case should be dismissed under California's anti-SLAPP law. The trial court refused to dismiss plaintiff's defamation, false light, and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. (Trial Court's June 23, 2025 Order [scroll to Exhibit A]).

Pastors' Defamation Suit Barred by Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine

In Nieto v. Great Bridge Presbyterian Church, Inc., (VA App., March 31, 2026), a Virginia state appellate court held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine required dismissal of a defamation suit brought by two pastors against the church that they formerly led. The complaint also alleged tortious interference with plaintiffs' pastoral relationship with the congregation. The claims grew out of a letter that was emailed to 750 persons after plaintiffs were dismissed from their pastoral relationship with their congregation.

The court said in part:

Here, the appellants base their defamation claims on a list of statements that can be categorized as either 1) purported mismanagement of funds or 2) the intimidation and shunning of “dissenters” or other members of the congregation.  All statements in each category are barred from civil-court review because of the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine....

Each of these statements would require us to evaluate and determine the appropriate financial management standard for pastors serving as leaders in the Presbyterian denomination and whether and to what extent the appellants may have breached that standard as determined by the denomination.... Great Bridge is a religious institution established as a local church by the Presbyterian denomination and therefore is subject to the religious denomination’s doctrinal and organizational documents, including certain policies and beliefs that pertain to proper church order, practices, governance, and leadership. ...

Without first determining the proper method that a pastor serving a Presbyterian church should responsibly exercise when administering the finances of a Presbyterian church, we cannot determine whether the statements regarding how the appellants allegedly misused that authority are actionable.  And a secular judicial body determining the fitness and qualifications of the office of a pastor who governs a church would violate that church’s “autonomy with respect to internal management decisions that are essential to the institution’s central mission.”...

Similarly, we cannot use neutral principles of law to discern whether the statements about the intimidation and shunning of “dissenters” or other members of the congregation are actionable....

Priest Brings Defamation Action Against Podcasters Who Questioned His Credentials as an Exorcist

Suit was filed this week in a Michigan federal district court in an unusual battle between a Catholic priest and rival podcasters. The complaint (full text) in Martins v. Romero, (ED MI, filed 11/17/2025), alleges in part:

1. This is a defamation and false light action stemming from false and misleading statements published on the Jesus 911 podcast on the November 20th, November 27th, and December 4th, 2024 episodes.   

2. The Defendants intentionally or recklessly invited public critique and scrutiny over Plaintiff’s title as an exorcist by repeatedly asserting that the Plaintiff is not an exorcist. The Defendants’ statements have perpetuated a narrative that undermines the Plaintiff’s credibility....

43. The Exorcist Files is a podcast co-created and co-hosted by Ryan Bethea and Fr. Martins....

44. The Exorcist Files podcast aired its first episode on January 25, 2023, and currently streams on large podcast platforms such as Spotify and Apple Music.  

45. Due to the popularity of the podcast, Fr. Martins published a book, also titled The Exorcist Files, where he provides a comprehensive view of the 2,000-year-old Catholic ministry of exorcism, examining spiritual dangers lurking in modern society, to help readers understand how to remain free from their influence and control. The Exorcist Files book was published on November 19, 2024, and its release was widely anticipated.   

46. Upon information and belief, the Defendants had identified Fr. Martins as a competitor in the popular niche of exorcism themed television, radio, podcast, and books. They timed the release of their podcasts to destroy Fr. Martin’s reputation and to diminish the sales of Fr. Martins’ book....

[Thanks to Eugene Volokh via Religionlaw for the lead] 

Award of Attorney's Fees Not Barred by Church Autonomy Doctrine

In Coronado-Arrascue v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Colorado Springs, (CO App., Nov. 13, 2025), a Colorado state appellate court held that the dismissal on church autonomy grounds of a priest's defamation suit against his former diocese does not preclude the award of attorney's fees by the court to the Diocese. The court said in part:

[Plaintiff] contends that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the award.  In support of this contention, he reasons that because the court determined that the church autonomy doctrine divested it of subject matter jurisdiction to consider the substance of his claims, it follows that the church autonomy doctrine also divested the court of subject matter jurisdiction to consider the Diocese’s request for an award of fees and costs.  Second, Coronado-Arrascue contends that resolving the Diocese’s request for fees and costs would require the court to become “excessively entangled” with religion in violation of the church autonomy doctrine.  We reject both contentions....

... [T]he unambiguous language of section 13-17-201 and section 13-16-113(2) provides that an award of fees and costs is mandatory regardless of whether a complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  ...

 So, regardless of the court’s decision on the merits of Coronado-Arrascue’s claims, its assessment of whether there was a basis to award the Diocese its fees and costs was a separate determination.

... [I]t wasn’t necessary, as Coronado-Arrascue claims, for the court to “probe internal ecclesiastical matters” to determine whether there was a basis to award fees and costs.  Rather, the court was only required to examine the face of his complaint to determine whether the substance of Coronado-Arrascue’s claims were pleaded in tort.

[Thanks to John Melcon for the lead.]

Priest's Defamation Suit Dismissed on Ecclesiastical Abstention Grounds

In Catholic Diocese of Richmond v. Smalls, (VA App, Nov. 5, 2025), a Virginia state appellate court dismissed on ecclesiastical abstention grounds a defamation suit by a priest serving in the Diocese of Belize.  The Diocese of Richmond included plaintiff's name on a list of priests who had credible and substantiated allegation of sexual abuse of a minor.  The allegations against plaintiff occurred while he was a seminarian in the Richmond Diocese. The court said in part:

It is clear that the definition used to determine that there was a credible and substantiated allegation against Smalls of sexual abuse involving a minor includes references to religious precepts.  The definition discusses sexual abuse in terms of a violation of the Sixth Commandment.  It also provides that clergy who possessed, acquired, or distributed “pornographic images of minors under the age of fourteen” committed sexual abuse, but does not define “pornographic images.”  But if there is doubt as to whether such an offense has occurred, bishops are directed to reference writings of moral theologians.  Smalls’s defamation claim thus rests on the falsity of a statement that is based on the application of a specific religious definition of sexual abuse.  “[C]ivil courts cannot adjudicate defamation claims when the truth of the statements in question turns on ecclesiastical law.” ...

Because Smalls’s claim for defamation cannot be resolved on neutral secular principles, the circuit court was without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case....

Ministerial Exception Applies to Most Claims by Unitarian Minister

In Rohde v. Unitarian Universalist Association, (ED PA, July 11, 2025), a Pennsylvania federal district court dismissed on ministerial exception grounds a retired Unitarian minister's claims of defamation, false light, tortious interference with contract claims as well as her claim that her contract was breached by defendant's decision to remove her from Fellowship and revoke her ministerial credentials. According to the court:

In April 2021, three other Unitarian Universalist ministers filed a complaint against Rev. Rohde with the Association and claimed that she had committed “ministerial misconduct” based on social media interactions the three ministers had with her.... The ministers’ complaint alleged that Rev. Rohde “engaged in ‘defamation’ of colleagues, breaking of ‘confidentiality,’ and other unspecified ‘professional conduct’ violations.”... 

The Committee’s “Executive Committee” determined that Rev. Rohde had committed “ministerial misconduct” and recommended that the full Committee remove her from Fellowship and revoke her ministerial credentials.... After a hearing on October 2, 2022, the Committee voted to remove Rev. Rohde from Fellowship and to revoke her ministerial credentials....

The question of whether Rev. Rohde in fact committed ministerial misconduct and violated ministerial ethics would involve the Court in measuring Rev. Rohde’s conduct against church doctrine and second-guessing the Association’s disciplinary processes for ministers.   The First Amendment prohibits the Court from weighing in on such issues....

However, the court held that the ministerial exception doctrine did not bar plaintiff's claim for payment of her retirement benefits, saying in part:

... [T]he Court can resolve both Rev. Rohde’s breach of contract claim and promissory estoppel claim without analyzing doctrine or impacting the Association’s ability to choose its ministers.  Rev. Rohde does not allege—and the Association’s bylaws and the Committee’s rules and policies do not show—that she was required to remain in Fellowship after retiring to continue receiving her “past earned” benefits.... Therefore, the ministerial exception does not bar Rev. Rohde’s breach of contract or promissory estoppel claims against the Pension Society at this stage.

Court Refuses to Dismiss Megachurch Pastor's Defamation Suit Against Sex Offender

In Jakes v. Youngblood, (WD PA, April 25, 2025), a Pennsylvania federal district court refused to dismiss under Pennsylvania's anti-SLAPP law a defamation suit brought by megachurch pastor T.D. Jakes against convicted sex offender Duane Youngblood.  Jakes sued after Youngblood in a podcast accused Jakes of grooming and sexually abusing him some 40 years earlier when Youngblood was 18 to 19 years old. Anti-SLAPP laws are designed to allow rapid dismissal of suits filed to suppress protected speech. The court, applying the Erie doctrine, held that the Pennsylvania anti-SLAPP law is procedural and thus does not apply to diversity cases in federal court. Instead, dismissal is governed by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 12 and 56.  The court said in part:

The Court does not believe that a procedural rule protecting a substantive right is, by virtue of the right it is protecting, transformed into a substantive law. The statute exists to spare those who exercise their free speech rights from unwarranted and harassing litigation. However, §8340.15 pursues this policy goal through procedural means.

Christian Post reports on the decision.

Defamation Suit by Russian Orthodox Church Priest Dismissed Under Church Autonomy Doctrine

 In Belya v. Kapral, (SD NY, March 31, 2025), a New York federal district court dismissed a defamation suit brought by a former priest in the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia. According to the court:

Plaintiff Alexander Belya was once a priest in the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR for short). During his time with ROCOR, Belya led one of the order’s churches in Miami. In 2019, word came down from Moscow that Belya had been elevated to Bishop of Miami, an announcement that came as a surprise to ROCOR’s senior clergy. They hadn’t elected Belya, a necessary step in the elevation of any American bishop. Sensing foul play, they investigated and sent a letter to the Synod—the executive committee of ROCOR’s highest leadership council— about the situation. The letter informed the Synod that Belya’s election never happened and that two prior letters to Moscow, which purported to confirm Belya’s election, were “irregular” and lacked the usual markers of sacred church communications.  

News of the ROCOR letter got out and went viral in the religious press. The reports accused Belya of old-fashioned forgery. With his reputation ruined, Belya is now suing everyone who drafted and signed the ROCOR letter, as well as ROCOR itself. Belya says the letter defamed him by implying that he forged the two earlier letters about his election to bishop, an allegation that the religious press picked up and ran with....

First, putting aside the constitutional issues that dominate the parties’ briefing, Belya’s claims fail on routine state-law grounds. Second, even if Belya’s claims could otherwise proceed, a trial in this case would drag the Court and jury into matters of faith, spiritual doctrine, and internal church governance—precisely what the church-autonomy doctrine is designed to prevent.

[Thanks to Eugene Volokh via Religionlaw for the lead.]

Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine Does Not Apply To Pastor's Defamation Suit

In Garner v. Southern Baptist Convention, (TN App., Jan. 8. 2025), a Tennessee state appellate court held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not apply to a defamation suit brought by a Baptist pastor against the Southern Baptist Convention and various of its officials and staff. At issue are oral conversations and a letter from an SBC staff member suggesting that allegations of sexual misconduct had been made against Preston Garner, a pastor at Everett Hills Baptist Church. The court said in part:

The conduct at issue is the Appellants’ purported publication of written and oral statements that Mr. Garner was “an individual with an alleged history of abuse” and that the allegation was credible, while failing to also state that “the allegation[ was] made through an anonymous online portal” and that the Appellants “had not made any inquiry into the veracity of the anonymous report, or that no evidence supported the anonymous report.”  ... [T]he Appellants in this case have not raised any argument that their conduct resulted from the application or interpretation of any religious canon.  Moreover, any argument by the Appellants that the Letter was sent as part of a pastoral disciplinary process is undercut by the concession of the SBC and the Credentials Committee that “[t]he Credentials Committee does not ‘investigate what occurred or judge the culpability of an accused individual,’ but rather only reviews ‘how the SBC church responded to sexual abuse allegations and make[s] recommendations as to whether those actions or inactions are consistent with the SBC’s beliefs regarding sexual abuse.’”

... [C]onsidering the Garners’ claims will not require the trial court to resolve any religious disputes or to rely on religious doctrine. 

The court also concluded that the Tennessee Public Participation Act applies to the lawsuit, but that plaintiffs had carried their burden of proof needed to avoid early dismissal of the case.

2nd Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Louis Farrakhan's Suit Against ADL

In Farrakhan v. Anti-Defamation League, (2nd Cir., Jan. 3, 2025), the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought against the Anti-Defamation League by Minister Louis Farrakhan and the Nation of Islam that alleged free speech and defamation claims. Upholding the trial court's dismissal of the First Amendment claims for lack of standing, the court said in part:

To the extent plaintiffs assert claims against defendants because third parties—Morgan State University and Vimeo—denied or rescinded plaintiffs’ access to speech platforms, those alleged First Amendment injuries are not fairly traceable to the defendants’ actions....

Plaintiffs’ remaining First Amendment claims do not state any injuries in fact....

As to the defamation claims, the court said in part:

Plaintiffs challenge a number of defendants’ statements that label plaintiffs in various ways as “anti-Semitic.”  Under New York law, these statements are nonactionable opinions....

Plaintiffs also challenge statements made by defendants interpreting Farrakhan’s own statements.  The challenged statements were either accompanied by disclosures of Farrakhan’s actual statements or were based on Farrakhan’s statements that were widely reported by the media....

Finally, plaintiffs challenge certain of defendants’ factual statements.  On de novo review, we agree with the district court that the SAC fails to sufficiently allege the falsity of those statements.  

Jonathan Turley reports on the decision.

Federal Court Refuses to Enjoin Distribution of Notice from Rabbinical Court

In Esses v. Rosen, (ED NY, Oct. 15, 2024), a New York federal district court refused to issue a preliminary injunction barring defendants from disseminating in plaintiff's neighborhood a rabbinical court's notice (a sieruv) that plaintiff has failed to respond to a summons from the rabbinical court. Plaintiff also asked that the seiruv be taken down or removed from places where it had been posted. Plaintiff alleged claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The court said in part:

While plaintiff does not dispute that she brought the claims in this case before a secular court rather than a religious one, she suggests that the seiruv is defamatory because it indicates that her doing so was “improper[].”  That statement is nowhere contained in the seiruv itself.  But even if the seiruv is read to convey that implication through its reference to plaintiff’s civil filing, the First Amendment would prevent this Court from second-guessing a religious court’s view of impropriety. ... 

Plaintiff next claims that the instructional document distributed with the seiruv is defamatory because it falsely conveys “that the rabbis of the beth din were encouraging social ostracism and shaming in this case.” ... In any event, the Establishment Clause would preclude this Court from finding defamation on that ground.  To decide whether the instructional document was true or false in its asserted characterization of plaintiff’s seiruv, the Court would be “called upon to inquire into the rules and customs governing rabbinical courts as they are utilized in the Orthodox Jewish religion,”

[Thanks to Volokh Conspiracy for the lead.]

PA Supreme Court: Yard Signs Responding to Neighbors' Antisemitism Protected by Pennsylvania Constitution

In a 4-2 decision in Oberholzer v. Galapo, (PA Sup. Ct., Aug. 20, 2024), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, relying on the broad free speech protections in Art. I, Sec. 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, dissolved an injunction issued by a trial court in an unusual dispute between neighbors. As described by Justice Dougherty's majority opinion:

In November 2014, a brewing feud between the neighbors over landscaping issues reached a boiling point after Dr. Galapo confronted Mr. Oberholzer about a resurveyed property line and Mrs. Oberholzer responded by calling him a “fucking Jew.”  This prompted the Galapos in June 2015 to erect the first of many signs primarily displaying anti-hate and anti-racist messages “along the back tree-line directly abutting [the Oberholzers’] property line, pointed directly at [the Oberholzers’] house, and in direct sight of [other] neighbors’ houses.” ...  All told, the Galapos posted twenty-three signs over a years-long span, during which the neighbors continued to quarrel over other minor nuisances.

Among other things, the Oberholzers sued claiming the signs placed them in a false light. The majority concluded:

We hold the Galapos engaged in protected speech when they posted in their own yard stationary signs decrying hatred and racism.  We further hold the Oberholzers failed to prove that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner by the Galapos’ pure residential speech.  As such, Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and this Court’s precedents precluded the trial court from enjoining the signs, regardless of the nature of the torts alleged.  The injunction imposed an improper prior restraint on speech in violation of Article I, Section 7.

Justice Wecht filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

The Galapos argue that the present injunction violates the no-injunction rule, that it is an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech, and that it fails strict scrutiny.  These arguments are unpersuasive.  The no-injunction rule does not exist in Pennsylvania.  Moreover, even if it did exist, it would not apply here because the equity court did not purport to enjoin defamatory speech.... The argument that the injunction constitutes a prior restraint is also mistaken because the injunction does not restrict speech in advance of its publication.  Finally, the injunction withstands application of strict scrutiny because it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.

Justice Brobson also filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

I would conclude that the trial courts of this Commonwealth have the authority to enjoin residential speech protected by Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution that rises to the level of a private nuisance and disrupts the quiet enjoyment of a neighbor’s home.  I would further find that the Injunction is content neutral, furthers the Commonwealth’s significant interest in protecting the privacy and quiet enjoyment of the Oberholzers’ home, and burdens no more of the Galapos’ speech than necessary to protect the Oberholzers’ right to residential privacy.

AP reports on the decision.

Nebraska Supreme Court Upholds Dismissal of Priest's Suit Against Archdiocese

 In Syring v. Archdiocese of Omaha, (NE Sup. Ct., July 26, 2024), the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of defamation, infliction of mental distress, interference with prospective employment and breach of fiduciary duty claims by a Catholic priest against his Archdiocese.  The priest was listed on an Archdiocese website that named those against whom there had been allegations of misconduct or abuse of a minor. He was forced to resign his ministry position and the Archdiocese refused to approve his serving as a hospital chaplain. The court held that the Archdiocese's action did not meet the standard for outrageous conduct needed to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. It went on the dismiss various of plaintiff's claims on the basis of the ministerial exception doctrine.  The court said in part:

Syring’s claims asserted that the Archdiocese “falsely impute[d] unfitness to preform [sic] duties of employment, and prejudice[d] [Syring] in his profession or trade.” The other claims were premised upon Syring’s assertion that the Archdiocese owed him fiduciary duties. For example, the complaint identified a purported breach of a fiduciary duty in the Archdiocese’s “requiring [Syring’s] resignation, and omitting to advise him of his right to counsel, both civil and canonical.”

We cannot uphold Syring’s claims without interfering with the internal governance of the church, or depriving the church of control, over the selection of its ministers. The claims— based on the conversation between officials of a Catholic archdiocese and a hospital operated by a Catholic religious order regarding permission for Syring to serve as a chaplain, Syring’s fitness to perform the duties of his employment, and the requiring of Syring’s resignation from that employment— lie at the heart of the ministerial exception articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court. The district court did not err in dismissing these claims.